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'It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have
lightened the day's toil of any human being'
- John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 1888.
'What', asked the French lecturer on the Science of Metals and Mining,
'is the most important thing to come out of a coal-mine?'
'Coal', replied the students.
'No', said the lecturer, Frederic Le Play, 'the most important thing is
the coal-miner'.
- F.D. Gould 'Le Play', Sociological Review, (1927)
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the suggestion that dramatic changes are occurring
in the organisation of work and production, and that these amount to
the emergence of a new 'post-Fordist' industrial paradigm. In
particular, the claim that introduction of new forms of
microelectronic-based technologies is leading to the emergence of new
forms of skilled work, and that, as a result, old forms of industrial
conflict are ameliorated, is analysed. The value of this conceptualisation
of contemporary workplace change is questioned. A critique of the
'post-Fordist' argument is offered. This stresses: that new tendencies
in the organisation of work can be discerned but that generally these
are occurring alongside enduring forms of hierarchy and control; that
the new forms of work and production represent a reformulation of
traditional capitalist concerns of efficiency and control through the
extension of 'flow principles'; and that the pattern of change in reality
is highly uneven and spatially differentiated. An examination of the
pattern of workplace restructuring in contemporary Britain reveals that
it owed little to the unfolding of a new, universal industrial paradigm,
and more to a peculiar concern with the alleged 'restrictive practices' of
labour. Significant changes in work and industrial relations are
acknowledged to have occurred, but are seen as owing less to the
inherent properties of new technology than to historically developed
pattern of social conflict and compromise. The study then offers more
substantial evidence of the nature of workplace change through a
case-study of the nationalised British coal industry. The post-war
process of mechanisation and the rationalisation of work and industrial
relations is analysed. It is argued that in the 1970s a strategy of
technical change was initiated in which microelectronic-based
technologies were important. The impact of this restructuring on two
coalfields - the North East and Selby - is examined. Although
centrally-determined, the pattern of restructuring was highly uneven
and, in each case, was overlain by a concern with alleged labour
indiscipline. Thus restructuring owed as much to dominant perceptions
of the British industrial problem, as did it did to the demands of new
technology.
11
CONTENTS
Page
Frontpiece	 1.
Abstract	 1]
Contents	 iii
Acknowlegments	 iv
List of Tables	 vi
List of Figures	 vii
Chapter One:	 Introduction	 1
Chapter Two: A New Paradigm of Work Organisation
and Technology?	 19
Chapter Three: Post-Fordist Britain?	 100
Chapter Four: Technical Change and the Transformation
of Work in the British coal industry	 151
Chapter Five: The North East: 'The jewel
in British Coal's Crown'?	 222
Chapter Six:	 Selby: a post-Fordist coalmine?
	 297
Chapter Seven: Conclusion.	 363
Appendix One: Method
	 386
Bibiliography	 401
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S
I should like to thank Ash Amin who supervised the preparation of this
thesis and the research on which it is based. I have greatly valued
his advice, support and friendship over the past few years. Above all
he persuaded me I could do it.
Others in the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies have
offered advice and support and have made it a pleasant place in which
to work and study. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude
to Neil Turnbull for discussing ideas, reading various papers and
drafts and for company at Roker Park. Thanks also to all the
footballers for providing a weekly respite from the treadmill: the boys
done good.
Beyond CURDS, many others assisted me in the conduct of my
research. Jonathan Renouf shared his knowledge of the Durham miners
and read many parts of the thesis in draft. During the course of the
fieldwork I received help from members and officials of the North East
NUM: Bill Etherington took an interest in the study and provided
important statistical data which greatly helped in the preparation of
Chapter Five; Howard Linklater at Westoe and Dave Temple at Murton
gave their time and discussed issues at the outset of the research when
my ignorance of mining matters was complete; Ross Forbes was
irrepressible and offered help and welcome distraction in equal measure.
My knowledge of the pre-powerloading era was greatly advanced
through discussions with Gus Tomaney and especially his guided tours
iv
of Woody Close. The cooperation of Jon Winterton helped to facilitate
the Selby case study and some of the interviews on which Chapter Six
is partly based were conducted jointly. I am grateful also to Martin
Longman, Head of Services, British Coal Selby Group for providing
data, answering queries and showing me Stillingfleet.
My Mam and Dad, Sylvia and Jim Tomaney, have always supported my
endeavours and I am deeply grateful to them for the sacrifices they
have made for me and for everything they have taught me. In
particular, I was sustained throughout by my Mam's Yorkshire
puddings, generally acknowledged to be the world's best.
I owe an incalculable debt to Helen Stevens whose forbearance and
understanding during this enterprise have been beyond measure. My
failure to perform my domestic duties gradually worsened as 30th
September approached, but from now on I'll be a new man.
The research on which this thesis is based was conducted while I was
in receipt of a studentship provided through the Economic and Social
Research Council's Programme on Information and Communications
Technology.
V
Table 5.4
Table 5.5
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Labour Costs in Manufacturing, selected countries,
1960-86.
Table 3.2 Investment and Capital Stock in the UK.
Table 3.3 Total factor productivity growth in British
manufacturing (hourly).
Table 3.4 Total factor productivity in UK public sector.
Table 4.1 Percentage of NCB output powerloaded, 1946-67
Table 4.2 Non-mechanical delays in coal production,
September, 1977
Table 4.3 Impact of heavy duty equipment.
Table 4.4 British Coal: costs of production.
Table 5.1 North East Area: costs of production,
1985/6-1988/9.
Table 5.2 North East Area: Main production indicators
1982/3/-1988/9.
Table 5.3 Westoe Colliery: Main production indicators.
Table 5.6
Table 5.7
North East Area: Face results, September 1989.
Westoe Colliery: Manpower requirements of Rapid
Loading System.
Westoe Colliery: Manpower requirements of Tube
Conveyor System.
North East Area: Capital charges and bottom line
costs of production.
Table 6.1 Selby Mine: Comparative face data
Table 6.2 Investment per man on books, North Yorkshire Area
Area and Selby.
Table 6.3 Selby Mine: Production delays
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1 Post-war productivity in coalmining.
Figure 4.2 Heavy-duty investment and results.
Figure 4.3 British Coal: machine available time trends.
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.5
North East Deep Mines: Average daily output per
face, 1981/2-1988/9.
North East Deep Mines: Proportion of output from
retreat faces, 1981/2-1988/9
North East Deep Mines: Average total length of face,
1981/2-1988/9.
North East Deep Mines: Average square metres per
shift, 1978/9-1987/8.
North East Deep Mines: Average development metres
per shift, 1981/2-1988/9.
Figure 5.6 Wearmouth Colliery.
Figure 5.7
Figure 5.8
Figure 5.9
Dawdon Colliery: number and propertion of men on
books.
North East Deep Mines: Machine available time,
1981/2-1988/9.
North East Deep Mines: Shear section changes,
1987/8
Figure 5.10 Dawdon Colliery: CO3 face shearer unit changes.
Figure 5.11 North East Deep MInes: Overtime as a proprtion of
all shifts 1985/5 and 1989/90.
Figure 6.1 The Selby Coalfield.
Figure 6.2 Improvements in coal clearance equipment
running time, Gascoigne Wood.
Figure 6.3 Selby Mine: Run of mine production time losses,
July-October, 1989.
vii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. PREAMBLE
Since the early 1970s the pace of change in the social and technical
organisation of production has quickened to such a degree, that there
now exists a popular view that the advanced capitalist societies face an
historical turning point. Changes in the workplace are seen by some
social scientists to be at the heart of wider processes of societal
transformation. They point to the widespread dissemination of
microelectronic-based production technologies and to radical innovations
in the social organisation of work; developments providing the basis for
reversing the crisis of profitability and productivity of the 1970s and
securing the transition towards a new regime of capitalist development.
Relatedly, the debate on the nature of work, too, has undergone a
significant change. In the 1970s, to a large degree, the debate was
dominated by Braverman's thesis, advanced in his seminal text Labor
and Monopoly Capital (Braverman, 1974), that the organisation of work
under capitalism is characterised by a long-term tendency toward
deskilling, based on the growing application of Taylorist forms of labour
control. Braverman's theory was linked to a set of predictions derived
from Marx, which associated the development of capitalism with the
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growing alienation of the direct producers from the product of their
labour. Given the publicity surrounding phenomena such as 'blue collar
blues' and incidents of sabotage and strikes which characterised the
period in which Braverman was writing, it is not surprising that, at
least initially, his ideas had a receptive audience. By the late 1970s,
however, a strong critique had begun to develop against Braverman's
central thesis on the tendency within capitalism towards the progressive
degradation of work. Broadly, the critique centred around two claims.
First, it was argued that there is no immanent movement towards
deskilling within the capitalist labour process, and that capitalist
exploitation of labour power can take many forms, including the
exploitation of a skilled labour force. Later, a growing body of writers
began to argue that the labour process has witnessed a set of social
and technical developments which raise the possibility - or even the
likelihood - of a general 're-enchantment' of work. While generally
accepting Braverman's assessment that past forms of work organisation
were characterised by a tendency to deskill workers, it is argued that
recent developments have reversed this historical tendency.
While Braverman's work, therefore, inspired a body of research
concerned to identify the nature and contours of workplace control and
deskilling, the implication of more recent arguments is that the nature
of work has changed so much that new issues outside the conceptual
framework set by Braverman need to be addressed. With this latter
shift in focus a new air of optimism has come to surround thinking on
the future of work. Writers concerned with the possibility of
developing more humane forms of work within capitalist society now
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believe that the trends in industrial organisation, market structures
and, above all, production technology are working in precisely this
direction. In particular, the perspective on the social effects of new
information technologies in production has changed. The latter are now
seen to be giving rise to new kinds of competences and occupational
categories which will raise the level of human participation in production
and lay the basis for more harmonious work relations.
In Britain, this general optimism about the direction of workplace
change has been advanced most vigorously by the journal Marxism
Today, which has blended the various optimistic views on contemporary
change into a unified perspective on a future, described as
'post-Fordist'. New technology is said to be bringing into being new
forms of work organisation which are both more efficient and more
humane. It is further argued that this transition has been presided
over by the policies and politics of the New Right as expressed through
the practice of Thatcherism.
However, the vision of new and better times builds upon a number of
unresolved questions. What, for instance, is the relationship between
technical change and the emergence of new forms of work organisation?
Do new technologies and innovations in work practices offer a general
solution for the crisis of profitability through improved capitalist
efficiency in all industries and national economies? Has the experience
of introducing new forms of work organisation been compatible,
universally, with the objectives of 'humanisation'? Is it sensible to
conceive of contemporary change in terms of a sharp break with the
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past? In short, is there an alternative way of conceptualising
industrial change?
The aim of this study, therefore, is to put this optimistic assessment of
the nature of contemporary workplace change under scrutiny. The
study critically examines the argument that the trend of technical
change, particula.rly in large scale industry, is in the direction of more
enriched work and that this necessarily offers the basis for a new
accommodation between capital and labour. The various theoretical
components of the new optimism are identified and their conceptual and
empirical bases are analysed.
Arising from this critique, the possibility of an alternative explanation
of the direction of contemporary workplace change is discussed. There
are two elements to this discussion. The first raises the possibility
that the emergence of new tendencies in workplace organisation may be
occurring alongside old enduring forms of workplace hierarchy and
control. Thus, it is proposed that new forms of work organisation
might represent the reformulation of traditional capitalist concerns of
efficiency and control. Secondly, an attempt is made to square the
argument that new technologies are propelling management to cultivate a
new skilled, more cooperative workforce, with evidence which suggests
the persistence of endemic, if uneven, forms of industrial conflict.
Broadly, the aim of this study is to question the value of conceiving
contemporary change in terms of the unfolding of a new, universal,
industrial paradigm. In particular, the capability of the new optimistic
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visions of the future to cope with diversity and uneveness in the
process of industrial restructuring in the real world is analysed.
The study seeks to illustrate that national and historical factors play a
central role in shaping patterns of change. This point, together with
the two preceding objectives is highlighted by a discussion of the
historical pattern of change in British industry. A review of the
evidence of change during the 1980s illustrates the difficulties of
conceptualising contemporary change in Britain in terms of the
emergence of a post-Fordist industrial paradigm. While important
changes are acknowledged to have occurred, and while it is accepted
that the Thatcher governments played a key role in them, it is argued
that these changes did not lay the foundation for post-Fordist
production, along the lines suggested by the optimists. Taking into
consideration also the emphasis which official and other accounts have
placed on the historical problem of 'restrictive practices', it is argued
that, in the British case, the nature of change has been more limited
and conflict-ridden than implied by the post-Fordist thesis. It is also
sustained that, generally, changes in the organisation of work have
owed less to inherent properties of new technology than to an
historically developed pattern of social conflict and compromise, which
has given rise to a particular, rather constrained, view of the
industrial problem. The particular role played by the state (through
its ownership of the nationalised industries) in inflecting the direction
of workplace restructuring in Britain, is emphasised.
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Having suggested that restructuring in British industry generally owed
less to the unfolding of a new 'post-Fordist' logic of economic
rationalisation, the study offers more substantial evidence through a
case-study of change in the nationalised British coal industry. The
choice of the coal industry is justified on a number of grounds.
Firstly, it provides an antidote to the large number of studies of a
small range of industries (notably motor manufacture) on which the
assertions about post-Fordism are based. Although the coal industry is
an 'old', extractive one, I show that, from mid-1970s, the industry
embarked on a large-scale strategy of productive modernisation based
around the introduction of microelectronics. Therefore, the coal
industry offers a different insight on the tendencies identified by the
new optimism. Secondly, the fact the industry was state-owned and,
latterly, under the strong influence from the Thatcher governments,
helps to illuminate the specific nature of restructuring in Britain.
2. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The structure of the study follows this broad argument through a
number of stages. Chapter Two begins with an analysis of the schools
of thought which form the basis for the optimistic view of contemporary
workplace change. The chapter offers a critical assessment of these
different schools, all of which advance the hypothesis that the advanced
industrial societies stand on the edge of a new 'post-Fordist' era
wherein industrial production will be both more efficient and more
humane. Four major propositions, some of which inform each other,
and which together form a 'new orthodoxy' are identified: the theory
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of flexible specialisation; claims about the alleged 'Japanisation' of
industrial production; the theory of 'new production concepts' as
developed in Germany; and some recent inflections within the French
'regulation approacht.
Perhaps the most popular among these conceptualisations of change is
the theory of flexible specialisation, associated with the work of Michael
Piore and Charles Sabel (Piore and Sabel, 1984). This approach
identifies the 're-emergence of craft-work' in industrial production,
based on the widespread use of computer technology. The principal
argument is that the system of mass production is in crisis. This
system, it is argued, which was based on a combination of extreme task
fragmentation and the use of dedicated machinery in the manufacture of
long runs of standardised commodities for stable and undifferentiated
mass markets, is being rapidly transformed. Mass markets are said to
have reached saturation point, with consumer demand having become
more heterogeneous, with a new emphasis on specialised and quality
commodities. The ability to respond to rapidly shifting demand is said
to require the flexible use of computer reprogrammable production
technologies, which reduce manufacturing lead times allowing rapid
changeovers in product runs.
In relation to the workplace it is argued that new, 'flexible' forms of
work organisation must accompany new production technologies in order
to guarantee their success. Piore and Sabel go so far as to see in this
a 'revitalisation of craft-work', which reverses the trend toward the
degradation of work and, most importantly, raises the possibility of a
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new, mutually beneficial, bargain between capital and labour. The
ability to adjust rapidly to changing market conditions requires the
active participation of workers and requires the relaxation of
hierarchical forms of labour control and the elaboration of a consensual
industrial relations, in a new 'industrial paradigm'.
The second and parallel thesis considered is one which anticipates the
extension of the Japanese of model industrial production and workplace
organisation to hegemonic status. Particularly in Britain and the United
States, a view has been propagated which suggests the long term
productivity crisis can be overcome if Western countries emulate
'Japanese' methods of production. More importantly, the 'Japanisation'
thesis has been mobilised into the broader 'post-Fordist' conception of
contemporary industrial change and, in particular, Japanese production
systems have been taken as evidence for the emergence of more humane
forms of work organisation (see for example Kaplinsky, 1988; Kenney
and Florida, 1988).
This debate is of particular relevance to the UK.
	 Successive
Conservative governments of the 1980s extolled 'Japanisation' as one the
main tools for restoring British competitiveness. Looking for a
'demonstration effect' on British companies the British government has
actively encouraged Japanese manufacturers to locate plants in the UK.
The discussion of Japanisation outlines some of the key features of
Japanese production methods and suggests that, in general, they are
distinguished by an intensive utilisation of labour, rather than the use
of specific technologies.
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The third optimistic theorisation of change in the workplace which is
considered, derives from Kern and Schumann's (1984a) work
emphasising the significance of 'new production concepts'. This
approach claims to identify the emergence of a trend toward task
integration, with positive implications for labour. Kern and Schumann
suggest that while the end of capitalist rationalisation (ie. the
improvement of labour productivity with the aim of improved valorisation
of capital) remains unchanged, the means by which it is being achieved
is being altered. They argue that with the development of more
complex production technologies, capitalist enterprises have abandoned
the conception of human labour as simply a cost to be minimised and
instead have begun to regard labour as a 'positive planning concept'
and this is signified by the emergence of a new type of skilled worker.
The task of the labour movement, they suggest, is to ally itself with
'modernist' factions of management in their battle with the
'traditionalists' for the introduction of new production concepts.
The work of Kern and Schumann is of interest to the concerns of this
study because German industry is increasingly seen as the 'core' of the
European economy. The review in Chapter Two of the empirical
evidence in Germany itself, however, suggests the trends identified by
Kern and Schumann are more equivocal and less coherent than they
claim. It is claimed that while it is certainly possible to argue that the
position of German workers is stronger than that of their British
counterparts, the question of whether these are the product of
technical change or owe more to the prevailing pattern of
management/labour bargaining and conflict, needs to be addressed.
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The idea of a transition from a mass production (Fordist) to a
post-Fordist economy owes much to ideas developed and disseminated
through the work of the French 'regulation school'. According to
Aglietta's (1979) seminal text, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation,
Fordism represented a 'regime of accumulation' which lasted from the
inter-war period through to the end of the 1960s. At the centre of this
regime of accumulation was the growth of production based on the
'Fordist' assembly line. Aglietta identified a 'crisis' of Fordist
production which reflected certain technical and social limits of this
type of production. The period after the crisis is seen as one of
experimentation in the organisation of the production process. Aglietta
adopted the term 'neo-Fordism' to describe the character of these
experiments, emphasising, in contrast to the flexible specialisation
thesis, continuities between Fordist production forms and their
successors.
In the original formulation, writers in this tradition tended to view new
experiments in the organisation of work as having largely negative
consequences for workers, through processes of work intensification
and increased management control. Lately, however, some exponents of
the 'regulation school', have begun to espouse a view not dissimilar to
that of Piore and Sabel, that the new forms of production technology
require a requalified and 'involved' workforce for their efficient
operation. In particular, the early emphasis on the importance of the
socially contested nature of restructuring has tended to be downplayed.
Instead, there is a tendency to assume that a new economic rationality
is propelling the humanisation of work. This recent optimism within the
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regulation approach is the fourth conception of change which is
explored.
The major criticism proposed in Chapter Two is that writers in all four
schools identifying the emergence of post-Fordist forms of work,
reproduce one of Braverman's key errors, namely the search for a
totalising view of the forms of work and its transformation. Arising
from this criticism are a number of other problems. One important
point emerging from the critique of Braverman was the idea that at all
stages of the development of the capitalist labour process there exists a
tension between capital's wish to control labour as a commodity and the
need to liberate its subjective, creative aspects. Thus, it is argued
that while the post-Fordist writers may be correct to identify
noteworthy shifts occurring in the balance between 'consent' and
'control', they have yet to show that the underlying character of the
capital-labour relation has been altered by such tendencies.
It is argued also that what post-Fordist writers take as evidence of a
new 'industrial paradigm' are in fact a set of more limited, but
nonetheless significant changes, in the organisation of large scale
industry. The growing capital intensity of industry, it appears, does
require a heightened concern with capital utilisation and, perhaps, a
new engagement with conceptual abilities of workers. However, in
reality changes in technology and work practices are related in complex
and often contradictory ways. While managements have begun on
occasions to delegate to the shopfloor certain tasks which were
previously the domain of managers and to promote a certain integration
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of tasks, post-Fordist writers have tended to overlook the constrained
nature of this autonomy and the limited nature of most of the new
skills. Most investment in information technology and limited extensions
in worker skills reflects attempts to ensure high rates of machine
utilisation, rather than the creation of a new computer-skilled
craft-worker.
Drawing on this critique of the post-Fordist thesis, the second half of
Chapter Two outlines the elements of an alternative framework. This
conceptualisation draws on insights of the early work in the 'regulation
approach', the critique of 'new production concepts' which has been
developed within European sociology and on certain insights from the
British 'labour process debate'. A major contention of this alternative
approach is that contemporary technical change does not in itself
guarantee the humanisation of work. Instead the extent to which the
process of restructuring remains socially contested, and the extent to
which this results in a highly uneven pattern of change, is stressed.
Secondly, it is proposed that the emphasis on radical new departures in
production organisation, needs to be tempered by a recognition of the
existence of important lines of continuity and even the intensification of
previous organisational forms in production. Specifically, I suggest
that social and technical innovations in the workplace continue to be
united under the common managerial quest for greater integration of
production and higher rates of capital utilisation. Restructuring is
conceptualised as the search for new 'time and control economies',
through the extension and reformulation of the principles of 'flow
production', of which Fordist forms of production were one expression.
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This is a historic capitalist imperative, but one which may be taking on
significant new forms.
The stress on the socially contested nature of change leads to the
proposition that historically determined and nationally distinctive
patterns of class conflict and accommodation may be more important
variables for explaining the complex and varied patterns of workplace
change, than any inexorable logic built into the properties of new
technologies. This argument is the guiding principle behind Chapter
Three. The chapter begins by examining the various attempts by
British supporters of the new orthodoxy to account for the pattern of
workplace change during the 198 Os. Particular attention is devoted to
the argument that the Thatcher governments engaged in, and largely
succeeded in laying down the foundations for a high productivity
'post- Fordist' manufacturing sector in Britain.
The chapter goes on to suggest that the Thatcher governments of the
1980s had a particularly restricted understanding of the nature of the
British industrial problem, which had little to do with the kind of
reforms which the new orthodoxy takes as evidence of post-Fordism.
The Thatcher governments took the view that the British industrial
problem was essentially one of 'restrictive practices' and the 'excessive'
power of trade unions. It was this perception, rather than the
management of the emergence of post-Fordism, which guided the pattern
of change. The genesis of this perception of the industrial problem
and the role it played in determining the specific pattern of change in
Britain is examined. It is argued that while the Thatcher governments
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presided over a rapid growth in manufacturing productivity, this was
borne largely of a shift in the balance of class forces in favour of
management, not the emergence of a post-Fordist 'industrial paradigm'.
Thus, the chapter shows that, even where the state had sanctioned, in
nationalised industries, large investments in new technology, the
pattern of restructuring was informed by the idea that the central
industrial problem was one of labour indiscipline.
Chapter Four attempts to illuminate the foregoing themes through a case
study of restructuring in the coal industry. This case study is
informed by the alternative theoretical framework outlined at the end of
Chapter Two. This suggests that managements are currently concerned
with attempts to improve production processes through the further
extension of flow principles, but that their approach to this problem is
influenced by industry-specific patterns of social and technical
development and that these in turn are influenced by existing patterns
of conflict and bargaining. To this extent restructuring in the coal
industry has exhibited also a 'British' concern with the 'excessive'
power of workplace trade unions and 'restrictive practices'. One
argument advanced in Chapter Three is that the British state, and
particularly the Thatcher governments, played an important role in
determining the direction of industrial restructuring. The case study
of change in the nationalised coal industry attempts to investigate this
claim. Thus, while management might be expected to pursue general
capitalist imperatives, this will have a hue which is the product of a
specific history and geography.
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Chapter Four, therefore, outlines the development of the labour process
in coalmining. The chapter begins by outlining the nature of the
pre-mechanised labour process, illustrating its craft-like character and
the extensive workplace autonomy which miners historically exercised.
The chapter then charts the progress of the mechanisation of the
production process from the inter-war period. Mechanisation of longwall
mining is understood as an attempt to emulate Fordist-type flow
production. Changes occurred also in work-practices and patterns of
industrial relations which were designed to make these more rational and
to accompany the technical changes. Despite these developments,
traditions of job controls survived and were reformulated to meet the
demands of mechanised production. The restructuring in the industry
since the 1970s is then examined. A large-scale programme of technical
change was initiated in the 1970s, based on the development of a more
capital intensive form of longwall mechanisation and extensive application
of microelectronic control and monitoring technologies. Lately, this
longer term strategy of technical change has been overlain by extensive
restructuring of work-practices, which by most accounts, has
underpinned the recent, widely reported rise in productivity in the coal
industry. This latter development is situated in the context of the
defeat of National Union of Mineworkers following the 1984/5 miners'
strike - a key moment in the restructuring of industrial relations in
1980s Britain.
The implementation of the strategy of technical change and the
restructuring of work practices in the post-strike period are examined
through studies of the divergent patterns of change in the North East
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and Selby coalfields. The findings of these studies are presented in
Chapters Five and Six. Emphasis was given to the inherent uneveness
of the contemporary process of restructuring and the regional
case-studies attempt to capture this uneveness. No two workplaces are
entirely alike. Even workplaces which have identical technologies and
similar industrial relations structures can operate in very different
ways. For complex and historically determined reasons local practices
and power structures can differ enormously. Nowhere is this truer
than in the coal industry, where there is a large literature which
illustrates the importance of regional differences in the industry, in
terms of work organisation, bargaining practices and traditions of
industrial and political practice. Chapters Five and Six demonstrate a
sensitivity to these local and regional differences.
Chapter Five is a case study of the 'old' and declining North East
coalfield, which did not employ the technology at the heart of the
technical change programme, but which, nevertheless, witnessed
dramatically improved productivity in the period after the miners'
strike. The chapter shows that despite the impact of mechanisation,
work in the North East coalfield was characterised right up until the
miners' strike by the existence of a set of regionally distinctive job
controls. Central to management's post-strike activity was the attempt
to eliminate 'restrictive practices' - even though the negative impact of
these practices on productivity was assumed rather than demonstrated.
In the North East case, the improved productivity is shown to be a
result, largely, of an intensification of work made possible by the
defeat of the NUM in the miners' strike and management's subordination
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of labour. Despite the productivity improvement, the chapter questions
whether the basis for sustained competitive success has been
established.
Chapter Six is a case study of the new, modern Selby mine complex
which was developed during the 1980s and which embodies the latest
developments in production technology and has a much higher level of
productivity than the North East. Selby was conceived as an explicit
attempt to achieve 'continuous flow production'. To this end the mine
was designed to incorporate a high level of automation and centralised
monitoring of plant, to ensure adequate machine utilisation. The
chapter examines the extent to which Selby embodied a radically new
approach on the part of management toward labour, concomitant with
the technological system. The chapter suggests that management's
attitude toward labour has been confused and inconsistent. Attempts to
elicit the active participation of labour have been complimented by
arbitrary exercise of new-found managerial authority. Also the trend
of technical change at Selby suggests that management are automating
skills as far as possible. I ask, therefore, in what sense can Selby be
understood as a post-Fordist mine?
Chapter Seven presents some conclusions. The diverse patterns of
restructuring in the North East and Selby coalfields are compared and
contrasted. The differing fortunes of the workforces in each coalfield
are given particular attention. Subsequently, the experience of
restructuring in the coal industry is examined in relation to the
theoretical concerns of the earlier part of the thesis. The value of
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conceptualising the process of change in the terms of the 'post-Fordist'
paradigm is questioned. Restructuring is seen as reflecting an
equivocal pattern of change and continuity which in turn was the
product of a specific pattern of management/labour conflict and the
political contingencies which reflected the industry's ownership by the
state. In general, management's approach to restructuring tended to
be influenced by a notion that the human contribution to the production
process should be minimised rather than accentuated. In this regard,
restructuring in coal in the 1980s owed much to the dominant conception
of the industrial problem held by Thatcher governments - a view which
stressed the need to subordinate the position of labour in production.
I conclude by arguing that this pattern of restructuring was not
inevitable but that an alternative model existed which could have been
founded on the traditions of craft organisation and job controls which,
in contrast to the bounded autonomy proposed by the post-Fordist
model, would have laid the basis for genuinely independent workers'
participation in production.
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CHAPTER TWO
A NEW PARADIGM OF WORK ORGANISATION AND TECHNOLOGY?
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the claim, advanced from various quarters and in
differing forms, that fundamental changes have occurred in the
organisation of work and production over recent years in the
industrialised countries. The aim is to assess, at a broad conceptual
level, what new principles, if any, underlie the reorganisation of work
in the present period and whether the changes described amount to a
fundamental reorganisation of the labour process as well as guaranteeing
a new and better deal for labour.
It begins, for the purposes of clarification, by drawing a contrast
between the tenor of the debates of the 1970s and those since. It then
examines four main positions which anticipate the rise of more benign
forms of production organisation and labour practices in the post-mass
production ('post-Fordist') economy. They are: the theory of flexible
specialisation; claims concerning the 'Japanisation' of industry; the
debate surrounding the alleged emergence of 'new production concepts'
in Germany; and recent contributions of the French 'regulation
approach'. In each case I explore the limits of the approach in
question. This chapter then examines the debates which have
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contributed to this 'new orthodoxy' and to the 'optimistic estimation of
the prospects for the quality of work in industry' (Dankbaar 1988a: 26)
through an analysis of the four main approaches outlined above. I
suggest that the evidence for a new organising principle of work and
production is flawed: while certain changes can be identified these are
less dramatic than implied by the new orthodoxy. Moreover, rather
than representing a radical break, they tend, in many cases, to
represent an intensification of existing tendencies. My argument is that
the changes identified by the 'post-Fordist' writers express many
possibilities, including the continuity of elements of Fordism.
Trajectories of workplace change, it is argued, cannot be understood as
a product of the properties of new technology, but are conditioned by
deeply embedded traditions of industrial practice, which are the
themselves the product of specific histories and geographies. The
notion, therefore, that technical change guarantees the prospect of the
humanisation of work is unsustainable.
2. TAYLORISM AND ITS CRITICS
In general, during the 1970s debates were concerned with question of
the growing hegemony of Taylorist methods of industrial control, which
were based on the separation of conception and execution and extreme
task fragmentation. What was remarkable about this debate was the
extent to which it influenced discussion in almost all of the advanced
industrial countries. In the US and UK, a 'deskilling debate' took
place. In Germany discussion tended to focus on the 'polarisation of
skills'. In Italy a new 'mass worker' was identified, to which the Left
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attached its political hopes. The notion that Taylorist techniques were
of growing importance was common. Generally it was argued that this
process reflected a central tendency in capitalist production. The
French writer Gorz offers a representative view:
As a whole the history of capitalist technology can be read as
the history of the dequalification of the direct producers.
The dequalification process is certainly not linear: at the
beginning of each technical revolution it seems partially
inverted. But the general tendency immediately reasserts
itself: the new qualifications demanded by new techniques are
recomposed. The most qualified production workers'
professional skills are carved up into sub-specializations
shorn of autonomy. The power of control which they carried
- and thus power over the production process - is
transferred to non-workers as a separate function (Gorz,
1976: 57).
In the USA this view was echoed by Braverman (1974) in his seminal
contribution, Labor and Monopoly Capital. Although much criticised
this book generated a vast and productive debate in both the USA and
UK about the 'degradation of work' in capitalism. For Braverman,
Taylorism, with its search for the 'one best way' of work simplification
through the separation of manual and mental functions, extended
managerial control and allowed the speed up of work. Under monopoly
capitalism, scientific management had secured a dominant position in
management ideology and was a form of production characteristic of
monopoly capitalism. Braverman saw Taylorism as representing the
unfolding of capitalist rationality in the work process. Braverman's
position was much criticised on a number of now familiar accounts. He
was accused of romanticising a past craft idyll, of failing to recognise
that management balanced the extension of control with the need to win
consent and cooperation. Critics argued that while Taylorism was
central to the managerial organisation of the work process, it was not
the exclusive means of workplace organisation. In particular, marxists
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criticised Braverman for implying that capital, through its domination of
the labour process had secured complete control over society, pointing
out that the rise of social democracy had been important in securing
working class political assent in the advanced capitalist societies.
A major work which addressed at least one of Braverman's lacunae was
Alfred Sohn-Rethel's Intellectual and Manual Labour. For Sohn-Rethel
(1978), Taylorism represented less an expression of an immutable
deskilling tendency and more an historical attempt to modify the
contradictions of capitalist production. It was an attempt to offset a
crisis of profitability, originating at the turn of the century, through
'speed-up' facilitated by 'coercive timing' and mechanical pacing. For
Sohn-Rethel, the attempts to impose 'economy of time' in production had
their fullest expression in 'flow production' as exemplified by the
assembly industries which emerged at the beginning of the century1.
This development placed new constraints on capital - notably, a
pressure to reap scale economies. However, productive expansion
threatened over-capacity while cut backs in production were made more
difficult by rising fixed costs. Consequently it would become more
difficult for firms to respond to market exigencies, hence the pressure
Some writers employ the term Fordism to refer to this type of
production system. The term has come, also, to take on the wider
meaning of a social formation based on mass production and mass
consumption.
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to utilise plant in a tightly integrated fashion. In this way, Taylorism
represented the attempt to impose an 'economy of time' in production2.
However, it was Braverman's conception of Taylorism, rather than that
of Sohn-Rethel's, which tended to be more influential. Industrial
sociology in the 1970s, therefore, was dominated by attempts to identify
the existence or extent of deskilling. However, today, a 'new
orthodoxy. . .seems set to dominate the sociology of industry and
organisations' (Hyman, 1988: 48); one which suggests a very different
analysis and vision of the labour process. In contrast to the approach
which sees the 'dequalification of the direct producers' as a universal
and immutable expression of the logic of capitalist development, the new
orthodoxy sees the principles of 'scientific management' which were
established at the beginning of the century as a contingent response to
historically specific circumstances.
This new orthodoxy, celebrating such concepts as craft and flexibility
suggests that a new organising principle is emerging. It proposes that
'old' forms of work and production based on 'Taylorist' and 'Fordist'
2However, this creates a fundamental contradiction between the
'plant economy', which he saw as increasingly planned, and the 'market
economy', which he saw as increasingly anarchic. Sohn-Rethel believed
this contradiction would be resolved by the transition to socialism
(Sohri-Rethel, 1978: 139-180). The central issue for Sohn-Rethel was to
locate the objective of scientific management within the complex
developments which consituted 'monopoly capitalism': concentration and
centralisation, increased imperialist rivalry, the growth of the state
regulated economy, the development of mass production and consumption
and the growth of reformism within working class politics (see Elger and
Schwarz, 1980, who offer a sympathetic critique).
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forms of control are increasingly counterposed to 'new' flexible work
patterns characterised by loosened (or even abandoned) central
managerial control of the labour process. In some accounts these new
forms of work and production are ascribed liberating powers for labour
and in others they are linked to wider processes of societal
transformation - to changes related to the alleged emergence of a
post-industrial or post-modern society (see Harvey, 1989). In most
cases changes in skills and work patterns are linked to changes in
production technologies; contributing to 'the popular impression. . . that
the introduction of microelectronics will improve the quality of work in
manufacturing industry (Dankbaar, 1988a: 25). It is the elements of
this argument which are outlined and criticised in the following
sections.
3. FLEXIBLE SPECIALISATION AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF
CRAFT -WORK
The theory of flexible specialisation originally developed by Piore and
Sabel (eg Sabel, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984), has gained a pervasive
influence over Anglo-American debates concerning the nature of
contemporary industrial change, to the degree that some writers see it
as the centrepiece of the new orthodoxy described above (Hyman, 1988;
also Amin and Robins, 1990). According to Piore and Sabel the
advanced industrial societies are witnessing the emergence of a new
form of industrial organisation which is altering all facets of economic
activity including, the nature of markets, relations between firms, and
relations between industry and the state. Central are changes alleged
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to be occurring in the organisation of work itself, and in the relations
between capital and labour; changes in the direction of more skilled,
more humane, more flexible and more efficient working practices based
around the potentialities of both craft practices and advanced
manufacturing technologies.
For Piore and Sabel the present is a period of breakdown of the
hitherto dominant system of mass production - a system based on the
production of long runs of standardised commodities for stable 'mass'
markets, and involving the progressive erosion of craft skills and the
growing demand for unskilled or semi-skilled operatives. The
breakdown is attributed to the saturation and subsequent disintegration
of the markets for mass produced goods. With the rise of increasingly
differentiated and segmented markets and more discriminating consumer
tastes, the rigidity of mass production methods lay in their dedication
to the production of standardised commodities:
Mass markets are the precondition for the Fordist organisation
of production; when they begin to disintegrate, Fordism
begins to lose its appeal. Where [mass production] calls for
the separation of conception and execution, the substitution
of unskilled for skilled labour and special purpose
machines. . . . specialization often demands the reverse:
collaboration between designers and skilled producers to make
a variety of goods with general-purpose machines (Sabel,
1982: 194).
Sabel first identified the re-emergence of craft forms of production in
the small 'artisan' firms of central Italy, where he proclaimed the
existence of 'high technology cottage industry: the unity of conception
and execution, the abstract and the concrete' (1982: 220). Here, small
firms were bound together in industrial districts by a complex
25
relationship of 'competition and collaboration', characterised by
technological dynamism and constant product innovation.
The experience of these clusters of Italian small firms was later taken
as evidence of the birth of a new organising principle in industrial
production - 'flexible specialisation' - wherein craft production is
replacing mass production as the industrial paradigm (Piore and Sabel,
1984: 206). While craft production was 'marginalised' during the
ascendancy of mass production, Piore and Sabel now identify 'the
re-emergence of the craft paradigm amidst the crisis' (1984: 205) and
argue that capitalist societies stand abridge an 'industrial divide',
where the possibility exists for a new phase of industrial development
based on these principles. Although they state that capitalist societies
could either continue down the path of mass production or move in the
direction of increased flexibility, it is clear that they expect flexible
specialisation increasingly to dominate industrial production and they
point to an increasing number of actual examples of these production
systems which they claim vindicate their hypotheses. To wit, by the
1980s, the principles of flexible specialisation, it is suggested 'had
become a model of industrial development in certain regions and even,
in the case of West Germany and Japan, in whole nations' (Piore and
Sabel, 1984: 206).
Parallel changes, which Piore (1990) describes as 'analogous to' those
occurring in the small firms sector, are identified in large-scale
industries. As Sabel (1989) puts it, the industrial structures of large
firms and industrial districts are 'converging'. For instance, in the car
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industry mass production methods are said to be giving way to flexible
specialisation where firms are increasingly engaged in the manufacture
of 'specialised vehicles tailored to meet the needs of particular consumer
groups', with a tendency for specialised goods to be produced by means
of general purpose machines - 'broadly skilled workers using capital
equipment that can make various models' (Katz and Sabel, 1985: 297,
298). This new labour requirement compels firms to offer job security
as an inducement to workers to acquire the company-specific skills
associated with new technology:
Thus, the shifts in the conditions of competition have led by
diverse routes to a growing concern with the flexible use of
labour, and this concern has led to a preoccupation with the
reorganization of industrial relations and the redistribution of
rights within the factory (Katz and Sabel, 1985: 299,
emphasis added).
In firms such as GM, it is argued, the changes are exemplified in
developments such as the well-known QWL (Quality of Working Life)
programme and in the development of the Saturn plant. These
developments are taken to signify that:
Instead of treating labor predominantly as a cost, the
company began to consider reform of labor relations as part
of flexible production linking new technologies, polyvalent
workers, and more specialized products (Katz and Sabel,
1984: 303).
In the flexible specialisation approach there is little doubt that,
propelled by the exigencies of the marketplace, the introduction of new
technology is calling forth new competencies which will liberate workers
from the drudgery of Taylorism. The separation of conception and
execution, which Braverman saw as inherent under capitalist
production, is rescinded under the new forms of production. Similarly,
job hierarchies considered characteristic of 'mass production' are said to
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be disintegrating with the 'decentralisation of power and authority'
(Piore, 1990: 60). The 'return' to craft is deemed to be inherently
beneficial for labour:
Thus the production workers' intellectual participation in the
work processes is enhanced and his or her role revitalized.
Moreover, craft production depends on solidarity and
communitarianism. Given these conditions of working life in
craft production, there is a case for preferring it to mass
production, regardless of the place accorded to unions within
craft production (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 278, emphasis
added).
A return to craft?
The theory of flexible specialisation is an ambitious one. It seeks to
explain changes in markets, state activity, the geography of production
as well as changes in the organisation of work and industrial relations.
The discussion below, however, is restricted to claims concerned with
the workplace, notably in relation to the supposed demise of mass
production principles, not only because of the particular concerns of
this thesis, but also because of the already huge body of critical
writing which casts doubt on the idea of the emergence of an economy
based on flexible specialisation (see Amin, 1989; Hyman, 1988).
One of the key assumptions of the flexible specialisation approach
concerns the nature of technical change within mass production
industries3 . Taking the example of motor vehicles which is crucial to
3Although flexible specialisation devotes much attention to the
resurgence of small firms, present restructuring appears to reinforce
the position of large firms. An analysis of EC level data for mergers,
(Footnote Continued)
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the flexible specialisation case (see especially Katz and Sabel, 1985),
the vast weight of evidence suggests that technology is not being used
to facilitate rapid shifts in model types. In the first place, flexible
technologies are a good deal less flexible than they are portrayed in the
theory of flexible specialisation. Still less are traditional scale
economies being challenged by new techniques. The commissioning
costs of, for instance, robot lines, can be borne only by the largest
companies. The costs of recommissioning for model changeover remain
high and, as Williams et al note: 'Robots cannot be re-programmed for
new models by pressing a few buttons. That is a myth' (1987: 430).
It is myth which is fuelled by the flexible specialisation thesis.
According to Williams et al, the more likely trend established by the
introduction of FMS systems is for batch production to become more
capital intensive. However, whatever variety is planned for, it remains
(Footnote Continued)
acquisitions and joint ventures reveals that concentration of industrial
activity continues to be an important trend, especially in the best
performing areas of the manufacturing sector, a process encouraged by
contemporary trends of trade and market liberalisation (Amin and
Dietrich, 1990). Moreover, according to Aniin and Dietrich, these
processes of concentration, in some cases, reflect 'a deepening of old
'Fordist' forms, notably in the mass production industries or continuous
flow industries in which competition is intensely oligopolistic' (1990:
15). In industries such as food, printing, chemicals and consumer
goods, it is argued, 'the pursuit of scale economies remains ever
present' (ibid: 16). The deployment of flexible technologies, closer
coordination between product and production strategy and the extensive
utilisation of advanced information and communication technologies
allows closer integration between plants and divisions in different
locations (Dunning, 1988; also Amin and Dietrich, 1990). Increasingly,
seperate functions within production can be run as independent modules,
'but within an overall framework of an integrated flow system' (Amin and
Dietrich, 1990: 17; cf. also Murray, 1982; Belussi, 1987). This
evidence casts doubt on the notion of a 'craft paradigm' challenging
mass production.
29
crucial to obtain volumes which guarantee high rates of utilisation.
This evidence, and the stubborn persistence of mass markets for
relatively standardised products casts serious doubts on the central
proposition of the theory of flexible specialisation that scale economies
are of diminished importance in the strategies of firms, although the
means by which firms achieve these economies may be varied and may
include closer relations with suppliers (see the discussion of
'Japanisation' below)4.
It seems clear that where advanced production technology is being
introduced often it involves large scale investment in new computer
controlled production technologies, the general character of which is to
4Evidence for the saturation and disintegration of mass markets is
hard to find and this further undermines the claims made for flexible
specialisation. Williams et al (1987) firmly reject the argument that
markets for consumer durables are saturated and point to the creation of
new markets for mass produced standardised goods. While they accept the
evidence that markets may be fragmenting, this is occurring in ways
which do not threaten mass producers. The orthodox mass producer
increasingly survives by producing a family of interrelated models, but
this is taken as evidence of simple product differentiation (which may
be increasing in importance) rather than the 'disintegration of mass
markets'. In the British food industry 'a classic mass production
industry' (Smith, 1989) evidence of differential demand is
'contradictory'. For instance, Cadbury have reduced the variety of their
products and tended instead to concentrate on a limited number of core
brands - a trend guided by concentration in British and European
retailing. Smith describes Cadbury's approach as a 'strategy of product
and company globalisation, not fragmentation and decentralisation of
products and ownership' (1989: 213). The persistence of volume
production for mass markets , which seems to be an enduring feature of
the advanced economies, casts serious doubts on the notion that flexible
specialisation is 'replacing' mass production. In many cases what Piore
and Sabel appear to identify is a relative vertical disintegration of
the firm in the face various uncertainties in product and labour
markets. From this though they impute changes in the whole edifice of
advanced capitalism.
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be different to that suggested by the flexible specialisation thesis.
Wood (1989), for instance, through his participation in the MIT study
into the future of the automobile, found that managers tended to stress
the use of technology in the improvement of quality and the
enhancement of central coordination and control of the production
process. In the car industry, new technology appears to be used
mainly for increasing routing, production volumes and programming
flexibility within existing capital installations. In general, it seems that
computerisation of mass production processes facilitates an improved
control and integration of the labour process rather than rapid product
switches. Similarly, Murray, in an earlier study of the Bologna
engineering industry, suggested that systems such as CAM were being
used in a way 'that ensures the maximum saturation and coordination of
labour time' (1983: 88).
5Even within Sabel's celebrated industrial districts, however, the
notion that 'computer' technology is sustaining the emergence of 'a
craft paradigm' is difficult to sustain as a general principle. Lazerson
(1990), who otherwise has sympathy for the features of industrial
districts, questions the idea that the essence of these areas is
captured in the notion of 'high technology cottage industry'. He found
only very limited application of new technology in his study of the
Nodena (Emilia) knitwear industry. Artisanal knitwear firms are
characterised by heavy dependence on family labour, low overheads, long
working hours and less costly labour laws, features which reflect the
frequent juxtaposition of home and workplace. The production process in
the knitwear sector has proved highly resisterit to technical change. The
overall flexibility of the sector resides rather in the extreme division
of labour between artisan firms. This evidence validates the point made
by Norroni: 'The evidence placed on computer-based technology, and on
the opportunities it provides for making production processes flexible,
may induce people to forget that flexibility can arise from the way the
elements of production are organized regardless of the technology used.
In fact, flexibility in production is first and foremost an economic
phenomenon, which may even be independent of the technology adopted'
(1990: 16; cf. the discussion of 'Japanisation' below).
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In the flexible specialisation thesis, the computer is endowed with an
emancipatory potential. This view of the possibilities of the computer is
used to support a view of craft-work which echoes that of Braverman:
The computer is thus a machine that meets Marx's definition
of an artisan's tool: it is an instrument that responds to and
extends the productive capacity of the user. It is therefore
tempting to sum the observations of engineers and
ethnographers to the conclusion that technology has ended
the dominion of specialised machines over un- and semiskilled
workers, and redirected progress down the path of craft
production. The advent of the computer restores human
control over the production process; machinery is again
subordinated to the operator (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 261).
This touching faith in the ability of the computer to restore a craft
idyll, however, simply ignores many of the criticisms made of
Braverman and leads Piore and Sabel to leave some important gaps in
their analysis of contemporary change.
Firstly, while it is possible to accept that in certain cases technical
change may be calling forth new kinds of competences which might
'enskill' particular groups of workers, the flexible specialisation thesis
fails to address or to build into its analysis a recognition that skilled
work too may be subordinated to managerial control. While Braverman
postulated the progressive erosion of craft skills ('deskilling') and
growing managerial control of the labour process, criticism of his
position has tended to point to the continued survival of 'craft' labour
processes and the more general capacity of workers to resist managerial
initiative (see Elger, 1979; Thompson, 1983 for a review). The other
side of this observation, however, is that forms of specialised expertise
and craft competence may be embedded within a complex structure of
collective labour effectively subordinated to managerial control. While
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Piore and Sabel suggest that the mass production paradigm was
characterised by pervasive managerial control (which is a caricature),
the absence of managerial control over 'craft-work' tends to be assumed
rather than demonstrated. In practice, various kinds of labour process
will coexist at any one time, characterised by varying levels of
managerial control, often reflecting the local balance of forces between
management and labour and the particular character of product and
processes.
Secondly, many writers point to the limited nature of much of what
passes for 'enskilled' work. This is particularly true of attempts to
upgrade semi-skilled work processes in the 'mass production' industries.
A large body of case study evidence exists to suggest that the new
skilled occupations entail flexibility across a range of what were
previously demarcated skills or tasks, what Hyman refers to as 'an
expanded portfolio of competences' (quoted in Thompson, 1989: 226).
This may be as true of 'intellectual skills' as of manual ones. Here, in
many cases, it seems that the scope and depth of such jobs are often:
'so routinised that they could be picked up easily by other workers'
(ibid). Whether this amounts to 'humanisation' or the 're-emergence of
craft-work' is contentious6.
6By way of support for this argument, Shaiken et al found that the
introduction of CNC in the US manufacturing sector was leading to only
limited forms of worker autonomy. Shopf 10cr workers tended to be given
only manual override facilities, not programming capacities. This
situation seemed to reflect management's wish to retain control of the
basic parameters of the work process. In fact, Shaiken and his
colleagues identified a dilemma in management's approach to the
(Footnote Continued)
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It seems, therefore, that what flexible specialisation theory identifies as
the emergence of humane, 'enskilled' work, might actually signal a more
limited, if nonetheless important development in mass production
industries. A relative shift may be occurring in management's attempt
to engage the creative capacities of the workforce. This is related to
the introduction of new technology insofar as increased capital intensity
leads to a heightened concern with utilisation rates. Attempts to
engage the workforce in the struggle to improve utilisation rates have
become significant. Devices such as QWL appear to be a genuine
innovation in the attempt by management to resolve the
control/creativity dilemma. In many ways it appears as a qualitative
shift in the direction of greater engagement with the creative skills and
aspirations of the workforce. But, what are the terms on which such
innovations are being pursued? For instance, the fascination with QWL,
expressed by Katz and Sabel ignores the fact that:
QWL is a highly constrained form of empowerment that is far
removed from either of the traditional agendas of industrial
democracy or job enrichment. These constraints arise from
the subordination of participation within management
decision-making processes, efficiency criteria and power
relations that have largely remained untouched (Thompson,
1989: 226).
(Footnote Continued)
introduction of such systems: while acknowledging that operator
intervention is essential and that skilled workers operate CNC more
effectively, managers feared that routinely allowing machinists to
programme or edit would, by reducing managerial ability to supervise and
coordinate work, threaten shop performance (Shaiken et al 1986,
especially pages 172-3).
7Giordano's (1988) analysis of the introduction of QWL identifies
how it can actually increase management control. QWL, she argues, has
normally been introduced alongside automated production processes.
Taken together these two can contribute to the recentralisation of
corporate authority over production decisions insofar as both can be
(Footnote Continued)
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A third major problem area is the wilful neglect of the issue of
intensification. As already seen, attempts to broaden semi-skilled work
processes, for instance, may often represent simply a grouping together
of several related tasks. Given the limited nature of these changes,
important evidence exists to suggest that managements' concern with
upskilling is mainly an attempt to intensify work processes. As Shaiken
et al note: 'the classification issue is primarily a battle over the
intensity of work' (1986: 179). While some grouping together of tasks
may reflect changed technical requirements, much of this change is
concerned simply with eliminating downtime and waiting time from
production processes. This is achieved by, say, requiring production
workers to perform minor maintenance or inspection tasks.
Intensification may also underlie attempts to alter craft demarcations.
Thus apparent tendencies toward more skilled work may be facilitating
intensification on a large scale and may, therefore be a Trojan horse
for workers. Yet Piore and Sabel simply do not address this
possibility. More significantly, though, as pointed out earlier, they see
the trend toward craft labour leading to the humanisation of work in
ways which suggest that unions are almost superfluous as guarantors of
workers rights.	 They choose to focus on the issue of skills at the
(Footnote Continued)
information gathering processes. The capacity for automated equipment
to be used as information generators depends on workers' ability and
willingness to use computerised data. QWL, argues Giordano, helps to
accomplish this goal. Moreover, she recounts how information generated
in this way can and has been passed up the corporate hierarchy to
facilitate 'whipsawing' in the US car industry.
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expense of any implications this might have for effort levels, an area in
which the role of trade unions, of course remains crucial8.
The final problem relates to the total disregard of the flexible
specialisation thesis for losers and for unevenness in the process of
restructuring. While Sabel contrives to represent the Third Italy as
characterised by a post-Fordist harmony of craft labour, Murray (1983;
1987) for instance, has suggested that in Emilian engineering racial,
gender and skill differences also play an important part in the operation
of the industrial districts. The quality craft-work identified by Sabel
certainly appears to exist but is the preserve of 'middle-aged, Emilian
men' (Murray, 1987: 88). More enervating work processes are carried
out by more marginal social groups. Semi-skilled assembly work,
plastic moulding, wiring and so on is carried out by women, heavy
foundry work by southern Italian men and North Africans. Murray
maintains that the marginality of these groups is central to the
operation of the new flexibility. In the case of engineering in Bologna
there is a hierarchy of economic conditions associated with the artisan
8The complete lack of concern for the intensification issue is
reflected in Piore and Sabel's analysis of Japanese production methods
(1984: 156-82). Here they fail to integrate the many critical accounts
of the organisation of Japanese labour processes which focus on the
highly intensive nature of work and the anti-social impacts of this (see
section 4, below). It is also worth noting that many of the changes
which flexible specialisation theorists identify as occurring in the US
car industry (upskilling, QWL, etc.), are a response to and are directly
inspired by Japanese competition. For Parker and Slaughter (1990)
intensification is the very essence of this change which they call
'management by stress'. In the Japanese case the absence of independent
trade unions is a critical factor in explaining this intensity of the
work process, see section 4 below.
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sector, with conditions of work ranging from highly skilled and well
paid positions to dirty and deskilled ones. The division of labour
constructed on racial and gender divisions is central to the operation of
the small firm sector. Murray concludes that:
The geographical fragmentation of distinct phases of a
product's labour process works to create maximum wage
differentials between different groups of workers. This may
well be to the advantage of the skilled machinist. However,
it effectively undermines the radical solidaristic wage
bargaining pursued by the Italian engineering workers union,
the FLM, throughout the 1970s. And it leaves the majority of
workers in this sector, who do not possess these
much-demanded skills open to the unmediated vagaries of
market forces (1987: 88).
A more general set of points emerges from this last criticism. Piore
and Sabel argue that the regions and countries with surviving craft
skills are the most likely front-runners in the race to develop economic
development strategies based on flexible specialisation. However, their
discussion of the rise of skilled work ignores the uneven distribution of
skills throughout the workforce. To this extent, they choose not to
recognise the 'undesirable and costly downside' of the strategy they
advocate, namely, the extent to which it will foster new divisions within
the workforce (Jenson, 1990: 141). The 'unity of the abstract and the
concrete' within the artisan firm may simply express a growth in
polarisation of skills in the external labour market. As Jenson notes
different types of labour. are used in different ways: women workers,
for instance, are obstructed from obtaining access to the jobs which
characterise those parts of the artisan sector which Piore and Sabel
admire.
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In summary, it is possible to identify three major problem areas
emerging from flexible specialisation theory in its application to changes
in the production process. These are: firstly, the utility of the mass
production/flexible specialisation dichotomy itself. Secondly, the
inability to account for diverse outcomes to the process of restructuring
and to deal with the political implications of this. Finally, the fact that
even where instances of flexible specialisation can be identified it does
not necessarily have the benefits for labour which they assume.
Potentially Piore and Sabel may have some important insights concerning
changes in the organisation of production in certain qualified situations,
but these tend to be obscured behind claims that they have identified a
new (universal) organising principle to which all industries and forms
of work can, or must, gravitate. And on this point the theory of
flexible specialisation is unconvincing, incapable as it is of recognising
or dealing with the possibility of differences, of unevenness. Hyman
makes perhaps the crucial point;
to pose flexible specialisation as a potential recipe for
universal corporate success is to envisage an economy in
which there are no losers, only winners. . . but in a
competitive capitalist economy not all contestants can win
prizes. If some can gain a competitive edge through flexible
specialisation - and if self contained market niches are not
universally available - then some will be driven into the abyss
(1988: 52-3).
4. JAPANISATION AS POST-FORDISM
Japanese manufacturing techniques have exerted a mesmeric hold over
the imagination of many British and North American commentators. The
competitive success of Japanese manufacturing industry, often at the
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expense of western producers, has prompted this heightened interest.
Japan has been described as the quintessential 'post-Fordist' society
(eg. Kenney and Florida, 1988: 122). Moreover, the industrial
principles which are said to underpin Japanese competitive success, are
said to be transferable to other countries (eg. Schonberger, 1982).
Kenney and Florida, indeed go even further arguing that Japanese
production methods are the new organising principle for industrial
production:
The successful implementation of Japanese work organization
indicates that postfordist production is generalizable across
quite different national contexts. . . Far from being unique to
the Japanese context, social organization of postfordist
production appears to be setting in motion a dramatic
transformation of work organisation, industrial structure, and
labor relations across much of the landscape of advanced
industrial capitalism (Kenney and Florida, 1988: 144-5).
Relatedly, some writers have suggested that, compared to 'Fordist'
labour processes, the Japanese approach 'offers a much more humane
working environment' (Kaplinsky, 1988: 468). More specifically for the
empirical focus of this study, much has been made of the potential for
the 'Japanisation'• of British manufacturing (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988).
According to this perspective, Japanese methods have been transferred
into Britain through the arrival of inward investors and through
9The view that Japanese work organisation is more humane than that
said to prevail in western countries has been advanced from within the
flexible specialisation camp and offered as evidence of the
're-emergence of the craft paradigm' (e.g. Piore and Sabel, 1984:
205-208). In the previous section, however, I highlighted also the
apparent ambiguity of the Japanese case in the theory of flexible
specialisation. For this reason I do not address the pronouncements of
Sabel and others on this case. Also, as will become clear, I regard
talk of resurgent craftwork as particularly unhelpful in understanding
the significance of Japanese work organisation.
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'emulation' by existing firms. For some in management circles, Japanese
production methods hold out the possibility of arresting the
comparatively poor performance of British manufacturing (for example,
Parnaby, 1987; Wickens, 1987). This point of view is shared by key
government ministers (see Tomaney, 1991).
In what follows, then, the ever-growing debate on Japanese production
techniques is addressed in relation to the question of whether it
symbolises the alleged radical departure in industrial organisation and
whether it presages a trend towards the humanisation of work.
Turning Japanese? Innovative aspects of Japanese production methods
The argument that Japanese production methods signal the end of mass
production is particularly difficult to sustain. It seems clear that far
from being a manifestation of a resurgent 'craft paradigm' (Piore and
Sabel, 1984), Japanese competitive success has turned on the
performance of large enterprises practising the production of 'high
volume repetitively produced goods' (Schonberger, 1982, emphasis in
original). Furthermore, the idea that contemporary restructuring is
determined essentially by technical innovation is not supported by the
Japanese case. While it is true that Japanese enterprises make use of
advanced technology (Japan is the world's largest user of robots) there
seems broad agreement that the significance of these methods lies not in
the nature of technology but in the way it is used (e.g. Sayer, 1986;
Morroni, 1990). As Jurgens observes:
The Japanese production system is based on three principles:
flexibility in utilization of facilities; minimization of quality
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problems as they arise; minimization of production-flow
buffers, whether material, manpower or time-buffers. The
realization of these principles is not apparently dependent on
a specific technology; in fact most experts conclude that the
Japanese 'competitive edge' is not based on a specific
technology. One of the most important factors is, in fact the
intense manpower utilization resulting from the interaction of
the above mentioned production principles (1989: 208; cf.
Kaplinsky, 1988: 462).
The core of Japanese production management and productivity
improvement is generally viewed as arising from just-in-time production
and total quality control which are held to challenge some of the
assumptions of western orthodoxy in mass production industries, which,
it is said have traditionally tended to trade-off volume and quality in
ways which led to wasted output and wasted production time (eg.
Sayer, 1986). In contrast, Japanese production methods ('Just-in
-time' production or kanban) are said to be based around a special
concern with the elimination of wasted output and wasted time in
production. This is pursued through attempts to build quality control
functions into production (rather than testing for faults at the end of a
production run) and through attempts to eliminate sources of disruption
which lead to lost or unproductive time. The result is a 'smoothing' of
the production flow (Schonberger, 1982). In contrast to Western
orthodoxy, the activities of the workforce itself are central in these
processes. Management literature stresses the extent to which such a
system requires a 'skilled' and cooperative workforce (Monden, 1981;
Schonberger, 1982). This last feature of the system is the foundation
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for claims about the 'progressive' features of Japanese production
practices10.
The emphasis on employee involvement and high motivation levels in
management literature has led to the argument that Japanese methods
are a 'respect-for-human system where the workers are allowed to
display in full their capabilities through active participation in running
and improving their own workshops' (Sugimori et al, 1977: 553).
Moreover, this is seen to gel with key features of the Japanese
industrial relations system:
Customs such as lifetime employment system, labour unions by
companies, little discrimination between shop workers and
white-collar staff and chances available to workers for
promotion to management positions, have been of great service
in promoting the feeling of unity between the company and
workers (Sugimori et al, 1977: 553)
This sympathetic view of Japanese work organisation has been advanced
vigorously by a group of writers which, for ease of reference, I shall
term the Kyoto School (e.g Aoki, 1984, 1987, 1990; Koike, 1984, 1987).
Here the kanban (JIT) system is conceptualised as a 'semi-horizontal
operational coordination' method (Aoki, 1990), which requires shop level
flexibility in adjusting the amount, kinds and timing of in-process
products. Also minimal inventories necessitates effective control of low
level disruptions such as. machinery malfunctions, worker absenteeism,
quality defects, and so on, in order minimize their effects on the
°Monden (1981), Sayer (1986), Schonberger (1982) provide more
detailed discussion of the principles of 'just-in time' and the extent
to which it addresses problems in the operation of 'mass production'
processes (see also Tomaney, 1990).
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smooth operation of semi-horizontal coordination. This is aided by a
form of work organisation in which job demarcations are fluid. Job
rotation, for instance, is common with workers becoming 'skilled' in a
relatively wide range of jobs. This is an ideal accompaniment to
systems such as kanban'1.
Koike argues that shop-floor employees of large firms have 'white
collarized skills' and that these form a 'crucial foundation' (1987: 287)
of Japanese industrial success. These workers, moreover, 'think of
themselves as belonging to the middle class' (1987: 329). Wide ranging
on-the-job training supplemented by short, theory-oriented off-the-job
instruction, lasting several years is the foundation of this work
organisation. Shop-floor workers in large firms, therefore, share with
white collar workers the promise of a 'career' with their company
(Koike, 1984, 1987).
The existence and role of lifetime employment and seniority (or merit)
wage systems (nenko) and company unions are seen as reflecting and
For instance the assignment of a worker to a set of different
kinds of machine - laid out in linear sequence, rather then grouped by
function, can save time. necessary for the transport and loading of
in-process products, as well as in-shop inventories (Aoki, 1990).
Equally, the rotation process - or 'learning by doing' (Koike, 1984) -
makes the worker familiar with the whole work process involved in the
shop - a familiarity not readily obtained when the work process is
organised along more Tayloristic lines. The familiarity obtained may be
tacit, but is useful in identifying - and in some cases solving - local
disruptions. This is termed an 'integrative' system, where routine
tasks and tasks related to exceptional circumstances are not specialized
and work organisation tends to a team orientation. In large firms this
is the foundation of QCs (Koike, 1984).
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reinforcing this system of skill formation and worker participation.
Lifetime employment motivates both employers and employees to share
the costs of investment in this team-oriented human capital.
Seniority-related pay and long-term employment guarantees have been
developed as devices through which both management and labour can
reap returns from their respective investments over time. In order to
protect his skill development - the workers to whom these comments
apply are invariably men - the worker is seen as having a special
interest in the economic situation of the firm: 'Even without any loyalty
to the firm, he has to pay attention to the firm's productivity to
prevent it from being bested by rivals' (Koike, 1987: 307). Enterprise
unions, with their well-known cooperative attitude to management,
merely reflect these concerns of the workforce.
The arguments of the Kyoto School reflect the dominant view of
Japanese work organisation in the West. However, significantly for the
concerns of this thesis, these arguments have taken up by critics of
Taylorism (see: Kaplinsky, 1988; Kenney and Florida, 1988; cf. Sayer,
1986). In particular, the evidence of the Kyoto School has been
contrasted with a less celebratory view of Japanese production methods
which emphasises that continuous flow and constant rationalisation are
based on the extreme intensification of work. For Dohse et al (1985)
the existence of company unionism is indicative of the untrammelled
power obtained by Japanese management in the workplace which results
in continual rationalisation of production - often through QCs and the
like - using workers' own knowledge. They term this process
'Toyotism' but suggest that it 'is simply the practice of the
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organizational principles of Fordism under the conditions in which
management prerogatives are largely unlimited' (1985: 141) and which
were the result of defeats inflicted on the independent union movement,
which had posed a radical challenge to Japanese capital and state power
following the end of the Second World War.
Kenney and Florida present perhaps the boldest critique of what they
term the 'super-exploitation thesis', to present the Japanese case as an
example (or the example) of post-Fordism and as more humane than
Taylorism. Indeed they advocate such methods to American workers.
Adopting the 'Kyoto' view of the Japanese industrial system, they view
lifetime employment guarantees and nenko, as part of the 'unwritten
terms' of a 'class accord' and the 'white collarization' of shop-floor
work, participation in 'voluntary' quality circles and the rationalisation
of production, as the outcome of successful struggles by company
unions. They conclude that, in large firms, the strategies of company
unions have rendered capital dependent on labour to an unprecedented
degree. The success of this strategy is reflected in the relative
absence of industrial conflict over the issue of technical change in
Japanese enterprises.
However, this case for company unionism and the attendant benefits for
Japanese workers is not persuasive. In fact, the limited role played by
company unions in the production process is stressed by Toshiro
Shirai:
Generally speaking, while labour unions in Japan express the
primary concern over the wages, they pay little attention to
the amount of labour supplied in return for the wages. . . (the)
union function is very feeble or rarely seen in such areas as
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the regulation of production schedules, manning levels,
standard output quotas, speeds of production and so forth.
At least, unions scarcely pick up these issues as the agenda
for the formal collective bargaining (Shirai, 1968; quoted in
Kumazawa and Yamada, 1988: 117).
To the extent that negotiations occur they do so informally. Moreover,
when the 'congruence of union and management hierarchies'
(Deutschmann, 1987: 483) is taken into account, it is easy to accept the
argument that negotiations are dominated by the concerns of
management, with the company union's role limited to 'preparing
acceptance for the new technology and an atmosphere of smooth
cooperation for its implementation' (Deutschmann 1987: 470). For
Deutschmann, Japanese unions have failed to act as a 'countervailing
power' to the interests of management at every level 12 . Indeed, it was
precisely the absence of limits on management's ability to rationalise
production and intensify work processes, which was the foundation of
rapid productivity increases after 1960. Moreover, it was on this
foundation of rising productivity that long term employment guarantees
were introduced. But far from being part of the 'unwritten terms' of
the class accord, 'lifetime' employment has always been a gift of
management and more often than not a response to endemic labour
2Kawanishi (1986: 152) goes so far as to describe enterprise
unions as an 'auxiliary instrument' of personnel administration in large
firms: 'Thus the labour-management consultation system is, under the
good name of worker's participation, an instrument which converts the
union into an auxiliary instrument of management and by the union, for
the increase of productivity. Under such labour-management relations,
the workshop organisation of a union becomes an organisation which,
under the hegemony of management, mobilises its members to increase
productivity (ibid).
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shortages 13 . Moreover, lifetime employment has been preserved for
core workers in large firms only through the dualistic nature of the
Japanese production system and labour market14.
It is clear that large firms have avoided large scale employment
problems mainly through 'externalising' the consequences of technical
change and rationalisation. Deutschmann (1987) examined why rapid
technical change took place so smoothly in large enterprises in the
1970s and concludes that work previously done by contractors was 'put
in' in order to guarantee employment for core workers. The 'success'
of enterprise unions, therefore, needs to be measured against this
dualism and the discrimination along lines of age, gender and ethnicity
which it involves.
The company orientation of unions also limits the value of the 'skills'
which are seen as central to nenko practices. This means that far from
being indicative of worker security and company dependence, they are
precisely the opposite. The company specific nature of the skills means
As Tokunaga observes: '...the lifetime employment system was not
prescribed in collective agreements, but existed only by custom: thus,
if a management considered a situation serious, it could dismiss even
regular employees (honko)' (1983: 316; for a similar interpretation see
Kumuzawa and Yamuda, 1988: 123).
'4Kenney and Florida acknowledge the existence of this dualism but,
ultimately, view the relationship between large firms and smaller ones
not as one dominated by power inequities, but as one aspect of the
system's effciency. The relationship between these firms is explained
in terms of sharing the burden of innovation. However, they themselves
recognise that the 'white-collar' skills which they laud barely extend
outside the large firms (cf. Koike, 1987).
47
there are no nation-wide social arrangements against which worker's
skills can be evaluated across the dividing lines of firms organised, as
they are, in a powerful hierarchy (Kumuzawa and Yamada, 1988).
Thus, far from guaranteeing the economic security of workers the
Japanese industrial relations system actually limits it. As Deutschmann
(1987) observes, the lack of vocational labour markets denies 'exit'
options for those employees not able or willing to comply with
rationalisation measures. This has two implications. Firstly, it means
firms can safely invest in 'human capital' with a guarantee of good
returns. Secondly, it means workers must comply with rationalisation
measures to guarantee the prosperity of 'their' firm. The company
unions themselves are rendered more committed to the competitive
struggle of the firm: in fact in a real material sense the interest of
workers, unions and companies are at one15.
Ultimately Kenney and Florida's case for Japanisation as a humane,
'post-Fordist' form of work organisation, rests on their rejection of the
5Paradoxica11y, this situation also explains why examples of
worker militancy in post-war Japan have usually been associated with the
issue of lay-off s. The major strikes at Nissan and Toyota in the early
1950s - the defeat of which was a prelude to the development of the
industrial relations system - concerned lay-of fs (Cusumano, 1985). The
famous strike of the traditionally militant Mitsuii-Miike coalminers in
1959-60, also concerned this issue, and is usually regarded as the last
attempt to halt the rationalisation offensive which underlay the
economic growth of the 1960s (Muto, 1985, 1986; Tokunaga, 1983). The
mass redundancies which accompanied the privatisation and dimemberment
of Japan National Railways led to violent protests in the 1980s. This
has been taken as evidence of the increasing fragility of the nenko
system (Itoh, 1990: 18-19).
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view that intensification is built into the system. In a key passage
they argue:
The objective of the JIT system is to increase productivity
not through super-exploitation of labor but rather through
increased technological efficiency, heightened utilization of
equipment, minimal scrappage or rework, decreased inventory
and higher quality. It thus increases the 'value' extracted in
production, decreases materials consumed per unit and
minimizes circulation time, making the actual production
process much more efficient (1985: 136).
This is a neat argument but one which fails to address the main point
of the critics that the search for precisely these time economies in the
production process is premised upon and contributes to a more intensive
use of labour. The pursuit of stockless production is based upon the
elimination of all wasteful motions in the performance of work: 'The net
result, when combined with job flexibility and upwardly mobile task
allocation levels is the continuous reduction of labour' (Turnbull, 1987:
11). The continued reduction of batch sizes allows tighter control of
the production process and work allocation, greater utilisation of
residual labour and the standardisation of job tasks. This is the basis
of Schonberger's rejection of the idea that JIT is more 'humanistic' than
'Taylorism': 'but the Japanese out-Taylor us all - including putting
Taylor to good use in QC circles or small group improvement activities'
(1982: 193). The continued removal of in-process buffers intensifies
work even further' 6 . The delegation of quality control responsibilities
'The Japanese no longer accept the buffer principle. Instead of
adding buffer stocks at the points of irregularity, Japanese managers
expose the workforce to the consequences. The response is that workers
and foremen rally to root out the causes of irregularity. To ignore it
is to face the consequences of work stoppages. The Japanese principle
of exposing the workers to the consequences of production irregularities
(Footnote Continued)
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adds further to work burdens. However, the devolution of certain
previously specialised tasks to the shop-floor is generally more limited
than implied by terms such as 'intellectual skills':
Some of them may be probably highly routinized so that other
workers can perform them without any real training.
Furthermore, it is not unusual that frequent mobility in a
workshop arises because of the management policy of
operating with minimal manning levels. What can safely be
said is only that 'skill' scarcely emerges as a source of
workers' autonomous power to regulate how and how much
workers should work (Kumuzawa and Yamada, 1988: 124; cf.
also the discussion of skills under flexible specialisation in
the previous section).
The case, in my view, for Japanese work methods as a form of
'super-exploitation' remains strong. Moreover, the version of Japanese
work methods outlined here would appear to resolve the discrepancy
between those accounts which emphasise features such as 'learning-by
doing' and so on (eg Koike passim; Sayer, 1986), and those accounts
which stress intensification: intensification can be seen as the outcome
of efforts to engage the participation of the workforce in the
rationalisation effort17.
(Footnote Continued)
is not applied passively. In the Toyota kanban system, for example, each
time that workers succeed in correcting the causes of recent
irregularity (machine jamming, cantankerous holding devices, etc.,) the
managers remove still more buffer stock. The workers are never allowed
to settle into a comfortable pattern; or rather, the pattern becomes one
of continually perfecting the production process' (Schonberger, 1982:
32, emphasis in original; cf. also the comments of Abernathy et al,
1983: 176).
Dohse et al (1985) in their attempt to stress the negative
aspects of Japanese work methods and the extent to which they are
founded on the defeats suffered by Japanese labour, however, are in
danger of understating their novelty when they argue that they are
simply a form of uninhibited Fordism. Systems such as kanban represent
a real innovation as far as the operation of mass production industries
(Footnote Continued)
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Japanisation outside Japan?
The notion of Japanisation as post-Fordism is based crucially on claims
made for the transferability of these methods. Jurgens discusses the
transferability of these methods in terms of a 'highly uneven selection
pattern' (1989: 217). Western firms have taken up job rotation methods
and have begun the pursuit of zero defects, zero buffers and so on.
The introduction of production teams and the decentralisation of
responsibilities seem part of broader international trend. However,
these processes cannot be taken as evidence of 'Japanisation' because
they have a more limited range of functions than in Japan. Also the
mobilisation of problem-solving among shop-floor workers has proceeded
at a slow pace. According to Jurgens the limited nature of worker
involvement in the west reflects the fact that:
The mechanisms for assuring conformity and regulating
attitudes seem to be too embodied in Japanese social
structures . and their conditional factors for their transfer to
be systematically developed (1989: 218).
(Footnote Continued)
is concerned. As suggested earlier, in principle, JIT addresses some
key problems in the orthodox operation of mass production processes
which concern the elimination of idle time. In particular, systems such
as kanban address the key question of line balancing from a different
set of premises to those of Western orthodoxy. In Western mass
production contexts line balancing tends to be a technical exercise
concerned with ensuring proportional labour times for fixed labour
assignments. This is a difficult task to achieve and contributes to the
emergence of gaps in the work process. The Japanese approach of moving
workers around the shop is designed very largely to address this problem
by either moving workers to trouble spots or moving them away when lines
are running smoothly. This allows shops to operate with less workers.
Also it ensures a high proportion of time worked to time attended.
Schonberger (1982: 140) expresses this with characteristic candour:
'Good line balancing means full utilization of workers: keep them busy'.
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Nevertheless, claims continue to be made that a new organising
principle for industrial production is emerging and I return to this
issue in the next chapter in the light of the specific claims for the
'Japanisation of British industry'.
Despite various confused attempts to mobilise 'Japanisation' as
supporting evidence for flexible specialisation, it seems that these
methods do not suggest the 'end of mass production'. Rather they
suggest an innovation within mass production industry and its
development into a more continuous process (Schonberger, 1982: 104-5;
also Shaiken et al, 1986: 176). JIT and its supports can be seen as a
variant of the integrated mass production process to which I drew
attention at the end of the previous section. In the Japanese case,
though, the central emphasis is on shop design and intensive utilisation
labour rather than a particular technology.
The absence of a countervailing power to management is central to the
operation of this system. As Kumuzawa and Yamada argue:
'The set of popularly perceived productivity advantages
of so-called Japanese-style management largely rest on
management's unchallenged power to reorganize the
existing production process more efficiently (1988: 102).
Therefore the argument, , advanced by Kaplinsky and by Kenney and
Florida, that the adoption of such working methods will guarantee a
new, post-Fordist, humanisation of work is implausible. There is an
overwhelming case for viewing JIT - and the forms of work organisation
with which it is associated - as a form of work intensification.
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5. NEW PRODUCTION CONCEPTS: THE GERMAN DEBATES
The notion that key aspects of manufacturing industry are seeing the
emergence of 'new production concepts' which raise the possibility of
reskilling and, more importantly, the possibility of a new bargain
between capital and labour, is associated with the work of Horst Kern
and Michael Schumann and their colleagues at the Soziologisches
Forschungsinstitut (SOFI) in Gottingen. The possibility, however, that
the new forms of technology and work organisation offer positive signs
for organised labour, in fact, has been more widely heralded (see, for
instance, Streeck, 1987; Sorge and Streeck, 1988, and other work from
the Wissenschaftszentrum, WZB, Berlin). Debates about the value of
this conception of contemporary workplace restructuring in
manufacturing have dominated European sociology, in much the way the
debate about flexible specialisation has dominated Anglo-American
discussions (see Campbell, 1989, for a review). While superficially
similar to the concept of flexible specialisation, the 'new production
concepts' idea is significantly different and, in my view, warrants
separate discussion18.
The few English language discussions of Kern and Schumann (1984)
have tended to present their work as another variant of flexible
specialisation. While this is partially justified (Kern is now
collaborating with Sabel) this approach raises the danger of ignoring
the interesting debate which has surrounded the reception of their work.
My own view is that, despite its limitations, the work of Kern and
Schumann, in crucial respects, is superior to that of Piore and Sabel.
I discuss the key differences below.
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In particular, and in contrast to the theory of 'flexible specialisation',
the theory of 'new production concepts' is grounded in the recent
experience of the (former) West German economy (hereafter referred to
as 'Germany') and the development of the 'high-wage/high-productivity
coalition'. This raises the question of the general applicability of this
model and the relevance of discussing it in the light of the concerns of
this chapter and the thesis more generally. There are two good
reasons for including a discussion of this debate in this chapter.
First, there have been attempts to locate the emergence of new
production concepts outside Germany (see Kern and Schumann, 1989)
and to explain the poor performance of other economies (eg. the UK) in
terms of the absence of 'new production concepts' (eg. Lane, 1988).
The implication of these discussions is that the insights of Kern and
Schumann could be applied to situations outside Germany. Second, the
debate surrounding new production concepts offers some insights of a
general nature into the transformations occurring in process and mass
production industries.
The End of the Division of Labour?
The end of the division of labour: that is what development
in an important part of industrial production could lead to
under the influence of the new production concepts (Kern and
Schumann, 1987: 163)
Kern and Schumann's identification of 'new production concepts' around
1984 was a remarkable change from their previous position which had
identified the progressive 'polarisation of skills' at the plant level (see
Campbell, 1989). For Kern and Schumann the new experiments in work
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organisation which had gestated in the 1970s and which began to bear
fruit in the 1980s represent a radical break with Taylorism. Skilled
work, 'which during a process stretching over many years has been
forced into secondary sectors' is seen as returning 'to the primary
production area' (Schumann, 1987: 46).
The re-emergence of skilled work and an associated valorisation of
labour is ascribed to several reasons: because the fully automated
factory is seen as a false hope; because technical change and the
nature of markets requires more flexibility from workers; because the
'old' methods of securing control over the workforce have lost their
credibility, and; because of a general demand for more satisfying forms
of work (eg. Schumann, 1987: 57). More generally, Streeck, reviewing
the trend toward flexible industrial relations argues that the initiatives
put forward by management are designed:
to find ways of managing an unprecedented degree of
economic uncertainty deriving from a need for continuous
rapid adjustment to a market environment that seems to have
become permanently more turbulent than in the past. Coping
with this uncertainty seems to require an increasingly close
(re-)integration of industrial relations and industrial strategy
in the context of a comprehensive manufacturing policy (1987:
285, emphasis in original).
Kern and Schumann's thesis is based on research into changes
occurring in three 'core' areas of German manufacturing: motor
vehicles, machine tools and chemicals (Kern and Schumann, 1984a, 1987;
Schumann, 1990). While the concrete forms of work organisation differ
in each case, they feel able to offer some claims about developments
which are common to all. A new 'consciousness of the qualitative
significance of human work performance' (Kern and Schumann, 1987:
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160) arises principally with the trend towards flexible forms of
automation. Where automation is occurring a 'holistic principle of
labour skill appropriation' is emerging because the introduction of new
technology 'frequently allows - or even demands - the tailoring of jobs
for higher qualifications as well as broader responsibilities or at least a
less detailed division of labour' (Kern and Schumann, 1984b: 59).
This general trend is seen to be expressed concretely in each of the
industries studied. In the car industry, Kern and Schumann (1984,
1987) identified initially the emergence of a vocational 'production
mechanic' associated with intensive mechanisation. Follow up work
though suggests that the trend to new production concepts takes two
principle forms. In 'high-tech areas' (eg. stamping and machining
shops) the idea of 'integrated work' has gained general acceptance:
The issue at stake is not simply the future localization of
maintenance but also that of quality control, machine
programming, and the regulating of the work flow. The
decisive factor for the broad diffusion of the idea of
integrated work roles is the conviction that it is exactly the
polyvalent production worker - polyvalent in the sense that
he is able to carry out maintenance operations in addition to
his direct functions - who can guarantee maximum utilization
of costly machinery. Killing two birds with one stone, one
hopes to stop the expansion of maintenance costs as well
(Schumann, 1990: 3).
In assembly areas, where the obstacles to automation are much greater,
it is possible to identify only 'hesitant steps to job enrichment' (ibid)
which consist of more flexible work cycles, de-coupling the assembly
line, teamworking and so on.
In the machine tool industry the widespread introduction of CNC
equipment is said to be resulting also in a demand for higher skills,
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with skilled labour regarded as a 'positive planning concept' and no
longer as a 'necessary evil' (Kern and Schumann, 1987: 161; also
Lappe, 1988; Mickler, 1989). Here the increase in skilled work is not
purely a product of technical change but a result of the decision to
combine control and programming functions. Within the chemical
industry the pursuit of full automation may continue the trend towards
'the professionalisation of production work' (Kern and Schumann, 1984:
161), although, again, follow up studies suggest the enthusiasm for
work reform is here less than in the other two industries and is moving
at a slower rate of progress (Schumann, 1990; cf. Cavestro, 1989, for
broadly supporting French evidence on machine tools and chemicals)
Despite differences which are the product of sectoral specificities a
generally increased demand for a new type of skilled worker arises from
the process of contemporary restructuring. There is a common factor
underlying this new skilled work: 'What is required is a man who is
manually gifted and theoretically talented, able to diagnose and to act
effectively', one who 'must be in a position to compensate for
weaknesses in the technical system by practical action' (Schumann,
1987: 47-48). Schumann has used the generic term 'systems controller'
to capture the nature of the new skilled work emerging in
manufacturing.
'The worker supports technical autonomy and intervenes if
machinery does not function at an optimal level or if
breakdowns occur. His actions are subsidiary. In the case
of deviation from the optimum or failures the worker may take
direct control of the process, always with the aim then, to
give control back to the machinery. . . If the technical system
should work perfectly, the main responsibility of a systems'
controller is to check and to service the machinery. He
himself does a perfect job if he succeeds to anticipate
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deviations and breakdowns in the technical system and
proceeds to initiate prevention (Schumann, 1990: 19).
In short, the requalification of the workforce is necessary to guarantee
the smooth operation of increasingly complex and costly items of plant.
In a number of respects similarities clearly exist between 'new
production concepts' and flexible specialisation. However, it is worth
also stressing the important differences. Firstly, in their earlier work
at least, Kern and Schumann are less keen to make claims for
'paradigm' change of the kind advanced by Piore and Sabel. To an
extent they emphasise continuities as well as changes. In particular,
they argue that the principle of capitalist rationalisation remains
unaltered - the improved utilisation of machinery - but the means to
achieving this end is being altered. Arising from this, they offer a
production led account of restructuring rather than a market led one.
Secondly, they reject the idea that changes in manufacturing signify
the 're-emergence of craft-work'. The new skilled worker is 'less
materials-oriented and more concerned with technical and organizational
procedures', the new worker is instead 'a kind of scout: sensitive to
breakdowns, with quick reactions and the ability to improvise and take
preventive (sic) action' (Kern and Schumann, 1989: 94). Finally, Kern
and Schumann recognise that while some workers benefit from the
emergence of new skilled work, others lose out. They identify three
broad groups, the self-evident winners; the tolerators of rationalisation
whose positions are protected by employment laws but who lack the
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basis for moving into the new jobs, and; the losers who are expelled
from employment or who never actually obtain it19.
Notwithstanding the possibility of a downside to these developments,
'new production concepts' are said by their supporters to offer an
unprecedented opportunity for labour to strike a new bargain with
capital. The fact that the new rationalisation strategies require the
active participation of labour in production potentially gives labour a
new strength in the workplace. Unions need to work with the grain of
technical change. Such a response by trade unions would necessitate
their commitment to decentralised bargaining structures (in the German
case) and a recognition that interest representation by unions would be
closely integrated with the management of production and a concern for
productivity. Moreover, unions would need to recognise the need for
and institute greater pay differentials, more bonus systems and share
ownership by workers. These change are necessary to secure unions a
role in the new production system (eg. Streeck, 1987). Management
too, though, according to this view, must begin a reassessment of its
attitudes toward labour:
Higher productivity cannot be attained under the present
conditions without a more considerate, 'enlightened' treatment
' 91n fact one consequence of these developments in skills and
technology is to make it even more difficult for the unemployed to enter
the labour market. To this extent the problems inherent in the new
developments within plants are 'externalised' (Kern and Schumann, 1989:
96; cf. the discussion of Japanisation above). Altmann and Dull (1990:
112) suggest, however, that while the notion of 'new production
concepts' has been taken up with enthusiasm by sections of German
management, the issue of labour market segmentation has largely been
ignored.
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of human labour - that is something capital too must learn
(Kern and Schumann, 1987: 162).
Increasingly as sections of management come to see the value of the new
production concepts, labour's strategy should be to make alliance with
the 'modernisers' in their battle with the 'traditionalists' who are stuck
in outmoded, Taylorist lines of thought. While some writers (eg.
Streeck) see a momentous struggle with the future survival of the
labour movement at stake should the battle be lost, Kern and Schumann
tend to give the impression that the future is foreclosed with few
choices available, and a future pattern of development which is already
determined.
Limits to new production concepts
The first area of controversy surrounding the existence or not of 'new
production concepts' concerns the extent of the putative experiments.
Kern and Schumann have been accused of 'a lack of empirical data in
supporting their far-reaching conclusions' (Wiedermayer, 1989: 63). As
Wiedermayer notes: 'the manner of their presentation conveys the
impression of a virtually inexorable development process (not only in
some core sectors but in the economy as a whole)' (1989: 63). Altmann
and Dull (1990) suggest that the 'new production concepts', as
described by Kern and Schumann, amount to only limited, isolated
experiments not an emerging trend. Kern and Schumann at times have
given the impression that a brave new world is all but assured, while
at other times they have been more cautious in their pronouncements.
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A further point made by sceptics concerns Kern and Schumann's focus
on the 'core' sectors, as this tends to ignore the fact that in other
sectors alternative rationalisation patterns may be dominant. Moreover,
even within their restricted choice of sectors, Kern and Schumann have
been accused of emphasising, in the case of the car industry, trends in
highly automated areas (where tendencies toward a more skilled
workforce are more evident) while having less to say about areas like
final assembly where the obstacles to automation are great and the
evidence for radical changes in work organisation less strong
(Berggren, 1989)20.
The discussion which follows concentrates on the debate which
surrounds the key features of restructuring in the 'core' sectors where
the evidence for new production concepts is said to be strongest. The
first question concerns the nature of the new skilled work which is
emerging. Critics of 'new production concepts' make three related
points. First they point to the difficulty of generalising about the
impact of technical change - even in its most advanced forms (cf. the
discussion of flexible specialisation). Also, they suggest that where
production workers are gaining new skills these tend to be of a more
limited kind than that suggested by Kern and Schumann. Finally, the
critics point out that even 'enskilled' work processes can be subject to
20Kern and Schumann (1987) do note the absence of 'new production
concepts' in 'old' industrial sectors such as shipbuilding, steelmaking
and coalmining. The sectors, they argue, are distinguished by a simple
struggle for survival and descending position in the economic hierarchy.
This claim has obvious implications for this thesis which are addressed
in chapters Four and Six and are appraised in the conclusion.
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high levels of managerial control and that this has implications for other
important issues such as work burdens. These issues are highlighted
by an examination of critical research in two important areas:
robotisation in key areas of the production process and in the
emergence of team-working - the two often being closely related
phenomena.
One study of the introduction of robots in three different car plants
owned by separate firms concluded that general prognostications were
difficult because of the impossibility of assessing the consequences of
new technology independently of the particular circumstances under
which it is implemented. New technology, it is argued, may be
implemented within a 'traditional' division of labour as well as within
relatively autonomous work groups. This posed the question of who
were the winners and who were the losers in the rationalisation
process, and prompted the observation that new technology creates new
conflicts of interest between work groups rather than harmonious new
production concepts (Windoif, 1985).
Malsch et al (1984) have studied the introduction of robots into the
German car industry, largely in relation to spot welding. They argue
that for those who retained their jobs after automation the range of
skills involved the addition of 'small tasks' such as the preparation of
work materials, care and maintenance of electrodes in welding guns, or
quality control tasks, the effect of which was to eliminate certain
'indirect' tasks, but 'there is no basic change in the unskilled character
of the work' (Malsch et al, 1984: 40). Robotisation, due to its
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complexity and propensity to technical failure, does lead to an increased
demand for for qualified electricians and electrical engineers (engaged
in trouble shooting and monitoring activities akin to those in process
industries) so that the average skill profile of the plant increases. To
an extent there is a shift, associated with robotisation to a more
'autonomous, comprehensive automation worker' as opposed to 'a drilled,
segmented one' (Malsch et al, 1984: 43). However, this is a limited
innovation rather than a radical break because little control over the
work process has been ceded. The new 'comprehensive' worker they
argue is subject to 'comprehensive control', made possible by the
widespread use of information technology based on computer-integrated
control of production and personnel information systems.
This point is reiterated by Dankbaar's study of team-working in the
(West) German car industry. The use of modular production for certain
forms of off-line assembly work, for instance, allows longer work cycles
for the completion of sub-assemblies, than does a moving assembly line,
and this can be taken as evidence of work humanisation. But the use
of AGVs (automatic guided vehicles) is double-edged because of the
possibilities for increased performance control to which they give rise:
The computer knows the standard times for the various
operations that have to be carried out in every station on
every piece of work and it would be easy to signify each
station (eg. by a light switching on if it is taking more than
standard time (1988b)21.
21A brief reference to the Swedish example is interesting here,
because of the degree to which it has inspired German restructuring (see
Schumann, 1990). For instance, the much lauded 'departure from the
assembly line' represented by 'dock assembly' at Volvo's experimental
(Footnote Continued)
63
It is noteworthy that in the particular case studied by Dankbaar the
works council successfully resisted the attempt to use AGV technology
to increase control over individual performance. However, the
potentiality is clear and is ignored by the optimists: 'skilled' work may
be integrated into the machine system.
This is not to impute a crude 'control imperative' to management. It is,
instead, a recognition that capital intensification is requiring new
efforts to increase machine utilisation. Increased use of monitoring
technologies reflects this broader imperative rather than a simple desire
to control the workforce. The heightened concern with machine
utilisation, however, is often related by the critical research to the
process of intensification - a process facilitated by the assignment of
extra tasks to production workers. This is exemplified in the
pronouncements of management in relation to team-working - usually
taken as the ultimate expression of humanisation. Thus according to V
Haas of GM, Austria, in relation to that company's most advanced
experiments:
Generally stated, each of the individual departments named
has its own personnel that can be divided with with respect
to labour deployment into active time and idle or waiting time.
This is mainly caused by more or less rigid departmental
(Footnote Continued)
Kalmar plant (e.g. Lindholm and Norstedt, 1975; Aguren et al, 1984), is
now regarded as only a limited innovation. The carriers which move
part-completed work into docks for groups to perform a range of tasks
are controlled centrally by a computer with a uniform work pace
throughout the plant (Berggren, 1989: 181). Many of the innovations
associated with flexible automation at Volvo in fact give rise to
increased possibilites for central monitoring (see Auer, 1985; Gronblad,
1987). Thus, Breggren's (1989: 193) description 'the dominant trend' in
the Swedish motor industry as the emergence of 'flexible Taylorism'
seems accurate (see Tomaney, 1990).
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boundaries in the sense of a division of labour and areas of
responsibility. The team concept has this as a starting point.
The concept leads to production teams, that means that all
those directly participating are 'in one boat', and all can do
all of the tasks within the area of responsibility of the team -
quality, production, volume and capacity utilisation. The
joining together of previously separated individual areas of
responsibility in a team opens up possibilities for reducing
the sum of time lost. Or, expressed differently, to achieve
the highest possible ratio of time worked within the working
time of the individual employee. The ideal leads automatically
to the formation of a team based on different areas of
responsibility (quoted in Jurgens et al, 1988: 269; c.f.
similar comments made by J Heizmann of Opel, 1983: 113, in
relation to team-working with robots at that firm's Ingolstadt
plant).
This intensification of the work process arising from the new forms of
work organisation is a feature which is stressed in the critical
accounts. The work of Kern and Schumann, however, is characterised
by varying degrees of ambivalence or silence on the subject (cf. also
Lane, 1988). Yet, as Altmann and Dull suggest the new technologies in
which Kern and Schumann seem to place their faith do not themselves
lead to reduced work burdens 'but rather to a shift of stress factors'
(1990: 120). This discussion reveals perhaps one important limitation of
the German high-wage / high-productivity coalition from the workers'
viewpoint.
A second aspect of the conflict over intensification relates to the
present controversy surrounding weekend working and flexible shift
patterns. Arising partly as a result of the success of the metalworkers
union, IG Metall, in winning a reduction of the working week in the
metalworking industry to 35 hours in 1984, management's expressed
desire for weekend working reflects a wish to raise levels of utilisation
of expensive capital equipment: 'The traditional form of time
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arrangement could not easily be applied to the new constellation of
production and time economy within industry' (Schudlich, 1989: 32)22.
While writers such as Streeck suggest that employers have stolen a
march on unions where the question of flexible shift patterns is
concerned by responding to the real desires of working people, the
conflict concerns fundamentally different conceptions of the problem.
As Hinrichs and Wiesenthal observed:
Whilst the employee preferences for non-standardised working
times expressed an interest in self-determined organization of
life,. . . the employer strategy of creating flexible working
times represents precisely this kind of access to the
'Lebensraum' of the employees. The proposed changes aim at
the exploitation of time spheres hitherto regarded as
'private',. . .it is precisely those time spheres which are to be
regained for working use (1984: 287, translated in Schudlich,
1989: 35-6)
Debates about working time in the German car industry are inextricably
linked to the issue of the relocation of investment to low cost countries.
High unit wage costs are propelling both the attempt to utilise labour
more efficiently and to seek out locations for low cost production.
Among other things this use of the 'periphery' to undermine the
'centre' (i.e. high wages and reduced hours) illustrates the dangers of
a focus on developments in 'core sectors' as precursors of more
widespread change and the uneven and contradictory application of the
22 'The interest of management in implementing more flexible working
times is explicitly explained as a question of the 'economic necessity'
to avoid 'idle times' of employees and extra payments for overtime work.
Flexible working times would contribute to overcoming the
'counterproductive effects of rigid working time arrangements', make it
easier to cover peaks in work volume and increase the utilisation of
plant. With working hours no longer linked to operating times, cost
saving regulation of the use of labour would be possible' (Schudlich,
1989: 35)
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the new production concepts themselves (c.f. the discussion of flexible
specialisation in section three)23.
The contribution of the German debate
The work of Kern and Schumann is provocative and its main benefit has
been in terms of the debate it has inspired. The idea of new
production concepts has been subject to telling criticism. The argument
that sweeping changes are transforming the 'core' sectors of the German
economy needs to be treated with caution. However, the argument that
rather less dramatic, more piecemeal and contradictory changes are
occurring in those industries is sustainable. Kern and Schumann's
focus on new forms of work organisation overstates their novelty. This
overstatement can be explained by their attempt to draw a contrast
between new production concepts and the previous pattern of skill
23For instance, VW's decision to take a controlling interest in
SEAT, for the production small cars has been explained largely (although
not exclusively) in terms of its access to low labour costs in Spain
(eg. Financial Times, 22.2.89). This seems also to be an important
reason behind VW's decision to situate its joint venture with Ford, for
the production of a 'people carrier', in Portugal (Financial Times,
22.5.91. Other German car producers such as Opel have used threats to
transfer investment elsewhere (eg. Antwerp) to secure IGM's agreement to
Saturday working in German plants (Financial Times, 23.8.89). The
decentralisation of decisionmaking over the concrete implementation of
the 35 hour week led to the controversial decision by the local works
council to sanction weekend working at BMW's Regensburg plant without
1GM centrally being aware (Financial Times, 8.8.89). The issue of
weekend working is one of the most divisive issues facing the German
union movement. Unions such as IG Chemie (chemical workers) take a
largely sympathetic attitude to requests for weekend working, whereas IG
Druck und Papier (printworkers) have tended to be more militant in their
opposition. 1GM have suffered some notable recent defeats on the issue
which seem to have forced a more pragmatic attitude.
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polarisation. This perspective on the past, however, leaves the
impression of a German industry that had been thoroughly imbued with
Taylorism. In reality, though, German industry was relatively less
influenced by Taylorism than other European countries (cf. Lane,
1988). In fact craft types of labour endured to a greater extent that
elsewhere - a product, to a large degree, of the industrial strengths of
the German economy in high value-added sectors. Thus, the trajectory
of technical change should be located within the specificities of the
German economy (see also Chapter Three). Even within these somewhat
favourable circumstances, the critical accounts suggest the extent to
which the process of workplace change continues to be negotiated and
contested.
5. REGULATION THEORY AND THE CRISIS OF FORDISM
French 'regulation theory' has been dedicated to the development of a
set of concepts designed to make sense of the specificities of the
particular periods of capitalist development. According to this position,
while at the most abstract level there remain certain invariant relations
of capitalist production, the concrete relations of production,
consumption and regulation differ historically, and in line with broad
transformations in technology, the wage relation, the consumption norm
and forms of economic regulation24 . This approach accords a centrality
2 Usefu1 accounts which identify the geneology of this approach and
chart some its internal differences are Barbrook (1990) and Dunford
(1990).
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to transformations in the labour process in the account of change. In
what follows I concentrate on the implications of the regulation approach
for the labour process, rather than the theory in general.
The crisis of Fordism and the transformation of the labour process
What we are witnessing, then, is an attempt to make sweeping
changes to what Marx called 'factory legislation', an
expression he used in discussing changes in the wage labor
relation that accompanied a major technological and economic
change (Coriat, 1984: 45).
Regulationists have sought to theorise the development of the labour
process in terms of the imperatives placed upon production by the
process of valorisation. The saving of labour is of central importance
in an economy based on production for profit. The concrete forms of
the labour process are seen in terms of Marx's characterisation of the
movement from simple cooperation, through manufacture to large-scale
industry (or machinofacture). Using this approach the mechanisation of
the labour process signals a relative shift from the production of
absolute surplus value to relative surplus value, concomitant with the
real subordination of labour. The continued transformation of the
labour process reflected the attempt to reduce, what Marx termed, the
'pores' in the working day - that is, losses of time which result from
the way the labour process is organised and the capacity (and will) of
workers to sustain the pace of work. The onus placed on capital to
secure these time economies historically has propelled the continued
intensification of the work process, which is obtained 'chiefly by
subordinating labour power to the continuous and uniform movement of
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the machine system and increasing the system's speed of operation'
(Aglietta, 1979: 51).
For Aglietta (1979) Fordism represents the ultimate expression of this
inherent tendency in the capitalist production process. Fordism
'deepened' Taylorism in the labour process through the integration of
the fragmented labour process through the principle of flow production
and by fixing workers to jobs whose positions were determined by the
configuration of the machine system. With flow production the
individual worker lost all control over work rhythm. Fordism is
therefore the mechanical expression of Taylorism. At the 'heart' of
Fordism is the 'semi-automatic assembly line' used especially in the
assembly of goods for mass consumption although, according to Aglietta,
it was subsequently extended upstream to the production of
standardised intermediate components for the manufacture of the means
of consumption. The widespread diffusion of Fordist production
methods (and the productivity improvements to which they gave rise)
were the foundation of post-war economic growth.
However, it is the exhaustion of Taylorist/Fordist methods which
underlies the present crisis. The improvement in productivity
characteristic of the post-war period proved difficult to sustain from
the end of the 1960s. There were both external (market-related) and
internal limits to the further development of Fordist principles 25 . The
2sThe 'external' limits concern changes in the conditions or
(Footnote Continued)
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internal limits, according to Aglietta were threefold. First there was an
increase in the 'balance delay time', that is, delays caused by
imbalances on the assembly line. This reflects the impossibility of
distributing work time equally and leads to idle periods on the part of
workers with shorter cycles (see also Palloix, 1976: 51). Second the
uniformity of effort required by assembly line pacing caused fatigue
amongst workers which had consequences for absenteeism, accident
rates and even work quality. Finally, the collectivisation of work
achieved by the assembly line abolished 'any perceptible tie between the
collective output of the work force and the expenditure of energy by
the individual worker' (Aglietta, 1979: 121). Managements responded to
this latter problem with 'complicated plans' designed 'to involve the
participation of workers in apparent productivity gains' (ibid)26.
(Footnote Continued)
realisation of the economic surplus. According to Aglietta, 'The
far-reaching transformations of the technical division of labour that
the semi-automatic assembly line permits give an enormous boost to
productive capacity and consequently demand social conditions specific
to the mass circulation of commodities at a rapidly increasing rate'
(1979: 119). These conditions were established, in the USA, with the
emergence a 'mass consumption norm' in the post-war period. Further
productivity gains are pursued through increased fragmentation of tasks
and further mechanisation. The technical rigidity of the machine system,
however, means there are dangers in this strategy. 'This way of raising
productivity consequently makes investment propel investment on an even
large scale, while markets must be expanded at whatever cost, with
increasing risks of devalorization of the fixed capital thus
immobilized' (Aglietta, 1979: 119; see Clarke 1988a&b for a critique of
this view).
26These productivity bargains also served a wider purpose ensuring
a close relation between wage rises and productivity improvements in the
'leading sectors' which underpinned the extension of the 'mass
consumption norm'. In the USA 'the canalization of the economic class
struggle by collective bargaining' (Aglietta, 1979: 190) reflected the
emergence of highly centralized bargaining structures regulated by the
state through the National Labor Relations Board (see Boyer, 1984, for a
similar account of the French 'post-war compromise').
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For Aglietta the limits of Fordism were revealed by the heightened level
of class struggle from the end of the 1960s. In the USA this involved
problems of labour control and the rejection, by workforces, of
centrally agreed wage rises. In the early work of the regulation
approach class conflict is given an important explanatory role in the
emergence of the crisis of Fordism and as the stimulus to the
reorganisation of production. Coriat, for instance, traces the origin of
the crisis in France to the period 1966-74. The central feature of this
period 'is the relative instability of capitalist industry based on
repetitive Taylorised labor, an instability brought about by frequent
and forceful struggle by workers in the workplace' (Coriat, 1984: 40).
The period was characterised, moreover, by a shift from wage-related
demands to demands for the reorganisation of work processes and
improved conditions27.
According to Aglietta, 'The class struggles in production today bear the
germ of a major new transformation of the labour process -
Neo-Fordism' (1979: 122; see also Palliox, 1976, from whom this term is
borrowed). This strategy combines automatic production control (or
automation) and new forms of work organisation, 'now in embryo', based
on the recomposition of tasks.
27Coriat goes further and argues: 'Taken together, these demands
constituted something close to a program for revision of workplace
relations, a program for which the working class actively fought and
struggled' (1984: 41). This position is heavily influenced by the
Italian tradition of 'autonomist' marxism (e.g. Negri, 1990). Aglietta
(1979: 28) also acknowledges a debt to Negri.
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Automation addresses the technical limits of Fordism which gave rise to
increased porosity of the working day:
The new principle of work organisation is that of a totally
integrated system in which production operations properly so
called, as well as measurement and handling of information,
react upon one another as elements in a single process, in
successive and separate steps of an empirical process of
heterogeneous phases (Aglietta, 1979: 124).
This integration of discrete and diverse elements of production into a
more unified and smoother productive flow has implications for the
nature of work. The 'mechanical principle of fragmented labour
discipline by hierarchical direction' is replaced by an 'informational
principle' of work organized in semi-autonomous groups, disciplined by
the direct constraint of production itself' (Aglietta, 1979: 167). The
application of microelectronics to production, according to Coriat, makes
possible 'new forms of time management and flow control on the
shopfloor', which 'result in considerable time-savings in production as
well as increased efficiency in the utilisation of machines and tools'
(1984: 40).
The early work within the regulation approach framed the discussion of
the restructuring of the Fordist labour process in the terms of a
profound defeat of the European and North American labour
movements 28 . Lately though, writers in the regulation tradition have
28Boyer, for instance, identified five forms of flexibility as
emerging within European labour relations: the general adaptability of
the productive organisation to endemic uncertainty; moves toward a more
polyvalent workers; the erosion of legal constraints on the employment
contract; attempts to increase the sensitivity of wages to the economic
(Footnote Continued)
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begun to argue, rather in the manner of Kern and Schumann, that the
active participation of the workforce is required to ensure the optimum
performance of the new technologies and in the struggle for the
improved quality which Japanese competition demands. Current
attempts to reorganise work are seen as an attempt to come to terms
with the 'paradoxical involvement' of semi-skilled workers. This
suggests that Taylorist factory structures polarised the collective
capacity for innovation which is now at a premium: 'Most of the
production teams found themselves excluded in principle from the battle
for productivity and quality' (Leborgne and Lipietz,1988: 265; emphasis
in original). Yet, most 'Taylorised' operatives continued to intervene
in order to optimise the production process even against the
instructions of the O&M office: 'They do so to assert their autonomy as
human beings' (ibid). Current experiments are a recognition of this
and an attempt to exploit this aspect of workers' knowledge for the
purposes of valorisation.
The fundamental source of the crisis of Fordism, therefore, is this
'crisis of informal involvement of workers in production' (Lipietz, 1978).
Fordism increasingly failed to secure the conscious, 'formal' commitment
of workers in the struggle of productivity. Lipietz (1987) proposes an
'anti-Taylorian' revolution which would bring into being a new class
(Footnote Continued)
situation of the firm; and the growing freedom of the enterprise to
dispense with social and fiscal contributions. He concluded: '...in
these times of crisis, flexibility strategies have entailed under
various euphemisms, the downward adjustment of most hitherto established
conditions of employment of workers' (1987: 115).
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compromise that would secure, simultaneously, the socio-technical
requirements for transcending the productivity slowdown and as a
means to to secure the economic and political requirements for
society-wide consent and stability. Workers would offer increased
involvement in, and commitment to, improving production on the basis
of enhanced skills and team-work. Capitalists would provide guarantees
of employment, enriched jobs and a share in productivity growth.
Thus Leborgne and Lipietz state:
Hence the real industrial divide: is the classical Fordist
division of labour going to be reshaped or not; is the
workers' involvement definitely going to be down-played; or,
on the contrary, will its 'paradoxical' character be offset,
thus reducing the division between design, maintenance and
manufacturing? (1988: 268).
Even Coriat (1987), formerly the principal advocate of the class
struggle wing of regulation theory, argues that a trend toward the
devolution of management tasks to the workshop is underway. In his
early work Coriat focused on the role of microelectronics in securing a
greater integration of production in large scale industry. Lately, this
focus on the use of computer technology has been complemented by an
emphasis on 'flexibility' akin to that the flexible specialisation thesis.
Basing his argument on research in small footwear firms, Coriat (1987)
argues computer technology is facilitating rapid product shifts.
The increased presence of microelectronics in the firm, moreover, allows
certain key tasks planning to be devolved to the shopfloor. These
tasks include certain production planning functions and tasks related to
the 'calculation of the costs of production' (1987: 11) which are
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necessary for maximising the rate of utilisation of equipment - such as
wage systems designed to make workers partly responsible for prices
and costs. The separation between conception and execution is being
blurred as work becomes more 'team-oriented'. Coriat has outlined what
he believes to be the implications of this: 'If our hypothesis about the
new content of productivity is correct, the different solutions being
tried for work organisation and skill distribution are not equally
efficient'. Moreover, the question of skill and hierarchy in the
workshop 'can no longer be treated as 'social' issues; they belong to
the core of the competitive dilemma' (Coriat, 1987: 12). A new
economic rationality is underpinning workplace restructuring.
Leborgne and Lipietz present a typology of three emerging labour
processes which, they indicate, represent the choices facing
contemporary capitalist societies. The first tendency is toward a
'neo-Taylorist' labour process. This is represented by FIAT's Turin
operations and involves more automation and deepening Taylorist
principles: 'Not a pleasant future, but a possible one' (Leborgne and
Lipietz, 1988: 272). The second tendency is toward a 'Californian'
labour process. This allows flexible production but on the basis of low
capital intensity and worker's involvement is on an individual basis.
Silicon Valley is the model. However, Leborgne and Lipietz speculate
on the problems of regulating this system at the macroeconomic level.
The third labour process is termed 'Saturnian' (in homage to GM's
experimental plant). The workforce is committed to cooperation in the
pursuit of innovation but on the basis of collective bargaining and a
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rigid wage contract. This has appeal to both management and labour.
Alternatively this model is termed Kalmarian.
The work of the regulation approach writers on the labour process
makes a number of useful contributions. The emphasis on the changing
nature of skills, and the emergence, particularly within mass production
industries, of forms of work which are more 'abstract' and more
concerned with system optimisation accords with arguments advanced
earlier in this chapter. Equally, the theorisation of the use of
information technology in terms of its contribution to the greater
integration of the labour process also resonates with earlier arguments.
However, while the early work of the regulation approach recognised
that technical change and the reform of work were determined by the
exigencies of the valorisation process resulting in tendencies toward
intensification; the later work of the regulation approach, in
emphasising the necessity for a new bargain between capital and labour,
has downplayed these insights.
The work of Leborgne and Lipietz is interesting for its attempt to
retain the possibility of a diversity of outcomes in the present period of
restructuring, but increasingly the regulation approach is underpinned
by the belief that contemporary workplace change embodies a new
economic rationality which necessitates a new bargain between capital
and labour. There is a tendency in this approach, however, to
underestimate the extent to which cooperation can be coerced rather
bargained. This is amply demonstrated by the Japanese case which
illustrates that 'teamwork' and 'cooperation' can be secured through
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tying workers fortunes closely to the competitive fortunes of individual
firms (see section four). Equally, 'cooperation' can be elicited through
he sanction of labour market pressures in a period of mass
unemployment (see Chapter Three).
6. ELEMENTS OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The aim of the foregoing sections has been to outline and criticise the
contributions which have gone to make up the new orthodoxy. This
new orthodoxy is founded on a basic optimism that the direction of
technical change is forcing employers into establishing more cooperative
relations with labour. This has had the effect of reversing the
preceding emphasis on the degradation of labour which hitherto
dominated industrial sociology, but on the basis of the evidence
presented in the previous sections the proposition that the new
direction of workplace change is inherently beneficial for labour, needs
to be treated with caution. This necessitates an alternative explanation
of the nature of contemporary workplace change. On the basis of a
synthesis of earlier criticisms of the new orthodoxy, and drawing on
the alternative propositions outlined, the last section of this chapter
seeks to outline the basic elements of an alternative interpretation of
change.
A basis for optimism?
Despite the criticisms made against their optimistic assertions,
post-Fordist writers have not dulled in their enthusiasm for their
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version of contemporary workplace change. In a recent paper Piore
(1990) has argued instead for the mobilisation of the concepts of work,
labour and action developed by Hannah Arendt 29 . Piore argues that
production, as it occurs in industrial districts and 'decentralised'
corporate structures, conforms to Arendt's definition of 'action'. The
central activity is not the creation of goods, as such, but 'the
discourse which surrounds the production process, and the opportunity
which that discourse provides each person to reveal him or herself as
an individual to his or her interlocutors and collaborators' (1990: 66).
Productive activity is becoming a deeply and inherently satisfying
experience, rather than one characterised by exploitation and conflict.
The structure of large firms and industrial districts, Piore contends,
are converging - both are becoming 'communities' of producers. This
position appears to assume that the exercise of managerial authority has
evaporated and posits a workplace largely devoid of the conflicts
hitherto considered endemic in capitalist enterprise30.
29 1n doing so Piore, without acknowledging the widespread criticism
of this concept appears to distance himself from the idea of
'revitalised craft-work'.
30Part of the significance of the 'Japanisation' thesis for claims
about post-Fordism, lies in the support it offers for the notion of a
conflict-free workplace. For instance, the position of the Kyoto School
on work organisation, nenko and company unionism is underpinned by a
particular theory of the firm developed in opposition the neo-classical
approach (which assumes activity is guided by the pursuit of profit
maximization). Employees and shareholders are seen as the firm's
'constituents' and their interests are both considered in the formation
of management policy. Management itself is seen as playing the role of
'mediator', 'striking a balance' between the interests of shareholders
and those of employees, with the enterprise union forming part of the
firm's substructure (Aoki, 1984, 1987). The fact that personal
shareholdings of the founding families of companies such as Matsushita
(Footnote Continued)
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Piore's recent contribution captures the underlying tenor of the
'post-Fordist' thesis, but is firmly challenged by the evidence of the
preceding sections, from which a number of general propositions
emerge. Firstly, where computer technology is being introduced, there
is little evidence that its introduction signals the re-emergence of
craft-work. Far from facilitating the resurgence of artisanal
production, the computerisation of processes is occurring in ways which
consolidate large scale production. Generally, computerisation of
processes is reflective of the growing capital intensity of large scale
industry. In this context computerisation of production processes is
more concerned with improving the control and integration of the
productive flow, than with facilitating rapid product changes.
Moreover, while improved production flows in mass production are a
general aim of management, there are several ways to achieve this end.
Japanese managements achieve a smoother production flow through
innovations such as JIT which appear unconnected to any specific
technology. The pattern of change, moreover, is more incremental and
evolutionary than is implied by concepts such 'post-Fordism'.
Secondly, the 'post-Fordist' thesis may be right to draw our attention
to changes in the content of work, but it frequently overstates the
extent of change and misconstrues its nature. Kern and Schumann, in
their rejection of the idea of 'revitalised craft-work', come close to
(Footnote Continued)
or Toyota are very small is offered as evidence that: 'In such firms,
employees feel they are not working for the profit of owners but for
their own employment' (Koike, 1987: 307-8).
80
capturing the new content of work in capital intensive production when
they stress the extent to which increasingly the worker 'supports the
technical autonomy of the system', noting that the worker is less
materials oriented and more concerned with technical and organisational
procedures 31 . The new 'skills' associated in different ways with the
German and Japanese models, however, are of a limited nature.
Although the range of specific dexterities and competencies may be
extended under these systems, in principle, they reflect little more
than the erosion and recasting of demarcations between direct and
in-direct jobs. On the basis of this conception Malsch et al, reviewing
German evidence, conclude:
• . if Fordism is seen as synonymous with management control
over the labour-process, it is not the end but rather a
historical modification of Fordism, perhaps an 'automated
Fordism'. . . In this perspective the new comprehensive skilled
worker represents progress in comparison with the
exaggerated one-sided deployment of the old mass worker,
but there is, however, no reason to create a new legend of
the skilled worker (Malsch et al, 1984: 44)32
The post-Fordist approaches also tend to neglect the issue of how these
new 'skilled' jobs are integrated into the wider, centrally-determined,
division of labour. They tend to overlook, therefore, the extent to
3 This 'new' work content, however, was identified as a growing
tendency in large scale industry in the mid-nineteenth century: 'Labour
no longer appears so much to be included within the production process;
rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator
to the production process itself' (Marx, 1973: 705).
32 1n the case of 'teamworking', I would argue, especially in its
Japanese variants, the simplification of the range of tasks is a
prerequisite of production workers being able to perform all the tasks
in the team. Paradoxically, therefore, an intense fragmentation of
tasks is the foundation of this 'skilled' work.
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which 'reskilling' may facilitate an intensification of the labour process.
This tendency, which seems so central to current developments in all
their forms, largely is ignored in the post-Fordist accounts.
Thirdly, while it may be true that in some cases the process of
workplace change has bestowed benefits on certain groups of workers,
in certain places, at certain times, one important conclusion to be
drawn from the evidence presented in this chapter is that the process
of workplace change continues to be socially contested. This is obvious
even in the Italian case so celebrated by the flexible specialisation
approach. A large part of the flexible specialisation thesis rests on the
claims made for the performance of small firms in central Italy, but as
Fergus Murray notes, through its fixation with the Third Italy, the
flexible specialisation thesis is able to ignore other Italian evidence
which contradicts its own claims:
Sabel tends to represent the co-existence of, and connections
between, a buoyant small/medium firm sector and a northern
multinational-dominated sector, as the former replacing the
latter. This is not the case, but the formulation neatly
avoids the question of multinational capital and the much more
problematic transfer of ownership and control, and labour
process transformation, in this sector' (1987: 86).
The labour process transformations in the 'Fordist' sectors of Italian
industry do not conform to the portrait of enskllling and harmony
painted by Piore and Sabel. The Fordist sectors have been
characterised by intense class conflicts 33 . Sabel has little to say about
33The example of FIAT offers powerful support for this view. Faced
with growing unrest in its huge, integrated plants in Turin, FIAT
embarked on a large-scale programme of automation along 'neo-Taylorist'
(Footnote Continued)
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this aspect of industrial change in contemporary Italy. Industrial
change remains socially contested and this means that the process of
restructuring is highly uneven.
A historical divide?
The argument that the capitalist labour process has been characterised
by sharp discontinuities in industrial practice - expressed in the
transition to Fordism and from Fordism to post-Fordism - is difficult to
sustain. Ever since the Industrial Revolution the capitalist labour
process has undergone transformation through the introduction of new
techniques and work practices and skill patterns. Fordism, as defined
by the new orthodoxy, consisted of the twin processes of the
fragmentation of tasks (Taylorism) and the growth of mechanisation
around dedicated machinery. However, the extent to which these
developments represented a radical departure from existing tendencies
in the transformation of the capitalist labour process, is dubious.
(Footnote Continued)
lines (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1989; also Partridge, 1984) and productive
decentralisation to the Mezzogiorno and central Italy, aimed at
undermining the cohesion of its workforce and the legislative gains made
in the period after the Hot Autumn (Amin, 1982; Spriano, 1985). The
heavy defeat inflicted on the Turin FIAT unions with the collapse of the
six week strike of 1980 was the prelude for this restructuring (Revelli,
1982; Rollier, 1986). Cesare Romiti, FIAT's managing director, has said
of this period: 'Afterwards politicians told me that they regarded [the
confrontation with the unions] as a turning point when the capitalist
system in Italy could have been overthrown. . . The principle objective of
the clash with the trade unions was to allow us to build a sound basis
for FIAT's future. Having started the battle we were totally committed
to carry it through to the end, and we were convinced that we would win'
(quoted in The Guardian, 8.4.87).
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Marx, for instance, drawing on the work of Charles Babbage and
Andrew Ure analysed the emergence of large scale industry
(machinofacture) in the nineteenth century, precisely in these terms.
Tendencies within 'manufacture' for the break up of complex, skilled
tasks into simplified, deskilled ones through a deepening of the detailed
division of labour, culminated in machinofacture, which was concomitant
with the 'real subordination of labour' 34 . This rendered the labour
process more continuous through a 'closer filling up of the pores of the
working day' or a 'condensation of labour' (Marx, 1974a: 534) and
facilitated further mechanisation, although it was seen as necessarily
incomplete and subject to continuous challenge (cf. Thompson, 1967).
Taylorism and Fordism were forms of work organisation which led to the
further integration of production. In particular, Ford's adoption of the
assembly line represented a breakthrough in the historic problem,
identified by Marx among others, of the rationalisation and
mechanisation of the transfer of material and assemblies 35 . Taylorist
and Fordist principles tended to be applied most extensively in
conditions of mass markets, mass production and high velocity of
34That is, the thoroughgoing domination of the labour process by
the exclusively capitalist imperative of valorisation. Marx discusses
this tendency in his Resultate (see Marx , 1974a: 1019-1028).
35Hounshell (1984) emphasises important lines of continuity between
Ford's innovations and the preceding ones of Singer, Colt and other
pioneers of the 'American system of manufactures'. For Hounshell the
great innovation of the latter system was the creation of truly
interchangeable component parts, which allowed the development of
rationalised assembly. Accordingly, Fordism is seen as a particular
expression of this emerging trajectory (see also Walker, 1989).
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throughput. Taylor advocated bureaucratisation of the shopfloor
(through time and motion study) as means to solve the problems of
coordination and reintegration raised by the increasingly complex
division of labour. Ford's innovation was to propose technical solutions
which established a rationalisation pattern for mass production
industries. The essential underlying principle of both Taylorism and
Fordism, though, was the institution of a flow line, designed to ensure
high rates of utilisation of fixed capital.
Fordism and Taylorism, however, were not universally applicable.
There were technical limits to mechanisation in some industries (Walker,
1989). Indeed, some factories may have been partly rationalised along
Taylorist lines, while other parts of the factory (or process) remained
untouched (Littler, 1982) and limited market size precluded extensive
mechanisation and the pursuit of rationalisation (Littler, 1983, Walker,
1989). The decomposition of tasks had its limits as Adam Smith noted.
Chris Smith (1989) notes that the false dichotomy of craft and mass
production (or Fordist and post- Fordist production) conveniently
ignores established industrial classifications of unit, batch, mass and
process production36 . Quite simply, many industries were never
Fordist (Sayer, 1985; Clarke, 1988b). As Elger puts it:
The decades spanning the turn of the century, then, marked
a period of major capitalist initiatives concerned to secure
adequate valorisation and accumulation in the context of
intensifying international oligopolist competition and increased
worker organisation. A substantial deepening of the real
36Moreover, Walker (1989) notes that general purpose machines far
from replacing dedicated ones have an industrial history which is
seperate from that of 'Fordism'.
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subordination of the labour process to capital, accomplished
through a combination of mechanisation and Taylorist
specialisation and simplification of labour, was and remains
central to, but not exhaustive of, the strategy of capital
(1979: 81)
Taylorism and mechanisation did not 'create a simply homogeneous mass
of deskilled labour' but rather 'a complex, internally differentiated
apparatus of collective labour which contained an uneven variety of
narrow skills and specific dexterities' (Elger, 1979: 82). The
post-Fordist thesis, however, contrives to present the mass production
'paradigm' as one of homogenised deskilled labour in order to highlight
the contrast with 'new' skilled work37.
What Taylorism and Fordism do express, however, are a particular
solution to an essential capitalist problem, resulting from the growing
capital intensity of production and the need to ensure continuous
production. As Alfred Sohn Rethel noted:
Growing capital intensity and a rising organic composition of
capital leads, at a certain point, to a changing costing
structure of production, amounting to an increasing dominance
of the so-called indirect or fixed element of cost (1978: 144).
Moreover:
The dominance of overhead cost is associated with a specific
economy of time relating to the labour process of production.
The more highly the production capacity of a given plant is
utilised, that is to say, the more products are turned out in
37The idea that the long post-war boom was underpinned by Fordismt
therefore is difficult to sustain. As Williams et al observe: 'Ford's
innovations may have been important but they are hardly responsible for
the whole trajectory of development in the advanced economies. Rather
they created. ..assembly industries' (1987: 421). I would suggest,
though, that, within industries organised along these lines, the
tendency to Taylorist forms of work organisation was important.
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a given time and, as a consequence, the quicker the capital
can be turned over, then the lower is the unit cost of the
output and the greater the competitive struggle for profit
under conditions of monopoly capitalism (1978: 148)38.
Fordism and Taylorism, according to Sohn Rethel represented a
particular 'economy of time' based on the mechanisation of transfer:
The flow method of manufacture is the mode of production
most perfectly adapted to the demands of the economy of time
in monopoly capital. The entirety of a workshop or factory is
integrated into one continuous process in the service of the
rule of speed (1978: 161).
I would argue that what the new orthodoxy take as evidence of the 'end
of Fordism' are a set of more limited, but nonetheless significant,
developments of this broad tendency. The role of innovations in
microelectronic technology in this process, is important.
The nature of change
For Sohn-Rethel, Fordist assembly lines were the ultimate expression of
the capitalist necessity of achieving a continuous production flow.
However, contemporary developments illustrate that this is a historic
capitalist pursuit, which is subject to periodic development reflected in
the continued transformation of the labour process. Under Fordism,
38This reflects an essential capitalist concern identified by Marx:
'The value of fixed capital is reproduced only in so far as it is used
up in the production process. Through disuse it loses its use value
without its value being passed onto the product. Hence, the greater the
scale on which fixed capital develops, in the sense in which we regard
it here, the more does the continuity of the production process or the
constant flow of reproduction become an externally compelling condition
for the mode of production founded on capital (Marx, 1973: 703).
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mechanical lines, for instance, created a new set of problems with flow
coordination, work pace equalisation and fixed work sequencing.
Taylorist methods attempted to integrate the production through work
study, recording of information and the creation of bureaucratic strata
of management but have often merely exacerbated the problem of
production imbalances and idle periods. Information technology,
however, has given rise to new attempts at integrating the production
through the 'mechanisation' of information:
A big jump is achieved with on-line monitoring for continuous
data collection on the various dimensions of production,
directed automatically by computers with sophisticated
programming. Mechanization of information flows may be more
important for overall productivity than the mechanization of
individual tasks (Walker, 1989: 67).
The application of information technology to production, however, has
been uneven, reflecting different technical and economic limits (Walker,
1989). Automation was established as a trend in series and process
industries, for instance, long before 'the crisis of Fordism', while it
had a much more limited application in batch industries. The
significance of information technology is that it raises the possibility of
automating non-mass production. As Williams et al (1987) note the
likely outcome of this process is to establish in batch production
principles akin to those of mass production and to make it more capital
intensive. In process industries and mass production while there is
little evidence for an 'automation revolution' (cf. Littler, 1983),
information technologies do allow a further integration of the production
process - a further extension of flow principles. A certain
technological convergence be occurring between batch, mass and flow
production industries. Coriat, for instance, has argued that 'the
88
automated Fordist workshop' is beginning to 'take on certain features of
process type work' (1981: 100; my translation; cf. Malsch et al, 1984).
This view point is emphasised by critical German research which sees
the application of information technology as uniting traditional
management concerns with the integration of production with extended
managerial control over the productive flow. According to a
sympathetic review of this position:
By virtue of their large capacity for reproducing and
extending information processing operations, computer
technologies can be used to take over planning functions
associated with organisation and control. They offer a new
level of integration of the production process, for example,
through the integration of partial work functions into a
continuous process, through matching temporally the insertion
of the different production factors, and through transforming
the demands of the market into optimal production commands
(processing data on market situation, orders and delivery
times). The result is a significant step forward in the
penetration of both time economy and of the real subsumption
of labour under capital. Subsumption now tends to reach out
to include complex, mental functions, thereby giving new
impetus to automation and the prospect of direct control of
the production process through external data and planning
(Campbell, 1989: 264, emphasis added).
This process is seen as especially important in batch production, where
flexibly deployed skills have traditionally been important. Computer
technology is seen as overcoming these obstacles to give greater control
over production and of subjecting these processes further to the
exigencies of valorisation.
The critical research within the German debates and the early work of
the regulation school tends to see technical change and new forms of
work organisation more as developments of existing trends: 'the
modification of Taylorism' (Altmann and Dull, 1990: 112; see also Dull,
89
1989), 'flexible Taylorism' (Berggren, 1989: 193) or 'automated Fordism'
(Malsch et al, 1984; Coriat, 1981) or 'neo-Fordism' (Aglietta, 19790.
This view sees contemporary innovations in work organisation as
addressing certain limits of Taylorist and Fordist type principles of
work organisation rather than representing a radical, new departure.
If the new production concepts are an isolated phenomenon then the
dominant tendency is likely to be toward the creation of new types of
semi-skilled production work. In both cases, though, the tendency is
for the worker to be further integrated into a predetermined process39.
The changes identified by the critical German research are incremental
and uneven, rather than radical and universal. Such changes,
however, remain important40.
The impact of technical change on skill formation is likely to be diverse
and complex. However, growing capital intensity and automation does
39The penetration of time economy, however, is uneven, occurring
'neither simultaneously nor with same dynamic and intensity'. Instead:
'the targets, course and degree of reorganisation processes seen from
the angle of the economy of time, are in the end determined by the
economic, technical and material conditions of production, which are
varying from industry to industry' (Benz-Overhage, 1982: 89, translated
in Papadimitriou, 1986: 38).
40At the saute time, Japanese production systems are characterised
by the pursuit of a smoother and more integrated production flow,
although information technology is less central, than is reorganisation
of work itself (Sayer, 1986, Jurgens, 1989). Japanese methods signal 'a
redirection from the classic Fordist obsessions with specialized
conversion machinery or automated transfer toward the integration
function in general' (Walker, 1989: 68). The pursuit of 'continuous
flow' is the central aim but it is achieved through incremental
inprovements to work practices and technical systems (Schonberger,
1982).
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lead to a growing importance, for management, of creating active
vigilance, responsibility and initiative among workers on its behalf, as a
result of increasing integration, interdependency and capital intensity
(cf. Elger, 1979)41. However, the forms of limited expertise and
empirical skill arising from this imperative are subordinated to the
demands of valorisation. This position emerges from the research
programme of the Institut fur Sozialforschung (IfS) at Frankfurt (eg.
Brandt, 1986; Hoss, 1986; Papadirnitriou, 1986) and the Institut fur
Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung (1SF) at Munich (eg. Altmann and
Dull, 1990; Dull, 1989) developed in opposition to the theory of 'new
production concepts'. According to this research, in general terms the
'computerisation' of industrial processes gives rise to a relative
homogenisation of conditions as between mass and batch production and
reflected the heightened importance attached to capital utilisation. This
in turn leads to the emergence of a new type of semi-skilled work:
This seems similar to the type of complex semi-skilled tasks
(like monitoring and controlling production equipment) which
has long existed in the steel industry and the chemical
industry.. . This type of industrial work is above all
characterised by a discrepancy between specific requirements
and work stress: as long as the production process proceeds
trouble-free, work is neither physically nor mentally
challenging whereas contingencies strain concentration and
perception as well as intellectual and reactive capacity to the
utmost (Papadimitriou, 1986: 43; cf. Altmann and Dull, 1990).
41As Marx noted: 'The capitalist's fanatical insistence on economy
in means of production is therefore quite understandable. That nothing
is lost or wasted and the means of production are consumed only in the
manner required by production itself, depends partly on the skill and
intelligence of the labourers and partly on discipline enforced by the
capitalist for the combined labour' (Marx, 1974b: 83).
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To the extent that new production systems attempt to harness the
subjective aspects of workers' abilities, this is seen as overcoming
certain limitations in hierarchical forms of work organisation in ways
which reflect a continuing logic of rationalisation:
• . that is to utilize the resources inherent in labour power and
new technologies in an isolated and fragmented manner while
at the same time integrating and optimizing them by
organizing the production framework and structuring the
collective worker (Dull, 1984, translated in Hoss, 1986:
254)42.
For the critics it is the subordination of the new forms of work
organisation to the imperatives of the process of valorisation which
gives them their characteristic tendency toward intensification43.
2Work is becoming more 'abstract' in the sense that it is becoming
less concerned with particular skills of material conversion and more
with machine optimisation. Conversion itself is a function of the entire
process. Marx noted this tendency within large scale industry: '...the
product ceases to be the product of the isolated direct labour and the
combination of social activity appears, rather, as the producer (1973:
709).
43Coriat's (1980) study of group working in the French car industry
offers support for these broad hypotheses. Although, in the most
advanced forms these methods raised the possibility of less repetitive
work and a certain 'freedom' to manage production time, control of the
overall work pace remained firmly in the hands of management who
determined output norms and monitored performance centrally. For
Coriat, like the critical German writers, such tendencies corresponded
to the traditional ends of rationalisation: 'Thus, a reduction of the
transfer times and the losses associated with the assembly line model;
the conversion of all or part of this time into effectively productive
time; the new possibility for the worker to accumulate small time-gains
in relation to 'theoretical' production times. All thiB is based on the
intensification of labour, by the increase in the number of productive
actions in the course of the working day' (1980: 40; of. the comments of
V. Haas in section four). For Coriat this represented a 'new economy of
time and control'.
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Also, this perspective, far from seeing the capitalist demand for
teamwork raising the possibility of a new social bargain in the
workplace, the development of semi-autonomous teamwork is the attempt
to 'subordinate labour power also on the level of motivational abilities to
capitalist exploitation' (Hoss, 1986: 254). This process perhaps is best
exemplified by the Japanese case where the mobilisation of workers'
creativity in the struggle for corporate success is more extensive and
systematic than that achieved in countries like Germany (Jurgens,
1989). Whether such developments lead to improvements in workers'
conditions is seen as highly contingent. However, under the conditions
prevailing in Germany in the 1980s, the critics observe that additional
responsibilities without relaxation of time standards is leading to a
general process of intensification. This process is not accompanied by
improved occupational status or systematic retraining because 'the skill
problem is solved by selection' (Hoss, 1986: 256). Also, the new
production concepts are restricted to strategically significant sections of
the production process and autonomy is limited by increased power
delegated to lower parts of the managerial hierarchy (cf. Dankbaar,
1989b: 36). Accordingly, the new production concepts in both limited
and advanced forms are seen as 'a further decisive step of the 'real
subsumption' labour under capital' (Hoss, 1986: 257).
However, there remains a problem with the conceptualisation of change
outlined in the critical German debates, namely the use of the notion of
'real subordination'. In the IfS approach the 'computerisation' of the
production process is securing the complete domination of labour by
managerial authority. This is ironic given that Braverman, for
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instance, appeared to assume that Taylorism had achieved precisely this
end. In a broader sense, it was a view held by the Frankfurt School
as early as the 1930s, and by commentators such as Charles Babbage
and Andrew Ure before them. However, a more open use of the
concept of real subordination would help to account for the extension of
continued workplace conflict and worker gains. As Elger puts it:
'it is necessary to recognise that the continually
revolutionised character of modern mechanised production
persistently renders 'incomplete' the subordination of labour
to capital (in the sense of total direction and control by
capital). On the one hand it creates new skills competencies
and other opportunities for bargaining leverage arising from
the complex coordination and interdependence of the collective
labourer; on the other hand in phases of rapid accumulation
unaccompanied by massive displacement of living labour by
dead labour, it depletes the reserve army and provides the
basis for powerful worker organisation' (1979: 65-6; see also
Marx, 1974c: 1O19-28).
For the IfS writers the further penetration of the time economy is a
step on the inexorable subordination of labour to capital (cf. Sohn
Rethel, 1978). Coriat's preference (in his early work) to write of the
search for new 'time and control economies' could signal a more open
usage of the concept of subordination, in keeping with Elger's (1979)
argument that technical change and the transformation of work renders
it persistently 'incomplete'. Coriat's approach raises the possibility for
genuine diversity and contest in the struggle for productivity
improvement, rather than the merely formal acceptance of this
possibility in the work of the IfS. Such an approach might also help to
in particular, while identifying an important trend toward
computerisation, the If S writers seriously underestimate the
difficulties of using such technologies in practice (eg. Walker, 1989;
see also Chapter Six below).
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account for apparent gains of German workers - which even critical
writers in Germany recognise as a possibility in the present
restructuring.
My argument, then, is not that workers can never gain from the
process of technical change or workplace restructuring but that
technical change does not guarantee such an outcome, even where it
demands more active participation from the workforce. In the German
case (or the Swedish one) where workers can point to a real concern on
the part of management (or sections of it) for the humanisation of
work, this reflects more than technical requirements. In particular, it
reflects the historic strength of the workers' movement in those
countries, and the patterns of class accommodation which have
developed from these. These have resulted in institutional forms of
industrial relations which, through works councils and co-determination,
accord labour an institutional lever in the process of workplace
restructuring (see especially Streeck, 1985). In contrast, the
particular pattern of rationalisation which has dominated in Japan has
been built on the the structural weaknesses of company unions.
The important underlying differences between these patterns of
restructuring and the extent to which they are rooted in specific
histories and geographies tends to be obscured when they are offered
merely as examples of an unfolding logic of 'post-Fordist' restructuring.
The distinguishing feature of the post-war economic growth, therefore,
was not so much that it was 'Fordist' (based on mass production for
mass markets), but that it was underpinned by 'the institutionalisation
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of a particular balance of class forces, in which rising wages and rising
levels of social expenditure were the price paid for the industrial and
political integration of the working class' (Clarke, 1988b: 85). It is the
character of this accommodation, which varies significantly from place to
place, which is the decisive factor in accounting for variations in the
national patterns of change.
An important determining character of the nature of workplace change,
then, is the balance of forces existing between management and labour
be it at the level of the firm, industry, region or nation. This
observation is of wider significance because it implies that, despite
certain common concerns borne of an age in which capital-intensive
forms of production are of heightened importance, unevenness is
embedded in the process of change at every level. A sensitivity to the
historicity and spatiality of restructuring is essential45.
7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have sought to criticise those theoretical approaches
which claim that since the end of the 1970s radical transformation has
Badham and Matthews (1989) recently have attempted to rescue the
broad 'post-Fordist' agenda from its critics. They argue that the
scenario offered by Piore and Sabel should be seen as just one possible
outcome to the process of change. Instead they develop a three
dimensional model of the production system based on axes of product
innovation, process variability and labour responsibility along which
any region can be situated. While of doubtful heuristic value, I would
argue their approach, rather than signalling a brave new Fordist world,
serves principally to illustrate that diversity is embedded in the
process of change.
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occurred in the nature of industrial work and that this has been
generally positive for labour. What post-Fordist writers take to be
signs of the end of mass production, are better seen as rather more
incremental developments in the organisation of large scale industry.
These seem to be part of a longer term process of change directed at
the achievement of continuous flow production. New technology and
new forms of work organisation (which are not always related) are
typically concerned with establishing a greater integration of the
production process. What is taken as a signal of the demise of Fordism
represents in some cases an intensification or at least a reformulation of
it. Post-Fordist writers identify new forms of skilled work. In
practice these generally turn out to be the accumulation of limited extra
competences. Where post-Fordist writers see the emergence of a
necessity for capital to adopt a more 'positive' attitude toward labour
they identify a real tendency associated with growing capital intensity.
However, such accounts neglect the constraints under which
'cooperation' is elicited and 'autonomy' granted. The contention that
the present period is characterised by the unfolding of a new,
universal 'post-Fordism' ignores the unevenness and diversity built into
the process of change. In particular, this unevenness reflects quite
specific national patterns of change, which are not captured by
concepts such as 'post-Fordism'. While accepting that capitalist
restructuring is likely to reflect certain essential characteristics the
forms which these can take are varied. Coriat's (1980, 1984) notion
that restructuring reflects the search for 'new time and control
economies' seems sufficiently open to capture this possibility of
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diversity, while concentrating attention on the essential ends of such
restructuring.
These propositions form the conceptual background to the empirical
investigations in the remainder of this thesis. The case study of
restructuring in the British coal industry is designed to illustrate the
historic pursuit of time and control economies in one sectoral context.
Present restructuring in coal accords an important place to the
introduction of microelectronic-based process technology. In order to
assess the degree to which contemporary developments in coal
production can be seen as radical departure along the lines suggested
by the 'post-Fordist' thesis, or as something which emerges
incrementally from a past trajectory of labour process transformation,
present developments are situated in their historical context.
Furthermore, given the emphasis placed on the uneven nature of the
transformation of labour process in the last section, the concrete nature
of restructuring is examined through experience of restructuring in two
different coalfields.
I have suggested in this chapter, that while capitalist enterprises are
characterised by a universal pursuit of time and control economies
borne of the valorisation imperative, the concrete forms of production
are likely to be diverse. I have stressed the extent to which particular
trajectories of restructuring owe less to a 'crisis of Fordism' and to the
subsequent emergence of a new 'post-Fordist' logic of restructuring,
than to nationally distinctive patterns of class conflict and
accommodation. Restructuring in the British coal industry, then, needs
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to be placed in the context of the broader pattern of industrial change.
Chapter Three offers an account of the nature of restructuring in
Britain in the 1980s. The chapter begins by noting the difficulties of
subsuming this restructuring into the 'post-Fordist' thesis. In Britain,
restructuring in the 1980s owed little to attempts to create a
'post-Fordist' economy and more to state-inspired attempts to alter
explicitly the balance of class forces in favour of capital.
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CHAPTER THREE
POST-FORDIST BRITAIN?
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter develops the argument that the pattern of workplace
change is highly uneven, through a discussion of contemporary
workplace change in Britain. Chapter Two showed how industrial
sociology has been dominated increasingly by accounts which suggest
that workplace change can be understood in terms of the emergence of
a radical new logic of 'post-Fordist' restructuring, which has positive
implications for workers. Yet, the evidence on which the claims for the
emergence of post-Fordism are based, tends to indicate more incremental
and limited forms of change which are influenced crucially by national,
historical factors. In order to understand the significance of the
diverse nature of actual patterns of restructuring due regard must be
paid to national trajectories of industrial change, which are themselves
the outcome of past patterns of social conflict and accommodation. This
chapter illustrates the value of this approach through an examination of
the British case.
My aim is to offer an account of change situated within the
'particularities of the British economy' as they relate to workplace
change (cf. Fine and Harris, 1986; Tailby and Whitson, 1989). The
argument advanced is that during the post-war period, economic
restructuring in Britain has tended increasingly to have a
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low-wage/low-productivity bias in the context of advanced capitalism.
It is argued also that the state has played a key role in promulgating
labour process changes quite sharply at odds with the post-Fordist
thesis. With the advent, in 1979, of a government inspired by the
ideology of the New Right, a reduction in the power of trade unions
and, specifically, a reduction in their influence within the workplace,
came to be a prerequisite of economic restructuring. This strategy was
embodied in the frequently employed rhetoric about the need to reassert
'management's right to manage'. Thus, even where the state itself had
sanctioned large investments in new technology, in the nationalised
industries, the process of restructuring has been one driven by a
concern with subordinating the position of labour within the workplace.
The chapter begins, therefore, by criticising attempts to account for
the pattern of workplace change by reference to 'post-Fordist' theories.
These approaches fall into three broad categories. First, attempts have
been made to present the nature of industrial change in Britain in
terms of a successful strategy of 'post-Fordist' restructuring initiated
by the Thatcher governments. This view is associated, in particular,
with the Communist Party journal Marxism Today (also, CPGB, 1989).
Secondly, some writers see contemporary industrial change as in some
way reflecting the progressive 'Japanisation' of British industry (Oliver
and Wilkinson, 1988; Hanosn, 1991). Finally, there is the argument
that 'post-Fordism' is required in Britain, but that the restructuring of
the 1980s has not brought this about (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1988, 1989).
Each of these arguments is criticised for overlooking or misinterpreting
key aspects of recent industrial history. It is suggested, instead, that
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where workplace change has occurred, generally, it has taken on a
specific character, which has little to do with 'post-Fordism'. In order
to grasp the specific character of restructuring in Britain a different
explanation is required. An adequate explanation of contemporary
workplace change requires an understanding of the historical legacy of
work practices and industrial relations, upon which contemporary
changes have acted.
British manufacturing industry generally is held to have performed
poorly in the post-war period (eg. Alford, 1988). Particular emphasis
has been given to the role of trade union 'restrictive practices' in
explaining this poor performance. The chapter outlines the development
of this conception of the industrial problem and illustrates how it came
to influence the activities of the state. During the 1980s British
manufacturing industry witnessed a rapid rise in productivity, to the
extent that some have identified a 'productivity miracle'. This
productivity improvement is seen by some as the product of the
industrial relations and economic reforms of the Thatcher governments
which reduced the power of trade unions and restored managerial
prerogative (see Hanson, 1991; and especially Metcalf, 1988, for whom
the British coal industry is an example of this 'miracle'). Far from
seeing this 'productivity, miracle' as reflecting the emergence of a
post-Fordist economy, the chapter stresses the fragility and limited
nature of this industrial restructuring. The following section examines
attempts to apply 'post-Fordist' analyses to the British case as prelude
to offering an alternative account of this restructuring.
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2. NEW AND FLEXIBLE TIMES? SINS OF OMISSION AND COMMISSION
There have been several attempts to account for the pattern of recent
workplace change in Britain by reference to the new orthodoxy: the
explicitly 'post-Fordist' (lately 'New Times') analysis of Marxism Today;
accounts which identify the 'Japanisation' of industry; and the analysis
of proponents of flexible specialisation. Despite differences between
these conceptions, they are united by certain lacunae in their analyses
which are highlighted below. Notably, they share in common a
misreading or partial reading of recent British industrial history and,
relatedly, a superficial grasp of the character of workplace change in
the 1980s. This limits their ability to inform the debate on the nature
of change in Britain and suggests the difficulties of applying
post-Fordist analyses to the British experience.
The dominant, optimistic position on contemporary industrial
restructuring has been advanced with vigour in Britain by the journal
Marxism Today. This approach equates the industrial restructuring
occurring in Britain under the direction of successive Conservative
governments, to the logic of change required by the directives of the
post-Fordist economy. To wit: 'Thatcherism is a hegemonic force, with
the long term goal of transforming British society. . .a renovation of
capitalism for the new times' (CPGB, 1989: 10)'. According to this
As one prominent sympathiser with this position, Hugo Young, has
put it: 'What distinguishes the Marxism Taday treatment from most others
is that it starts from facts not propaganda. It treats Mrs Thatcher not
(Footnote Continued)
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perspective Thatcherism presided over the emergence of 'New Times' in
Britain, propelled by the new logic of economic restructuring:
At the industrial heart of the new times will be production
based on a shift to information technology and
microelectronics. New technology allows more intensive
automation and its extension from larger to smaller companies,
pulling together the shopfloor and the showroom. It allows
production to be both more flexible, automated and
integrated. . .Work is being organised around new technology.
Traditional demarcation lines between blue collar and white
collar workers, skilled and unskilled are being torn down in
the wake of massive redundancies in manufacturing. In
future, work in manufacturing will be about flexible team
working within much smaller, more skilled workforces (CPGB,
1989: 6-7).
The Thatcher governments are seen as instrumental in orchestrating
this change. One writer associated with the Communist Party's position
has claimed that the Conservative government has fomented 'a revolution
in the organisation of most British manufacturing companies'
(Leadbetter, 1989: 28):
Behind lies the factories of the past which produced most of
the components they needed within a single site. They used a
strict division of labour to produce large volumes of
standardised products for a stable national market. Ahead lies
the factory of the future. Many of its components will come
from external suppliers. It will use interchangeable teams of
skilled workers and flexible computer-controlled machinery to
produce smaller batches of customised products for shifting
international markets (ibid).
This approach, thus, conceives of a clear transition from Fordism to
post-Fordism. However, the extent to which British industry typically
can be categorised as having been 'Fordist' is doubtful (see below). At
the same time, despite the assertions, there is little evidence to support
(Footnote Continued)
as object of hatred, but more clinically: as a conduit and beneficiary
of the social and economic trends which now dominate Western life' (The
Guardian, 29.8.88).
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this view of the dramatic nature of recent industrial change. For
instance, on the basis of a survey of major flexibility agreements
Incomes Data Services concluded:
Myths about the advance in flexible working practices have
misled many people into thinking that fundamental changes
have taken place on a very wide scale. On the contrary, the
fundamental changes are extremely narrowly concentrated in
particular sectors of industry. And even where these changes
have been taking place, they can be incomplete, halting or
superficial (1986: 4).
Despite the authoritative tone, the Marxism Today approach does not
offer a detailed analysis of the nature of the productivity improvement
of the 1980s, although this would seem to be essential in order to
situate their claims for a 'revolution' in the organisation of industrial
production.
The 'Japanisation' thesis, also, has been pervasive in Britain. The
UK, perhaps unique among the advanced industrial countries, has been
characterised by a debate about the value of Japanese production
methods and the extent to and means by which they can be implanted.
Leading management figures have argued that the adoption of Japanese
production methods by UK manufacturing companies could lead to large
scale productivity increases based on the creation of the harmonious
labour relations said to be characteristic of Japan (Parnaby, 1987;
Wickens 1987). This is the background to the strong claims which have
been made concerning the alleged 'Japanisation of British industry',
through the arrival of Japanese manufacturing transplants, and through
'emulation' of Japanese work practices by indigenous firms. Oliver and
Wilkinson in a survey of The Times 1000 companies claimed to have
found evidence of widespread 'emulation' and continue to take the
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perspective that 'Japanisation is a useful shorthand term for the
emulation of Japanese industrial practice by Western companies'
(Wilkinson and Oliver, 1989: 17)2.
However, even where apparently clear cases of 'Japanisation' can be
discerned it appears their novelty is often overestimated. Garrahan
and Stewart (1989, 1990) have examined, for instance, the claims of
'Japanisation' made concerning Nissan's assembly plant in North East
England. Despite the claims of its advocates (eg. Wickens, 1987) the
novelty of the production system was found to be greatly overstated
and to 'only superficially and rhetorically go beyond the social and
political context of Fordism' (Garrahan and Stewart, 1990: 151). The
idea that production is conflict free is rejected. Rather, it is argued
the significance of the Nissan investment lies in the new forms of
self-subordination of the workforce. The rhetoric of teamwork and TQC
is invoked in order to create competition between individual operatives.
Although dissatisfaction with this system exists among the workforce, it
rarely translates into organised and coherent opposition to management.
This reflects the 'marginalisation' of trade unions within the plant
resulting from the single union deal agreed between Nissan and the
AEU. On the other hand, the successful operation of this system is
seen as reflecting the particular character of regional decline and
2The low response level to their survey, however, plus the
apparently fragmented nature of their findings, would appear to caution
against the very claims they make (see Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988:
chapter 4).
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labour market conditions in the North East rather than the creation of a
set of non-conflictual work practices.
Further support for the notion that Japanese plants in the UK are only
limited form of 'Japanisation' is offered by Taylor et al (1991). They
compare a Japanese owned consumer electronics plant in South Wales
with a plant belonging to a leading 'emulator', Lucas Electrical. This
study found that neither plant was particularly 'Japanised'. At the
Welsh transplant systems such as JIT and TQC did not operate
(although they do at Nissan - Garrahan and Stewart, 1989). Persistent
problems remained in balancing output, throughput and quality - the
very problems which are said to be resolved by JIT (see Chapter Two;
section 3). Although the plant was characterised by quiescent labour
relations this is seen more as a product of the gender division of labour
and external market conditions than 'Japanese methods'. At Lucas,
which is seen by some as an exemplar of 'Japanisation' (Oliver and
Wilkinson, 1988; Parnaby, 1987; Turnbull, 1988), Taylor et al (1988)
argue that such rhetoric has served as an ideological gloss for a set of
more mundane changes. Where changes are occurring they are in the
direction of the modularisation of production rather than JIT or TQC.
Taylor et al, conclude that the ideological role of 'Japanisation' needs to
be carefully considered. Elsewhere, I have attempted to do this
(Tomaney, 1991) through a review of Japanese manufacturing investment
in North East England. In the case of the North East, Japanese
investment has taken many forms and has had varied effects, and this
belies attempts to speak of the 'Japanisation of British industry'.
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Official and media accounts, however, stress the extent to which all the
North East investments are characterised by 'flexible working'. Also,
in all cases, Japanese plants are characterised by either absent or
severely limited forms of trade union representation. My study shows
how in the pronouncements of government ministers, 'new' Japanese
working practices have been contrasted with 'old', conflictual patterns
of industrial relations in the region's traditional industries (coal, steel,
shipbuilding, see Chapter Five). For instance, the present Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Lilley has ascribed the decline
of the old industries to 'militant trades unionism' and its attendant
'restrictive practices', with these factors disproportionately concentrated
in the 'older industrial regions', which in turn have been characterised
by 'an excessive concentration of union power' (quoted in Tomaney,
1991). The promotion of Japanese investment, through the use of
regional policy, has been designed to address this situation. Claims
concerning 'Japanisation' of the region's industry, therefore, must be
seen in the context of the transformation of the regional political
economy, both materially and ideologically, away from 'old' unionised,
high wage industries to 'new', low wage, assembly oriented industries
characterised by 'flexible' work patterns (see also Tomaney, 1989).
In short, debates about. Japanisation have had a strong ideological
flavour glossing over a more limited reorganisation of work practices
along less dramatic lines than those suggested by the enthusiasts. In
contrast, the ideological use of the term 'Japanisation', in particular its
deployment as 'solution' for the 'restrictive practices' which are said to
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have characterised British manufacturing industry, is probably of
greater significance.
In contrast to writers grouped around Marxism Today, and the
supporters of the 'Japanisation' thesis, Hirst and Zeitlin (1988; 1989)
argue that the UK is still 'locked into the mass production paradigm',
but that it needs to and can go down the route of flexible
specialisation. Britain's failure to develop similar strategies to those in
Japan is seen as reflecting certain 'institutional rigidities', which reflect
poor management practices, past attempts by governments to promote
increases in firm size as means to achieve scale economies, and also the
legacy of restrictive practices by the trade unions. Although Hirst and
Zeitlin suggest that the 'decentralised corporation' represents one
response to the new competition, they are unequivocal in their
proposals for industrial renaissance, which centre on the creation of
industrial districts of small artisanal firms of the type which are said to
characterise the Third Italy (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1988; cf. Chapter Two,
section 3).
This analysis, however, is problematic. Firstly, the ascription of the
competitive failure of UK manufacturing to the continued dominance of
'mass production paradigm' fails to address (let alone incorporate) that
vast debate which identifies a long term decline in the UK's industrial
performance. Moreover, it ignores an important branch of that debate
which suggests that British manufacturing is distinguished by the
relative underdevelopment of Fordist production processes and
institutions. This body of work suggests that British industry did not
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modernise along Fordist lines in the inter-war period and instead was
characterised by extensive use of craft labour (see section 5 below).
Piore and Sabel (1984) the pioneers of the the flexible specialisation
thesis argued that countries with surviving craft industries would be
the most likely to develop flexible specialisation (see Chapter Two,
section 3). Hirst and Zeitlin offer no explanation of why flexible
specialisation has not developed in the UK when the conditions for its
adoption seem favourable. In fact, they uncritically accept arguments
about the adverse impact of 'restrictive practices', when these could be
taken as evidence of the enduring craft practices which are said to be
the foundation of flexible specialisation.
Secondly, the promotion of a small firm solution to manufacturing failure
does not take into account the relative domination of the UK
manufacturing sector by multinational companies which are important
players in the market and which dominate in the areas of technology
transfer and skill formation. As Nolan and O'Donnell (1991) note, it is
the strategies of such companies which increasingly account for the
particular character of the UK economy in the contemporary European
context, that is, as a low wage, low investment and low productivity
economy. The failure to address these questions of history and the
particular position of Britain in the international division of labour,
seriously weakens Hirst and Zeitlin's approach, which assumes that all
countries (and regions and industries) can adopt the strategy of
flexible specialisation. Their approach is voluntaristic and policy
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driven, i.e. serious analysis of real changes is subordinated to policy
proposals for small firm development3.
The post-Fordist accounts fail to capture the nature of workplace
change in Britain in all but the most superficial ways. The 'New Times'
and 'Japanisation' theses describe a dramatic and radical departure from
past (Fordist) industrial practice, while the proponents of 'flexible
specialisation' argue no real changes have occurred and Britain remains
trapped in a Fordist past. The explanation for these divergent
accounts of contemporary industrial change arise from the attempt to
conceive of recent restructuring in Britain in terms of the
Fordism/post-Fordism dichotomy. There is a large body of evidence to
suggest that Britain was never stereotypically Fordist, or, at least, was
Fordist in only limited ways. Indeed, it is argued that Britain's poor
3British interest in flexible specialisation reflects partly the
influence of this perspective on the policies of the former Greater
London Council. The GLC's industrial arm (GLEB) sought to promote a
strategy of flexible specialisation in London through investment in
small firms (GLC, 1985: chapter one; Robin Murray, 1985). Public
investment in these firms was dependent on commitments to improve
working practices in the direction of the Italian stereotype advanced by
Sabel. However, a subsequent autocritique admitted that GLEB's approach
was fatally weakened because it 'did not have a coherent strategy for
tackling transnationals' (MacIntosh and Wainwright, 1987: 259). Among
other things this meant that the initiatives of small firms were often
stifled by large manufacturers and retailers. Nolan and O'Donnell (1987,
1991) suggest further that flexible specialisation in practice failed to
appreciate the tensions of working in and against the market. Although
posing as a radical critique of the 'free market' policies of the
Conservative government, GLEB's strategy of promoting production for
niche markets was essentially elitist because it failed to resolve the
question of how production could address real unmet needs (of. Clarke,
1990). This in fact was in conflict with the GLC's wider social aims.
Underpinning the GLEB approach was the assumption that through niche
marketing there could only ever be winners in the competitive process -
a view which I criticised in the previous chapter.
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industrial performance reflected the enduring presence of craft-type
labour practices and the forms of workplace trade unionism to which
these were related. By the 1980s, the 'British disease' had come to be
defined as a problem of 'restrictive practices'. It was this view which
was adopted by the state and, therefore, informed state-led
restructuring practices. In large measure, this accounts for the
particular character of restructuring in Britain.
The 'post-Fordist' accounts lack of historical insight is a crucial factor
in its failure to grasp the character of contemporary restructuring,
because processes of restructuring and technical change cannot be
understood in abstraction from the historical and geographical traditions
of industrial practice in which they are deeply embedded. To ignore
history and geography is to fetishise the process of change. The
discussion which follows, therefore, attempts to specify the particular
character of British industrial development. In particular, the
argument that British industry did not develop along Fordist lines and
that, therefore, the present period cannot be understood in terms of
the transition to 'post-Fordism', is examined. The post-Fordist
accounts outlined above, in different ways, all exhibit a concern with
'restrictive practices' or trade union 'demarcations'. Japanisation is
proposed as a solution to 'restrictive practices', while for Hirst and
Zeitlin, such practices serve to obstruct the birth of flexible
specialisation. This concern represents an important connection
between the debate concerning Fordism/post-Fordism and the parallel
debate concerning the role of the Thatcherite 'productivity miracle' in
overcoming the 'British disease'. Tracing through the significance of
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'restrictive practices' in both rhetoric and practice helps to illuminate
the nature of contemporary workplace change in Britain, in ways which
transcends simple dichotomies. This is the task of the following
sections, which aim to provide an historical account of the pattern of
workplace change in Britain as a means to understand the particular
character of contemporary workplace change. This account begins with
an outline of the dominant claims concerning the 'British disease' and
the 'productivity miracle'.
3. THE BRITISH DISEASE AND THE THATCHERITE 'MIRACLE'
The view of Japanisation held by Peter Lilley (described above) remains
interesting insofar as it reveals something about the dominant
conception - or at least rhetoric - concerning the nature of the
economic crisis in Britain and the appropriate responses to it.
Analyses of the relatively poor post-war performance of the British
economy has been heavily informed by the notion that economic decline
has been caused by the 'restrictive practices' of trade unions. In an
influential book, Hayek, writing at the turn of the last decade,
formulated the view that the 'powers of trade unions' were 'the main
reason for the decline of the British economy in general' (1984: 52).
He went on to argue that:
The chief instances of such legal powers are intimidatory
picketing, preventing non-members from doing particular jobs
such as 'demarcation' rules, and the rule of the closed
shop. . . Such practices have substantially reduced the
productivity potential of British labour generally (Hayek,
1984: 53)
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Arguments such as these were the inspiration behind, among other
things, the reform of trade union legislation, which were designed to
create the conditions for profitable production in Britain. The
'productivity miracle' in British manufacturing during the 1980s is
attributed to the effects of this legislation (eg. Hanson, 1991; Metcalf,
1988).
A more developed position argues that the sclerosis of British industry
reflects the economy's heritage in the area of industrial relations, but
more in terms of the type of industrial relations rather than the level of
trade union membership. The combined impact of highly differentiated
markets, legal immunities for unions, fragmented and small scale
employers and strong craft union traditions, led British manufacturers
to emphasise payment-by-results bargaining, with control over
demarcation and effort intensity shared with workers in a less capital
4Leaving aside for one moment the nature of this 'productivity
miracle', the economic effects of industrial relations legislation since
1979 are far from clear. Legislative issues have been concerned
principally with outlawing the closed shop, limiting picketing, the
removal of trade union 'immunity' from prosecution (i.e. the equivalent
of the right to strike in other countries) and the requirement to ballot
members over strike action and political activities. Strike activity and
union membership indeed have fallen. While the removal of strike
immunities may have had some limiting effect on union activities (beyond
a small number of high profile sequestrations of union funds, such as
those of the NUN in 1984/5) and the ballot provisions may have limited
rapid strike action, the case that they have had a major impact on union
activity remains to be proved. Decline in strike activity (and falls in
union membership levels) have been a feature of all advanced industrial
countries. This suggests wider economic factors have been more
important in securing relative worker quiescence in the 1980s (see Brown
and Wadhwani, 1990).
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intensive production system (e.g. the influential article by Crafts,
1988; also Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986; Lewchuk, 1986; Zeitlin, 1980).
This approach, it is said, contrasted with the needs of 'Fordist' forms
of production which were supposedly being generalised during this
period (i.e., strict managerial control over work effort, day wages and
collective bargaining, under a clearly defined managerial hierarchy
designed to exploit large scale plant efficiently). Following the second
world war, the advantages of standardisation and mechanisation began
to increase. However, in Britain, managements granted concessions to
workers in the early post-war period in order to secure short-term
industrial reconstruction. Such concessions served to entrench the
operation of job controls and craft practices. Later, when competitive
pressure increased the need for rationalisation efforts, managements ran
up against the strength of worker resistance5.
5This argument has had wide appeal. Significantly it has been
adopted by the OECD: 'Restrictive work practices appear to have been
more serious obstacles to enhanced efficiency than in many other member
countries. Rigid demarcation lines between different crafts have been a
feature of work organisation in Britain. Strict separation between types
of jobs at times meant there were several hundred job titles in large
plants. This system invited bottlenecks to slow production and thereby
lower productivity. A different aspect of restrictive work practices has
been the prevalence of excessive manning levels in some production
processes as a result of unions attempting to maintain employment levels
in declining industries or industries where new technology offered
significant scope for labour saving' (OECD, 1988: 66). As supporting
evidence for this contention, the OECD cite a comparative study of
production processes in similar plants in Britain and Germany which
suggested that long delays in repairing machines in Britain could be
attributed to rigid demarcation between operational and maintenance
workers.
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Crafts argues that post-war governments, also, were reluctant to
address the productivity problem through trade union legislation,
'perhaps through fear of destroying the 'post-war settlement" (1988:
10, see also Metcalf, 1989). The unprecedented power of workers and
unions forced governments into uneasy alliance with organised labour in
order to limit inflationary tendencies, thus avoiding a necessary
restructuring of union power and the employment relation:
For as long as cooperation was pursued as a solution to the
changed bargaining power of organized labour there was a
major obstacle to attempts at reforming industrial relations in
pursuit of a system more conducive to productivity growth.
(Crafts, 1988: 10)
Donovan (1968) advocated a cooperative solution to this state of affairs,
arguing that many labour problems were caused by the disjunction of
the formal structure of industry level bargaining and the informal,
fragmented nature of workplace bargaining. Accordingly, 'proposals for
the reform of collective bargaining are therefore fundamental to the
improved use of manpower' (Donovan, 1968: 85). Donovan encouraged
a move to single employer bargaining, especially through the adoption
of productivity deals:
• . . a genuine productivity agreement offers solutions to many
of the typical problems of industrial relations. It raises the
standards of supervision and of managerial planning and
control. It closes the gap between rates of pay and actual
earnings. It permits negotiations on performance. It enables
demarcation difficulties to be eliminated or reduced. It
concentrates decisions at the level of the company or factory.
It formalises and regulates the position of the shop steward
(1968: 84).
Donovan provided a model of rationalisation and modernisation and there
is evidence of a growing 'formalisation' of industrial relations from the
late 1960s and rationalisation of structures (through the introduction of
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measured day work and productivity agreements). However, while
these efforts were complemented by state sponsored concentration and
centralisation of production (see Massey, 1984), debate has concentrated
on the 'failure of reform'. The argument that reform 'failed', firstly,
because it took place in a hostile environment and, secondly, because it
served to formalise bad practice, has been synthesised by Metcalf
(1988). He argues, on the one hand, that Donovan was destined to fail
because governments continued to give 'state handouts' to companies
with product market difficulties, in particular, to 'monopolised,
unionised, male-intensive industries like coal, steel, cars and ships' and
'any pernicious effects on productivity may have filtered outwards'
(1988: 6,7; cf. Hanson, 1991). Moreover, the use of incomes policies
meant that productivity-enhancing changes in working practices leading
to wage increases were more difficult to negotiate. Also, labour market
interventions such as the Fair Wage principle and Wages Councils helped
to militate against fundamental reform. On the other hand, the growth
of 'formalisation' in the 1970s occurred in a climate which was
favourable to unions:
Procedural and substantive rules, which were on the
increase, may have built-in rigidities. The self-confidence of
officials, stewards and workers (as compared with
management) may have caused the frontier of control to be
stabilised incorporating restrictive custom and practices.
Formalisation often meant management concessions rather than
being a vehicle to greater cooperation and higher productivity
(Metcalf, 1988: 8).
Accordingly the Thatcher governments are distinguished by their
rejection of cooperative solutions to the control of inflation and the
underlying productivity crisis (Hanson, 1991). The resulting reform
has given 'management an opportunity to control restrictive practices,
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to obtain faster productivity growth and to assert control over the
productive process' (Crafts, 1988: 16)6. In a number of ways the
policies of the Thatcher governments created conditions which have
contributed to a fundamental reform of industrial relations which has led
to a 'productivity miracle'. Productivity has risen often through
'concession bargaining' or more far-reaching 'flexibility agreements'. At
the same time productivity has risen faster in the (expanded) non-union
sector, reflecting 'the greater use of 'managerial prerogative over the
organisation of work' (Metcalf, 1988: 14-5).
According to this argument, Thatcherism altered the context in which
bargaining occurred by effecting changes in labour markets, product
markets, bargaining structures and by launching an assault on
corporatist institutions. The principle labour market change was the
creation of mass unemployment, as Metcalf puts it: 'high levels of
redundancy and unemployment overlay the re-arrangement of the labour
market'. In addition, however, the labour market interventions
'buttressing union power have been undermined', notably through the
abolition of the Fair Wage principle and the weakening of Wages
Councils. Legal constraints on unions make their operation more
difficult. In product markets high exchange rates forced businesses to
become more competitive. 	 Competition was encouraged through
deregulation in industries like television; privatisation and contracting
6Thi has been complemented 'by an attempt permanently to dismantle
the postwar settlement through seeking to erode Labour's power base'
(Crafts, 1988: 16). This took the form of privatisation, council house
sales, rates reform, educational reform, and so on (cf. Clarke, 1988a).
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in the public sector also encouraged improved working practices; and
'where nationalised industries remain subsidies and borrowing limits
have been slashed'. In collective bargaining, multi-employer
arrangements are less common and negotiations are more frequently
conducted within a single firm. The state corporations have led the
way with moves to decentralised bargaining, performance-related pay
and the rejection of traditional negotiating machinery. Nationally the
traditional institutions of 'corporatism' - NEDC, HSC, ACAS, etc -
have been marginalised or ignored (Metcalf, 1988: 16-17; cf. Hanson,
1991).
This account of both the 'British disease' and the Thatcherite success
in tackling it has gained wide acceptance. Moreover, acceptance of this
argument extends into sections of the Left. For instance in a recent
article Leys (1991) has defended the 'New Times' analysis of Marxism
Today - particularly as advanced by Stuart Hall - arguing that
Thatcherism was the only available political solution to the crisis facing
British capitalism, and that the 1980s have indeed seen a major
productivity breakthrough. However, the version of economic history
on which this perception is based can be criticised on a number of
important counts. This makes it is necessary to reassess the claims for
a productivity miracle and to examine in detail the nature of change in
manufacturing in the 1980s. In the following sections I offer, firstly, a
different interpretation of the nature of the post-war economic problem
and, secondly, a reassessment of the nature of the productivity miracle
and the workplace change which underpinned it. One of my aims is to
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highlight the role of the state in this process and, to that end, I
discuss in more detail events in the nationalised car industry.
4. TRADE UNIONS AND THE BRITISH DISEASE
Accounts which assign trade unions the primary role in the incubation
of the British disease neglect the extent to which from as early as the
the 19th century, but certainly thereafter, British capital preferred
investment abroad to a greater extent than its main competitor
countries. Sohn Rethel (1978) argues that, in general, faced with a
crisis of accumulation and declining rate of profit during the Great
Depression, the advanced capitalist countries tended to adopt one of
two strategies depending on the particular constraints facing them:
either they opened up new territories and expanded markets abroad or
they intensified the rate of exploitation at home. The first strategy
recommended itself easiest to 'rich creditor countries' like Britain; the
second strategy recommended itself to the United States, 'still a debtor
country, but rapidly advancing in industry and with the world's
highest wage level'. These latter conditions propelled the development
of 'scientific management'.
By way of support for this argument, Clarke (1988a) maintains that
Britain's relative industrial decline reflected the ability of British
capital to retreat into protected imperial markets in the face of
successive world crises. While this was crucial to Britain's economic,
social and political stability, it reduced the pressure to apply new
technology, develop new products and introduce new methods of
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management. It also limited the tendency to monopolisation and to the
integration of productive and financial capital which proceeded at a
much faster pace in the USA, Germany and Japan. A low rate of
investment meant that British manufacturing industry carried a
relatively light burden of external debt and depreciation and so could
continue to make profits so long as revenue covered current costs,
further reducing pressure to monopolise industry and transform
production methods. The relative stability of production methods and
forms of corporate organisation meant, among other things, that British
companies still often relied on 'primitive' methods of management, with
little direct managerial control of production processes. This conception
of British economic history suggests both that British industry neither
developed along Fordist lines and, that industrial development was
hampered less by widespread restrictive practices than by low levels of
investment.
What, then, was the impact of job controls? Job controls do have their
origin in the rejection of the detailed employer direction of production
which was central to the craft identity of early trades unionism. Also,
it is true that they have been far more extensive in Britain than in
other advanced industrial countries, but there is no simple relationship
between the historical existence of job controls and the failure of
British manufacturing to modernise along Fordist or post-Fordist lines.
As Hyman and Elger (1981) show there is a more general explanation
for the persistence of 'unscientific management' and the extension of job
controls to non-craft groups in British industry: job controls can serve
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the interests of capital by reinforcing workers' commitment to profitable
production.
For instance, the existence of the gang system in the Coventry
engineering and car industry is seen as an extreme application of job
controls by shop stewards. In the car industry the gang system did
have advantages for workers in terms of improved wages, control of
work and the mitigation of work pressures. However, at the same time
the combined operation of the gang system and that of piecework
renumeration facilitated demanning. The key features of shopfloor
control, it seems, were bargained or autonomous steward regulation of
manning levels, the negotiated movement of workers between jobs and
steward control of overtime rotas. Stewards did pursue reduced work
pressures in order to sustain distinctive principles of fairness and need
and the operation of these 'restrictive practices' was central to the
development of solidarity and collectivism, but the constraints imposed
on management were limited and often involved self-supervision (Hyman
and Elger, 1981). Such arrangements were encouraged by management
as forms of 'responsible autonomy' (Freidman, 1977). Even where
extensive craft controls existed these did not lead to rigid or static
'restrictive practices' and could in fact contribute to productivity, both
through the restraint of 'disorder' and through the standards of
workmanship which the craft tradition promoted (Hyman and Elger,
1981; Edwards and Terry, 1989). In practice job controls were not
necessarily established against sustained managerial opposition: 'They
grew out of situations in which no one was 'in control'. They reflected
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and reinforced traditional unplanned ways of doing things' (Edwards
and Terry, 1989: 219)1.
Important explanations for the poor productivity performance of British
industry, which tend to be overlooked in the dominant accounts, lie in
the character of management strategy and patterns of manufacturing
investment which reflected Britain's emerging position in the
international division of labour. Clarke (1988a), for instance, has
described the strategies of the British state as 'Keynesian' (i.e.
concerned with demand management) in order to distinguish them from
'corporatist' ones (i.e. concerned with planned reorganisation of
industry). In general, forms of state intervention were limited. Even
the nationalised industries suffered from this half-hearted intervention,
being under-invested, with prices kept down, and strategy subject to
short-term considerations (Clarke, 1988a; Fine and Harris, 1986; also
Chapter Four). The poor productivity performance of British
manufacturing corresponded to the relative backwardness of the
industrial structure and continued foreign investment (often through
acquisition) by British companies. Moreover the British economy
increasingly stood out as 'a specialist producer of relatively low
technology, low value added products and as a low wage, low
7Hyman and Elger also note the relative fragility of the job
control gains made by workers. In relation to the car industry they
argue: 'Workers' gains in terms of wages and conditions were not
entrenched in widely ratified agreements but were sustained through
defence and elaboration of 'custom and practice' on a piecemeal basis'
(1981: 134). Thus, in contrast to other countries, there were few legal
constraints on employers, particularly in relation to the hiring and
disposal of labour (Nolan and O'Donnell, 1991).
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productivity, low investment economy' with 'a comparative trade
advantage in low research intensive industries, such as food, drink and
tobacco' (Nolan and O'Donnell, 1991: 112; see table 3.1). By contrast
the dynamic, technology intensive sectors (such as cars, electronics)
have been increasingly dominated by multinational companies which
tended to locate low value-added activities in Britain (e.g. Fine and
Harris, 1986; Nolan 1989a, 1989b; Nolan and O'Donnell, 1991).
The particular character of the British economy in the post-war period
has been reinforced increasingly by the strategies of multinational
companies. International producers historically have been less likely to
commit themselves to concession making. In the car industry, for
instance Ford consistently sought the most intensive work rates and the
least constrained managerial deployment of labour across their
international operations, making it much more difficult for Ford workers
to establish the job controls of the type found in the West Midlands. A
corollary of this, as Hyman and Elger (1981) note, is the nature of the
investment associated with this approach to work organisation. Ford's
investment in Britain has tended to be more labour intensive rather
than elsewhere: 'Thus corporate strategies little encumbered by worker
resistance, and informed by such factors as wage levels and the supply
of skills and experience are of central importance in explaining the form
and extent of capital investment in the UK' (Hyman and Elger, 1981:
137). Nolan and O'Donnell (1991) cite Ford's former personnel director
as arguing that, in the post-war period, Ford consciously elected to
situate its least capital intensive assembly operations in Britain, while
in countries such as West Germany - where the institutional and legal
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context of industrial relations militated against cheap and readily
disposable labour - it was forced to implement more advanced production
techniques. Arguably this is what underlies the high-wage/
high-productivity virtuous circle there (cf. Chapter Two).
Job controls were, therefore, not unimportant, but existed in this wider
context. Clarke, thus, offers a general assessment of the impact of job
controls on industrial performance:
Although workers' resistance has frequently been cited as a
major cause of low productivity, it was far more common for
employers to milk old plant dry and refuse new investment
demanded by the trade unions than for unions to resist
investment plans outright. However, the ability of workers
to prevent the employers from unilaterally dictating the terms
of such investment made re-equipment less attractive, and
made even many modern plants less productive than their
equivalents abroad, where workers had been forced, or
persuaded by real and sustained wage increases, to intensify
their labour (1988a: 293; cf. Goodrich, 1921: 202-216).
It is in this context that subsequent shopfloor reform efforts - which
according to Edwards and Terry (1989) were widespread by the late
1960s and early 1970s and which were given ideological legitimacy by
Donovan - generally failed to secure their promised end of increased
productivity and and greater formalisation 8 . Hyman and Elger (1981)
argue that whatever the historical conditions of decline, by the
beginning of the 1980s an offensive against the shopfloor
9Attempts to modernise British manufacturing are usually seen as a
response to the balance of payment crises of the 1960s which led to the
formation of of the NEDC and later, under Labour, to the National Plan,
the Department of Economic Affairs and later still the IRC and Mm Tech.
In fact the efforts to modernise British manufacturing in the post-war
period could be seen to stretch back to the Anglo-American Productivity
Councils of the 1940s which aimed to promote 'scientific management'.
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counter-culture seemed essential to key sections of capital in order to
secure international competitiveness. By the early 1980s the rhetoric of
'restrictive practices' had become ideologically central 'in the
implementation of the law of value; in the definition of socially
necessary labour time in the terms most advantageous to capital' (Hyman
and Elger, 1981: 138). It is against this history that the claims of those
who see Thatcherism as representing a radically transformative period
in British economic and social history should be measured. Seen from
this point of view, the Conservative governments of the 1980s seem a
less radical departure from the past than the Marxism Today account
would suggest. The Thatcher governments came merely to accept what
was the widely held view that the industrial problem as one of labour
practices and excessive trade union power. 'Thatcherism', however,
was distinguished by the vigour with which it sought to subordinate the
position of labour within production. This view of the industrial
problem underpinned the restructuring of the 1980s to the extent that
the state was able to influence its direction. In the following section,
therefore, the particular character of the 'productivity miracle' is
analysed. Subsequently, the role played by the state in directly
influencing the nature of change through the provision of a
'demonstration effect' is analysed.
5. THE REORGANISATION OF WORK IN THE 1980s
'Britain has got the cure.. . they used to talk about us in
terms of the British disease. Now they talk about us and say
'Look come to Britain and see how Britain has done it',
Margaret Thatcher (quoted in Nolan, 1989a: 81n)
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A review of the process of industrial relations reform, work
reorganisation and technical change in industry in the 1980s,
undermines both the claims of the post-Fordist writers, those who
profess to identify a productivity 'miracle', and those, like Hirst and
Zeitlin, who argue that no real change has occurred.
The British experience suggests significant changes are occurring.
However these are based on a set of connections between market
changes, technology and work practices, which are often at odds with
the ascribed features of 'post-Fordism'. An example is Chris Smith's
research in the food sector which found efforts directed at
restructuring work organisation and undermining job demarcations
occurring with the move toward fewer products. Moreover:
'Flexibility has little to do with extending skills or worker
satisfaction, and a lot to do with undermining the remaining
areas of craft control in maintenance, extending managerial
authority over labour mobility and ensuring greater utilisation
of expensive capital equipment' (Smith, 1989: 214).
If British developments seem modest in relation to those which define
flexible specialisation or Japanese industrial practice, they tend to be
concerned with the ends of restructuring identified in Chapter Two,
namely an attempt to eliminate the 'unproductive' aspects of the
production process. For instance in their review of major flexibility
agreements, Incomes Data Services (IDS, 1986) identified the broad
principles underlying changes in work practices as concerned with the
elimination of idle time in production (downtime, waiting time and so on)
and increased rates of machine utilisation. These general aims are
reflected in the comments of the Director-General of the Engineering
Employers Federation:
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'We need to make maximum use of plant and machinery by
eliminating restrictive practices, by having full flexibility
between and within trades and occupations and between
supervisor and supervised. . . [and]. . .in order to make better
use of plant and equipment our member companies need to be
able to adopt flexible working times when required (quoted in
Wickens, 1987: 41).
In contrast to the dramatic picture of change painted by Marxism
Today, Elger's (1990, 1991) reviews of the mass of case study and
survey evidence from manufacturing suggest a more limited piecemeal
pattern of workplace change. Elger charts a relative shift in the
direction of horizontal job enlargement rather than multiskilling, for
instance. Equally, this trend has the effect of intensifying work
through a reduction in the porosity of the working day. Such changes
are said to reflect the relative vulnerability of labour, rather than
fundamental shifts in strategy on the part of management. There is,
moreover, no simple connection between technical change and work
reform. Where technical change has occurred in manufacturing it has
been largely assimilated into pre-existing patterns of industrial relations
and occupational organisation, with a bias against high trust polyvalent
team-working, notwithstanding any properties of the technology that
might suggest the value of such reforms (cf. Jones, 1989). According
to Elger, the weight of evidence suggests a variety of limited shifts in
patterns of competence and control within and between different
9Attempts to restructure inter-craft demarcations have been seen in
the same way. A survey of managers in fifty British companies found
that: 'The major factor causing the blurring (of demarcations] is
economic pressure to reduce lost production through breakdowns, labour
costs, and as a result of changes in the technology of the machines'
(Cross, 1985: 69: see also Tomaney, 1990).
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occupational groups, with some examples of deskilling but more of
modified variants of limited but specialist expertise. The more general
pursuit of task flexibility reflects diverse and incremental attempts to
reduce manning levels and to increase the flexibility of work allocation,
often through the erosion of job controls. This can have varied
implications dependent on sectoral and establishment considerations but
usually involves job enlargement with only modest extensions of
competence and grading. This lays the basis not for multiskilling but
work intensification.
This evidence would appear to undermine both the post-Fordist
argument and the claims concerning a 'productivity miracle':
Recent productivity gains do not stem from a fundamental
reorganisation of the forces of production in Britain, but
instead are the product of a series of step-by-step changes
dictated by short term aims and perspectives (Nolan, 1989:
101).
For Nolan the process of restructuring in manufacturing during the
1980s continued the comparatively low-wage, labour intensive bias of the
post-war period10 . The productivity gains of the 1980s reflect. the
interaction of output recovery and continuing job loss since 1982, a
°Wi11iaxns et al (1990) add further weight to this argument and see
the restructuring of the 1980s as contributing further to the 'hollowing
out' of British manufacturing. Their analysis of a sample of company
reports from British multinationals emphasised a retreat from
competitive markets and expansion in production abroad rather than
investment in manufacturing at home. British companies, they argue,
perform badly in product development. For Williams et al these
processes are exemplified by the activities of Hanson, plc., which has
stated publically its preference for sheltered, low-tech businesses
which are slow changing and do not require major investment.
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relative shift in power at the workplace, and the kind of limited
technical and work-related changes which Elger describes.
In the British case, restructuring generally has not been accompanied
by large scale technical change. In particular investment levels have
not been high and hardly warrant discussion of the emergence of a new
'industrial paradigm'. Haskel and Kay (1990) have shown that
investment remained low during the 1980s and the capital stock did not
grow faster than in previous periods (see Table 3.2). Estimates of
total factor productivity, therefore, show the same performance trend
as movements in labour productivity (Haskel and Kay, 1990; cf. Bean
and Symons, 1989). One authoritative source concluded:
Stronger labour productivity growth has not been linked to
capital investment, which, in fact, has remained lower relative
to GD? than in other recovery periods. Rather it seems
linked to changes in work organisation with inflexible and
outdated job demarcation giving way to more rational job
allocation. This would appear to indicate that a large part of
the observed growth rates in the 1980s are in fact successive
level changes as opposed to underlying growth rates (OECD,
1988: 79)11
'No1an's (1989b) analysis shows that between 1979-85 total factor
productivity grew faster• in Britain than in France, West Germany and
Italy. If the relevant point of comparison is Britain's record before
1973, however, the figures are less favourable. Thus, he argues, one
plausible explanation of this record is that Britain began to recover
from the effects of the world-wide economic crisis and recession of the
1970s and, in consequence, has seen a return to the underlying (and
uncompetitive) productivity trend which prevailed in the the 1960s and
early 1970a (see Table 3.3). Nolan's analysis is all the more impressive
because it is based on a comprehensive review of the mass of material
written on this complex subject and because it is informed by a critique
of the productivity measurement exercise.
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Moreover, Britain's retraining and skill formation policies remained
among the most limited in Europe. This issue was noted by the House
of Lords Committee on Science and Technology in their report on the
training requirements of new technologies published in 1985:
Technological progress in the UK is being hampered by the
failure to develop the human resources of the nation.. .At
stake is the UK's competitive edge in international trade and
ultimately therefore the UK's economic future. . . The Committee
doubts whether there is a more serious challenge facing
British industry than the inadequate provision of people
properly qualified and trained to exploit effectively the new
technologies as they emerge (quoted in Ashton et al, 1989:
150)12.
Thus, Nolan argues, to the extent that productivity improvements
reflect the 'fear factor' (Metcalf, 1988) or a new spirit of 'individualism'
(Richardson and Wood, 1988) within the workforce they may prove to be
short lived. While accepting that labour productivity has increased,
Nolan rejects the idea of 'miracle':
The problem with such terms is that they encourage writers
to speak misleadingly of an enduring 'trend shift' in supply
side conditions, when in fact what they are merely describing
is a new, and intrinsically fragile, power shift arising from
the exceptionally brutal conditions of the early 1980s (1989b:
115).
2Exact international comparisons are difficult to make, but
according to a major EC survey, 38 per cent of persons in the UK are
engaged in skilled work compared to 80 per cent in France, 67 per cent
in Germany and 63 per cent for Europe as a whole (Special EC labour
market survey, European Economy, Supplement B, September 1989). Ashton
et al's (1989) history of the the government's training policy shows a
progressive withdrawal from direct training provision through a
combination of expenditure cutbacks and privatisation. This process
reached it zenith with the introduction of employer-led Training and
Enterprise Councils which are mainly an ideological investment in. the
rhetoric of an enterprise economy (see Amin and Tomaney, 1991; Hague,
1991). The British government was the only one in Europe not to support
the EC's recently proposed £59m training programme (The Guardian,
6.6.90)
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These conclusions seem reasonable on the basis of the evidence
reviewed here, but they require qualification in one crucial respect.
Terry (1989) argues that the pattern of concession making by unions
and workers may have handed a more long term advantage to
management by enmeshing unions in the long term struggle for
competitive success. The narrowing of bargaining agendas and the
acceptance of competitiveness arguments raise new issues for workplace
organisations. Elger's review of case study evidence from the motor
vehicle industry - focussing on the relative shift from a confrontational
approach involving an ideological and real attack on 'restrictive
practices' to a more 'Japanised' one - would support this argument.
Elger argues that 'the first may have served as a transitional moment of
coercive restructuring on the way towards the emergence of the second,
involving the more active orchestration of flexibility and consent'
(Elger, 1991: 60; also Holloway, 1987).
It seems clear - for instance, through the comments of Peter Lilley
cited earlier - that for the present government at least the direction of
change should be in the direction of 'Japanisation' described in section
2. To the extent that government in the late 1980s has been able to
influence the direction of change it has promoted this scenario. The
direct role of the state in promoting a particular pattern of
restructuring would appear to be a distinguishing feature of the British
case and is examined in more detail below.
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6. THE STATE AND RESTRUCTURING
A key way in which the state - and specifically the Thatcher
governments - has sought to influence the direction of change has been
in relation to state-owned industry. As Wiliman and Winch suggest:
It might be supposed that governments, particularly those
explicitly intending to introduce innovative economic
programmes, would seek to set out an example in those
institutions over which they exert financial control. If, in
addition, those institutions have previously confirmed the
party view of trade unions, then it may be supposed that
steps could be taken to ensure these parallels continue (1985:
189).
The 'productivity miracles' in companies such as BL/Rover and British
Coal have been key elements in the construction of the argument for
the overall success of the Thatcher governments in arresting economic
decline. Transformations in workplace relations in the state owned
industrial sector have been far more dramatic than those occurring in
the privately owned sector13.
Most studies of workplace change in the 1980s have focused on changes
occurring in privately-owned manufacturing. However, the direct role
played by the state in the process of workplace restructuring is of
3Haske1 and Kay (1990), for instance, suggest that the pace of
reform has been particularly marked in those industries which were
publicly owned in 1979.. .There was a marked break in trend around 1982/3
when the privatisation programme began, and the growth of productivity
over the latter period has been strong across the sector. It is notable,
however, that performance has been strong whether the industry was
privatised or not (1990: 10; see Table 3.4)
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crucial importance. The Thatcher governments have professed a
general hostility to state ownership. For commentators on the Right a
deeper significance is attached to the reform of such companies because
all the failures of British manufacturing - especially in relation to
'restrictive practices' - existed on an exponentially larger scale in the
state owned industrial sector despite the reform efforts of the 1960s and
early 1970s (Metcalf, 1988; see Tomaney, 1991)'. For these reasons
events in the state controlled sector require close investigation15.
While the assault on job controls and the trade union organisation which
underpinned them gained added edge from the presence of a
particularly hostile Tory government, the concern with reforming
industrial relations has longer antecedents. Awareness of the long term
nature of the restructuring process in the nationalised industries helps
to avoid a fetishisation of the activities of the Thatcher governments
and the extent to which these represent a radical break with past
industrial policy and practice in the UK. In some ways, as I hope to
show, the activities of the Thatcher governments were merely an
intensification of a developing tendency rather than a sharp
4There is more than a measure of truth in this. In relation to
BL, for instance Scarbrough argues: 'Shop stewards in BL were
effectively organised and more powerful in their own right than any
similar group in the rest of British industry, and despite management's
hopes MDW [Measured Day Work] had done little to erode their power'
(1986: 97).
The state also provided this demonstration effect through the
changes which it orchestrated in the public services (see Fairbrother,
1988), but which are not discussed here.
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discontinuity with the past. For this reason my interest is more with
the activities of the state than the Thatcher governments per Se.
The role of the state in framing the nature of the industrial problem in
the UK and the characteristic response to it is highlighted by the case
of BL16 . In the car industry, from the middle of the 1970s, ownership
of BL guaranteed an important role to the state in the restructuring
process. Increasingly, in relation to BL, state intervention took on a
particular form:
In the role of crisis management state interventions have
deployed the rhetoric of 'restrictive practices' to attack
shopfloor organisation and working conditions, the
transformation of which has been made a condition of state
funding to make good the meagre investment of the post-war
years (Hyman and Elger, 1981: 138).
In the car industry generally, restructuring in the 1980s saw
significant changes in the direction of tightening control over the
allocation and intensity of labour reflecting the erosion of job controls
and limits on the activities of stewards. These reflected the search for
reduced costs and viable forms of lower-volume production, but took
place against a background of job loss and plant closure and often the
introduction labour displacing technology. Uneven movements in the
6This discussion is included not least because of certain
parallels with developments in the coal industry over the same period
and which are examined in the subsequent chapters. The similarities
should come as little surprise when it it is recollected that Ian
MacGregor (later the NCB's chairman during the 1984/5 miners' strike)
was appointed to the board of BL at the behest of its then chairman
Michael Edwardes (Edwardes, 1983). According to MacGregor's testimony,
it was during this period that he first diagnosed the British disease as
a surfeit of union power and management weakness (MacGregor, 1986:
59-84).
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direction of craft and operator flexibility were also important (Elger,
1990; Lyddon, 1990; Marsden et al, 1985). However, developments at
BL stand out because changes were implemented through a managerial
offensive which inflicted a severe defeat on shopfloor orgariisation. For
Elger (1990) restructuring at BL represented a 'distinctive moment' in
the wider restructuring in work and employment in motors. Arguably
the significance of events at BL - given the publicity which they were
accorded - were not lost on workers in manufacturing more generally.
At BL the progressive loss of markets in the 1970s posed a major
problem for governments because of the centrality of the company to
the British manufacturing sector. Both the Ryder report and the
National Enterprise Board saw the reform of labour relations as central
to any restructuring. Ryder proposed a product-led restructuring
aimed at winning back market share through an expansion of
production. The key element in this was to be the development of the
Metro. The Ryder strategy acknowledged the prevailing distribution of
power in the company by recommending the development of industrial
democracy, emphasising the need to achieve the cooperation of and
commitment of shop stewards in improving BL's performance,
particularly by reducing the number of official disputes and improving
continuity of production. The participative approach to change centred
on stewards' attempts to negotiate payment for change in the tradition
of mutuality (Wiliman and Winch, 1985, Scarbrough 1986).
Thereafter, the central feature of the reform of collective bargaining
within BL was the passage from joint commitment to change, to a
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position in late 1979, after the election of the Tories, where management
were prepared to impose changes in work practices unilaterally once
agreement could not be reached (Willman and Winch, 1985). This
approach was embodied in the person of Michael Edwardes who sought
to regain what he termed 'the sine qua non of survival.., the right to
manage' (quoted in Scarbrough, 1986: 104). Edwardes shared with
Ryder the desire to see continuity of production but his means to
achieving this end were significantly different. This approach
precluded negotiation of change based on the 'buy out' of restrictive
practices (Edwardes, 1983). Thus:
By November 1979 BL management were engaged in all-out
attack not only against such 'restrictive practices', but also
against the work-place organisation which sustained them
(Scarbrough, 1986: 106).
The centrality of the Metro to the restructuring strategy meant that
events at Longbridge, where it was to be produced, had special
significance, not least because of the particular choices management
made in relation to the new production system. The modernisation of
the plant began in 1977, during the post-Ryder period, which meant
change was subject to negotiation. Although primarily oriented to
strategic goals of volume and cost, management sought to build into the
process a greater degree of control over production (Scarbrough, 1986;
Scarbrough and Moran, 1985). The machinery chosen (particularly in
the advanced Body-in White shop) was a relatively inflexible form of
automation geared to high production volumes. Above all such
technology, operated under stringent financial conditions and
deteriorating market circumstances, demanded in heightened form the
continuity of production which Edwardes wanted. At Longbridge a
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change in the pattern of labour relations was required and, while there
were shifts over time in the conceptualisation of the desired change,
the outcome was consistent with a broader pattern of restructuring:
The decision was to invest in capital rather than labour: to
go for high-volume production: to require greater flexibility
of labour between routine unskilled jobs and faster workpace
(Wiliman and Winch, 1985: 63).
According to Scarbrough (1986) this form of automation tended to
transform social control of production into an abstract, built-in feature
of the production system. Moreover, at Longbridge new technology was
used to break down forms of work organisation based on groups (the
traditional basis of the gang system) into smaller numbers of isolated
individual workers: 'This tactic alone could increase operator efficiency
by 10 per cent or more' (Scarbrough and Moran, 1985: 208)17.
The capital intensive nature of the system meant that particular
attention was devoted to the question of maintenance requirements.
Although management wanted to erode the greater part of the trade's
autonomy and to erode demarcations, they did not tackle the trades
head on. Instead they used new technology to manipulate 'the technical
and political margins of the trade's work' (Scarbrough, 1986: 111).
Specifically, the abstract electronic and programming skills associated
with computer controlled. robot systems in the Body-in-White process
were expropriated for a new managerial 'control engineer' grade.
i will show that there were striking resonances with the pattern
of change at Longbridge and those which occurred in British Coal
(especially at Selby) - see Chapter Six.
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Complex tendencies of skilling and deskilling were at work within the
establishment of an overall hierarchical division of labour.
At Longbridge, the design of work practices coincided with Edwardes'
more general drive for management control which precluded
experimentation with the 'humanisation of work'. Under Edwardes BL
evolved a package of reforms in a document known as the 'Blue
Newspaper': which involved extensive changes to mobility, industrial
engineering and mutuality (Willman and Winch, 1985) and which, in the
face of fragmented and uncoordinated union opposition, management
unilaterally implemented in April 1980. The threat of dismissal faced
any possible rejection of the terms by the workforce. Longbridge
management used the broad reform package to introduce measures which
they saw as necessary for the successful operation of the plant.
Mutuality was ended, manning levels and work standards became the
prerogative of industrial engineers, Works Committee members were
deprived of their semi-permanent status, leaving only the convenor and
his deputy as full-time officials and, according to Wiliman and Winch
(1984) stewards control over the effort bargain was reduced18.
8It is clear, however, that the type of work process introduced at
Longbridge did not follow directly from nature of the technology itself.
A similar technical system had been introduced at Saab's Trolihatten
plant accompanied by extensive 'humanisation' efforts, involving
team-working and extended cycle times. The production process at
Longbridge was characterised by a comparatively small workforce, with a
high proportion of skilled maintenance staff (to ensure continuous
production) and a number of extremely short cycle jobs on direct work
(Wiliman and Winch, 1985; also Berggren, 1989). Pontusson contrasts BL's
approach with Volvo's: 'Whereas Volvo represents a prototypical case of
industrial innovation through bargaining and collaboration between
(Footnote Continued)
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The role of government and the fact that BL was state owned was
crucially important in accounting for the dramatic nature of
restructuring at BL. At first, through the NEB, the state helped to
frame the problems of BL as being derived from shopfloor disorder.
Later, the laissez faire attitude of the Tory government (and the
worsening financial position of the company) helped to strengthen
management's position. Moreover, at key points in the restructuring
process Edwardes was able to threaten mass dismissals or the liquidation
of the company. As Scarbrough notes, however:
It was only in the particular circumstances of the late 1970s,
and especially the government's adoption of a policy of
disengagement, that such threats became perceptibly real -
allowing management to exploit the power inequality inherent in
the employment contract as a weapon against the collectivities
of workers (1986: 108).
The changes at BL have been more dramatic than those which have
occurred elsewhere and provided a powerful 'demonstration effect' for
manufacturing industry but the limits to this change should also be
acknowledged. The forms of technical innovation were limited. BL's
productivity miracle has been much remarked upon but both Scarbrough
and Wiliman and Winch suggest that it has not been based on a
technical breakthrough but arises from the reform of working practices.
Moreover, while the level of industrial action at BL fell in the mid-1980s
(Footnote Continued)
management and labour, EL represents a prototypical case of innovation
conceived by management and imposed on labour' (1990: 312). This
'neo-Taylorist' approach (cf. the discussion of Lipietz's typology in
the previous chapter) reflected political choices by management. This is
exemplified by the comments of a manager in the powertrain shop at
Longbridge in relation to the Machine Monitoring System, an electronic
information gathering system, the purpose of which he described as 'to
look for the idle buggers' (Scarbrough and Moran, 1985: 49).
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it was not eradicated. 'The miracle of Longbridge' reflected 'primarily
a shift in power and intensification, rather than any more radical
transformation of work relations' (Elger, 1991: 61) and provided fragile
foundations for continued industrial development.
7. CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated that post-Fordist analyses have little
explanatory purchase in the British case, whatever their merits in
explaining events elsewhere. The difficulties (and dangers) of
attempting to subsume the complex patterns of contemporary
restructuring in a single account of change have been highlighted.
This chapter has argued that rather than measuring the development of
British industry against an ideal model of capitalist development there is
a need instead to emphasise the force of institutional and social
conditions which operate differently in various advanced economies.
Post-Fordist accounts of change, on the other hand, are representative
of a particular theoretical approach which searches for a 'pure' form
industrial production:
They involve taking an abstract concept of particular features
of the ideal country, separating them from the complex
historical circumstances in which they have developed and
assuming that they could, in principle, have been adopted in
a similar form in Britain (Fine and Harris, 1986: 13).
The many empirical examples which are not readily classifiable as
post-Fordism are seen as somehow residual, i.e. as regions or
industries which must (or will) catch up with new forms of production
organisation which are being imposed by the new economic rationality.
Alternatively, lagging regions and industries are viewed as pathological
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exceptions: they are relegated to the status of 'discordant facts' (Chris
Smith, 1989). However, diversity and unevenness are inherent in the
process of change. The tendency of post-Fordist writers to see
developments in terms of an immutable logic determined by responses to
market conditions, igl'iores the fact that firms and economies are rooted
in specific historical contexts and, that processes of restructuring are
mediated expressions of strategies, conflicts and compromises reflecting
national, sectoral, corporate and other conditions. As Elger (1990)
notes, such positive accounts of change are buttressed more by
polemical and overdrawn contrasts rather than a true appreciation of
the complex and equivocal forms of restructuring which have occurred.
Furthermore, the notion that 'Thatcherism' has fundamentally altered
the direction of industrial development, still less provided the
conditions for the emergence of post-Fordist society, has been
questioned. While there is little evidence that Thatcherism has burst
asunder the integument surrounding a putative post-Fordism, important
changes have occurred which should not be underestimated. While
inspired by the timeless quest of capitalist enterprise to secure further
time and control economies in production, British firms have pursued
limited forms of restructuring in the 1980s. To the extent that it is
possible to generalise, it seems clear that these have been aimed largely
at reducing production time losses often through the erosion of
demarcations. However, firms have not been concerned with laying
down the foundations of a 'post-Fordist' labour process, but, instead,
have acted to effect more limited changes largely in response to the
changed balance of class forces prevailing in 1980s Britain. Thus,
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there is little evidence that this restructuring, in any way, has laid the
foundations for a renewal of British industry19.
This is hardly surprising given the limited, even banal, conception of
the British industrial problem held by important sections of the political
establishment. The example of BL, in particular, highlights the role
played by the state in formulating the nature of the industrial problems
and the response to it. Also, the case of BL shows that it is
necessary to distinguish between the political contingencies which
dominated the state sector and the market contingencies which
dominated the private sector (cf. Elger, 1987). In the 1970s, the
prevailing balance of forces in the industry and the wider balance of
class forces militated in the direction of corporatist solutions to the
productivity problems. Later, under the Conservatives, with
corporatist solutions discredited and the threat of mass unemployment
and the withdrawal of state support hanging over the company, a more
combative managerial approach was made possible. It is striking that
9 'Thatcherism' (CPGB, 1989) is in many ways a 'chaotic conception'
(Marx, 1973: 100). It ascribes to the Conservative governments a
political cohesion which they rarely exhibited. Also it tends to
suggest a radical break in the practice of the state when important
continuities also existed. In particular, the low wage, labour
intensive bias to restructuring which marked the post-war period has not
been altered. Nevertheless, to the extent to which the policies of the
1980s can be said to have contained an essential notion, it is of the
necessity of subordinating the position of labour within production (and
indeed within society more generally). As Clarke puts it: 'While
Keynesianism was the ideological expression of the attempt of capital to
respond to the generalised aspirations of the working class in the
post-war boom, neo-liberalism is the ideological expression of the
subordination of working class aspirations to the valorisatiori of
capital' (1988a: 86).
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the concern with labour indiscipline was embodied in the technological
choices which management made.
It was within this broad pattern of British restructuring that events
within coal were played out. Coalmining has been seen both as the
virtual embodiment of the 'British disease' and as central to the
restructuring of the 1980s (Metcalf, 1988; MacGregor, 1986). At least
one key management figure in the coal industry saw his mission in
almost 'post-Fordist' terms:
No longer could we survive as labour intensive economy.
Instead we had to begin the slow and painful change to a
capital-intensive economy. The change was imperative. There
was no way to stop the inexorable tide. . . Attempts to resist it
can only result in a bigger bang when the pressures finally
break through to a new and different economic balance. It
was my job to try and manage the change - to be a sort of
midwife to it - in such a way as to ensure it caused the
minimum of discomfort (MacGregor, 1986: 64-66).
For Ian MacGregor, up until the late 1970s British society in general
had still failed to grasp the changes which were occurring in the world
economy. Nowhere was this more true than in the coal industry where
managers cowered in the face of union power:
If ever an industry suffered from the collection of maladies
many had come to associate with the British problem, it was
coal as it entered the 1980s (ibid: 125).
Chapter Four then outlines the nature of technical change and the
transformation of work in the coal industry. Specifically, it addresses
MacGregor's arguments, that, firstly, restructuring reflected broad
technical changes which were affecting companies in general and that,
secondly, the particular pattern of change was influenced by the
prevailing view of the nature of the British disease. However, in order
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not to fetishise change, contemporary events are set in their historical
context. The chapter concludes, however, by offering a detailed
account of the programme of technical change initiated in the 1970s and
the extent to which this was overlain by extensive restructuring of
work practices following the defeat of the 1984/5 miners' strike. The
differential outcomes of these processes and events in two seperate
coalfields are examined in Chapters Five and Six.
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TABLE 3.1
Iabc*xr Osts in Manufacturing, 1960-86
Total hourly labour costs
	
1960	 1970	 1980	 1982	 1984	 1986
(UK = 100)
USA	 296	 250	 126	 158	 194	 161
Japan	 30	 57	 80	 86	 109	 129
France	 94	 105	 121	 110	 114	 122
West Germany	 98	 144	 165	 147	 153	 173
Italy	 72	 113	 108	 104	 117	 127
Belgium	 94	 122	 176	 142	 140	 149
Netherlait1s	 N/A	 126	 160	 142	 142	 156
Norway	 113	 150	 153	 152	 163	 164
Sweden	 138	 181	 170	 142	 147	 154
UK	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: cited in Nolan ar O'l)Dnnell (1991: 113).
Note: Labour costs are ccmared at current market exchange rates.
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TABLE 3.2
Investnnt and Capital Stack
1969-73 1973-79 1979-82 1983-89*
Investnnt/GDP	 0.22	 0.21	 0.18	 0.20
capital Stack in
inanufac±uring (grozth p. a)	 3.29	 2.54	 1.59	 0.80
*Ifl,t data up to 1989, Q2
capital 50 1987, Q4
Source: (SO, cited in Haskel and Kay (1990).
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TABLE 3.3
Total factor productivity growth in manufacturing (hourly) a
Average annual percentage change.
1973b	 1973-9	 1979-85
USA	 2.6	 0.4	 2.4
Japan	 6.9	 2.4	 4.4
France	 5.4	 3.0	 1.9
West Germany	 3.6	 2.8	 2.0
Italy	 5.6	 2.1	 1.6
Belgium	 6.6	 5.0	 3.7
13K	 3.3	 0.0	 2.3
Notes: a) Output is added at constant prices.
b) The starting years are as follows: USA, 1960; Japan, 1966;
Germany, 1961; France, 1964; 13K and Italy, 1960; Belgium, 1962.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1987; cited in Nolan (1989b: 104).
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TABLE 3.4
Total factor productivity in UK piblic sector
RA
British Coal*
British Gas
British Rail
British Steel
British Telecom
Electricity Industry
Post Office
Average
nnual rate of increase (per cent)
1979-88	 1979-83	 1983-88
	
1.6	 0.0	 2.8
	
2.9	 0.6	 4.6
	
3.3	 -0.2	 6.2
	
1.3	 -0.4	 2.7
	
12.9	 8.4	 12.4
	
2.4	 2.0	 2.5
	
1.4	 -1.6	 4.0
	
3.7	 3.6	 3.3
	
3.7	 1.6	 4.8
* adjusted for effects of 1984/5 strike
Source: Haskel arid Kay (1990).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the post-war history of the labour process in the
nationalised coal industry. The chapter seeks to place restructuring in
coalmining, firstly, within the discussion of 'post-Fordism', and,
secondly, within the specific context of industrial restructuring in 1980s
Britain.
The British coal industry provides an interesting case for exploring the
significance of the post-Fordist thesis. In Chapter Two I criticised
those theoretical approaches to the understanding of contemporary
workplace change which claim that current forms of restructuring
amount to a radical break with past forms of industrial practice. In
particular I criticised those approaches which identify a terminal crisis
of mass production brought on by the application of microelectronics. I
argued instead that such theories appear to point to a set of more
limited developments in the organisation of industrial production around
flow principles. The application of microelectronics (and other process
innovations) in production reflects the intensified search for time and
control economies which is a historical characteristic of large scale
industry. Thus, although important innovations are occurring in
production organisation and control, in many ways these represent a
deepening of an older capitalist imperative. The discussion of the
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historical development of coalmining in this chapter is an illustration of
this argument.
Restructuring in industry such as coalmining is of interest also for
reasons arising from the discussion of the British case in Chapter
Three. Under the Thatcher governments, the view that the 'British
disease' had its origins in excessive union power in the workplace,
manifested in the operation of job controls became paramount.
Moreover, the political response to the industrial problem became
concerned with altering the balance of power between management and
unions within the workplace and within society as a whole. The case of
coal illustrates well this general argument. Using Elger's terminology,
restructuring in coal can be seen as 'distinctive moment' in the broader
industrial restructuring of the 1980s. As I noted in the last chapter,
employees and unions in the state sector have tended to face more
sustained management pressure for restructuring than those in private
manufacturing. BL, for instance, seen to embody many of the key
features of the 'British disease' and has since been seen as a metaphor
for successful industrial restructuring. The recent history of the coal
industry has been presented in a similar light. Metcalf, for instance,
chooses to title his celebration of the 'productivity miracle' of
Thatcher's Britain, 'Water notes dry up'. He suggests:
Water notes are issued in coal mining to permit a miner to cut
short his shift if his clothes are wet. Sometimes in the recent
past they were issued when the 'the conditions were as dry
as the Sahara' but no longer. Although coal is not part of
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manufacturing, the changes in this practice seem to capture
the spirit of the times (1988: 27_28)1.
The recent history of the coal industry neatly demonstrates the
significance of this interpretation of the industrial problem and the
changing balance between technical and social responses to industrial
efficiency limits.
The chapter begins by outlining briefly the forms of work and
technology which the nationalised coal industry inherited. The chapter
shows that traditionally the miner enjoyed a high degree of workplace
autonomy. Early attempts at mechanisation are outlined. Although
these were limited, it is shown how, at the time, these were seen as
attempts to 'Fordise' coal production. The chapter then charts the
mechanisation of longwall mining in the nationalisation era and illustrates
the extent to which this aimed at creating 'flow production'
underground and how the work process was subject to certain of the
features of 'scientific management' •2 Despite these changes miners
The facetiousness of this remark is offensive to miners who work
in conditions considerably more dangerous and unpleasant than those of
the London School of Economics. A water note is often little recompense
for a shift spent working in freezing black sludge.
2 'Scientific' production methods were propagated alongside
increased mechanisation, for instance, by the US Coal Commission in the
inter-war period. Carter Goodrich, with characteristic insight, noted:
'Even the most 'progressive' mine of today is very far indeed from the
extreme of the 'Ford methods', but one prominent superintendent declares
that just such a degree of regimentation can be attained as soon as a
sufficiently automatic cutter-and-loader can safely be driven down a
longwall face, and another argues for a standardization of 'every
operation down to the minutest detail so that no responsibility of any
kind will fall on the worker''(1928: 155).
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continued to regulate their work, retaining a probably unprecedented
degree of control over the work process. Mechanised coal production
(called 'powerloading') was widespread by the 1960s, but the
productivity improvements associated with its introduction were
disappointing. A set of production problems emerged which bore a
similarity to the 'crisis of mass production' outlined in Chapter Two.
The chapter shows how a series of technical improvements to
powerloading were proposed, with an important role ascribed to the
potentialities of microelectronics in ensuring a high rate of machine
utilisation. These innovations were introduced progressively from the
end of the 1970s and amounted to a qualitative development of the
production process. In one sense, this might be taken as evidence of
of the emergence of a 'post-Fordist' labour process, but also reflected a
deepening of the existing tendencies toward an integrated flow
production. Again, the innovations did not result in the expected rise
in productivity and by the early 1980s the productivity problem in coal
increasingly came to be defined as a problem of labour relations.
The chapter charts the general productivity improvement in the
post-strike period and suggests it is a consequence of the complex
interaction of the alteration of working practices in ways designed to
increase the utilisation of new technology. The restructuring process
at BC was also as an attempt to bring labour practices into line with a
long term pattern of technical change. BC's deteriorating market
position added to the pressure for altered work practices which,
according to most accounts, were imposed unilaterally by management.
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Notwithstanding the putative 'post-Fordist' aspect to restructuring, the
chapter shows, therefore, that actual pattern of restructuring from the
1970s owed much to the 'British model' of restructuring outlined in
chapter three. First, although the primary direction of technical
change was toward reducing unit cost through higher output and
reduced machine time losses, it seems that increased managerial control
over labour was built in where possible. This was particularly the case
when labour practices were seen to be a cause of production losses.
However, the practical impact of such technologies on the workforce,
particularly on skills, have been a subject of controversy. The
question of the impact of new technology on the workforce remains an
empirical one and is dealt with in the following two chapters. Second,
despite the increasing capital intensity of the production process, there
is no evidence that management sought new accommodations with labour
in order to ensure its optimum utilisation (because managerial faith had
been already placed in the capacities of information technology to
achieve this end). Instead the reassertion of 'management's right to
manage' became the dominant rhetoric. In fact one aspect of the
miners' strike was not only a defeat for the NUM but also for those
factions of the national level management who were opposed to this
hardline view and the emergence, in their place, of a cadre of
managerial militants.
If this account bears a striking similarity to the interpretation of events
at BL outlined in the previous chapter, in one important respect, this
should not be a surprise. A key figure in the restructuring of both
companies in recent times was Ian MacGregor. MacGregor was a board
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member at BL, drafted in by Michael Edwardes (Edwardes, 1983).
MacGregor's experience there was crucial in defining his interpretation
of the British malaise and the role in it played by labour (MacGregor,
1986: 59-84).
2. WORK AND TECHNOLOGY PRIOR TO NATIONALISATION
During the period of rapid expansion of the coal industry through to
the latter half of the nineteenth century virtually all coal was handgot.
There were two principal forms of handgot mining: bord and pillar (or
room and pillar method) and later longwall handgot mining. Bord and
pillar mining predominated during the early development of the coal
industry at the outcrop. Under handgot mining (or 'single place
working') the collier completed the full range of getting tasks before
loading the coal into tubs. Forms of industrial organisation were
pre-industrial and capitalist forms of work and time-discipline were
absent (cf. Thompson, 1967). The collier was paid according to
piece-rates and supervision was minimal 4 . According to Goldthorpe:
The colliers saw the supervisor simply as a watchman acting
on behalf of the management and the law: so long as they
worked in the right place and obeyed safety regulations, he
3 1t is not my intention in this chapter to offer a comprehensive
history of the macroeconomic developments in the coal industry of this
period. To the extent that these developments form the background to the
substantive matters of this chapter they are referred to only briefly.
Also, I do not intend to comment on the detailed and Byzantine debates
about the development of the labour process in the coal industry. As far
as possible I follow lines of consensus in these debates.
4As Marx noted: 'Since the quality and intensity of the work are
here controlled by the very form of the wage, superintendence of labour
becomes to a great extent superfluous' (1976: 695).
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had no right to intervene: he had no direct role to play in
the work of winning the coal.. . The deputy was rarely called
upon to harass the men into greater efforts; he had no
progress schedule to maintain (1959: 215-216).
The entire system of handgot mining was seen as self-regulating. The
tempo of production was slow and, therefore, did not require elaborate
arrangements back-bye for getting the coal to surface. Despite the
slowness of the tempo, all the aspects of production appeared to balance
each other, while requiring a minimum of organisation and within the
limits of what was technologically simple it was possible to realise the
system's potential. Because the cycle of operations was self-contained,
it was possible for production to take place over 24 hours on a three
shift system. This meant that such overheads as did exist were in
continual use6.
6Carter Goodrich (1921) reports a case arising under the Minimum
Wage Act, when an overman was called upon to testify whether or not a
miner did his work properly: 'Overman: 'I never saw him work.'
Magistrate: 'But isn't it your duty under the Mines Act to visit each
working place twice a day?' 'Yes.' 'Don't you do it?' 'Yes.' 'Then why
didn't you ever see him work?' 'They always stop work when they see an
overman coming, and sit down and wait till he's gone - even take out
their pipes if its a mine free from gas. They won't let anybody watch
them.' (Goodrich, 1921: 137-8). The putters, however, who supplied the
tubs for the colliers, in some cases, were supervised more rigidly by
the deputies in attempt to ensure that an adequate number of tubs was
supplied to each place.
6Trist and Bamforth (1951) coined the term 'responsible autonomy'
to describe the level of control enjoyed by the colliers under this
system (cf. Friedman, 1977, who used the term in relation to the gang
system in the Coventry engineering industry: also Chapter Three).
Goodrich (1928) on the other hand, writing about handgot room and pillar
methods in the US situation referred to the 'miners' freedom or
'indiscipline' and noted how factory foremen avoided employing miners
when possible because of their attitudes to work.
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To the extent that the task of regulating the production process was
devolved to the miners themselves, in some cases, sophisticated and
solidaristic mechanisms were developed to ensure equal chances to earn.
Perhaps the most developed form of these job controls were the
'cavilling' and 'marra' traditions of the Northern coalfield. Because
conditions varied throughout the pit, earnings were determined by the
nature of the place each miner obtained. In order to prevent
favouritism, and more generally to equalise the chances of good
earnings, under the auspices of the Lodges quarterly lots were drawn
to determine the allocation of stalls (see Chapter Five for further
discussion)7.
The nature of the late nineteenth century period of expansion of the
industry determined the dimensions of the crisis which beset the
industry in the period after the First World War. The expansion of
output was determined largely by extending hours of work or reducing
pay (via the sliding scale) rather than transforming the technical base
of the industry. Although mechanisation gradually began to make an
impact on the industry between the wars, levels of output per manshift
failed to match those of the Britain's major competitors. Profitability
remained highly dependent upon the relationship between wages and
7Such principles were not restricted to Durham and Northumberland.
In the USA the principle of 'square turn' was an equivalent egalitarian
form of work allocation, ensuring that no man should have more mine cars
(tubs) than any other. The underlying solidaristic principle was that
every man ought to get a fair share of the work that was going (see
Goodrich, 1928). In the southern British coalfields (e.g. Notts.) the
more individualistic 'butty' system was the norm (see Chapter Five).
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prices, because the former represented up to 80 per cent of production
costs. As a result the competitive strategy of the British coalowners in
the inter-war period relied to a large degree on driving down wages.
This was the background to the General Strike and the the miners'
lockout which followed it.
The beginnings of mechanisation did occur in the inter-war period,
however, chiefly at the face itself. The principal developments were
the introduction of undercutter machines and later of conveyors. By
1925 the proportion of output cut by machine had risen to 20 per cent,
but this had little appreciable impact on productivity which actually
continued to fall during this period (PEP, 1936). Costs of production,
therefore, still largely reflected labour inputs and this fact underlay
the employers' strategy of cutting wages and lengthening hours as a
response to the competitive pressures building up on the industry
(Reid, 1945).
Mechanisation of longwall mining before the Second World War failed to
establish an upward trend in overall productivity despite increases in
the proportion of coal mechanically cut. The amount of coal
mechanically cut rose from 58.5 million tons per annum in 1927 to 142
million tons by 1939. Overall productivity rose to 22.47 cwts by 1933
but thereafter declined. An upward trend for productivity at the face
was established during the 1930s. However, the number of coalcutters
in use over this period increased only marginally, by 7 per cent (Reid,
1945). In part this increased performance can be attributed to better
machine design and the 40 per cent increase in electrical horse power
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which occurred over this period, but the major explanation for the
change lay in the wider application of conveyors. The introduction of
conveyors on a large scale, it was believed, allowed the more regular
and consistent use of the coal cutters with mining methods which made
fuller use of their cutting capacity and tended to generalise longwall
mining (eg PEP, 1936; Reid, 1945). By 1939 58 per cent of total
output was conveyed along the face, with conveyors increasingly used
in the gate roads (Reid, 1945).
The introduction of conveyors made machine mining more economically
viable, by making it possible to extend the length of the face. In
addition the new longwall organised around the face conveyor had the
economic advantage of reducing the proportion of development work (to
make gate roads) in relation to the extraction area. The use of double
and single unit longwalls allowed a bigger concentration of men to be
engaged in the coaling process and i'n turn allowed a degree of
concentration of workings within the mine. For Trist et al (1963) this
system was 'expressive of the prevailing outlook of mass production
engineering' (see also Trist and Bamforth, 1951).
Unsurprisingly, this innovation in the technological basis of coal
production was accompanied by important changes in the organisation of
work. Principally, the technical changes had the effect of eroding the
basis of self regulation inherent in the single place tradition, where the
collier conducted the full range of coal-getting tasks. The new process
required distinct task groups and endowed the production process with
a cyclical character. On a machine cut longwall, production occurred
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over a three shift cycle lasting 24 hours. In the first (prep) shift the
coal was undercut by machine; in the second (coaling, getting or tub
loading) shift the coal was 'filled off' and timbers set to support the
new roof area; in the third (advancing) shift, pulling (moving the
conveyor forward) and caunchwork (ripping) were carried out8.
In contrast to the previous, highly flexible system, machine mining was
based on a increased division of labour and was beset by problems of
coordination and regulation. Notwithstanding the potential for improved
performance under this system, the cyclical character of production
meant that any disruptions had reverberations throughout the 24 hour
period. Goldthorpe noted the significance of the shift to partial
mechanisation:
No shift can begin its own work until that of the preceding
shift has been completed. The deputy, and he alone in the
district, has responsibility for the smooth running of the
cycle. It is one of his most important functions to see that
the work of the shift conforms to schedule, and that
stoppages are kept down to a minimum, since even a small
8Contemporary commentators stressed the deskilling aspects of
mechanisation. Harold Heslop in his 'socialist realist' novel of the
'Daristone' (Durham) coalfield wrote about the mechanisation of a face
and its impact on work: 'Cameron watched him go. A skilled hewer, Bill
Smith, he thought. A man who could get coal where another would surely
fail, a man in whom was bred all the finest sense of the miner. And
progress had decreed a change, so here he was, reduced from the proud
eminence of the skilled craftsman of the pick to a mere shoveller. Any
chap from London could do the same!.. .And if they could have looked
across the centuries they might have experienced the sympathy of the old
craftsman who were beholding a revolutionary change' (Heslop, 1934:
229). Although the beginnings of machine mining represented a
qualitative development of the labour process (equivalent to the real
subordination of the labour process - see Chapter Two), Heslop
overstates the extent to which the miner had been rendered a 'mere'
labourer or even equivalent to a Londoner (cf. Bamforth and Trist, 1951,
who stressed the skills associated with partial mechanisation).
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hold-up can have a disproportionately adverse effect upon the
operation of the production process as a whole (1959: 217).
A single shift no longer contained the complete coalgetting task, but
was 'only a part of a scheme of production into which it has to be
smoothly integrated' (Goldthorpe, 1959: 218).
As the potential of mechanisation began to be revealed in the inter-war
period the limitations of existing organisational structures and forms of
ownership were also exposed. Increased capital intensity led to an
increase in overhead costs and this created a new imperative to ensure
a more efficient utilisation of assets. This imperative existed at the
level of the individual enterprise and at the level of the industry as a
whole. Increasingly contemporary commentators argued that chaotic
patterns of ownership and control within the industry were incompatible
with growing mechanisation. In particular, it was believed that
amalgamations would lead to increased productivity by allowing the
reorganisation of layout and haulage and the closure of mines not
amenable to mechanisation. Such a situation would have allowed the
9For Goldthorpe these changes amounted to the application of
'factory methods' or 'the Ford system' to coal production. The
mechanisation of mining required an increase in supervision: 'Otherwise
the cycle may be disrupted, output thus lost, and machines, representing
comparatively high overheads, stand idle' (1959: 219; also Trist and
Bamforth, 1951, for a certain similarity of argument). Heslop's novel
offers contemporary testimony: 'Jack Cameron had arrived at the state
besought by capitalism - a state of perpetual exploitation. Not a minute
lost. Always going. The mine had been Fordized. They were turning out
coal like they turned out cars, and almost as cheaply. . .He had allowed
the boss to dictate a machine which in turn dictated their lives. They
were producing coal with the facility with which Bloomsbury produces
novels and plays' (Heslop, 1934: 229-30).
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industry to reap the full fruits of mechanisation. Examining the
situation Political and Economic Planning argued: 'There is little doubt
that overhead costs are increased by mechanisation, and that
mechanisation may not therefore be wholly successful unless accompanied
by concentration of output' (PEP, 1934: 33)b0•
The wartime coalition government appointed the Reid Committee to
investigate technical conditions in the industry 'from coalface to wagon'
and they recommended a 'drastic technical reorganisation' (Reid, 1945:
1). The Committee's Report recognised the technical improvement which
had occurred in the inter-war period, but identified at least two major
problems facing the industry. First, it recognised that mechanisation
had largely been confined to the coalface through the introduction of
cutting machines and conveyors. (By 1945 72 per cent of coal was
produced mechanically and 71 per cent of coal was conveyed
mechanically along the face). Reid, however, noted that the
introduction of conveyors had failed to raise substantially the tonnage
handled per outbye worker, and the Committee concluded that
°A series of official and semi-official reports drew public
attention to the need for drastic reorganisation of the industry during
the inter-war period (Sankey, 1919; Samuel, 1925; PEP, 1936) but these
had little impact on the coalowners. The defeat of the miners in 1926
meant that the endemic crisis of the industry remained unresolved while
all attempts to alter the structure of the industry in a manner likely
to facilitate more rational production failed. The Coal Mines Act of
1930 responded to the crisis by organising sales cartels in an effort to
restrict output and maintain prices. In addition the Act created the
Coal Mines Reorganisation Committee which was invested with the task of
bringing about amalgamations. In the event, as a test case in 1935
proved, the legal powers with which the Committee hoped to achieve its
aims, were inadequate to the task.
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arrangements between gate conveyors and the shaft bottom were
inefficient. The haulage system could not cope with the higher levels
of performance at the face which were being made possible by
mechanisation. The second and related problem identified was that
existing mines were often too small and badly organised to make the
introduction of new haulage methods worthwhile. Therefore, the
Committee recommended a programme of amalgamation, rationalisation and
reconstruction of mines with the aim of creating larger units capable of
securing economies of scale and more rationally planned production11.
Although the Reid Report did not deal directly with the question of
ownership its recommendations implied a radical alteration of the
structure of the industry. The changes called for in the report implied
some degree of state intervention to secure the desired restructuring.
3. NATIONALISATION, MECHANISATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The coal industry was nationalised on January 1st 1947. Powerful
forces existed to bring about this change. Firstly, private ownership,
through systematic under-investment, had clearly failed to produce a
coal industry capable of competing with other industrial countries.
Secondly, the miners' long campaign for the industry to be taken into
Reid's plan was for a rational, mechanised coal industry in which
traditional miners' 'customs'- notably the limitation of the 'stint',
cavilling, and the seniority rule - would be 'incompatible with modern
mining practice' (1945: 117).
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public ownership had made a compelling moral case for nationalisation12.
By vesting day, however, it had become clear that the model of
nationalisation would be the Morrisonian one. The prevailing view was
that the organisation should be run on technocratic rather than
democratic lines (for the controversies within the MFGB in relation to
this debate see Coates, 1974; also Eldon Barry, 1964: 109-123).
The new National Coal Board was given the task of breaking even
taking an average of good years and bad. This commercial orientation
within otherwise unaltered capitalist market relations meant that for
miners the experience of work remained virtually the same in the
post-nationalisation period. The situation was exacerbated by the
economic imperatives of the post-war period, when the pressures of
post-war economic reconstruction led to a huge demand for fuel. This,
together with the prevailing balance of payments crisis which prevented
the importation of mining equipment, meant that large-scale technical
change was postponed, and the emphasis instead was placed on
extending existing systems and intensifying work practices13.
2Moreover, it was clear that the cooperation of the miners' unions
in the post-war reconstruction exercise added impetus to the case.
Given the weight of the MFGB (later NUN) within the wider labour
movement, nationalisation had come to be seen as essential to the
operation of a 'post-war settlement'. Nationalisation therefore
represented an 'aspect of the institutionalisation of the balance of
class forces in the post-war period' (Clarke, 1988b: 85).
3Despite the new forms of union-management consultation introduced
under nationalisation, therefore, miners did not regard the underlying
relations of production as having changed. Writing contemporaneously,
Dennis et al (1956: 76-77), argued that such changes as had occurred
'have been unaccompanied by profound modifications in the general
(Footnote Continued)
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In the period after the War slow progress was made in extending
machine mining and improving the back-bye infrastructure in ways
which led to the better use of face equipment. This involved the
gradual extension of the use of conveyors in gate roads; so that there
was a doubling of the total mileage of conveyors underground to 1,734
miles between 1947 and 1953 (Fine and Harris, 1986). This type of
mining was to remain the dominant form of coal getting until the 1960s,
with a further diminution of handgot faces. Despite the growing level
of mechanisation - between 1949 and 1955, as output grew, overall
productivity rose only 6 per cent from 1.19t to 1.25t - there was no
major breakthrough in levels of productivity, the reasons for which are
addressed below.
The origins and significance of powerloading
Even as it was being introduced the limits of this type of partially-
mechanised coal getting were being recognised. Most attention focused
on the cyclical viature of face operations, especially the time consuming
and non-productive task of dismantling the conveyor, threading it
through the props and reassembling it, which was undertaken during
the third shift. British mining engineers were increasingly made aware
of the advances of their US counterparts in developing methods of
(Footnote Continued)
economic framework of which mining is a part, or of the social structure
within which miners exist. . .they saw no change in the local management
of the mines when nationalization took place. In all these ways they see
themselves opposed to the same forces as before nationalization'.
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production which combined the activities of cutting and loading into a
single system of 'powerloading'14.
While it was clear that any advance in mechanisation had to occur along
the axis of the conveyor-based longwall, there was much space for
innovation within these parameters. The first in a series of technical
breakthroughs which were to lead to the development of a system of
powerloading, was the application in British conditions of the German
invented armoured face conveyor (AFC). Built out of heavy steel, it
comprised a series of short conveyor pans, loosely bolted together and
connected to a drive unit and return unit in the face-ends. At
intervals, on top of the pans, scraper bars were positioned and these
were driven by chains. As coal was cut mechanically, it fell onto the
pans and was pushed away by the scraper bars in the direction of the
loadergate. The AFC was a major innovation in face technology which,
despite improvements to the detailed design, has remained basically
unaltered to this day. Its heavy steel structure allowed it to transport
greater volume of coal and to allow a cutting machine to traverse the
face while positioned on top of it (Harlow, 1977; Ashworth, 1984).
4The first cutter-loaders, such as the AS Meco-Moore, did begin to
lessen the cyclical character of face operations, but were limited to
geological conditions of relatively thick, level seams. Within these
limits the Meco-Moore began to have fairly wide application in areas
such as the East Midlands in the 1950s. But, despite their advantages,
the development of such machines did not address the fundamental problem
of the need to reposition equipment in front of the props during the
third shift. The AS Meco-Moore, therefore, while reaching a high point
of application in 1957 when 165 machines were in use, gradually declined
and virtually disappeared in the 1960s (Kelly, 1969).
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This latter feature, according to Ashworth 'brought about an economy
of lateral space in front of the face' (1984: 78). Moreover, because the
metal pans were loosely bolted together 'the AFC could immediately be
pushed up to the new line of the cut length of face which had not yet
been cut' (ibid). A shortened version of the AFC was used in the face
end as a stage loader to allow the loading of coal onto belts in the
loadergate end-on rather than at right angles.
The new system required the space in front of the face to be free of
obstruction, including props. A major advance occurred with the
introduction first, of yielding props and later, and more importantly, of
hydraulic props. These latter consist of two steel tubes which can be
raised or lowered telescopically by hydraulic fluid. By 1956 some
400,000 hydraulic props had been introduced. Later hydraulic props
were grouped together and supplied with power to make them
self-advancing. In this system the supports are designed so that they
ram forward the AFC as they are being advanced. According to
Ashworth:
The great achievement of powered supports was that the
provision of support for the strata newly exposed by coal
cutting, and the removal of the conveyor to the new line of
the face, which used to take so much time and physical
effort, could be accomplished with the use of hydraulically
transmitted power while coal getting was still in progress
(1984: 82).
The third shift task of advancing the conveyor, as it were, had been
eliminated. A new degree of integration had been achieved in the
organisation of the production process. As a consequence, the way was
clear for winning coal on two or three production shifts per day instead
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of one. Significant time economies were possible. According to one
contemporary observer:
Not oniy does three-shift working make more economical use
of all the pit's capital equipment, but it greatly reduces the
risk of those interruptions to production which are the bane
of cyclical work, where no shift can begin work unless the
work of the preceding shift has been completed. Furthermore,
faces that can be worked continuously allow a pit to wind coal
on more than one shift from fewer faces than where each face
is on a cycle (much less expense is involved in working five
faces for two or three shifts a day than in working five faces
on one shift and five additional faces on a second shift). One
great and final advantage of the new machines which eliminate
handloading (and permit continuous mining) is that they allow
coal-getting to be performed by relatively small work teams
(Baldwin, 1955: 277-278, emphasis added. See also:
Shepherd, 1951; Scott and Noble, 1954).
The transition to powerloading was completed with the widespread
introduction of the Anderton Shearer Loader (ASL) as the principal coal
cutter, which used a rotary drum with picks fitted onto its
circumfrential surface to shear coal from the face (for detailed accounts
see Kelly, 1969; Townsend, 1976; Ashworth, 1984; chapter 3). The ASL
emerged from a range of competing models (such as the plough and
trepanner). One of its main attractions was its suitability to being
adapted to traversing the face while being mounted on a conveyor. The
percentage of output which was powerloaded grew from just over 10 per
cent in 1955 to almost 86 per cent by 1966/67 (see Table 4.1). The ASL
itself produced over 50 per cent of powerloaded output by 1966 (and by
1977 it produced 80 per cent)15.
isUnlike previous forms of mechanisation, however, powerloading
technology was geologically selective. It could only be applied in
thicker seams and, therefore, contributed to closure pressures in the
peripheral coalfields and the relative concentration of mining in the
central coalfield. In my view, the contribution of technological choices
(Footnote Continued)
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Additional changes occurring in other parts of the mine at this time
were designed to complement those changes occurring at the face. The
gradual replacement of rope haulage systems by conveyors was seen as
essential to establishing the conditions which allowed the full utilisation
of powerloading equipment by allowing the transfer of mineral 'by a
single method in a continuous flow from the face to the surface and out
of the colliery' (Ashworth, 1984: 98). Thus, the ASL, based on the
critical component of the armoured face conveyor, supported by a belt
based coal clearance system, provided the basis for a general
mechanisation of mining which previous cutter-loader systems did not.
Despite this technological revolution some important limits to the full
utilisation of the system quickly began to emerge. Although Reid
(1945) had pointed out that technical developments elsewhere below
ground had not matched those occurring at the face in the inter-war
period, technical progress at the face outstripped that occurring
back-bye for most of the post-war period. The failure to match
progress at the face with progress back-bye had the effect of limiting
the potential effects of the introduction of powerloading.
Also, at the time of nationalisation most tunnels and headings were
driven using shotfiring and handloading. Throughout the 195 Os and
(Footnote Continued)
to the closure programme of the 1960s has never been fully analysed,
although I do not intend to contribute to this discussion here. It
should be noted, though, that the closure programme contributed to the
destablisation of industrial relations in the industry which is analysed
later in this section (see Renouf, 1990).
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1960s some progress was made in mechanising face-end activities, so
that by 1957 90 per cent of drivages used mechanical loading. Between
1953 and 1960 the average volume of material extracted per manshift
increased by 76 per cent and the average rate of advance of tunnels by
76 per cent, even though the average cross sectional area was 30 per
cent larger (Ashworth, 1984). Such improvements were not enough to
prevent growing concern about the slow progress in speeding up
face-end and tunnels drivages by the end of the 1960s. (Indeed it was
only at the end of the 1970s that substantial breakthroughs occurred in
this area).
Work practices, wages and industrial relations in the powerloading
period
The qualitative rise in the level of mechanisation was accompanied by,
and to some extent propelled, a reordering of work practices and
payment systems. As already described, the mechanisation of coal
cutting was concerned to a large degree with attempts to reform the
shift system. From the management viewpoint, the move to
powerloading gave new opportunities, and made necessary the need, for
a restructuring of the social relations of production in ways consistent
with growing capital intensity. The new pattern of rationalisation also
allowed the questions of the industry's strike proneness and problem of
wage drift arising from piecework to be addressed6.
Fine and Harris (1986) argue that strike proneness and wage drift
(Footnote Continued)
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The fundamental issue was raised, among others, by Trist et al (1963)
who called for a 'machine-centred work culture', based on the
recognition that productivity was determined less by human effort and
more by machine performance. This gave rise to a heightened concern
with lost production time:
Recognition of the new value of time will fundamentally affect
attitudes to all interruptions of the productive process - at
any stage and through any cause (Trist et al, 1963: 260).
They even suggested a new basis for productivity based not on output
per manshift but the proportion of actual to possible machine time. In
recognition of these new realities, they also suggested the wider
application of time based wages for face workers. Such a payment
system came to fruition in the National Power Loading Agreement,
introduced in 1966, which replaced piece-rates with a time based wage
system (a form of measured day work) for all workers on mechanised
faces. Negotiations over coalface wages were transferred from pit/area
level to national level and face manning levels were to be determined by
method study17.
(Footnote Continued)
after nationalisation were not a direct product of the type of wage
system, but rather of a generalised attempt to restrict wage rises.
Arguably though, the pattern of disputes also reflected a tendency
prevalent within coalmining for walkouts to occur as a prelude to
negotiations rather than as a last resort. This tactic, in turn, had its
origins in the pre-industrial forms of work organisation described
earlier. It was certainly an issue which agitated managers in the period
after nationalisation (Douglass, 1977).
7The incornpatability of machine mining and piece work was seen as
a truism by many 'progressive' mining engineers. Indeed as early as the
1920s it had been recognised by engineers and owners in the USA that
'machine mining is not piece work in the nature of it' (Coal Age,
24.7.24; quoted in Goodrich, 1928: 153).
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Most studies of the NPLA have focused on its impact on wage structures
(eg Searle Barnes, 1969; Handy, 1981; Krieger, 1983). These studies
recognise that technical change in the 1950s, and the growing impact of
powerloading was causing wage drift in piece rate lists and the
introduction of District Powerloading Agreements. Such wage drift
reinforced the NCB 's determination to rationalise wage structures.
While technical improvements occurred with increasing regularity in the
1950s giving rise to improved productivity, faceworkers, in particular,
tended to respond to these changes by demanding upward revisions in
local piece rates as a quid pro quo for acceptance of new technology,
regardless of any productivity improvements (Krieger, 1983). Fine and
Harris (1986), for instance, argue that often managements forwent the
opportunity to make incremental technical improvements for fear of
causing disputes. The period before the introduction of the NPLA was
characterised by the constant battle on the part of management to keep
down wage costs. The introduction of heterogeneous District
Powerloading Agreements exacerbated these tendencies and did not
contribute to the end of a rationalised wage structure (Kreiger, 1983).
The NPLA, therefore, was an attempt both to rationalise the wage
structure and to reduce the wage drift problem, through an acceptance
of the principle of collective bargaining. The NUM itself accepted the
NPLA as being in its. long-term interest by eliminating regional
differentials in pay which, it was argued, in turn were a function
largely of geological accident, ie. under piecework good geology allowed
good earnings because coalgetting was easier.
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The other aspect of the NPLA, less often discussed, dealt with the
issue of machine utilisation and work organisation. With wage
negotiations removed to the national level, management expected to be
able to concentrate their attentions at the pit level on improving
production organisation. The general growth in machine mining had
itself raised the possibility of higher levels of supervision because
production was spatially concentrated. Fairciough pointed out:
Supervision is more concentrated and, therefore, more
effective. Less time has to be spent in travelling and senior
officials can visit each working place more frequently. All
tasks at the face are proceeding simultaneously on all three
shifts and there is a better understanding and integration of
the work as a whole (1960: 79-80).
As well as raising the possibility of increased supervision, a high level
of mechanisation also demanded it. In theory, manning levels were now
to be determined by pre-shift planning and specific jobs such as
chocker, ripper and so on were to be replaced by a single
'taskworker'. The traditions of self-regulation (such as cavilling),
about which Reid had complained in 1945, were to be eliminated (see
Heath, 1969). Gradually method study was applied to work organisation
and task assessment in an apparently self-conscious attempt to apply
the techniques of scientific management to what was now a 'modern'
industry (eg. Groonbridge, 1970)18.
lBFrom the view point of wage structures the NPLA can be seen as a
classic 1960s collective bargaining arrangement of the type advocated by
Donovan (see Chapter Three). The NCB believed their agreement to be a
path breaking one, and part of a movement which was modernising and
rationalising manufacturing industry at this time. In its Report and
Accounts for 1966/7 it argued the shift from piecework to day-wages
represented 'a major advance which might well set a pattern for other
industries' (quoted in Heath, 1969: 185). In fact Donovan referred
(Footnote Continued)
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The level of supervision and the level of machine utilisation increased
measurably in the period following the introduction of the NPLA. For
instance, the ratio of officials to workers increased from 1:12 in June
1967 to 1:9.5 in July 1968 (Heath, 1969). This was in fact part of a
longer term trend associated with the introduction of powerloading.
Between 1958 and 1968 the ratio of officials to faceworkers increased
from 6.5 to 4.5, an increase of 39 per cent. Moreover, among the
increased number of underground officials a higher proportion were
overmen, concerned with production chasing, as opposed to deputies
concerned with safety (Allen, 1981: 92). Higher utilisation of plant,
made possible by the shift to 'continuous mining', increased appreciably
following the introduction of the NPLA. The number of longwall faces
working three or four shifts increased by 18 per cent between March
1965 and March 1966. However, between March 1966 to March 1967, the
first year of operation of the NPLA, increase was about 33 per cent
(Heath, 1969)'. Rationalisation was clearly aimed at destroying the old
autonomies of the miner which were seen as incompatible with machine
mining and reflected the wider concern within British management about
outmoded work practices (see Donovan, 1968; Chapter Three).
(Footnote Continued)
approvingly to the NPLA.
9According to Goldthorpe, for instance, under powerloading: 'It is
the machine rather than the deputy or the miner, that sets the pace of
operations' (1959: 225; cf. Chapter 2, section six). I argue below,
though that this was true in theory only though, because of the
unpredictability of the mining process.
174
Limits to progress with powerloading
From the foregoing it is clear that a transformation of the technical and
social basis of coal mining occurred from the mid-1950s through the
1960s. The shift to mechanised longwall mining was an attempt to apply
the perceived advantages of mass production engineering to the coal
industry. By the end of the 1960s, the production system in the
industry was based on a new economy of time and control based on
powerloading, and was seen as the culmination of the shift from a
labour intensive, self-regulating form of production to a more
scientifically controlled, capital intensive one. This in fact was the end
state to which the most 'progressive' mining engineers had aspired for
some considerable time (see Goodrich, 1928; Reid, 1945; Anglo American
Council on Productivity, 1951; Goldthorpe, 1959). The move to national
collective bargaining in wages appeared to cap this process of
modernised and rationalised structures (Krieger, 1983).
However, it became quickly apparent that the new form of production
organisation brought its own problems. These were reflected in the
failure of the new powerloading technology to achieve the productivity
levels hoped for, and the emergence of new and apparently intractable
problems of labour control and industrial relations. A productivity
plateau emerged by the end of the 1960s which reflected the technical
limits of mechanised mining (Figure 4.1). Ashworth summarises a
fundamental difficulty which underlies the attempt to introduce factory
like conditions into the coal mine:
To a large extent the limitations and the contrast arise from
the tension between the new technology and the conditions in
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which it has to be applied. A modern coalmine, using the
most advanced technology available, with a face being worked
quickly to produce a regular large daily output and coal
moving all the way on conveyors from the face to the surface,
looks much more like the continuous flow production
industries familiar for decades in many types of
manufacturing. In a sense, this is clearly the character
towards which the coal industry was aspiring and moving.
But it is a character that could not wholly be achieved. Quite
apart from the hard physical conditions which must sometimes
damage machinery and overstrain men, the operating
conditions (unlike those in manufacturing) do not remain
uniform and cannot be regulated into something near
uniformity. The difference shows itself in the time when the
running of machinery is interrupted in a coalmine and is not
in an assembly line manufacturing industry. It also accounts
for some of the continuing large need for labour in mining
(1984: 118; cf. Douglass, 1977: 215, for a miner's view).
At the end of the 1960s, mining engineers began to address the problem
of lost production time. At that time it was estimated that on most
mechanised faces machine operating time averaged only three hours out
of a seven and quarter hour shift. A survey of 66 mechanised faces
showed that within the limits of the prevailing technology average face
output could be increased by one third through the reduction of
'operational and ancillary time'; that is, time associated with repair,
maintenance and machine turnarounds (Kelly, 1969; also Burns et al,
1985). Although the origins of many of the technical problems appeared
to remain obscure at this stage, by 1980 the NCB were able to codify
526 mechanical delay faults. To this extent, the problems emerging in
the organisation of the production process in coalmining could be said
to reflect, in exaggerated form, the problems of coordination and
integration which are alleged to have brought into crisis mass
production industries around this time (equivalent in some ways to the
so-called 'balance delay problem' described in Chapter Two).
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The sources of delays in the production process were not only
technical. The same survey mentioned above suggested that a further
third of potential production time was being lost largely because of poor
worker discipline. This category of delays was attributed to unskilled
or careless operation of machinery, poor time-keeping and inadequate
supervision (Kelly, 1969). Subsequently, the NCB reported the results
of a study which showed how worker 'indiscipline' translated into lost
production time (see Table 4.2).
Although many contemporary observers had feared that the NPLA and
associated increases in the use of method study and higher levels of
supervision would lead to the final erosion of the miners' historic ability
to retain a high level of control over his own work pace it seemed that
this was far from the case. Reid (1945) had expressed the belief that
traditions of self regulation were incompatible with capital intensive
mining, while for Trist et al (1963) traditions such as cavilling
interfered with the rational production planning. The NCB expressed
the view that the NPLA had 'considerably changed longstanding
practices and habits'. However, it is clear that such intentions were
not borne out in practice. In an article written originally in 1974,
Douglass shows clearly how, despite the introduction of 'factory
methods' of production, miners managed to retain a probably
unprecedented degree of control over their own work (Douglass, 1977;
see Chapter Five for a fuller discussion). Labour indiscipline began to
be seen as a crucial part of the productivity problem and in this sense
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the coal industry was no exception to British industry as a whole (see
Chapter Three)20.
A third dimension to the emerging crisis of the new powerloading
technology lay in the changing pattern of industrial relations and
strikes. One aim of the NPLA had been to eradicate the high level of
strike proneness exhibited by the coal industry under the piece wage
system. It was presumed that the large number of small scale strikes
which reflected disputes over price lists and allowances would disappear
because under the NPLA wage negotiations would be transferred away
from the pit to the national level. To some degree this occurred
following the introduction of day-wages. Equally, however, it seems a
new pattern of local conflicts based on disputes over manning levels
replaced the earlier disputes over price lists (Winterton, 1981; Fine and
Harris, 1986). Some colliery managers regretted the removal of
incentives made necessary by the NPLA which they felt led to workplace
resistance and effort reduction (Kreiger, 1983; Edwards and Heery,
1989).
201 address this issue in more detail in Chapter Five. Among other
things, this illustrates how accounts which ascribe the high level of
workplace autonomy enjoyed by miners simply to the physical conditions
of the mine (and consequenty to the inherent problems of supervision)
are misplaced. Carter Goodrich recognised this in the earliest days of
mechanisation: 'It is the organization of the mine that determines how
rarely a miner shall see his boss, but how he shall act when he does see
him is also a matter of the custom of the trade and the theorations of
the gob pile' (1928: 97-98). The 'miners' indiscipline', therefore was
the result of collective practice of the 'gob pile democracies' not a
simple function of darkness and isolation.
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To the extent that wage negotiations had been transferred to the
national level and local, regional and sectional differences had been
reduced, the basis for unified national industrial action over pay had
been created. This end was in one sense a by-product of the technical
and social changes brought about by the introduction of powerloading
and the NPLA. Yet, it was an end to which the political Left within the
NUM had been aspiring since nationalisation 21 . It was on this basis
that a series of large scale strikes began in 1969 with the surfacemen's
dispute and culminated in the national strikes of 1972 and 1974. This
new militancy, however, was not technologically determined. The
growing radicalisation of miners, disillusioned by the experience of
nationalisation, and the growing influence of a campaigning Left within
the NUM were also important. Thus, the miners' strikes of the 1970s
have been described as both reflecting and contributing to the growth
of the 'mass militancy' which characterised this period of British
political history (Rutledge, 1977) and which signalled a growing
dissatisfaction with operation of of the 'post-war settlement' (Clarke
1988a: chapter 11). To this degree, the crisis of productivity and
2 The NUN had been committed to the concept of day-wages since the
formulation of the Miners' Charter in the 1946. The Left within the
union campaigned for the leadership to turn this policy into a reality
and, to some extent, saw the NPLA as a long term victory. In the
short-term, it posed serious political problems for the union as areas
which had done well under the piece rate system had their wages pegged
as areas with low piece rates caught up (Kreiger, 1983; Rutledge, 1977).
179
control which beset the coal industry from the end of the 1960s
mirrored that occurring generally within British manufacturing22.
4 PLAN FOR COAL: THE CONTEXT OF THE 1984/5 STRIKE
The position of the coal industry within the economy was transformed
during the 1960s, partly as a consequence of market contraction, but
also as a result of the technical changes of that period. Coal
production now tended to come from large rationalised mines using
powerloading techniques. The type of production system which had
evolved was as close an approximation to the factory environment as
could conceivably be achieved. This new arrangement brought with it
its own technical problems and sources of conflict between management
and labour. The conflicts of 1972 and 1974 highlighted the limits of the
system which had been introduced and stimulated the pursuit of means
to overcome these technical limits and to alter the social relations of
production.
The combined processes of technical change and the concentration of
production in areas which mechanisation suited, together with official
promotion of alternative sources of fuel (oil, nuclear) which reduced the
market for coal, led to the large scale pit closures of the 1960s.
22See Slaughter (1955) for an account of the beginnings of the
process of radicalisation. A further contributing factor to the
radicalisation process in the NUN was the impact of the closure
programme in the peripheral coalfields and the threat this posed to
mining communities (see Renouf, 1990, for an analysis in relation to the
Durham coalfield).
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However, the coincidence of the 1974 miners' strike and the oil crisis
and, on the back of important industrial victories of the labour
movement, the election of a Labour government initially committed to a
corporatist-type agenda led to a reassessment of the role of coal within
the economy. The Plan for Coal, 1974, (PFC) allowed for the closure
of ageing and inefficient mines but also for the shortfall to be made up
by substantial investment, including the opening up of previously
unexploited reserves, notably at Selby, on the assumption of expanding
demand. The PFC also extended the consultative mechanism for
bringing the unions into decision making. However, the onset of world
recession, leading to a fall in the demand for energy, together with a
fall in oil prices, meant the forecasts of expanded demand did not
materialise. Moreover, the effects of rapid inflation meant that the
costs of investment contained in the PFC rose rapidly from the end of
the 1970s (Ashworth, 1984; Williams et al, 1986; Bailey, 1991).
The Labour government was forced to increase the funding of the PFC.
A gradual shift in attitude accompanied the election of the Conservative
government in 1979, which imposed a more stringent financial regime on
the NCB and which underlay the strategy of eliminating high cost
capacity23 . The first attempt to achieve this in 1981 was abandoned
23Although the financial regime was tightened under the
Conservatives, in reality the process was begun under the previous
Labour government. The previous regulatory regime for nationalised
industries, as set out in the White Papers of 1961 and 1967, was loosely
defined without clear areas of responsibility between government and
corporation. The 1978 White Paper, The Nationalised Industries (Cmnd
3437), emphasised the primacy of financial targets, although, in
(Footnote Continued)
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following strike action by the NUM. However, it is clear that from an
early stage, central government had been planning for the possibility of
a confrontation with the NUM and confrontation began to look inevitable
(see Beynon, 1985; Renouf, 1990). The collapse in the demand for
energy and increasing pressure from central government generated a
financial crisis which allowed the NCB to play on ambiguities embodied
within the PFC. The Board's vigorous interpretation of clauses on
exhaustion lay behind the 1984/5 strike24.
While these broader events were being played out two developments
central to the labour process concerns of this thesis were also
occurring. Firstly, important changes were made to payment systems,
(Footnote Continued)
practice, external financing limits had been introduced in 1976. The
White Paper placed increased emphasis upon the control of the
corporations' profitability and returns on capital and corporations'
cost efficiency. Efficiency audits were to be carried out by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (see MMC, 1983; more generally see
Molyneux and Thompson, 1987).
24The NCB's financial crisis had its origins in the PFC. During
the 1960s a large proportion of the NCB's resources went into financing
the extensive closure programme. The PFC attempted to rectify this by
increasing government investment in the industry. However, because the
PFC was financed through fixed interest government loans rather than
equity, the NCB was burdened with high interest charges. By 1981/2
interest payments amounted to 10 per cent of the industry's capital
liabilities and 7 per cent of turnover. This had two consequences.
Firstly, it placed an additional constraint on the generation of
internal funds for investment since interest payments represented the
first call on funds. Later, government directives (notably the Coal
Industry Acts, 1980, 1983) required the industry to break-even over a
short time period. The NCB responded by proposing a reduction in
capacity. The industry's room for manoeuvre was further reduced by the
pricing policy imposed by the government. The price of NCB coal sold to
the CEGB, which purchased 70 per cent of the industry's output, was cut
partly as a prelude to the later privatisation of the electricity supply
industry.
182
through the introduction of the Area Incentive Scheme (AIS) in
1977/78. Secondly, a programme of technical development was
instituted, originally financed under the Plan For Coal.
At least three factors conspired to bring about the introduction of the
AIS. Firstly, many pit managers believed that the NPLA, despite its
emphasis on work study and increased supervision, had reduced
incentives and was responsible for the productivity plateau of the 1970s
(Edwards and Heery, 1989). The tripartite Coal Industry Examination
of 1974, which was part of the PFC exercise argued that incentives
were necessary to raise productivity (Hudson, 1989). Also, at the
level of senior management there was a recognition that the NPLA had
provided the basis for unity between areas which had been a factor in
the 1972 and 1974 strikes (Feickert, 1986). Finally, pressure from the
Labour government anxious to preserve its Social Contract, persuaded
the NUM leadership to accept the AIS (Renouf, 1990). In fact, despite
the idea of incentives being rejected at national NUM conferences and in
a national ballot in the mid-1970s, the right-dominated NEC negotiated
the AIS with the NCB and allowed individual areas which had achieved
a majority for the scheme to negotiate separate area deals. The
Nottinghamshire Area did so opening the floodgates for series of area
agreements (see Renouf, 1990: 89-92). Arguably, the divisions
resulting from the AIS contributed to those which underlay the 1984/5
strike.
Simultaneously, the NCB continued its programme of technical change.
One element of this was the continued development of longwall
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technology, but utilising heavy duty mining equipment (HDME). This
programme began with the shield support programme in the late 1970s
(see below). While these developments have been presented as a new
departure in coal production, the director of the NCB's research and
development establishment described them as 'consolidating the
mechanization advances of the 1960s' (Tregelles, 1984: 401). The other
main element was the application of advances in microelectronics to the
production process. The Coal Industry Examination of 1974 argued that
since 93 per cent of faces were mechanised the extra output from even
modest increase in the average running time per shift would have a real
impact on productivity and invested great hopes in remote control and
automation (see Hudson, 1989: 179).
Attempts to automate the production process were attempted during the
1960s. A Remotely Operated Longwall Face (ROLF) was established at
Bevercotes Colliery, but was abandoned because of the limited nature of
electronic technology at that time (eg Burns et al, 1985). The wide
availability of the transducer by the mid-1970s, however, prompted a
new concern with automation, monitoring and control, which was
centrally concerned with reducing machine downtimes (Tregelles, 1984,
1986) and which led to what is now known generically as advanced
technology mining (ATM) The HDME/ATM strategy forms the basis of
technical change in the subsequent period and is the subject of the
following section25.
2 For some senior members of management at least, these
(Footnote Continued)
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5. TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE COAL INDUSTRY IN THE 1980s
The process of technical change begun in the late 1970s comprised the
application of HDME, the shift to retreat mining, the growing
application of ATM and a range of supporting development all of which
were addressed at eliminating the discontinuities in the powerloaded
mining process. The main drift of these developments and the debates
surrounding them are outlined below. In particular, in the light of the
claims made for a generalised upskilling associated with microelectronics
(see Chapter Two), the impact of technical change on skills is
assessed. The discussion of skills, however, refers also to the specific
debate on the nature of change in coalmining which emerged during the
1980s. The aim of the section, therefore, is to capture the qualitative
significance of the technical changes of the period. The description of
the changes goes into some detail in order to provide a basis of
understanding for the case study material presented in the subsequent
chapters.
(Footnote Continued)
developments were seen as a complete package. In December 1973, Wilfrid
Miron, a NCB member, outlined a secret strategy aimed at attacking the
NUN, especially given the growing left-wing ('Communists, Marxists and
the like') complexion of the NUN's executive and the growing number of
'Marxist indoctrinated' branch officials. Miron recommended the NCB
should 'revert to some form of local pit or district incentives', a
reconsideration of its relationship to the NACODS based on the
recognition 'that they are less and less a part of management', an
expansion of automation and the attempt to mine 'either without or with
a minimum number of miners' and to ensure 'that of those employed in the
mining industry the maximum number should be outwith the NUN'. While
the actual impact of this thinking on the NCB is uncertain, there is
little doubt it reflected the views of at least a section of management
(see Bradshaw, 1985; Feickert, 1987).
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Heavy duty mining
According to Wheeler:
The concept of heavy duty mining was developed to enable
British Coal to produce from less faces at a reduced cost.
The approach is directed towards the coal face but can only
be successful if the whole mine is geared up to handle the
larger bulk tonnages and peak loads (1988: 17)
Essentially the term heavy duty is applied to powered supports,
conveyors and powerloaders of a type larger, more powerful and more
robust than is conventionally used, utilising very high levels of
electrical horsepower. Central to the heavy duty face system is the
powered shield support. The shield support face programme was
introduced in 1977/78 when six faces were equipped with this
technology (producing 2.1 per cent of total major longwall mined
output). By 1987/88, 43 per cent of all major longwall faces were
equipped with shield supports, representing over 50 per cent of deep
mined output. Daily output per face (DOF) from shield support faces
averaged 1496t compared to a DOF of 1003t from conventional faces.
Output per manshift (OMS) is considerably higher on heavy duty faces
than on conventional faces. In 1986 OMS from shield support faces was
31.88t compared to 17.82t from conventional faces (Moses, 1986; see
table 4.3 and figure 4.2).
Heavy duty faces allow a greater volume of coal to be extracted at a
greater intensity of production. One effect of the introduction of heavy
duty faces has been to allow BC to concentrate production on a smaller
number of faces while increasing levels of output. An important
consequence of this is that a larger volume of output can be produced
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with a lower level of manning. Producing faces at collieries fell by a
third to 305 in the period March 1983 to April 1987 and then fell to 276
by the following April (BC, 1988), while output fell by less than
6million tonnes (mt).
As Wheeler points out, however, in principle the heavy duty concept is
not confined to the face alone. Although heavy duty faces are the
commonest expression of the trend toward this type of mining other
aspects of the mining process are being given the heavy duty
treatment. Mineral conveyors belts are being upgraded and free steered
vehicles are being developed which can cope with heavy duty
equipment. The heavy duty concept of increased strength and power
should then be viewed as a context within which many of the changes
outlined below are occurring.
Another important trend occurring alongside the introduction of heavy
duty mining concepts is an increase in the average length of face. In
the ten years up to 1982 the average length of face rose from 171m to
195m, an increase of 14 per cent. Longer face lengths have a number
of advantages: a reduced amount of roadway formation per tonnesof coal
produced; a reduced proportion of machine ancillary time per cutting
cycle; a reduced capital investment for a given total face and reduced
development effort per coal block and thus lower costs and higher
levels of productivity (Horton, 1983)26.
26Related to these developments are attempts to achieve more
(Footnote Continued)
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The trend toward retreat mining
Traditionally longwall faces have used advance mining methods. Under
this system the extraction of coal is carried out (more or less)
simultaneously with the driving of access roads (or gates). There are
disadvantages associated with advance mining. One concern is that at
the point where the face meets the gate an enormous amount of plant
and machinery accumulates and can lead to congestion. This might lead
to the disruption of the gate-heading process. In the area are
conveyors for clearing coal, the gate-end box for the AFC, the
hydraulic tank pump, the motor for the shield supports, electrical
switchgear as well as gate headers. More importantly, the rate of
extraction can be dependent, to a large degree, on the rate of
formation of gate roads (Reid, 1945, includes a discussion of the
relative merits of advance and retreat methods).
Since the mid 1970s the principles of retreat mining have been
developed and the system has been widely introduced where geologically
applicable. Such faces are seen to have advantages over advancing
faces. Under the retreat mining system a panel of coal is extracted
(Footnote Continued)
accurate alignment of the armoured face conveyor (AFC) with powered
shield supports. This coordination is essential because of the large
amounts of coal produced by high performance shearers. Failure to remove
coal quickly from the face to outbye conveyors can lead to build-ups of
coal at the face which can halt production. According to BC's Technical
Director, Ken Moses, this lays the basis of the automation of the range
of face activities and the possibility of the reduction in the size of
face teams from an average ten workers to two (cited in Financial Times,
20.3.89).
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using one or more gates which have been pre-driven to their ultimate
boundary (from which extraction commences). Under this system
because the gates have been pre-driven, the face ends, by definition
are less congested and the rate of extraction at the face is independent
of the gate heading rate. Moreover, by pre-driving the gates (in
theory at least) an almost complete picture of the panel is obtained with
early warning given about faulting and so on. These advantages have
led to a rapid proliferation of retreat faces since the end of the 1970s.
Where introduced retreat mining has led to significant productivity
growth (see Chapters Five and Six). In most cases the shift to retreat
mining has been made possible by the more widespread application of
heavy duty heading machines.27
Developments "elsewhere below ground (EBG)
Developments at the face are the most widely known of those occurring
in the coal industry and, historically, face productivity has increased
at a faster rate than the productivity of the mine as a whole, a trend
identified by Reid (1945). The improvement of EBG productivity has
now emerged as a priority for British Coal, but progress has been
27Wider application of retreat mining has been made possible by the
introduction of roofbolting. Roofbolts can be described as giant
'rawlplugs' which are inserted into overhead strata in order to support
it. By 1987/88 31 per cent of all longwall faces were roofbolted prior
to salvage (Daws, 1988). BC is keen to extend the use of roofbolting in
the hope that it will speed up and cut the costs of development work
(see Coal News, Oct 1987; Financial Times, 20.3.98). The NUN has
regarded roofbolting as less satisfactory than girder support and
general safety doubts have been addressed (TUSIU, 1988), but this does
not appear to have slowed the introduction of roofbolting.
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slow. The inability of BC to reduce levels of EBG manning reflects the
higher levels of DOF which are associated with the face productivity
gains since 1984/85. In fact in this regard BC appears to be running in
order to standstill. Although there have been improvements in EBG
productivity these have not been of the order of those occurring at the
face.28
During the 1980s efforts were made to rationalise the back-bye
infrastructure and to speed up and make more technically flexible the
range of EBG activities. In some cases new arterial roadways were
driven from shaft bottoms to workings in efforts to increase machine
available time (MAT), improve materials handling capability and eliminate
EBG jobs (e.g. Tucker, 1986; and Chapter Six). Elsewhere new
manriding facilities were introduced, especially the introduction of
battery powered locos to speed travelling times (see Chapter Five).
More extensive use has been made of free-steered vehicles - an
underground industrial tractor - used for 'load, haul, dump' (LHD)
activites. By 1989 some 400 FSVs were in operation (Financial Times,
20.3.89).
2alndeed the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1989) report on the
industry noted: 'Our recent report attached considerable importance to
the control and reduction of EBG manning levels. We were therefore
surprised to note that this had not become a feature of most capital
investment projects we studied. In most cases this category of manpower
as proportion of the total remained virtually unaffected. We note that
BC has been making a continuing effort in this respect and that targets
have been set and met. We accept that retreat working and other forms of
modern mining technology at the face will (with lower face manning
levels) initially lead to an increase in indirect labour (MMC, 1989: 9).
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Further improvements to the back-bye infrastructure have included
attempts to improve mineral transport. Delays in mineral transport
through chute blockage or belt breakage occur largely because of an
inconsistent size of mineral (the so-called 'large lumps'). Recently
attempts have been made to combat this problem by the introduction of
coal face sizers (or 'crushers'). Watt (1984) argues that mineral
transfer has been characterised by a proliferation of short, low horse
power conveyors with a high proportion of transfer points. He
advocates longer length conveyors using heavy duty belts which
reduces the potential for blockages and requires less labour.
Another means by which the productive flow of the mine is increased is
through improved bunkerage. Bunkers are used to regulate the flow of
run of mine coal (ROM) from the face out-bye, because coal can be
produced at the face at a faster rate than it can be transported to the
shaft bottom and beyond. Conventional bunkers, however, have proved
unable to cope with the ever increasing levels of output achieved at the
face. As a result high capacity horizontal strata bunkers have been
developed. These are ingeniously simple and can be described almost
as closed in roadways where coal can be stored without affecting face
production.
Advanced technology mining
The process of automation has been outlined in influential work by the
Bradford Group. The Group surveyed technical literature on MINOS
(Mine Operating System) in the early 1980s (e.g. Burns et al, 1985;
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Winterton, 1985) and concluded it was a modular concept comprising
various subsystems. This facilitated central control and monitoring of
underground activities from a surface control-room. The Bradford
Group described the objectives of MINOS as threefold: to increase the
productivity of labour; to increase the productivity of capital and to
increase control over all aspects of operations. For instance, MIDAS
shearer guidance is seen as eroding the autonomy of the shearer
driver, while automated plant health monitoring (e.g. IMPACT) and the
move from diagnosis and repair to the replacement of modules deskills
craft-workers 29 . However, while the Bradford Group may identify an
important tendency in restructuring, there is danger in overstating
both the capacities of information technology and in seeing them as
concerned with a deskilling imperative.
More recent engineering literature, for instance, tends to emphasise the
limitations of existing automated techniques. Even where applied,
automation and monitoring systems have been found to run up against
29Penn (1990) criticises the Bradford Group for seeing automation
as centrally concerned with deskilling and the increase in management
control, especially in relation to craftwork. Penn's data does indicate
growing supervision of craft-work and absence of systematic retraining
of craft-workers, but his research in two pits in Lancashire in the
mid-1980s found no evidence of self-diagnostic equipment. Also he
argues while there was evidence of increased use of modular components
in electrical equipment, this was not evidence of deskilling, because
the electrician needs a broader understanding of the interaction of
modules and their integration into the wider system. More broadly, the
proportion of maintenance workers to production workers was growing in
the pits in question. Penn, therefore, rejects the deskilling argument.
In reply to these arguments Leman and Winterton (1991) make the
reasonable point that the Bradford Group predictions on deskilling
related to systems which were absent at the pits studied by Penn. This
debate is illuminated in Chapters Five and Six.
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clear operating limitations. For instance, face delay monitoring often
has fallen short of establishing the true cause of such delays. A cited
example is a display which indicates 'bunker full' - which is really an
effect of some other action not a cause (Steel, 1988). The Bradford
Group overestimated the extent to which automated systems were
conceived as part of a totalising whole. MIDAS, for instance, is a
stand alone system (Steel, 1988). Law et al suggest:
There are at present a number of control and monitoring
systems available for use at the coalface and others at various
stages of development. These systems have been developed
separately, leading to a situation where 'islands of automation'
exist on the coalface, each improving the efficiency of
operation it is applied to but working in isolation from others
(1986: 126).
Also, the discussion of automation in the Bradford Group's approach
tends to overlook other important non-IT changes such as HDME and
retreat mining. Where these are discussed they tend to be seen as
consequences of automation, when the logical causation is the opposite.
In fact in most cases there is likely to be a complex interaction of IT
and non-IT related technical change. The direction of present technical
change, it would seem is accurately captured by Gibbon and Bromley
who argue:
The existing critical literature on technical change in British
mining perhaps inadvertently gives the impression that the
main change in the last decade has been the introduction of
microelectronics and that the impetus behind this change has
been to deskill the workforce and concentrate management
control of the labour process. There is little doubt that
microelectronics do indeed centralize management control over
information and deskill workers (especially fitters and
electricians). But microelectronics in combination with heavy
duty technology is mainly intended to minimise downtime and
hence increase unit output. Some elements of technical change
(eg. FSVs) have a higher skill content for operatives than
the technology they have replaced. Future technological
change lies in the extension of heavy duty mining methods
supported by microelectronics rather than the universal
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application of microelectronics (1990: 67; cf. Hopper et al,
1985)°.
The possibilities for increased management control nevertheless are
exemplified by FIDO (Face Information Digested On-line) system. FIDO
monitors the activity of the shearer, gathering information which is
transmitted to the surface control room. It seeks to identify delays in
the coal getting process and to allow management to act upon these.
Also, it helps management to identify long term trends in delays and
allows the planning of corrective action. A feature of FIDO is the
facility for increased managerial control:
The system improves communications. The controller knows
immediately the face is stopped; he does not have to rely on
a message from underground. Using the status display, and his
own knowledge and experience, he can often interpret what is
happening on the face. When he contacts the face his questions
are straight to the point. People underground are aware of the
resources which are available to the controller. They realize
that he will not be fobbed off with imprecise information,
hence their replies to his questions are more accurate
(Cleary, 1981: 288).
In theory, the miner's ability to determine the pace of his work is
significantly eroded. Part of the purpose of FIDO it seems is the
elimination of natural breaks by powerloaders, which are regarded as a
source of 'avoidable' delays. In addition, two former Derbyshire miners
have described how FIDO interacts closely with the operation of the
30According to Tregelles (1986) IT-related research covered five
areas: improvement of plant design criteria; condition based maintenance
of plant; system monitoring for operational management (initial concern
was with ventilation following industrial action by deputies, but was
later extended to monitoring the running time of conveyors and face
equipment); automation (especially of conveyors and coal prep plants,
but later of shearers); and management information systems.
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bonus scheme to increase the pressure to keep machines running and to
maintain output (Bohen and Wroughton, 1988: 103_104)31.
BC made extensive use during this period of advances in
microelectronics, particularly transducers. The incorporation of
transducers into plant was used in some cases to give real-time
condition information. Machine condition monitoring systems (e.g.
IMPACT) predict breakdowns by noting temperature rises or excessive
vibrations and, therefore, eliminate some regular inspection tests.
Repairs can be planned outside production time. Information stored on
computer enables accurate records of performance by items of plant to
be produced and influences maintenance plans and future design
modifications (Bates, 1981; Horton, 1983). Such systems help to
increase machine running time and, in theory, reduce the demand for
craft labour.
One current preoccupation in BC is with the automation of coal
conveyancing. There are two reasons behind this:
There is need to optirnise the load to match coal flow from
powerloaded faces. There is also need to reduce the number of
men operating conveyors by using remote control. Advances in
electronic data transmission, sensors, transducers and
computers have been exploited to meet these demands (Tucker,
1986: 382).
31Reporting research conducted in the period prior to the miners'
strike, however, Hopper et al (1985) found little evidence that such
technology was perceived as a threat and concluded that management's
complete mastery of technology and workforce remained elusive. Instead
their account emphasised the importance of an increasingly rigorous
financial environment and the pressures this placed on individual pits
in providing the impetus to restructuring (see section six below).
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One means by which BC intends to achieve this is through the the
automation of coal conveyancing, through MINOS, which is now present
at 90 per cent of mines 32 . According to Tucker high levels of manning
EBG often reflect 'lack of properly designed, remotely controlled
conveyor transfer points' (1986: 382). Tucker states that 1986 Area
figures showed a range of 36 per cent to 86 per cent of transfer points
were manually operated. BC believe that automation of coal clearance
and conveying could substantially improve productivity and reduce EBG
costs. There is also a belief that increased automation of conveyors
outbye can lead to a reduction in delays and belt stoppages. Tucker
suggests that collieries equipped with automated coal clearance, where
introduced, have led to the elimination of the equivalent of 1 .14 jobs
per plant item controlled, with delays being 20 per cent less than with
manual operations. MINUS systems have also been developed to monitor
environmental conditions, such as dust and methane build-up. This
aspect of MINUS has been linked by senior BC figures with the desire
to reduce the number of safety officials (deputies) underground (eg.
Northard, 1987)
The extent to which centralised monitoring has been successful in its
central aim of reducing downtime is difficult to say. It appears that
machine running time increased from 24 per cent of the average shift in
1983 (Cox, 1987) to 34 per cent in 1987/88 (Steel, 1988). Logically,
32Steel (1988) lists the aims of MINOS as a) the receipt of
environmental information with limited control and storage; b) remote
operation of plant; c) monitoring the running of plant and providing
production information on downtime.
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MINOS must have played some part in this, but there are other
considerations (see below). In the post strike period, however, MRT
has appeared to remain at around 110 minutes. Even now machines are
said to be operating at less than 50 per cent of (theoretical) potential
(Steel 1988). BC, despite its best efforts, appears to be having little
success in increasing MRT as a proportion of MAT:
Statistics show that there has been no improvement in machine
running time in the past four years: on average the machine
cuts coal only two hours out of five hours of available time
per shift. The increase in output per day and productivity is
explained by the fact that heavy duty faces in medium to
thick seams have a production capacity of approaching
1,000t/h therefore producing more tonnes per minute with no
additional running time (Hartley, 1990: 223; see Figure 4.3).
Present developments focus on attempts made to integrate the
information gained from various monitoring and control devices through
EASY (Event Analysis System) and the CIS-VAX system33.
Attempts to improve machine reliability
The concentration of production on fewer faces made possible by the
introduction of HDME has increased the importance of efficient
maintenance procedures, in order to minimise machine downtime. This is
33EASY is a software package for analysing data produced by
monitoring systems. Data from MINOS, FIDO and so on are inputted and
output consists of histograms, graphs, charts, etc. CIS-VAX develops the
principles of previous management information systems. Its development
was stimulated by slow progress in raising MRT despite widespread
automation and plant monitoring. It represents a step forward in the
attempt to capture real-time information and to integrate the analysis
of data from various systems (Steel, 1988). It is testimony to the
argument which I raised earlier about the limited nature of much
automation and monitoring.
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achieved partly through automated condition monitoring. These systems
also have the aim of reducing the need for craft labour. Such systems
are complemented by a range of less dramatic but equally important
developments in preventative maintenance.34
Since 1984 BC has been introducing routine condition monitoring (RCM)
in order to provide the technical information required for constructive
maintenance schedules:
Routine condition monitoring is the application of test
equipment on either a routine or continuous basis to monitor
the performance and condition of machinery against
Acceptance Standards (Cutts and Entwistle, 1988: 278).
Acceptance standards are established during commissioning tests. This
allows machines to operate at optimum performance and also provides
'trends' in machine deterioration for the purpose of scheduling
constructive maintenance outside production time. The equipment used
in RCM is often relatively simple. Endoprobes (or borescopes) are used
as optical aids to visual non-destructive examination of inaccessible
plant. These operate on the same principle as endoscopy in surgery.
3 Unti1 recently a colliery's maintenance requirements were
administered through the planned preventative maintenance (PPM) system.
PPM encompasses a variety of work schedules ranging from simple visual
examinations to internal inspection of machinery and also includes the
time-based or cyclic changes of plant. This approach is reliant on the
judgement of craft-workers carrying out the examinations in order to
plan remedial work. During the periods between the examinations, there
is little indication of impending breakdowns which can lead to lost
production. Moreover, PPM does not check the performance and condition
of machinery and this results in a situation where it is not performing
at its optimum. Also, according to management: 'This type of maintenance
is expensive in manpower, since the physical examinations can be lengthy
and mostly have to be implemented whilst machinery is standing during
non-production periods or alternatively at weekends (Cutts and
Entwistle, 1988: 278).
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Similarly, oil debris analysis can be carried out with an instrument
costing as little as £2,000. Oil debris testing can be used to assess
gearbox or pump performances and to measure levels of contamination in
order to predict breakdowns. Here oil samples are taken on a regular
basis from gearboxes and then processed through the debris tester to
provide an indication of the amount of metallic debris present in the oil.
By logging the results graphically a trend can be observed as to the
rate of deterioration and hence a judgement can be made of when a
gearbox is likely to fail (see Jarvis and Lewis, 1984) .
This pattern of technical change is almost fifteen years old and has
tended to proceed incrementally and, before 1984/5, appeared to have a
limited impact on productivity. Given that most of the changes outlined
above have been underway since the mid 1970s it seems surprising that
it is only in the period since 1984/5 that significant gains in
productivity have been registered. Plotted on a graph it might be
expected that the productivity curve should show a steady increase
through the 1980s. Instead Figure 4.1 shows the early 1980s were
characterised by a plateau followed by a rapid rise after 1984-85. If the
strike period represented an interruption in the slow process of
In addition the information generated by RCM is leading BC to
tighten the specifications for equipment which it gives to suppliers in
an effort to 'design out as much maintenance as is practical' (Greaves
and Thompson, 1986: 333: see also Northard, 1986). One aim of RCM is
that all information generated can be computerised and subject to
analysis in the constant search for 'trends'.
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technical change, the question is: what changes occurred in the
post-strike period to cause a rapid rise in productivity?36
36This is not the place to offer an account of the strike (for
which see Adeney and Lloyd, 1985; Beynon 1985; Callinicos and Simon,
1985; Renouf, 1990), except to make the following points. First, the
governments planned confrontation with the miners (see Beynon, 1985) can
be seen (to use Elger's phrase) as a 'distinctive moment' in
restructuring of the 1980s and the assertion of the government's
definition of the industrial problem as one of labour intransigence.
Norman Tebbit described it as the 'the last battle' in the attempt to
break the 'shackles' of trade unionism in Britain (Schwarz, 1985: 52).
State ownership played an important part in determining that the dispute
would be concerned with subordinating the role of labour, providing a
powerful 'demonstration effect'. This presumably was the meaning
attached to Nigel Lawson's phrase that the strike was 'a worthwhile
investment' (Adeney and Lloyd, 1985: 202). Secondly, the conduct of the
strike had a number of implications for the post-strike pattern of
restructuring. On the union side, a number of factors contributed to a
debilitating weakness. In some parts of the country, large numbers of
miners had responded to the NCB's back to work campaign and returned to
work and the emergence of the strike breaking UDM severely weakened the
position of the NUN. Also, the NUN itself returned to work without a
settlement which put the union in a weak bargaining position (in the
words of one of my NUN informants: 'the only union in the country which
doesn't recognise the management'). On the management side, the strike
led to the eclipse of management moderates and the rise to power of a
militant faction of management under the patronage of Ian MacGregor.
For instance, immediately after the strike key management moderates like
Geoffrey Kirk (public relations) and Ned Smith (personnel) left the NCB.
MacGregor later said of Smith who opposed the back to work campaign: 'I
saw the need to hold the line to establish the right to manage as
paramount: he thought the need to compromise was paramount' (MacGregor,
1986: 290). For MacGregor, Smith was representative of the failed
management of the past: 'his naturally establishment mind had been
developed in a culture [of nationalisation] trained to avoid aggression'
(ibid: 186). It was during and shortly after the strike that management
hardljners such John Northard and Ken Moses, former Area directors who
had prosecuted the strike with particular vigour, were appointed to
national positions (see Winterton and Winterton, 1989: chapter seven).
Locally also personnel changes were important (see Chapter Six below).
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6 RESTRUCTURING LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE POST STRIKE PERIOD
The most dramatic consequences of the miners' strike were the resulting
capacity closures and job losses. In the period 1983/4 to 1989/90, the
number of collieries fell from 170 to 73 and the workforce from 192,000
to 65,000. During the same period output per manshift rose from 2.43t
to 4.32t. However, all analyses of the post-strike restructuring stress
the limited impact of closures in productivity improvement and the more
important effects of changes in surviving pits (Glyn, 1988; Prior and
McCloskey, 1988; Richardson and Wood, 1989). If the progress of
technical change over the 1980s has been incremental and slow, the
pace of restructuring in labour relations in the post-strike period has
been rapid and dramatic. These changes reflected the determination of
BC, in the words of Ian MacGregor to 'reassert management's right to
manage' (MacGregor, 1986).
In the period prior to the miners' strike there was disquiet within the
coal industry and beyond that the process of technical change in the
industry since the late 1970s had failed to halt escalating costs of
production and had not led to the expected productivity breakthrough
(eg. Spanton, 1982). For instance, in their 1983 report on the
37Glyn, analysing the immediate post-strike operating results,
argued: 'Less than one sixth of the productivity increase after the
strike reflected the direct effect of closing low productivity pits (the
'cricket team' effect). Similar portions were accounted for by the
reallocation of manpower to more productive pits and by increasing the
number of shifts. This left a full half of the the productivity rise
accounted for by increasing output per manshift within the collieries
which stayed open' (1990: 172).
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industry the Monopolies and Mergers Commission focused the fact that
despite extensive mechanisation of the industry labour costs still
accounted for nearly 48 per cent of operating costs (MMC, 1983: 14).
As Gibbon and Bromley (1990) put it, for the MMC (and others) the
structure and practices of the labour force were out of synchronisation
with the available technology38.
The defeat of the miners' strike, therefore, presented an opportunity to
bring work practices into line with the new technology. The process of
restructuring, though, was determined by more immediate pressures
deriving from changes in market relations. 39
 In the immediate
39The Monopolies and Mergers Commission focused particularly on the
size of the craft labour force which amounted to 20 per cent of men on
books (MOB) in 1981 despite the growing application of self-diagnostic
equipment. Also noted was a general surplus of workers and low levels of
productivity EBG and a general decline in machine running times in the
period 1979/82. In this regard they proposed shift reforms and
improvements in shaft to face journey times (MMC, 1983; also Gibbon and
Bromley, 1990).
39The financial constraints within which BC operates were tightened
because of the threat to its markets from imported coal. The role of the
state in exposing BC to these 'market forces' was important. Between
1982/6 there was a 33 per cent increase in internationally traded coal,
but lower oil prices, the failure of Japanese imports to grow as
anticipated in the late-1970s, and increase in nuclear power production
(especially in Western Europe) and the prevalence of long-term contracts
substantially reduced prices. Also, a number of major coal facilities,
mainly in the form of low-cost surface mines, whose rationale was an
expected rise in prices and demand, were about to come on stream . The
British electricity industry, encouraged by the Tory government, was
committed to reducing costs in the run-up to privatisation. The CEGB
(purchaser of 70 per cent of domestic coal output) and NCB had signed a
'joint understanding' in 1979 (amended in 1982, 1983, and 1986 to
reflect the growing market weakness of BC). The 1986 agreement covered
the period to mid-1991 and was negotiated against the background of CEGB
claims to be able to import 3Omt of coal in 3-5 years. The CEGB agreed
to take BC output but only when BC agreed to sell a portion of it at
(Footnote Continued)
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post-strike period key management figures outlined a strategy for
addressing these problems, a codified expression of which was the
Wheeler Plan which outlined conditions for producing coal from 'a typical
midlands colliery' while reducing costs from £1 .44/gigajoule (gj) to
£l.11/gj (Wheeler, 1986) Wheeler argued for alteration to shaft
operations to make production and conveying of coal underground more
consistent and less prone to peaks and troughs. He argues that more
consistent production and increased output could be achieved by
abandoning the Five Day Week Agreement and allowing coaling to take
place over six days per week using three extended shifts per day. This
would allow coal to be produced continuously and for the shaft to be
operated for 23 hours per day.
(Footnote Continued)
prices equivalent to those on the international spot market. This
increased the financial pressures on BC (see Taylor, 1990, for a concise
discussion of market changes and the role of the state in promulgating
them).
°BC was conscious of the growing influence exerted by the
international coal trade on the domestic market. This trade is
inherently unstable and BC attempted to build recognition of this
instability into its restructuring. The foundations of this
restructuring were set out in the 'New Strategy for Coal (1985) which
replaced the PFC. The Strategy argued that slow productivity growth,
rising costs and falling demand required a shift from output planning to
a selling-based approach. The guiding criteria would no longer be
output, but production costs per gigajoule (a metric measure of heat
value). The Strategy assumed any colliery not producing at or below
£1.65/gj (later reduced to £1.50/gj) would not be economic in the
long-term (Taylor, 1990). Hopper et al (1985) noted that under the
nationalisation regime individual pits were largely insulated from
financial pressures because marketing and pricing functions were
assigned to area or national level. The cost per gigajoule formula, I
would argue, can be seen a formal mechanism for transmitting competitive
pressures down the organisational hierarchy (see Chapters Five and Six).
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Wheeler also proposed savings in manpower in all aspects of the mine -
by contracting out surface activities and by concentrating production on
fewer faces. Savings in craft labour are suggested by merging existing
fitters and electricians jobs into a single electro-mechanic and by
redistributing some maintenance tasks to machine operators. He also
proposes an end to the traditional separation between the safety and
production responsibilities of deputies and overman. Northard, another
key figure in senior management takes this further and argues that
improved environmental and plant monitoring by remote control:
'provides the opportunity to reappraise supervisory and organizational
requirements' (1987: 111).
Wheeler suggests that innovative forms of payment can help to improve
productivity. For example, he notes that development and salvage work
are subject to peaks and troughs and are notoriously difficult to plan,
but suggests that: 'tasks such as building large machines can be
achieved in hours rather than days and that junctions can be erected in
days rather than weeks (Wheeler, 1986: 158). This appears to be a
reference to the use of ad hoc contracts paid to individual miners or
groups of miners for the completion of particular salvage or development
tasks outside of normal working hours. Wheeler sees such devices as
only one in a range of local or area based incentive schemes which he
envisages.
Northard sums up the philosophy behind all of these moves:
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Output can be increased without adding to investment by
utifising the installed capacity more intensively (1987: 112)1.
These proposals have become known as the 'Wheeler Plan' and have
been described as representing in their entirety 'classical flexibility'
when the strategy as a whole was endorsed by BC chairman Robert
Haslam (The Guardian, 27.11.86) •42
Following the return to work there is evidence that BC attempted a
formal introduction of the Wheeler plan. In the immediate post strike
period, BC proposed a series of changes to mines safety legislation as
part of its pursuit of the Wheeler proposals. BC ended the 'de facto'
closed shop of NACODS - the supervisors' and safety officials' union -
in retaliation for a series of damaging strikes. BC proposed
amendments to the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, to allow pit managers
4 In fact from the early 1980s senior managers stressed that they
did not envisage any fundamental technical advances, but rather the
wider application of proven technologies (Spanton, 1982; Horton, 1983).
2Agreement to six day coal production has been achieved in certain
circumstances. Miners at Cynheidre in South Wales agreed to six day coal
production in order to overcome geological problems (Guardian, 20.7.88),
but this did not same the pit from closure. Miners at Solsgirth colliery
in Scotland agreed to six day coaling in order to reduce costs in an
effort to ward off closure threatened by the South of Scotland
Electricity Board's decision to import cheap foreign coal (Financial
Times, 23.2.86). Also six day working forms the core of the agreement
between the UDM and BC for the operation of Asfordby mine and was the
source of dispute between the NUN and the South Wales Area officials
over the proposed development of Margam mine. Prior and McCloskey
conclude: 'It is likely that, aware of its implications for increased
output, six day working will not be pressed for in the immediate future
except as a negotiating ploy for some specific projects such as
Asfordby, Margam and Frances. But the proposals remain as markers for
the pattern of development and they will, inevitable, become the price
paid by miners for any new investment in particular pits' (1986: 29; see
Chapters Five and Six below).
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to do the work of deputies as long as there are an adequate number of
miners with first aid certificates (Financial Times, 4.2.88). Northard
(1987) stated that there is no reason why all safety tasks should be the
responsibility of a single official, implying that safety tasks could be
devolved to a range of workers. BC called on the government to
remove the legal constraints stopping miners from working underground
for more than seven and a half hours at a time, as is required by the
1908 Coal Mines Regulation Act. This was been linked specifically to the
need to introduce longer shifts at undersea collieries in the North East
because of long travelling times (Financial Times, 30.11.88).
In general, however, the trend to 'flexible working' has been less
complete and more uneven. Press reports suggest new work practices
are being widely introduced. According to one report:
British Coal is achieving a variety of new working practices
in pits, but does not want to identify the extent of the
development because of opposition from the National Union of
Mineworkers (Financial Times, 14.7.88).
In some pits it is reported that men are replacing the previous shifts at
the coal face rather than at the shaft bottom, increasing MAT by up to
an hour. Subcontracting is said to be much increased. In addition the
use of ad hoc contracts for development and salvage work is reported
to be widespread (eg Financial Times, 1.7.88, 14.10.88; Evans, 1988).
Gibbon and Bromley (1990) note employee costs fell as a proportion of
operating costs from 52 per cent (1985/6) to 42 per cent (1988/9).
General attempts to reform the shift system led to an increase in the
'shifting index' from 215.5 per man per annum in 1981/2 to 241.5 in
1988/9 (Gibbon and Bromley, 1990). Also, important changes have been
made to the operation of incentive schemes (see below). The changes
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have been significant, although regular reports in the Financial Times
made it clear that the rate of change appears highly uneven across
areas and between pits.
The significance of the changes have led some writers to suggest that
the post-strike productivity rises and costs reductions can be
attributed to these developments. Prior and McCloskey examined the
reduction in the costs of production achieved by BC in the post strike
period. In particular, they analysed the 13 per cent drop in costs
which BC achieved between 1985/6 and 1986/7. According to this
analysis, cost changes did not show any significant correlation with
obvious parameters such as pit size, productivity or amount of
investment in the pit. They suggest that output increases achieved
with a reduced workforce account for a greater proportion of cost
reduction (and productivity gain) than does technical change. They
argue on the basis of a detailed analysis of colliery statistics that the
average operational pit shed 14.2 per cent of its workforce between
February 1986 and July 1987. They conclude:
about 50 per cent of the drop in British Coal costs has
come not from colliery closures nor from new investment but
from a generalised shakeout of labour. . .Almost certainly it is
a process which had been carried on from the first days back
after the strike when part of the old workforce simply failed
to pitch up and the management imposed new practices much
as the Crusaders imposed Christianity on the heathen and
heretic. Undoubtedly some labour reductions were the
consequence of new technology at the coal-face or elsewhere.
But there is little evidence that they stemmed from any
particular breakthrough. Rather they derived from the
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sudden application of [work] practices which had been
available for years (1988: 43)•43
Richardson and Wood's (1989) analysis of the post-strike change in
South Yorkshire suggested that the most important factor in explaining
the rapid rise in productivity was the replacement of the Yorkshire
Incentive Scheme (negotiated under the provisions of the AIS) by the
Doncaster Option. In the latter performance standards are said to be
more favourable to management, there is less room for negotiation over
delays and the payment system is more fractured between different
work groups. According to Richardson and Wood the new system is
seen as contributing to more continuous production. Together with a
wider attack on job controls and custom and practice and the general
tightening of labour discipline (e.g. enforcement of good time-keeping)
this has allowed pits to achieve commercial targets. 44 Productivity
rises are offsetting wage increases allowing miners to make high wages.
The 'historic' productivity improvement of the post-strike period,
however, is a product of management 'taking advantage of a unique
opportunity' (p16), arising from the defeat of the NUM, but is
43Glyn's analysis of BC's operating results in the immediate
post-strike period leads him to argue that 'current investment can have
played little role in the post-strike period; almost all the
productivity growth must have reflected pressure on miners to raise
output in the surviving pits, together with reductions of manpower'
(1988: 171).
4 It is from Richardson and Wood that Metcalf (1988) takes the
anecdote about 'water notes'.
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consistent with a 'fundamental change in workers attitudes', reflecting a
less collective outlook.45
All of these studies contain insights, but remain partial accounts, not
least because of the limited time frame within which they analyse
events. The assumption that restructuring can be equated with
post-strike events is erroneous. The approach of Prior and McCloskey
and that of Richardson and Wood stresses the absence of technical
change and therefore assumes that more 'flexible' work practices and
new bonus schemes can account for the rapid rise in productivity.
However, changes in labour relations in the post-strike period have
acted upon, as described earlier, a longer established trajectory of
technical change. In some ways the post-strike restructuring must
address the extent to which BC introduced work practices which were
co-terminous with the existing pattern of technical change. To this
extent it is something of a false dichotomy to separate technical change
and changes in work practices (cf. Chapter Two). The post-strike
period was characterised by a complex interplay of technical and
labour-related changes which varied inter-regionally as shown in the
following two chapters.
Edwards and Heery (1989) attribute a leading role to the bonus
reforms in the productivity improvement of the 1980s. Their study,
however, is essentially a study of the introduction of the AIS in the
mid-1970s. Their attempt to update their findings in the light of
post-strike events is based on interviews with industrial relations
staff at BC'S London headquarters. In my view this weakens their
understanding of post-strike changes which are highly varied at the
regional and intra-regional level (cf. Chapters Five and Six).
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Richardson and Wood's idea that somehow or other the acceptance of
revisions to payment systems in the post-strike period is consistent
with fundamental attitude changes on the part of miners needs to be
challenged. It is necessary to place the acceptance of such schemes
into the context of wider developments in management/union relations.
It is possible to identify two parallel processes in post-strike industrial
relations. Following the defeat of the strike, especially under the
MacGregor regime, it is apparent that there was an attempt to destroy
the NUM and to see its replacement by the strikebreaking UDM.
Management made a series of unilateral and provocative alterations to
agreements and procedures, notably through the introduction of a
draconian disciplinary code. Simultaneously, the NUM itself has
abrogated its national negotiating role. Gibbon and Bromley (1990) note
that, under MacGregor, local managers were encouraged to press home
the advantage against local NUM branches, exemplified in the notorious
statement: 'people are now discovering the price of insubordination and
boy are we going to make it stick' (quoted in Tomaney and Winterton,
1990: 24).
Tinder MacGregor's successor, Robert Haslam, a certain subtle shift in
attitude can be detected. The stalemate between BC and the NUM has
continued at the national level. However, local managers, aware that a
policy of confrontation alone is insufficient, began to promote the
existence of 'common interests'. This approach provided certain
attractions to branch officials who were under pressure due to the
failure of the NUM leadership nationally to agree a strategy on closures
and wages. This implies the necessity of local accommodations between
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managements and unions in the effort stave off closures and secure
movement on the wages front. In short local branches have engaged in
a process of 'bargained retreat' and acceptance of certain arguments
about competitivity. In the process local branches have made
concessions on working practices and payment systems. Rather than
being expressions of a new individualism, the changes charted by
Richardson and Wood are better understood as an expression of the
emergence of 'market corporatism' built on an altered balance of power
(Gibbon and Bromley, 1990; cf. Terry, 1989).
7. CONCLUSION
This chapter has been concerned with describing the general tendencies
inscribed in the programme of technical change and the restructuring of
work practices while attempting to retain a sensitivity to the possibility
of a diversity of actual outcomes. The strategy of technical change
arising from the provisions of the PFC was based around heavy duty
mining equipment, but this technology could only be applied in thicker
seam conditions. For instance, between 1982/88, 75 per cent of BC's
£3,700m investment programme was concentrated in just four regions -
North Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Central, South Yorkshire - whilst a
mere 15 per cent was allocated to the North East, Scotland and South
Wales (MMC, 1989). Thus, one would expect to find an uneven
distribution of new technology. Most analyses of the post-strike
restructuring have tended to be of events at the industry level or have
abstracted from single local cases to make pronouncements about
national developments. Yet the pattern of change has been highly
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uneven. This leads Glyn to argue that the 'whole pattern of regional
variation really deserves thorough analysis based on a detailed study of
the evolving industrial relations situation in the different areas' (1990:
172).	 This stands as further testimony to one of the central
propositions of this thesis - namely that broad patterns of change are
mediated by complex and equivocal pattern of local variation.
The following case studies of the North East and Selby coalfields are a
contribution to that process. They make an interesting contrast. Very
little of the investment arising from PFC went the way of the North
East (see Hudson 1989: chapter seven). Similarly the average seam
sections of the North East prevented the comprehensive application of
the HDME/ATM strategy. Paradoxically, although the level of
productivity remained comparatively low the rate of increase in the
region has been among the most rapid. Furthermore, by 1989/90 the
North East produced the lowest cost output within British Coal and was
described as 'the jewel in British Coal's crown'. The North East is a
particularly interesting case because it has been characterised
historically by a regionally distinctive set of job controls.
In contrast, Selby is an entirely new mine (or mine complex). Tts
development was a central proposition of the PFC and from the outset
was designed to embody the latest advances in mining equipment and in
information technology. Accordingly, Selby might be seen as a
'post-Fordist' coalmine and as such is a good place to examine this
contentious concept. This task might seem paradoxical. Why 'test' for
advanced production methods and new forms of work organisation in an
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'old', extractive industry like coal? Kern and Schumann, for instance,
suggest that in such industries as shipbuilding, the steel industry and
mining, firm strategies are simply a matter of 'naked economic survival':
In these crisis centres there is little room for the idea of
new production concepts: their fight for survival is
characterized by the destruction of capacity and
declining significance in the economic hierarchy (1984:
165).
However, the case of Selby suggests that this generalisation is only
partly true. Capacity closure was an important feature of restructuring
in the coal industry during the 1980s, but in Britain this occurred
alongside the creation of entirely new capacity, which incorporated a
production process which embodied the latest form of microelectronic
technology. Chapter Five examines the North East and Chapter Six
examines the Selby case. Some contrasts are drawn in Chapter Seven.
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TABLE 4.1
Percentage of C*itpit Ikxjerloaded, 1946-1967
1946	 2.0
1947	 2.6
1948	 3.7
1949	 4.4
1950	 3.8
1951	 4.1
1952	 5.2
1953	 6.1
1954	 7.9
1955	 10.8
1956	 15.5
1957	 23.0
1958	 27.8
1959	 31.3
1960	 37.5
1961	 47.7
1962	 58.8
1963/4	 68.4
1964/5	 75.0
1965/6	 80.7
19 66/7	 85.7
Source: NCB Report arxl Accounts, cited in Kelly (1969).
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TABLE 4.2
NcTk-thanica1 Delays in Coal Prockicticri, Støther 1977
ACI'IVITY	 IvIINtYITS
tate-start Wirdirig Relay 	 .91
Late-Start Man rider Relay 	 1.05
Late-start-Excess travel/Prep	 11.30
Late-start-after Snap	 .97
Early finish	 3.30
Wait at Shaft side (Shift End) 	 .85
Total	 18.38
Source: Production and Productivity 11etin, September 1977; cited in
Fine and Harris (1986:192).
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29
11
9
32
TABLE 4.3
flact of Heavy I)ity Equipint
December 1988
Equipnnt	 Deily output per face (t)
Conventional only	1177
One kID element:
Shield support	 1369
Shearer	 1126
AFC	 1451
Two III) elements:
Shield support & Shearer 	 1399
Shield support & FC 	 2106
Shearer & ?FC	 2077
Three kID elements:	 2445
No of Faces
74
61
31
2
Source: Moses (1989)
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TABLE 4.4
mSH AL
ats of Prodix±iai (f/gj) 1985/9
1985	 3.68
1986	 1.78
1987	 1.60
1988	 1.63
1989	 1.54
Source: NCB/British Coal, Report and Accounts, 1985/6-89/90.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE NORTH EAST: 'THE JEWEL IN BRITISH COAL'S CROWN'?
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the process of workplace restructuring in the
North East coalfield during the 1980s. The chapter charts the rapid
rise in productivity in the coalfield in the post-strike period. While
throughout the 20th century the coalfield has undergone more or less
progressive decline, by 1989/90 British Coal's North East Group
recorded a £66m profit, the highest of any group in the country. At
the same time production costs fell to £1 .40/gj, the lowest in the
country. In fact this was the best financial performance the coalfield
had registered since nationalisation. Moreover, during 1989/90,
according to British Coal, not a single tonne of coal was lost due to
industrial disputes, a testimony to a change of attitude on the part of
its employees. These developments led BC's then chairman Lord Haslam
to describe the North East Group as 'the jewel in British Coal's crown'
(British Coal, North East Group, press release, 30.8.90).
The aim of the chapter is to examine the basis for, and the character
of this productivity improvement in the light of the discussions in
previous chapters. The dramatic rise in productivity in the North East
coalfield has been offered as evidence of the wider 'productivity miracle'
and industrial transformation of the 1980s. On a visit to the North
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East in September 1990, the then Tory Party chairman Kenneth Baker
cited increased productivity at British Coal as evidence of the wider
transformation of the region's industrial base (The Journal, Newcastle,
21.9.90; also Tomaney, 1989). The character of the transformation
might then be said to evidence something about the nature of this
miracle. In what sense, then, has a productivity 'miracle' occurred in
the North East coalfield? What part has technical change played in the
productivity increase? Have new work practices played a part? If so,
how have workers faired in the process of change?
The argument advanced in this chapter is that the productivity
improvement which occurred in the period after the strike in the North
East has been based on fragile and limited foundations; an argument
advanced with regularity by officials of the NUM in the region and at
individual pits during the course of the fieldwork on which this chapter
is based. It is also argued that there was disquiet about the emerging
mining practice among at least some managers.
The chapter begins by briefly outlining the historical development of
the coalfield. There are two ways in which the history of the coalfield
influenced the pattern of contemporary developments. Firstly, the
North East coalfield has. been an important location for the type of
highly developed job controls alluded to in the previous chapter.
These are outlined in more detail. It is shown how such union operated
job controls survived mechanisation and continued to exist up to the
miners' strike. Post-strike restructuring in the North East was partly
concerned with eliminating these 'restrictive practices'. Secondly, the
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pattern of technical change and capacity restructuring under
nationalisation had implications for mining practice in the North East.
In particular, the chapter demonstrates how the peculiar features of
undersea mining were important in determining the pattern of
post-strike restructuring. Finally, the development of the North East's
market situation is outlined in order to highlight the relative
vulnerability of the coalfield to competition.
Subsequent sections outline the nature of technical change in the region
- taking the long view deemed appropriate in the previous chapter -
and the post-strike restructuring of work practices. Data and
discussion on regional trends in production indicators is provided, but
in order to capture processes as well as trends, this is supplemented
by data from more in-depth and qualitative case studies of change at
two pits carried out in 1989/90. The discussion on changes in work
practices is drawn principally from these studies. Further details on
the rationale for this choice of pits is provided in Appendix One. The
aim of these locally based studies is to highlight both the character of
the new working practices, their relationship to technical change and
the uneven and contested nature of their application. The conclusion
reached is that significant changes in work practices occurred in the
period from the end of the strike. The basis for this reorganisation
was the profound defeat inflicted on the NUM in 1984/5 which weakened
the union and made it impossible to resist management's imposition of
new working practices. Furthermore, faced with real closure threats
and inactivity from the national leadership, even the most militant union
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branches (Lodges) increasingly offered concessions to management in
the pursuit of an often elusive 'viability' for their pit.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH EAST COALFIELD
The historical legacy and the nature of mining in the North East
The Great Northern Coalfield (encompassing Northumberland and
Durham) is the oldest coalfield in the world and mining has taken place
there since Roman times, but expanded rapidly during the nineteenth
century 1 . Since nationalisation in 1947, however, the North East
coalfield has undergone a process of decline. In 1946, the last year
before nationalisation, the region produced 34mt. In 1947 there were
188 mines in North East England employing 149,000 men. By 1983/4
these figures were 16 and 23,000 respectively and output was just
under llmt.
In short, nationalisation allowed the managed decline of the North East
coalfield (Hudson, 1989; Renouf, 1990). While it is frequently argued
that such decline is the outcome of immutable geological factors (ie. the
exhaustion of seams), in the case of the North East, the process of
technical change was also important (cf. Chapter Four). Coal mining in
the North East began at the outcrop (in the west of the region) using
bord and pillar methods to exploit thin seams. The mechanisation
Peak output was achieved in 1911 when 56mt was produced.
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process around longwall faces described in the previous chapter led to
the progressive demise of bord and pillar mining as production was
concentrated on thicker seams suitable for powerloading technology.
Together with the decline in markets for coal after 1957 this had two
consequences for the North East. Nationally, production became
concentrated in the central English coalfields where the seams were
suited to mechanisation. This process helped to underpin the massive
closure programme of the 1960s which transformed the North East
economy. Regionally the same process of producing coal mechanically
from thicker seams led to the gradual concentration of production in the
east of the region.
The concentration of production in the East of the region had an
important implication for current mining practice. It meant that
increasingly mining occurred under the North Sea at ever increasing
distances from the shaft bottom. This, in turn, has meant that mining
in the North East is subject to peculiar production constraints rarely
encountered elsewhere. Production units are up to 7 miles from the
shaft bottom and the question of their further extension is determined
both by thickness and quality of reserves and upon production results
offsetting the adverse effect that increasing distance has upon
operating costs, in the light of intensifying market pressures. In
particular British Coal suggest that operating costs will be increased by
the maintenance of bigger and longer roadways; the provision of
additional roadways for ventilation; the provision of facilities for high
speed manriding to maintain face available time; the extension of
conveyor and other service systems including power transmission;
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increased power consumption for transport, ventilation and pumping;
depreciation on additional equipment and the provision of additional
waste disposal facilities. Of these factors, the problems with ventilation
and the need for a viable working time at the face are seen as the most
likely restricting factors (Archibald, 1988).
Job controls and industrial relations in the North East
The industrial relations traditions of the North East coalfield have
developed over two centuries. Under private ownership, following the
formation of stable unions in the late 19th century, labour relations
were characterised mainly by paternalism on the part of the owners and
moderation on the part of the official trade union movement. This
latter moderation was exemplified in the acceptance of the sliding scale
by the Durham Miners Association and the Northumberland Miners
Association (Austrin and Beynon, 1981; Douglass, 1977). However,
during this whole period, moderation at the level of the regional union
bureaucracy was complemented by traditions of rank and file militancy
in many areas - notably around Tyneside (Douglass, 1977) and in parts
of North West Durham (Turnbull, n.d.).
This militancy, according to David Douglass, a working miner, had
roots in the traditions of job control unique to the region. According
to Douglass: 'The cavilling system is the chief instrument of job control
in the Durham coalfield' (1977: 229). Cavilling has its origins in the
organisation of a fair distribution of bord and pillar work under
conditions of private ownership:
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Cavilling was the simplest, most democratic form of job
distribution which the workers could possibly have developed
for the purpose, given the conditions of private enterprise.
It was a way of equalizing chances and sharing out
opportunities. Because of geological conditions there are some
good places in a pit, some bad and more dangerous than
others. A face of coal may be hard and close cleated; the
roof may be soft or the stratum sodden with water. All of
these things interfere with the miner's capacity to earn
wages. Without the quarterly cavils one team of men might be
stuck with foul conditions where the work was harder but the
money less, because the stratum made production difficult. To
even things out the cavils provided everyone with a swap
(Douglass, 1977: 229_30)2.
Cavilling had an additional advantage:
The cavilling system was a first line of defence against
victimization. If the management had picked the places, union
men and agitators would have stood little chance against the
favourites (Douglass, 1977: 231).
Cavilling was the basis for a tradition of more extensive spot bargaining
over piece rates in the Northern coalfield. While this was translated
into traditions of militancy in the cases of pits like Wardley and
Chopwell ('Little Moscow'), the traditions of cavilling and extensive spot
bargaining of tasks and rates were common throughout Durham and
Northumberland and were carried over to the powerloading era and
reformulated to meet the demands of mechanised mining (Douglass, 1977:
215; Kreiger, 1983: 157-170; see below).
The cavilling system was symbiotically related to the traditional marra
relationship. In bord and pillar mining the full range of mining tasks
2 'Cavilling was in stark contrast to the southern 'butty' system of
sub-contracting, in which men literally fought each other for places,
and the maxim was 'every man for himself'' (Douglass, 1977: 231; also
Krieger, 1983; Waller, 1985).
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were completed by pairs of colliers who, whether together during a
given shift or on different shifts, shared the same paynote. Miners
united in this way were marras3 . Marra groups were self selecting and
typically made up of men of a comparable standard of work
performance. The introduction of longwall mining led to a broadening
of numbers and definition, with as many as two or three dozen men on
each of three shifts, but the principles of self-selection and composite
tasks remained:
Most important, the marra group took on new importance in
the day-to day development of the power relations which
emerged between management and men. The marra group
became the unit around which opposition to management
initiative naturally coalesced. . . Long after the bord and pillar
system which generated it had receded into marginal
existence. . . the marra relationship continued to condition the
laboring relations and the power relations of Durham miners.
It generates rules for worker self-selection of work team and
assignment of task, and cooperative regulation of output. It
has fundamentally conditioned the political culture of the
underground life (Kreiger, 1983: 86-87; also Douglass, 1977:
221-229).
Both Krieger and Douglass make clear that the cavilling and marra
traditions survived the transition to powerloading and continued to form
the basis for a solidaristic workplace culture.
These traditions coexisted with political moderation at the regional level.
Prior to the strike of 1984/5, however, changes in the political outlook
of the miners' unions at the regional level began to occur, particularly
in Durham. Lloyd notes that during this period: 'In the North East, a
3The term since entered the wider dialect in the North East to take
on a more general meaning of 'friend'.
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young, radical leadership had taken power at pit level and was pushing
the previously centrist leadership to unfamiliarly militant postures'
(1985: 22). This formed part of the background to the vigorous
prosecution of the strike and also the subsequent restructuring in the
North East.
Plan for Coal and the North East
The provisions of the Plan for Coal which underpinned the NCB's
investment strategy in the 1970s (see chapter four) had a specific
effect on the North East. The planned expansion of capacity envisaged
in the PFC was intended to come from the central English coalfields.
Consequently, the bulk of the investment associated with the PFC was
to occur there (eg. the development of the Selby complex, see Chapter
Six). In the North East only one relatively large investment - relative
that is to the scale of investment in the 1960s rather than to that in
the central coalfields after 1974 - was planned to increase coking coal
production from the Horden-Blackhall-Easington complex for British
Steel Corporation's Redcar complex. BSC's decision, as a consequence
41n fact the process of political change had begun earlier. The
signs of change were indicated by the Durham miners' support for strike
action in 1981 over the closure issue. In 1984, following the death of
Tommy Bartles, the leader of the Durham Mechanics and a leading figure
in the right nationally, Bill Etherington, the left's candidate was
elected as President. After the strike the left's control of the union
was consolidated with the election of David Hopper and David Guy as
General Secretary and President of the Durham Miner's Association. The
Durham Miner's Association and Durham Colliery Mechanics Association
together with their equivalents in Northumberland merged in 1988 to form
a single North East Area of the NUN. A fuller account of the process of
political change in the DMA and DCMA is provided by Renouf (1990).
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of government pressure after 1979 to cut losses, to import cheap coking
coal led to the closure of the pits in the period before and immediately
after the strike (Hudson, 1989: chapter 7; Beynon et al, 1990).
In the period after the approval of the PFC the pace of decline in the
North East coal industry moderated. Between 1974/5 and 1979/80 the
number of collieries fell from 35 to 29, with employment falling from
38,000 to 33,000 over the same period. Output during this period fell
only marginally from 14.6mt to 14.lmt. Of significance though was a
fall in OMS from 1.89t to 1.87t. The decline in OMS during the late
1970s is indicative of the relative lack of investment in the North East
coalfield under PFC. Thereafter OMS improved if slowly to reach 2.23t
by 1983/4, a consequence, according to Hudson (1989: 190) of cuts in
capacity, reductions in employment and reorganisation of work practices
in remaining pits rather than investment in new technology. Despite
the increase, OMS remained at less than a third of the target level
specified for new collieries in the central coalfield.
One consequence of the progressive loss of coking coal markets was to
increase the reliance of the North East on the CEGB for the purchase
of its output. In the post-war period the new Thameside power
stations had become an important market for North East coal 5 . By the
mid 1980s, North East output was highly dependent on these markets.
5For instance, the reconstruction of St Hilda pit in South Shields
into Westoe colliery was with the purpose of supplying the Thameside
power stations.
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However, given the desire of the electricity supply industry to import
increased amounts of coal, these markets were highly vulnerable due to
the ease by which they could supplied by sea from the
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp spot market 6 . For these reasons the
post strike pressures for restructuring, if anything, were more acute
in the North East than elsewhere, while the basis for producing coal
competitively seemed absent.
3. EXPLAINING THE PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT
Between the end of the strike and 1989/90 productivity almost doubled
to 4.09 tonnes per manshift. In 1984/85 there were 15 operating
collieries employing 18,000 men. By 1989/90 the number of operating
collieries had fallen to 7 employing less than 11,000 men. In 1985 the
then NCB began measuring deep-mine production costs in terms of price
per gigajoule (/gj) and at that point, nationally, was producing coal at
£3.68/gj. (There was no complete regional breakdown of production
costs on this basis at that time). By 1989/90 the now British Coal's
costs of production had fallen to £1.54/gj with costs in the North East
amongst the lowest in the country at £1.43/gj (Tables 5.1; 5.2).
6Chapter Four charted the growing emphasis on financial performance
at colliery level during the 1980s, particularly after the publication
of the 'New Strategy for Coal' in 1985. Tight cost parameters were
introduced against which all new investment projects and the viability
of individual collieries would be assessed. Costs per tonne were
replaced by costs per gigajoule. Among other things, this amounted to a
signalled that BC saw its markets in terms of power stations (where the
measure of heat value was crucial) and an abandonment of a serious
concern with markets for coking and anthracite grades - the traditional
specialities of the peripheral coalfields (cf. Hudson and Sadler, 1990).
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Table 5.1 shows the closure of eleven collieries during the 1980s and
the concentration of production on just 29 faces (compared to 61 in
1982/3), together with the loss of 50 per cent of the workforce. Despite
this, saleable output fell by only 17 per cent, a state of affairs
explained by a 87 per cent increase in productivity which incorporated
a 73 per cent increase in daily face output (D.O.F.). Figure 5.1
illustrates the growth in daily output per face and suggests that as far
as the 1980s are concerned, it is essentially a post-strike phenomenon.
This change is a function of several factors. The fact that
productiv, ty changes are more than the arithmetical effect of pit
closures is evidenced by an examination of changes in remaining
collieries. Table 5.2 gives production indicators from Westoe Colliery
and shows that the colliery actually increased output with a steadily
declining workforce between 1983/4 and 1989/90. The processes which
have underpinned this change are the subject of the rest of this
chapter. The discussion is separated into a section on capacity and
technical factors and one on changes in work and industrial relations.
4. PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT: A TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENT?
In an effort to disentangle the determinants of change, this section
examines the contribution of technical change and the restructuring of
capacity to the improvement in productivity and face output. On the
one hand it might be presumed that productivity improvement in the
North East simply reflects the broad process of technical change, based
on heavy duty technology and advanced microelectronics, outlined in
the previous chapter. On the other hand, it should be born in mind
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that the investment contained in the PFC was destined for the central
coalfield rather than regions like the North East. Also, despite the
productivity improvement achieved in the North East the national
productivity rate of 4.14t was still some 32 per cent higher. The
discussion below recognises that some technical change has occurred,
but stresses the relatively limited nature of change.
Changes In mining equipment and mining practice
One significant change during the 1980s was the relative growth in
retreat mining. Figure 5.2 shows that saleable output from retreat
faces rose from less than 30 per cent at the beginning of the 1980s to
over 60 per cent in 1988/9. The technical advantages of retreat mining,
described in the previous chapter are reflected in the relative
performance indicators. In the North East area the D .0. F. of advancing
faces in 1988/89 was 1,150t and the figure for retreat faces was
1,414t. In addition, retreat faces in general operate with much lower
levels of manpower than do advance faces which mean that they have
higher OMS 7 . However, it is also important to recognise that while
retreat faces tend to outperform advance faces the performance of the
latter improved in the 1980s. Between 1982/3 and 1988/9 D.O.F. from
7For instance at Westoe an advance face might operate with 17 men
while a retreat face will operate with as few as 10 men. This difference
reflects the technical advantages of retreat mining, that is, the
pre-driven gateways obviate the need for development workers and
ancillary workers in the face-ends. A commonly expressed analogy is that
with retreat mining 'all your troubles are left behind you'. A reduced
workforce and higher output translates into considerably improved
productivity.
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advance faces rose from 647t to 1, 159t suggesting wider factors were at
work8 . Certain limits to the application of retreat mining are discussed
below.
Figure 5.3 shows a growth in average total length of face in the period
after the strike. However, it is likely that this rapid growth is partly
the arithmetical effect of the post-strike closures of smaller collieries.
In surviving pits, however, increases in face length have occurred
throughout the 1980s. For instance, at Westoe face length has
increased from an average of 230m in the early 1980s to about 270m in
1989, but again this reflects in part the abandonment of smaller faces.
Such changes, therefore, are likely to account for only a small part of
improved D .0. F. and cannot account for the rapid rise in D .0. F. after
1986.
Figure 5.4 shows shearer results for the period 1978/79 and 1987/88.
Over this period the average square metres cut per machine shift was
8Despite the improvement in advance face performance, the drawbacks
of this method seem the same as they have always been, that is, an
inability to keep the gates advanced (I return to why this might be so
later). Some innovative methods have been attempted to overcome this
problem. For instance, atWearmouth Colliery, attempts are being made to
advance the headings up to 80m in front of the face line in order, as it
were, to disengage the gate formation process from the actual coal
getting process. However, some of the classical problems of advance
faces remain, notably, transporting materials into the headings. Also,
at some pits the partial retreat system is used where two advance faces
are worked but are separated by a panel of coal which is then retreated
using the existing gate roadways from the exhausted faces. This system
helps to reduce development costs, although it does not have all the
advantages of full retreat.
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doubled. Particularly noticeable is the rapid increase in the post-strike
period. This might be taken to reflect a drive to heavy duty mining.
However, the progress in the direction is more limited than the data
suggests. There is evidence that in the post-strike period there has
been a wider application of proven conventional technologies. An
example is the wide use of the Eickhoff shearer which is, it is argued,
particularly suitable to the prevailing thin seam conditions in the North
East because it is two thirds the size of a standard shearer. But these
machines were already used in many collieries prior to the strike and do
not meet a common definition of heavy duty equipment. It seems
unlikely, therefore, that they account for more than part of the
performance improvement since then.
Strictly defined there are no heavy duty faces in the North East. For
instance, the average cost of a face at Wearmouth in 1989/90 was £1.5m
compared to the cited cost of heavy duty face of between £6-lOm (see
Chapter Six). Items of heavy duty technology were introduced on only
a small number of faces, notably F seam at Westoe and at Ellington and
Easington. For instance, on F35r at Westoe, a heavy duty, all-electric
shearer is used. These faces, while not fully heavy duty (ie they don't
have heavy duty chocks), did see very high performance levels.
Westoe's F36 and F35r faces topped the area face league for September
1989. F35r achieved an average output of 2867t per week at an O.M.S.
of 68.4t. This is compared with national output and productivity
averages for the same period of 1666t per week and 43.33t respectively
(see Coal News November 1989). However, the gap between the best
performing faces and the rest remained considerable. Out of 19
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retreaters in the North East area only 5 performed better than the
national average (see Table 5.4). According to managers the thinness
of seam sections in North East pits remains an obstacle to the
application of HDME on a wide scale. Heavy duty technology was
designed for faces in excess of 5m in thickness and where sections are
narrower than that investment in HDME cannot be justified economically.
Significant moves were made in the post-strike period to restructure
capacity through the concentration of production, particularly in areas
of good geological conditions. In part this is reflected in the
abandonment of attempts to mine in very thin seams - after 1987/88
seams of less than 90cm were no longer worked. This seems to reflect
a 'more commercial' attitude to geological questions on the part of BC
managers than was previously the case. A long serving member of
management at one pit described how in the past winning coal in faulted
ground was seen as a test of a manager's engineering expertise and was
regarded as a challenge. Nowadays, he argued, commercial pressures
tend to preclude this. It seems also that at least some managers in the
past inculcated an ethos of the nationalised industry which placed an
obligation on them to extract coal wherever possible and to avoid
sterilisation of reserves. This attitude seems less common today. This
process of focusing production on the best reserves can be seen as
part of a wider process of concentrating production in time and space
in response to heightened commercial pressures to reduce unit costs.
The important point, though, is that one effect of concentrating
production in these areas is to allow face equipment to perform better.
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Indicators of shearer performance do not take into account the effect of
geology.
However, where existing, the combination of good geology, heavy duty
machines and retreat mining, together with careful planning of face
organisation represents a potent recipe for high performance. Where
introduced, heavy duty equipment has tended to be concentrated on
retreat faces which allow the extraction rates which repay the
associated high investment in quick time 9 . However, retreat mining has
limited application for geological reasons. For instance, the fivequarter
(F) seam, the main producing seam at Westoe, is overlain by heavily
water bearing strata while itself being sloped. In this district a system
of one advance face and one retreat face is operated off the lateral
roadways so that the water runs into the goaf rather than onto the
face.
Faster rates of face extraction necessitate faster development rates.
The technical backwardness of the North East in the early 1980s is
9An NUN official reflected on how these factors come together on
the high producing faces at Westoe, mentioned earlier and how they
contrasted with previous methods: 'In the past, you see, they used to
use longwall advance. They didn't use retreat faces a lot, so that on a
longwall advance you'd maybe have two machines and they would only be
single-end. only very occasionally double-end. So the mothergate machine
would come up and cut so far, but the tailgate machine would come down
and put what you call an end on for that machine to come up and take it
off. You might be waiting at the face ends because you had to build
butts and things like that, you might be waiting for the caunch. Or you
might be waiting of the advance heading. There were all sorts of things
involved... (Now) what happens is it's a retreating wall. You drive two
gates, drive them in a 100Cm, drive a face across that and just pull it
back out. With one double-ended, Eickhoff machine...'
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revealed by the fact that, as late as 1985/86, headings were advanced
at some pits through the shot and handful method. All headings in the
region are now mechanised. While this might be seen as a technical
breakthrough, in effect it is simply a catching up exercise. Headings
were advanced by roadheaders, with 'heavy duty' models such as HD
and LH 1300 and 1500s used in some pits by the late 1980s, notably
Westoe and Ellington. The improvement in rates of advance is shown in
Figure 5.5, which seems less dramatic than for other indicators and
which is discussed in more detail below.
In Chapter Four it was noted that the inspiration behind advanced
technology mining (ATM) was a concern to reduce machine downtimes.
Qualitative evidence suggests that a reduction in many categories of
face delay occurred after the strike, although comprehensive
quantification is unobtainable. More robust and reliable shearers mean
that machines on the face tend to run for a higher proportion of the
shift. This is particularly the case on retreat faces, where face
stoppages are less common. Moreover there is evidence that routine
condition monitoring may have had some success in reducing
in-production breakdowns 10 . Face delays are less common than
hitherto, but interview evidence suggests that the main delays do not
occur at the face but in the outbye coal clearance system, a point
developed further below.
°This development iB discussed in more detail below.
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The concentration of production in discrete zones and on fewer faces is
the most marked feature of the post-strike restructuring for better
productivity. At Westoe, for instance, there has been a long term
reduction in the number of faces from six to four. Of these four
faces, two faces produce the bulk of the output, the two other faces
making a somewhat more marginal contribution. The two high producing
faces are concentrated in one district - the fivequarter (or F) seam.
Whereas previously faces were distributed throughout the pit production
now occurs in more closely defined geographical areas. Currently,
major drivages are underway to develop an area known as the 'Sea
Winnings', lying below the old Whitburn Colliery take. This area holds
22mt of proven reserves in high seams. It is intended to operate this
district on the basis of retreat faces with pre-driven gates of 2, 000m.
A similar process of concentration occurred at Wearmouth where the
number of faces were reduced from seven faces to four. Subsequent
developments at Wearmouth were designed to concentrate production in
one district, the 1570 level (and to close another district, the 1850).
This remaining district will be on the same level as proven, but as yet
undeveloped reserves of lOOmt, in 92inch seams. Management stated
their intention to concentrate production in this area (see Figure 5.6)
on the basis of one or two faces (see Harrison, 1989).
The process of concentration has not been smooth and experience at
Westoe and Wearmouth suggests the fragility of the strategy. At
Westoe, the introduction of a prototype all-electric Eickhoff shearer on
to a well performing face in 1988 was designed to raise output but
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almost proved disastrous for the pit. Following its introduction the
machine suffered from severe mechanical problems. This soon
translated into production losses on F33s and the escalation of
production costs. A similar scenario was played out at Wearmouth with
the loss of J39s due to geological problems. In both cases management
responded to the crisis situation by making demands for coaling outside
of normal production hours. In the case of Westoe they were largely
successful in instituting coaling in the 'dead period' between the
afternoon and night shifts. At Wearmouth, attempts to produce coal on
a weekend resulted in a walk-out and the first sustained industrial in
the the North East action against this practice (discussed in more detail
below).
The main problem arising from this strategy is that the fewer the faces
the greater the consequences if output is lost. NUM representatives
have stressed the dangers of this strategy, but disquiet extends to
sections of management. As a senior management figure at a colliery
moving toward single face production put it:
This concentration in time and space may be good from a
business point of view and it may be a policy which should be
pursued. But I think we've over-pursued it. . . Operating only
one face places pressure on everybody: the management, the
maintenance people, the engineers, the people who have to
work it. It means that there is intense pressure on all
aspects of operating a single face. That sort of pressure over
long periods takes its toll.
Whereas in the past when pits were operated with more faces lost
output from one face could be made up from increased production from
elsewhere, the reduction in the number of faces makes this increasingly
difficult. One purpose of the face reductions though is to concentrate
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management's minds on the elimination of stoppages and delays. The
same manager noted:
The people at the top tend to look at the potential of the
expensive gear that we use. And what they say is you're not
using the equipment to its greatest potential. And the
pressure to improve performance on your best faces isn't
great enough, so we'll take away some of your insurance and
that will focus your mind on that which you've got left.
That's the approach.
Higher tonnages produced at the face put enormous pressure on the
coal clearance system: it is here that the cause of most stoppages
occur. In part problems of belt stoppages are overcome by the use of
bunkers which help to regulate the peak flows of coal off the face. At
Westoe this includes a bOOt semi-automated horizontal strata bunker in
addition to conventional staple bunkers. The bunker, a relatively
simple and cost effective system, provides a regulated output of
1, 200t/h onto the outgoing trunk conveyor irrespective of the tonnages
conveyed from the faces (see Mine & Quarry, May 1988).
At Westoe, moreover, attempts have been made to integrate the coal
clearance system to a hitherto unprecedented degree through the
installation of a rapid loading system at the pithead (Colliery Guardian,
March, 1988; Watson, 1990). The purpose of the system is to ensure a
constant flow of mineral out of the pit by facilitating the easier loading
of railway waggons for prompt despatch of trains to the Tyne coal
terminal at Jarrow, where the coal is loaded onto colliers. This
integration has caused problems of its own as one informant described:
We've upgraded all the conveyor belts in the colliery -
up graded to wider width belts. We've got the three thousand
tonne staple.. . [But]. . .once you've filled every thing up
underground there's nowhere else to go. It's a bit of a false
economy to store it, you've got to get rid of it at the end of
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the day. Yes we do have a problem. There is a problem at
the moment getting the coal away at the staithes, or, the
train can't take it to the staithes. Therefore, the coal can't
be loaded onto the train. This goes all the way down the
line. One derailment - if British Rail comes of the tracks - it
keeps the coal down. We end up having to store a full days
coal production underground. Once you've done that it takes
quite a long time to filter it away during the rest of the
week.
The limited and undramatic nature of technical change is further
illustrated by a discussion of the application of the
microelectronic-based technologies.
Automation, remote control and monitoring
In Chapter Four it was shown that automation and remote control were
an important part of the NCB's strategy in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Investment in new technology did not occur on a large scale in
the North East though. While in the central coalfields the expansion in
capacity was intended to embody the latest advances in the technology,
the implications of the process technical change for peripheral coalfields
like the North East at best were ambiguous. In the work of the
Bradford Group on automation and remote control (discussed in Chapter
Four) it was suggested that systems such as MINOS were likely to be
concentrated in the central coalfields. Moreover, the rise in
productivity inevitably arising from the introduction of such systems
would increase the productivity gap between the central coalfield and
the peripheral coalfield. Indeed the Bradford group suggest that it is
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the introduction of new technology leading to a rise in productivity
which underpinned the closure programme of the 1980s11.
Limited forms of automation and remote control were present in all pits
in the North East by 1989 and systems such as FIDO had been in
existence prior to the strike. Automation and control systems were
used in several ways. Firstly, through MINOS, automation of routine
tasks such as belt minding, transfer point attendance, pump and
ventilation minding had begun. District belt systems were operated
from a console located at a remote point. The main arterial belts
tended to be controlled from the surface. In some cases belts have
relatively few transfer points and are anything up to 1km in length. If
belts do stop for any reason this is monitored by MINOS which gives
information on location and duration of the stoppage. Also remote
monitoring of environmental conditions exists at some pits. At
Wearmouth, for instance, the highly advanced system which is used to
control the recirculation of air and thus to ensure adequate ventilation
in seams many kilometres from the shaft, is almost entirely automated
(Robinson and Harrison, 1987)12. It is clear that the most advanced
forms of automation such as auto-steering and in-built condition testing
of shearers had not been introduced, and because of their apparent
The case of the North East, however, would tend to emphasise also
the importance of market factors in determining the pace and character
of restructuring (see section two above and chapter four below).
2At present such systems are used in conjunction with the regular
inspections and manual tests carried out by deputies although British
Coal have intimated that such systems indicate that modern collieries
can operate with fewer numbers of safety officials (Northard, 1987).
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inappropriateness for North East conditions they are unlikely to be
introduced13 . Despite these developments, however, there is little
evidence that substantial inroads have been made in reducing the
proportion of EBG workers in line with BC's stated intentions. Figure
5.7 shows data from Dawdon colliery suggesting that while absolute
numbers fell proportions remained fairly similar.
In addition to automation ATM has been used in two other clearly
discernible reasons. Firstly it has been used to help in the analysis of
delays in the coal getting process. According to managers the principal
advantage of sensor-based monitoring systems such as MINOS and FIDO
derives from the information generated about production stoppages.
However, the most sophisticated real-time delay analysis systems such
as CIS-VAX are not used, but earlier systems such EASY are used in
at least some pits in the North East. The information produced via
MINOS and FIDO, is analysed only in unusual circumstances (such as in
the field trials of new equipment). Although managers gave examples
of how information generated by MINOS and FIDO had been used to
'design out delays', the limited nature of monitoring systems in North
' 3One exception to this generalisation was the introduction of
remotely controlled shearer operation on K41s at Ellington (Coal News,
September, 1988). More generally, a branch official, from a colliery
with thin and heavily faulted seams, pointed to a possible paradox in
relation to highly automated methods such as auto-steering arguing:
'Auto-steering only works where it isn't needed - where you've got big
level seams and where only an idiot couldn't cut a good horizon. It's no
good in the North East where you have bad geological conditions'. It is
possible that such technologies may be more appropriate if exploitation
of the Sea Winnings at Westoe or the thick coal at Wearmouth become a
reality, as these will utilise HDME. There is a more detailed
discussion of auto-steering in the next chapter.
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East pits should be stressed. Monitoring systems had rarely
progressed beyond a simple STOP/START recording facility. Delay
analysis relied heavily on manual inputting of data into computers from
control room and craftsmen's reports and was therefore used
sparingly14 . Also, some important activities were not subject to
monitoring, notably heading work. Here work rates tend to be
governed by old fashioned supervision from the overman (cf. Chapter
Six).
Whether such systems have made a significant contribution to raising
productivity is ambiguous. One branch official of NACODS speculated
that the inclusion of sensors on belt systems and so on, actually
contributed to delays by making them more sensitive to misalignments
and so on and causing them to stop in ways which would not have
happened in the past. Testing such a hypothesis is very difficult, but
it does receive some support from the comments of deputies at other
pits concerning environmental monitoring systems such as the AJ Jones
system, which is described as 'unreliable', often giving rise to warning
signals for no apparent reason.
4Management stressed that because - with EASY - data is manually
inputted, using the system is time consuming and labour intensive.
Therefore the system has tended to be used sparingly (eg during the
field trials of new equipment). Also, in some cases, data was considered
suspect because it came from a variety of sources including crafts-men's
reports, rather than being recorded directly using transducer
technology. There were no plans to introduce the more advanced real time
system CIS-VAX.
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The second way in which ATM systems are used is for very obvious
supervision reasons. Among faceworkers, development workers,
craft-workers and back-bye workers alike there is universal agreement
that systems such as FIDO and monitoring devices in general have
significantly assisted management attempts to raise pressure to overcome
production stoppages. The comments of a branch official at one case
study pit are revealing:
We've got examples at the pit. The other week. . . [ we ] . . .were
in the pit just clearing up under the belts, just messing
about really. We went along to a box end and we found the
box end covered in filings and coal. So we stopped the belts
and cleared it all out and made sure it was safe. Within two
minutes of it being stopped they [the surface control] were
on the phone asking what was the matter. When we told them
where we were, there was panic. They sent the overman out!
He said: 'Ah well, there's usually a man here and all the rest
of it, it's not usually like this'. But it had obviously been
like that for days. They didn't put any pressure on us two,
but if it had just been one of the normal lads, a buttin' lad,
sitting quiet doing his job, there'd have been hell on because
the belts were stopped. Because it was. . . [us].. .who'd
stopped it they didn't say owt, because it wasn't worth any
hassle to them. But that kind of thing happens all the time -
'What's the belt standing for? Get it away!'. That sort of
thing. The pressure's on them continually to get production
going...
It is in this rather crude way that microelectronic-based monitoring
systems were used in North East pits.
Conversations with miners and craftsmen reveal that there is a general
puzzlement at the limited extent to which ATM systems have been
introduced into North East deep-mines. Many miners (and indeed
deputies) report a period of enthusiasm for systems like FIDO a few
years ago but that this appeared quickly to wane. Others express
surprise that their worst fears of constant supervision and deskilling of
facework through microelectronics have not materialised. It is unclear
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why this might be so. One plausible explanation is that B C engineers
do not see these systems as justified or appropriate in the North East
case. This could be argued on engineering grounds or on the basis that
impressive productivity increases can be achieved without recourse to
this kind of investment.
Taking all this evidence together I would suggest that the main
significance of ATM has been through the automation of routine tasks,
allowing a limited integration of the production process via delay
analysis allowing a certain reduction in 'the porosity of the working
day'. However, it cannot be used to explain the raising of effort
levels, because FIDO, etc., existed prior to the strike in many pits.
While automation and, remote control and monitoring do provide
management with certain 'control' advantages there are strict limits on
the effectiveness of such systems. Moreover, there is little sense in
which management conceive such systems as 'modular' or part of an
integrated whole. One of the principal problems is the lack of
compatibility between different systems. Also control over automated
plant is not always centralised, but exercised from district consoles.
Monitoring is centrally concerned with machine downtime and smoothing
the production flow (although the latter is still subject to delays)
rather than control of the workforce, although the latter may be
facilitated by some technologies. The productivity improvement cannot
be attributed to any technical breakthrough in the North East.
Instead, limited, incremental improvements were identified.
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Automation and skills
The controversy concerning the impact of technical change on skills,
particularly that based on microelectronics - outlined in the previous
chapter - is partially illuminated by the experience of change in the
North East. As far as debates concerning the coal industry are
concerned the Bradford Group, it will be recalled, argued that systems
such as MINOS deskilled work while Penn argued that moves to modular
technologies merely change the nature of maintenance skills.
Taking production workers first, there is little direct evidence that the
work of facemen or development workers is being 'deskilled'. Few
production workers identify directly any change in the skill content of
the main tasks. Moreover, systems such as auto-steering, identified by
the Bradford Group as potentially deskilling, are largely absent from
North East mines. Some miners, however, do argue that more powerful
equipment makes the job of coal getting 'easier'. But they maintain
that other parts of the job remain unaffected by this and that the 'skill'
in the faceman's work is dealing with unforeseen situations and that
these have by no means been eliminated by monitoring techniques. The
point here is that 'there. is nothing to it' if everything goes according
to plan, but particularly on advancing faces in faulted ground with
poor roof conditions, it rarely does go to plan. Miners at Westoe who
have experienced work on the main producing retreater with its
all-electric shearer, suggest that careful selection of geological
conditions and high powered face equipment mean that performance
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levels are high and that often an operator is reduced to 'running after
the machine' 15
However, the Westoe fivequarter district is exceptional for the North
East, not the norm, and even here, geological conditions are not
completely stable. In general, therefore, it seems that faceworkers jobs
remain unaffected by the process of deskilling. The same could be said
for many backbye jobs. Many backbye jobs have always fallen into a
clear semi- or unskilled category and therefore testing for evidence of
deskilling is inappropriate. Skilled backbye jobs such as manset or
shunter driving had not been altered in any significant way over recent
years.
Arguably the greatest potential for deskilling lies in relation to
craft-work. Again, for many craftsmen the issue of skills was not
prominent. For them, as for miners, the key issues are the pay/effort
bargain and the organisation of production time. Also, although
craftsmen did harbour fears about the deskilling attributes of technical
change these have not materialised in the expected way 16 . On-line
condition and performance testing, for instance, was completely absent
in North East pits. Similarly, the original fears of union activists, that
5On a visit to the the main producing advance face in the
fivequarter district at Westoe, my overwhelming impression was of a
frenetic pace of work.
6Branch officials in general were aware of the work of the
Bradford Group on deskilling through discussions at NUN day schools.
Mechanics officials, in particular, stressed that the full scale assault
on craft skills which they had been led to expect had not materialised.
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routine condition monitoring might represent an attack on craft skills,
by concentrating knowledge of the maintenance process in the hands of
a few 'super-craftsmen' appeared not to have been borne out.
Craftsmen involved in RCM are seen as part of the horizontal rather
than vertical division of labour. Ironically perhaps, some of the tasks
associated with RCM are among the most routine. For instance, it is
the task of one worker at one colliery to repeat simple oil debris
analysis tests daily in a small windowless room - hardly the work of a
supercraftsman. In general craftsmen, especially fitters who are the
bulk of the craft workforce, found it hard to identify ways in which
the content of their work might have been altered.
To the extent that a deskilling issue exists, it clearly focuses on the
degradation of electrical skills. This is related principally to the
increased use of printed circuit boards in electrical equipment, which in
turn is seen as leading to the reduction of the electrical skill to 'unit
changes' (the loss of the diagnostic and analytical tasks), rendering the
electrician a 'panel-changer'. It would be wrong to overstate the
extent to which this process occurs in North East pits but a clear trend
has been established. A face electrician explained the apparent
advantages from management's point of view;
What you've got to. look at is the electrician on the face,
especially on coal work, he's just there to keep that face
going. He's there for breakdowns, nowt else. So the idea of
having a few cases to change is obviously a good thing, The
simpler, the better - to swap things over. They more or less
become a monkey17.
7This view is supported by every craftsman I spoke to even those
who were members of the UDM.
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In most North East pits there is still a equipment which is operated by
single wire systems and this requires 'old fashioned' fault finding
skills. However, the trend is clearly in the direction of unit changes
and the implications for skills seem clear cut. The same electrician
said:
Most electricians now. . . if it's a breakdown you know, it's a
case of changing this module and try it, then you change
that module, then you change this, then you change the
interior... If you've got to get the drawings out now, its
probably six months since you've last done one. So, you're
probably having to go back to square one. . .normally its a
last resort, that's what you've got to at the end. Usually you
just change things until it goes. The time's gone when you've
got to resort to the drawings, apart from small things. Those
times are very few and far between and normally you've got a
gaffer with you.. . you'll find most electricians just change a
module or a card18.
The discussion of electrical skills highlights a general point. Clearly
there is a deskilling process at work, although workers seem curiously
uninterested in it. However, the purpose of such changes is to .speed
up the process of fault finding as part of the general attempt to reduce
downtime rather than the outcome of a control imperative as such. A
certain dilution of craft skills can be discerned and it may be that this
will continue and intensify. Although one might expect to find more
widespread evidence of the impact of technical change on skills from
pits developed around the principles of ATM (see Chapter Six).
8A UDM craftsmen at the same pit made a similar point: 'If they've
got a fault on a panel, you get on the phone and say: Such and such has
gone down. And they'll say: Well take it out and put panel such and such
in and see what happens.. .It decreases the skills that's needed. All
you're doing is looking at the plan to see what card needs changing. You
take it out and the card is sent away to be repaired. I mean previously
what happened was you'd have to find the fault and repair it. So your
skill isn't needed anymore'.
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Technical change and productivity improvement
From the technical point of view therefore, the 1980s were characterised
by incremental improvements in technology, which seem to be part of a
longer term process of change designed to integrate the production
process and to achieve higher face tonnages, but HDME strictly
defined, and which is said by BC to underpin the technical
transformation of the industry was conspicuous by its absence. In fact
some technical change was simply a case of the mechanisation of
activities which had long been the norm in other coalfields. Technical
progress probably contributed to the increase in D.O.F., although this
improvement is partly the arithmetical effect of closures. The most
significant development is the concentration of production on fewer
faces, a strategy which appeared to bring in its wake a series of
related technical problems, notably in the area of coal clearance.
Moreover, the forms of control and monitoring systems in use were
limited in comparison to the trajectory of change outlined in the second
half of Chapter Four. The impact of new technology on skills also was
limited, although a clear tendency to the deskilling of electrical work
was in evidence. The post-strike productivity improvement in North
East, therefore cannot be ascribed to any major technological
breakthrough regardless of what is claimed for BC as a whole.
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5. RESTRUCTURING WORK PRACTICES
The post-strike offensive
The process of work intensification has been the central experience of
North East miners since the strike. It was this issue which was raised
time and again in discussions with miners, with the pace of work being
seen as increasing dramatically. In general, the direct content of work
has remained unaffected by recent developments but the range of tasks
assigned to individuals was increased.
In a few cases intensification can be seen as a function of technical
change. For instance, miners working on the main producing faces at
Westoe, such as F33r, report that high performance shearers traverse
the face so quickly that the associated tasks on the face - advancing
the chocks, timbering in the face ends, etc. - now have to be
completed much more quickly. The pace of work is variously described
as exhausting or frenetic.
More generally, intensification has been a simple consequence of labour
shedding. One manager claimed his pit was 'vastly overmanned' and
the changed balance of power in the post strike period allowed this
situation to be altered:
The first half or two thirds of the people we divested
ourselves of after the strike were doing jobs that didn't
really exist or were jobs that we could get somebody else to
do because of the change in attitude [on the part of the
unions and workforce] or we could simply design out. The
various planning moves - concentration of production in time
and space - have helped us. In my time we've lost over a
thousand men [since 1985]. . . There's been a certain amount of
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taking men away and officials and district management have
had to find ways of dealing with it. Its a fairly brutal
approach, but in an industry like this its one that works.
This is part of an apparent attempt to match the workforce exactly to
the number of jobs at the pit, with no extra men for contingencies
(traditionally seen as inevitable). Under this approach unforeseen
circumstances are managed through the use of overtime. Through this
strategy management in most pits have been able to maintain levels of
output with much reduced workforces (see Table 5.2 for a
representative example). This strategy has a number of implications
among which is the necessity to restructure working practices and
working time. A branch official gave one example of the consequences
of this strategy:
on the Dosco's that we've been talking about, [in the
major tunnel developments] the big Titan tunnellers, you'd
have three of four men working in that heading and their job
was to drive it. And they'd be supplied with girders and
timber, to timber it up and everything. There'd be another
set of men doing refuge work, following them in doing refuge
holes. Since the strike they have reduced the number of men
from four to three - three men working in the heading.
They're doing all the bricklaying, doing all the refuge holes
and walking out maybe 200, 300, 400m to collect supplies and
bringing them in.. . spending less time on the job they are
supposed to be doing because they're doing all the ancillary
tasks.
Such developments affect all workers in the pit. The processes affect
underground craftsmen. According to an electrician:
the pit is an expanding thing - we are now 11km out - so
there's more equipment, more stuff to cover, and a lot less
men to do it. Once upon a time we used to have a situation of
one man per heading, where a man would go into his heading
or coal work, maintain that heading, maintain that machine,
move everything in. Now that's not the situation regarding
fitters or electricians, where you might have two or three
headings to cover per shift besides any installation or salvage
work he has to do back-bye.
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Management are continually examining ways of merging jobs in all parts
of the pit, but especially backbye and on the surface. At Westoe
management proposed to abolish the separate job category of manset
guard and train a pooi of men from other job categories and, in
addition to their existing tasks, to assign these men to guard the
manset at the beginning and end of their shift. On the surface at
Wearmouth management had craftsmen trained to operate forklift vehicles
in order to reduce the number of specialist forklift drivers9.
Perhaps the most dramatic change in the organisation of work since the
strike has come at the surface where BC has adopted a strategy of
subcontracting an ever wider range of tasks. This policy has mainly
affected craft-workers and has led to the virtual elimination of some
trades from the pit workforce. At both Wearmouth and Westoe, for
instance, nearly all blacksmith work is now contracted out to local firms
for fabrication. On occasions this involves 'faxing' a drawing of a
piece of work to more than one firm in order to obtain a competitive
price for the work in question. At Westoe this had led to a reduction
in the number employed in the pit's blacksmith shop from over twenty
to six in 1990. Other trades such as bricklaying have also been badly
hit by this process. This represents a major change in the post strike
period, because unlike other coaLfields the North East never had a
9The Mechanics at Wearmouth opposed this proposal. However, at
Wearmouth there is a significant presence of metthera of the
strikebreaking UDM, who were concentrated among surface and craft grades
and who agreed to the proposal, and the colliery management were able to
press ahead.
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tradition of using contractors except for the most specialist tasks.
Indeed it was custom and practice before the strike for management at
some pits in Durham to send proposals to use contractors to the union
who would vet the job in question. Just prior to the strike the
Mechanics Unions at Westoe and Murton vetoed several such contracts
and organised their own members to do the work.
The restructuring of working practices in the post-strike period, by all
accounts, was dramatic. All groups of workers were affected and there
is little doubt that a general intensification of the work process
occurred. Moreover, through the institutionalisation of subcontracting
on a large scale, this is likely to have changed the character of pit
work forever in the North East.
Incentives
The restructuring of work practices has been accompanied by changes
to the operation of the incentive scheme. For Richardson and Wood
(1988) changes in incentives (notably the introduction of the Doncaster
Option) were the central factor in explaining the productivity rise.
Moreover, acceptance of such changes by the mining workforce was
seen as reflecting the abandonment of collective attitudes. Traditions
of solidaristic wage bargaining were a historical feature of the North
East (see section two). Significant alterations have been made to the
system of incentives prevailing before the strike, but this section
suggests that these have been aimed at weakening workplace trades
unionism and eroding union operated job controls, rather than reflecting
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a more 'individualistic' attitude on the part of the workforce, and
reflected management's ability to play on workers justified fears about
pit closures.
Conventionally under the incentive scheme, each development and face
in the pit is set a standard task based on rate of advance. If the men
achieve this task they receive a standard bonus. If they achieve more,
they earn an increasing bonus calculated on a sliding scale. Originally
the local workforce could elect to operate one of two systems. In the
first, each face team earned the same bonus, calculated by averaging
the bonuses earned by all of them. In the second, each face team
earned a bonus based on the performance of its own face. Typically,
in the North East pits operated the first system of pooled earnings, a
system in keeping with the traditional marra relation (see section two).
Craftsmen, backbye workers, development workers engaged in
hazardous work and men working at bank, earn a 'derived' bonus based
on a percntage of the average bonus achieved on all the faces (the
'colliery average') which is determined by the worker's grade and which
amounts to a percentage of the colliery average (either 100, 65 or 50
per cent). Generally the scheme allowed management to introduce and
consolidate wage differentials, based on variations ii production levels,
which in turn reflect geological factors and past investment decisions.
There were a number of key changes which have altered the operation
of the system in the North East after the strike. However, completely
new packages such as the Doncaster Option (see Chapter Four), where
the payment for advance principle is replaced by payment based on
tonnage and cost performance and payments for production delays
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except in the case of major shift breakdowns, had not been introduced.
The changes which have occurred since the strike have been made
possible by the fact that bonus payments have come to play an ever
increasing proportion of the weekly income of miners (see Chapter
Four). The achievement of good bonus becomes essential to the
maintenance of the miners' standard of living. Such a situation,
according to union officials, leads to a breakdown of the discipline
which traditionally surrounded local bargaining over effort and wages in
the North East. In general, in the pre-strike period the high level of
control over the organisation of work which was exercised by Lodges,
meant that some of the divisive aspects of the incentive scheme were
mitigated.
For instance, at Westoe prior to the strike, the NUM Lodge was heavily
involved in the selection of face teams. By drawing on the traditions
of cavilling the Lodge attempted to ensure that all face trained men
were given an opportunity to work on faces which had the potential for
good bonus earnings. The aim of this was to mitigate the divisive
effects of the existing bonus scheme. According to the Lodge
chairman:
It was one of the best systems you'd find. It wasn't the
strict cavilling system, but it was what we called the cavilling
system. More or less what happened was the team moved en
bloc from one face to the next. What we used to ensure that
those who had been spare on the exhausted face, on the new
face would get a place on the team and somebody would
become spare. We are trying to win back little bits of it. But
you know, we have not got the system that we had prior to
1985.
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While the cavilling system at Westoe was the basis for equitable
earnings, it was seen more generally as contributing to the solidaristic
work tradition for which Westoe was noted20.
Management at Westoe opposed this practice which, according to a
senior member of management, militated against good discipline because
'square pegs were fitted into round holes'. In the immediate
post-strike period, management, taking advantage of the changed
balance of power at the pit, stated their intention to abandon the old
system of team selection and to pick the teams themselves. The Lodge,
therefore, lost its ability to undermine the effects of the bonus system
through its control of job allocations21.
A similar process occurred at Dawdon where the colliery manager
explained poor performance in the C seam:
• . . the major problem at Dawdon was the face teams pooled
their incentive bonus payments so that there was no direct
relationship between effort and rewards. The union (NUM)
20Westoe was regarded as a traditionally militant pit, conforming
to the stereotype of Tyneside pits (cf. Douglass, 1977). Westoe's
militancy was exemplified by the series of well publicised short strikes
in the period prior to the miners' strike and by the high level of
support for industrial action - in relation to the new disciplinary code
and in support of sacked miners - after the strike (see Renouf, 1990,
for a fuller account of these episodes).
21The elimination of cavilling in this case had wider ramifications
as the Lodge official made clear: 'Well it frightened the men when he
started to pick his own teams. Lads were frightened to atop off. We had
a situation where management wanted mid-week shearing because one face
had went down and they were doing very badly towards the end of last
year [1988]. We actually had men who've never worked overtime, but
worked that mid-week overtime because they were frightened they wouldn't
get picked for the next team'. I return to other implications of this
conflict later in the chapter.
259
was approached with a view to the faces being paid separately
but they opposed this on the grounds that management were
trying to destroy any power or control the unions had, and
in their opinion, set worker against worker (Parkins, 1989:
535).
Parkin and his management staff visited the faces to advocate an
individual face bonus and stressed its importance to the future viability
of the pit. He reports that: 'Pressure from the faceworkers eventually
forced the union to hold meetings where the men finally voted to be
paid on an individual basis' (ibid 535-6). In the week following the
acceptance of the new system Parkin reports that output rose by 5000t.
Later though geological problems stopped the face in question,
indicating the extent to which the determinants of output lie largely
outside the hands of face teams22.
In neither the Westoe nor the Dawdon case, however, did management
produce any real evidence of how union involvement in the selection of
face teams or pooled bonuses actually impacted on productivity or how
their alteration of these practices, other than eroding the influence of
workplace trade unionism would improve productivity. In discussions
with managers, however, talk of 'restrictive practices' was common and
changes such as those just mentioned were offered as examples of how
managerial prerogative, deemed essential for economic survival, had
22 1n general, changes in the bonus system were accompanied by a
tightening of task standards. Whereas prior to the strike it was
possible to dispute task standards and this was done frequently at
Westoe, standards began to be determined 'synthetically' on the basis of
the known performance of machines derived from field trials and so on.
These changes both reflect and contribute to the changing balance of
power at the pit.
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been regained. The extent, however, to which the more stringent
operation of the bonus system has had an impact on productivity
remains unclear. Lodge officials and union activists suggest that face
teams are now highly motivated by the prospect of good bonuses, but
also how the divisiveness of the changes to the bonus system created
new problems of demoralisation away from the face.
The main feature of operation of the bonus system after the strike has
been the extent to which it has led to division between different
elements of the mining workforce. At some pits face teams have been
given payments over and above agreed bonus, in the words of one
informant, 'for showing willing'. In the view of many union officials
rates of advance (on which bonus payments are based) are only
marginally determined by effort rates and depend ultimately on
geological and technological factors over which face teams have only
limited control (cf. the Dawdon case above). Moreover, workers
elsewhere below ground remain on derived bonus. In effect the
combination of these factors creates the possibility for unfairness and
division which the old systems based on cavilling and marra principles
attempted to ameliorate. A one Lodge official put it:
I'll be quite honest about it here, some of the faces, there's
not a powerloader on them on less than £15 per shift
[bonus]. What happens is that on the sheet it'll show he's
getting £6 or £7 but then they get a backhanded payment as
well - on the note, mind. The undermanager will say: why
you tried you haven't got your standard, so we'll give you a
few extra bob. The problem of course is that that money
doesn't go into the divisor. . . Now when they pay backhanded
payments the powerloader is being looked after - he's the
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core worker - but the backbye lads are getting robbed every
week23.
A senior management figure at one pit acknowledged that the low level
of bonus for backbye workers means there is demoralisation among these
workers and speculated that the problems of advance faces could be
ascribed to the lack of motivation on the part those responsible for
supplying materials to the headings. In his view productivity on such
faces would be much improved by developing a system of 'individual
merit payments' for these men24.
The level of discontent over the operation of the incentive scheme
remained high among workers but its fragmented nature and the lack of
national leadership on the wages question, made it hard for Lodges to
translate this into industrial action. Many union activists saw what little
remaining influence they have in area of local bargaining slipping away.
Management at Wearmouth proposed to the mechanics union a list of ten
23The comments of a Lodge official at another pit offer
corroboration of this general point: '...taking my own pit as an
example. Face workers can make good bonuses. Those on drivages can't
make fantastic bonuses. Then, of course, you've got those who are on
derived bonuses, those who get the 100 per cent, the 65 per cent and the
50 per cent, datal lads - people like that. And so, therefore, if you
see for example, face teams or developments teams getting £26 per shift
and the colliery average is £12 and you are only getting 65 per cent of
that £12, it leaves a lot of discontent. It obviously leaves a lot of
divisions because, of course, those who are on datal work and transport
work can't get face trained; men who started at the pit at 16 who are
now 25 and it doesn't look like there is any prospect of them getting
trained'.
2 The intra-pit divisiveness of the bonus system is not addressed
by Richardson and Wood (1988) who concentrate on the implications of the
scheme for faceworkers. Most workers are not faceworkers though. Rates
of pay among backbye and surface groups remain low even with bonus.
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tasks to be undertaken by craftsmen for which they would be paid on a
one-off basis. The tasks included cleaning box-ends, laying way and
laying pipes, tasks normally outwith the responsibilities of craftsmen.
For want of an alternative and in order to retain some union sanction
the Mechanics Lodge negotiated a deal. In such circumstances,
however, it becomes virtually impossible for the union to even be aware
of what their membership are being paid and thus it becomes impossible
to regulate work practices in the cavilling and marra tradition.
Reorganisatlon of working time
The reorganisation of working time has perhaps been the most
contentious of the post-strike issues both nationally and in the North
East. The issue of production time is closely bound up with other
technical and social changes which have occurred in the post strike
period. Nationally, BC has made clear its desire for extended
production time, justified by the need to achieve higher utilisation rates
for expensive equipment. In the North East the argument was
advanced by BC in relation to the peculiarities of undersea mining (see
section two). The fact that extraction takes place at ever further
distances from the shaft means that an ever decreasing part of the
average shift is devoted to directly productive activity and a greater
proportion to travelling. In practice in North East deep-mines the
question of production time manifests itself in two main ways, firstly
through attempts to make a greater part of the existing working day
directly productive and, secondly, through attempts to extend the
working day.
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BC's efforts to increase the directly productive part of the working day
focus on attempts to improve two principle indicators: the shift index
and machine available time (MAT). Such a strategy involves both
technical and social factors. MAT refers to that theoretical part of the
shift or working day during which face equipment should by available
for operation. In North East mines MAT is limited principally by the
combined effects of long travelling times between shaft bottom and face
(up to 11km) and mining legislation which limits the length of the
official working day to seven and half hours plus one winding time. In
practice, therefore, attempts to increase MAT have focused on attempts
to transport men to their place of work more quickly. For instance,
miners report that discipline at the shaft bottom manset stations is much
tighter now than it was previously:
Once you've ridden and you're at the shaft bottom there's no
hanging about like there used to be.. .you're on the manset
straightaway and the emphasis is definitely on getting you
inbye as fast as possible and getting you on the face.
In addition the practice of shift changeovers occurring at the shaft
bottom was eliminated. Instead shift changeovers at the face eventually
were instituted in all North East pits25 . A range of other practices
born of long tradition, but indicating a high degree of workplace
25Although travelling discipline may have been increased, BC'S OWfl
figures suggest that MAT increased by about 10 minutes 1985/86 to
1987/88 (see Figure 5.8) although this i a more impressive achievement
than it at first appears if it is borne in mind that faces are
increasingly distant from the shaft. However, it is in the period since
these figures were produced that the reforms of working practices
described above have occurred, although BC have produced no exact
quantification of their effects, but there is no reason to contradict
national evidence that progress in improving global MAT figures has been
slow (see Chapter Four).
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control have also been eliminated. At Wearmouth historically machines
were stopped during the faceworkers' bait time; a practice since
abolished. Also at Wearmouth working to stint in development headings
has been eliminated26.
The effects of the bonus system and centralised monitoring, as well as
increased management confidence may also help to increase MAT. At
one pit:
Prior to the strike, it was custom and practice to have a bit
of bait or a cup of tea at the start of the shift. That doesn't
happen now. You get to the face and lads start working
straightaway. You'll get lads working through their bait. With
the bonus the way it is, if you're not working you're not
earning. And with FIDO you've got the control room asking
straightaway - why is the shearer not moving? Or you've got
a deputy breathing down your neck.
Lodge officials invest a great deal of hope in the potentialities of new
manriding systems in warding off the possibility of longer shifts. At
Westoe colliery a method study report showed the time gains achieved
26A miner who transferred into Wearmouth from a pit which had
closed explained this system with more than a hint of bemusement:
'... they had particular system where if you were a caunchman you had one
part of the cycle to do. If you had to like fill the stone away and put
the girder up that was your job. When that was done you were finished.
You used to have the spectacle of men doing their bit because they only
had a thin caunch that day, getting the stone away and they'd sit down'.
The mechanisatiori of heading work provided the opportunity to eliminate
this practice. According to the same man: 'They also had another system
through there, where if you're on the face you've got say like fifty
chocks and they're your fifty chocks. You dinna gan all the way down the
face pulling them in and ramming them. You just do your fifty and
somebody does another fifty and somebody else does another fifty. That
harks back to the day when men used to get cavilled and they used to be
drawn out for different parts of the face. If you got a bad cavil you
couldn't make your money: Oh champion I'm in the maingate end or I've
number 5 section, you nar. That's not bad I can get my coal there. Mind,
if he drew a bloody bad cavil he couldn't make his money, like'.
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by the introduction of new heavy duty battery locos using upgraded
tracks and related systems which are being introduced into the colliery
and which will add an estimated 40 minutes of MAT 27 . Indeed managers
have suggested similar possibilities (Harrison, 1989). However, the
development of manriding (and material haulage) systems suitable for
the undersea conditions of the North East has not been at the centre of
BC's strategy of technical change.
The second attempt to increase production time within the broad
confines of the existing working day concerns attempts to improve the
shift index. The shift index is the measure of the proportion of all
shifts which are machine shifts (ie, not ancillary shifts). Available
figures show that in the immediate post-strike period the shift index
stood at less than two but that by the first quarter of 1988/89 it had
risen to 2.24. (Comparisons with the pre-strike period are
problematic). A concerted effort was made on the part of managers to
reduce the number of ancillary shifts and it is likely that the figure of
2.24 has slowly been improved. For instance, before the strike
Wearmouth operated seven faces with twelve coaling shifts. This was
progressively altered until four faces were operated on eleven coaling
shifts (increasing the shift index from 1.7 to 2.75). This strategy is an
essential part of the 'concentration of production in time and space'
(Harrison, 1989) and is likely to account for a large part of the
observed improvement in D .0. F..
27 'Investigation of Manriding System with the Introduction of BoBo
locomotives', August 1989, by Colliery Method Study.
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How do collieries manage to operate with fewer preparation shifts? The
common explanation given by managers is 'improved maintenance
procedures'. In particular, the roles of routine condition monitoring
and other forms preventative maintenance were stressed. The argument
is that such techniques allow the careful planning of pre-emptive
maintenance procedures outside of production time rather than the
adoption of a crisis-response situation. Some support for this view is
suggested by Figure 5.9 which shows the reduction in non-planned
shearer section breakdowns in the North East collieries following the
introduction of routine condition monitoring as part of an Area initiative
in 1987/8828.
BC attempted to increase production time through formal and informal
attempts to lengthen the working day. In the immediate aftermath of
the strike senior BC figures on a number of occasions publicly stated
their wish to see the introduction of 9 hour shifts in North East
deep-mines. BC argued that such a shift arrangement would give rise
to an extra 30 per cent of MAT (eg House of Commons, 1986; The
Journal, 27.5.86: Financial Times; 30.11.88). Such shifts would be
28Parkin argues that at Dawdon there was a 'disastrous situation
regarding breakdowns. In.order to combat the situation all breakdowns
were logged (manually at first, now by computer) under the various
categories, ie face machines, AFC, outbye, etc. A pattern of breakdowns
soon showed the failure of the Eickhoff shearer components as being the
most serious. This was further compounded by the fact that a breakdown
in the middle of a thin seam face can take up to a week to repair. In
December RCM was set up, starting with oil debris sampling on CO3
face's Eickhoff shearer. This has been developed over the last two years
to cover all production units, coal clearance systems and supply
haulages. Since April, 1987 no oil related production failures have
occurred' (Parkins, 1989: 536; see figure 5.10).
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intended to operate over a four day cycle ensuring coal production over
six days. The introduction of such a shift system would require the
repeal of existing mining legislation (which limits the extent of the
working day to seven and a quarter hours plus one winding time) and
the abolition of the Five Day Week Agreement negotiated between the
NCB and NUM in 1947 (which prevents coal production on Saturday and
Sunday). However, in neither case have formal attempts been made to
replace these existing arrangements with new agreements.
Instead in the North East BC has concentrated on highly localised
attempts to undermine existing agreements and practices in an effort to
extend direct production time through 'voluntary overtime'. In practice
two issues can be identified. The first concerns 'mid-week coaling
between shifts' and the second 'weekend coaling'. Officially the
regional and national NUM remains opposed to both practices. Their
opposition is based on two factors. Firstly, they are seen as leading to
the introduction of 9 hour shifts by stealth and these are opposed on
grounds of health and safety. Secondly, extended coal production is
seen as fatal in a situation of contracting markets. The practice of
extended coal production was already widespread in other coalfields
(notably in the central area) but took much longer to be established in
the North East.
However, mid-week shearing between shifts has become an established
norm during the course of 1989 in all North East pits. From BC's point
of view the breakthrough seems to have been achieved at Easington
colliery where the practice was established earliest. This is indicated
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in Figure 5.11 which compares the percentage of shifts worked which
are overtime shifts for the period 1985/6 and June 1989, showing the
very high rates of overtime being worked at Easington. Once one pit
was engaging in this practice it proved very difficult for the NUM to
prevent its further adoption, especially when fears of closure were rife.
A major breakthrough for BC came when mid-week shearing was
established at Westoe colliery during the production crisis associated
with the introduction of the heavy duty shearers mentioned earlier.
This represented a coup for BC because of the militant reputation of
the miner's Lodge at Westoe. The establishment of mid-week shearing
between shifts and the associated growth in overtime working,
therefore, accounts for a significant increase in D.O.F. and hence
productivity.
Weekend coal production remained less significant in the North East
coalfield, but became an important issue in events at Wearmouth
colliery. BC management raised the issue of flexible working at
Wearmouth on a number of occasions following the end of the 1984/5
strike. Attempts were made to institute 24 hour coaling in late 1987
when G92s face hit geological problems (see Sunderland Echo, 26.8.87).
This led to a vigorous response on the part of the local NUM Lodge
which forced BC to withdraw the demand. In 1988 further attempts
were made to initiate coaling outside of normal production time in this
case during the holiday period. Again geological conditions - on H201s -
were cited as the reason. The Lodge responded with a threat to
withdraw safety cover at the pit (The Journal, 22.7.88, Sunderland
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Echo, 25.8.88). During 1988 management raised the subject of longer
shifts at the pit 'deputation' meetings. Later the issue surfaced in
most dramatic form when 300 miners at the colliery walked out after six
men were sent home by management for refusing to carry out coaling on
J39s during a weekend shift (see Sunday Sun, 13.8.89.). The response
of the colliery manager, using a tactic developed during the miners'
strike, was to send leaflets to the homes of each employee outlining his
plans for weekend coal production and the danger to the pit's future if
this was not instituted (The Journal, 18.8.89). The union responded to
this by introducing an overtime ban (Sunderland Echo 25.8.89). (For
one interpretation of these events see The UDM Miner, September
1989). The overtime ban was eventually lifted to allow negotiations to
take place with management. A compromise agreed at the area level
between Area officials and management allowed limited coaling between
shifts during the week to make up abnormal production losses.
Although deeply unhappy about this settlement Wearmouth Lodge
officials, in the absence of leadership at the regional level to spread
their action, felt compelled to accept it. In the aftermath of these
events it is clear that coaling in overtime became established at
Wearmouth29.
29 1n the process a further set of union operated job controls died.
At Wearmouth the union had controlled the distribution of overtime
through the operation of 'the six hour rule', which specified that no
man could work more than six hours overtime per week. The aim of the
rule was to ensure that all workers had the opportunity to make extra
earnings. It reflected an antipathy toward 'overtime bandits', held
especially by faceworkers, and often directed at craftsmen, some of whom
were held to 'practically live at the pit'. (Indeed one tJDM craftsman
told of how he regularly worked a six or seven day week, arguing that
(Footnote Continued)
270
Although a plateau was reached in North East mines with the universal
institution of coaling in overtime, the pace of introduction of these new
working arrangements was highly uneven. This unevenness reflects
local political factors. At Easington, where BC's breakthrough first
came, it seems a tradition of accommodative industrial relations proved
fertile ground for the testing of the new working arrangements. Once
the wall of opposition to new working practices had been breached at
one pit, it proved very difficult for Lodges at other pits to resist
management.
At Westoe it appears that management waited until a crisis emerged in
the Lodge leadership following the resignation of a branch official
before making a concerted push to introduce mid-week shearing between
shifts. The breakthrough at Westoe was a major coup for BC because
of the Lodge's reputation for militancy. It is perhaps surprising,
therefore, that the most protracted and bitter rearguard action against
the new working arrangements was fought at Wearmouth, with a
reputedly moderate Lodge and the only pit in the region with a sizeable
UDM presence. This can be explained by the emergence of a
campaigning Lodge leadership at the colliery in the post-strike period.
Whereas the Westoe Lodge leadership was characterised by instability
and several changes of personnel, Wearmouth had a relatively stable
and continuous branch leadership which adopted a vigorous opposition
to new working practices and conditions. Through a regular branch
(Footnote Continued)
for him overtime was 'a way of life'). The activities of the UDM had
already begun to erode both the purpose and effect of the rule.
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newsletter the Lodge committee attempted to counter management BC
arguments over flexible working and other issues, with at least some
apparent success.
6. CONCLUSION
The increase in productivity in the North East coalfield after the 1984/5
miners' strike reflected an increase in average D.O.F. achieved with a
steadily declining workforce. This improvement was achieved with only
a marginal utilisation of the heavy duty face equipment which has been
at the heart of BC's technical strategy, and which has been widely
used elsewhere. Indeed in some cases technical change in the North
East amounted only to the mechanisation of tasks which were the norm
in other areas. Other factors did play a part in this process, notably
in the form of longer faces and the move to retreat mining and re-use
of pre-driven gateways, though this process amounts to restructuring
of capacity rather than the introduction of new technology. Moreover,
this was facilitated by the increased concentration of production in
areas of good geology and the abandonment of areas thought likely to
be associated with unacceptably low extraction rates and high
production costs (regardless of ecological costs), which had the effect
of overstating the contribution of technical change in the productivity
improvement. Higher outputs were used to justify the concentration of
production on fewer faces, although the reduction in faces was also
used to stimulate the search for higher face outputs. The problematic
nature of this strategy was reflected in the production crises at
Wearmouth and Westoe. Lodge officials expressed their doubts about
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the viability of this approach as a long term strategy. Higher D.O.F.
brought in its wake a series of technical problems associated with coal
clearance. Whatever incremental changes may have occurred it seems
clear that improved productivity has not been a result of a technical
breakthrough30.
Information technology had limited application in the North East
coalfield, mainly confined to the automation of some routine tasks and
its monitoring capacity largely limited to the STOP/START functions,
although this allowed limited forms of delay analysis. Surveillance
systems such as FIDO cannot be used to explain any process of
intensification at the face. Miners invariably identify the post strike
period as the one in which effort rates increased, yet most surveillance
systems pre-dated the strike. As far as the impact of technical change
on craft skills is concerned, the evidence derived from this case study
would lend more support to the prognostications of the Bradford Group
30This is not deny that some important technical change did occur,
though this has tended to be concentrated in one or two pits (notably
Ellington and Westoe). At Ellington and Westoe, for instance, the
introduction of all-electric Eickhoffs is significant. In Ellington's
case the machine reportedly ran for 98 per cent MAT following
commissioning, producing one third of the pit's output (Colliery
Guardian, February, 1990:34). Westoe saw the introduction of one of the
largest single runs of 11kv cable in a UK mine. This project was part of
an electrical refurbishxnent of the mine and the replacement of 3.3kv and
6.6kv systems (Power Engineering Journal, January 1989). Also, the
introduction at Westoe of the rapid loading system (at a cost of £4.2m)
and a tube conveying system for transport of waste to Harton Staithes
(replacing the antiquated and unique internal electric railway) were
important. Both of these investments were welcomed by the NUM as an act
of faith in the pit (eg The Journal, 24.2.88) although in each case
substantial job losses accompanied the investments, see tables 5.5 and
5.6.
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(1985) rather those of Penn (1990). A clear tendency toward deskilling
is at work and is understood as such by miners of varied political
outlook. However, the introduction of module maintenance seems less a
product of a simple desire to 'control' the craft labour process than to
speed up repair processes.
The origins of the productivity improvement in the North East,
therefore, can be said to lie in the process of labour shakeout and the
reorganisation of work practices leading to work intensification. This
process was the outcome of the defeat of the miners' strike and,
significantly, of the divisive effects of the operation of incentive
schemes. (Although the evidence that the operation of the incentive
scheme itself has contributed to improved productivity remains
ambiguous). BC's real breakthrough has been its success in forcing
through new working practices and arrangements. What is remarkable,
however, is that given the balance of forces prevailing in the
post-strike period the North East Area NUM has been able to put up
some resistance.
Throughout the post-strike period Lodges were involved in a continual
rearguard action against closure. Conscious of the real threat of
closure hanging over many, if not all, North East pits, local unions,
often with tacit sanction of the regional level, allowed changes to
working practices to be made in an effort to secure 'viability'.
Throughout this period, there was a growing acceptance of arguments
about the necessity of profitable production in order to secure the
survival of pits, while Lodges, often unsuccessfully, sought to maintain
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a residual influence in the affairs of the pit. This represented a
cultural revolution from the nationalisation period and corresponds
closely to the definition of 'market corporatism' suggested by Gibbon
and Bromley (1990; see Chapter Four). The cavilling traditions of job
control based on principles of equity and fairness were one important
casualty in this process. In all cases, though, these changes occurred
without any alteration to formal bargaining structures31.
It is striking that management often made breakthroughs on working
practices in times of production crises caused by geological or technical
difficulties. At these times management approached unions to agree
alterations to working practices in order to overcome particular
problems. However, Lodges found it difficult to stop such temporary
concessions becoming the norm long after each crisis had passed. The
process of change at Westoe followed this trajectory. On occasions
when management could not secure union acceptance for altered work
practices they frequently resorted to direct communication with the
workforce (as happened at Wearmouth), a tactic first employed during
the miners' strike and later consolidated into the everyday repertoire of
management practice.
3 'Market corporatism' had become the order of the day at more
militant Lodges such as Murton where the socialist leadership were
engaged in an 'organised retreat'. Even at Wearrnouth, where a well
publicised battle against coaling in overtime occurred, important
reforms in shifts had already occurred in relation to the major drivages
to the high coal (see section 3). Travelling time from the shaft bottom
to the drivage headings took up to one hour. Conscious of the importance
of the development to the long term survival of the pit the Lodge agreed
to heading teams handing over at the work place rather than at the shaft
bottom.
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British Coal's productivity miracle in the North East, in relative terms
has been based on low levels of investment and highly intensive
exploitation of labour. Paradoxically, this strategy brought the North
East coalfield into profit for the first time since nationalisation. The
North East coalfield produced lower cost coal than the North Yorkshire
area (including the Selby complex) in 1989, although the latter had a
higher level of productivity. (North Yorkshire's costs of production
were £1.54 and overall OMS was 5.26t; the comparative figures in the
North East were £1.43 and 3.91t.) This reflects the high level of
capital charges resulting from the capital intensive mining operation
pursued in North Yorkshire. Perhaps the greatest irony of this
situation is highlighted even further in Table 5.7 which shows that in
the North East the collieries with the lowest capital charges (ie most
under-invested) produced the lowest cost deep-mined coal in the
country. Despite this performance, however, the dependence of the
North East coalfield on the CEGB's Thameside power stations for its
principal markets, and the decision of the privatised electricity
generators to gradually reduce purchases of British Coal output to
65mtpa, continued to pose a real threat to the coalfield producing the
country's cheapest deep -mined coal.
Events since the completion of the fieldwork on which this chapter is
based have a bearing on the arguments outlined above, and in
particular, illuminate the fragility of the productivity improvement since
the strike. In the summer of 1991 Dawdon colliery - in 1988/9 the
cheapest producer of coal in the region and hitherto held as an example
of successful restructuring (Parkins, 1989) - was closed, allegedly on
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grounds of exhaustion, with the loss of its 600 remaining jobs. More
significantly BC announced that it planned to close Murton colliery with
the loss of 1,000 jobs. Murton ran into difficulties after hitting severe
geological problems in its main producing face which led to accumulated
losses of £3.6m after April (The Journal, 14.8.91). The closure was
announced by Brian Wright, the new area director of BC who had
recently left the same job in South Wales where employment in the
industry had been reduced from 26,000 to 4,000 in the post-strike
period. At Murton the unions accused BC of 'mismanagement' arguing
that the face in question was poorly designed, at too great a length, in
order to maximise output. The unions had raised their misgivings
about the planned face before it began production, but management
pressed on. The unions were committed to opposing the closure on the
grounds that the geological difficulties could be overcome, and the
losses turned back into profit and at the time of writing were preparing
an alternative mining strategy for the colliery to present to BC North
East Group. From the unions' viewpoint the current crisis at Murton
stands as testimony to the flawed nature of the mining strategy pursued
by BC since the end of the strike.
The broader significance of these developments in relation to the main
themes of this thesis are, discussed in Chapter Seven. Chapter Seven
also compares and contrasts events in the North East with those in the
modern Selby complex of mines. Events at Selby are the subject of the
following chapter.
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TABLE 5.1
}m sr
Costs of Prodixticgi
 (f/gj) 1985/6 - 1988/9
Operatir Cost
1985/6	 1.95
1986/7	 1.58
1987/8	 1.48
198 8/9	 1.42
1989/90*	 1.53
* tharige of definition to cash cost per gj.
Source: British Coal data, privately supplied.
Bottom Line Cost
1.55
1.49
1.53
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TABLE 5.2
Main Producticzi Irdictors 1982/3 - 1988/9
1982/3	 1988/9
OperatlxT Collieries	 18	 7
Saleable output (000t)
0.M.S (t)
Production
Overall
Faces
D.O.F (t)
Men on books
12,511
8.77
2.09
61
747
21,600
10,348
18.69
3.91
32
1,290
11,100
Source: NCB/British Coal, Report aixi Accounts 1983/4 - 1989/90.
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Face Results, S,tther 1989
DTLTFRY	 FACE
F36
E78
J21
H49
C11A
J39
C50
1124
K261A
11201
F35
K17
G822
G12
E14
E102
CO5
376B
27
G36
i2 6
K16
Cli
27
F02
H612
33
C09
33
2178
2057
1955
1510
1348
1241
906
802
777
661
630
2867
2674
1988
1735
1674
1666
1650
1625
1383
1134
926
875
805
677
599
550
503
432
416
372
TABLE 5.4
TONNES/DAY
(ANO)
Westoe
Murton
Easirrjton
Wearnuth
(NTIlAL AV11)
Vane Tempest
Wearnuth
Dasdon
Westoe
Ellington
Weannouth
11)
West.oe
Eflirigton
Wearmouth
Easington
Easirton
(NATIThL AVE1)
Murton
E:1on
Easirton
Vane TelT!pest
tt1on
Vane Teirest
Eflirton
Dasdon
Dadon
Easington
Westoe
Murton
Da1on
Vane Teiiest
OMS(t)
40.46
40.43
33.09
23.70
25.35
28.55
13.51
29.48
15.33
8.69
10.27
68.40
40.12
33.14
33.81
43.33
39.06
49.24
25.80
36.15
15.03
28.25
14.18
31.11
33.77
19.31
20.40
11.75
17.23
13.13
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TABLE 5.5
IOE WILmY
!4anpcAr Reqjiirnts of Rapid liadin Systn
Function
Wagon Harxiling
Staithes
Drivers ar Guards
Traffic Control
Crossir Keeper
Foreman
Plate layers
Wagon Repairs
Craftsmen
Total
Previous
ManpcMer
121
Present
ManpcMer
76
Saving
45
	
24	 18	 -6
	
18	 9	 -9
	
27	 14	 -13
	
8	 5	 -3
	
1	 1	 0
	
4	 4	 0
	
13	 7	 -6
	
4	 3	 -1
	
22	 15	 -7
Source: Watson (1990)
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TABLE 5.6
WE1OE ar1IER
Manxxr Requirnts of Tube Qiweyor Systn
Function
Wagon Harilling
Drivers aIxi Guards
Traffic Control
Wagon Pepairs
caftsen
Foreman
Labourers
Staithes
Cross Keeper
Total
Previous
Manpower
76
Present
Manpower
16
Saving
60
	
18	 0	 -18
	
14	 0	 -14
	
5	 0	 -5
	
3	 0	 -3
	
15	 6	 -9
	
4	 1	 -3
	
7	 3	 -4
	
9	 6	 -3
	
1	 0	 -1
Source: Watson (1990)
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TABLE 5.7
H }ST AR
AverJe Q3pital cthaxges & Bottan Lire Costs of Prodixticzi
Average Capital thare for 	 Bottom line
27 nnths to June 1989 (£/gj) 	 costs (£/gj)
1989
t1on	 0.06	 1.33
Easington	 0.07	 1.51
Ellington	 0.08	 1.37
Murton	 0.04	 1.53
Vane Tempest	 0.04	 1.48
WearirKDuth	 0.11	 1.82
Westoe	 0.10	 1.51
Group	 0.07	 1.51
Source: Calculated from British Coal data, privately supplied.
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CHAPTER SIX
SELBY: A POST FORDIST COALMINE?
1 INTRODUCTION
The development of British Coal's Selby complex provides a compelling
contrast with the pattern of restructuring in the North East coalfield.
While restructuring in the North East was based on limited forms of
technical change, Selby's exploitation was proposed under the Plan for
Coal (PFC) and has been a symbol since the end of the 1970s of the
coal industry's shift from being a labour intensive industry to a capital
intensive one. From the outset engineers held that the use of
microelectronic technologies would be central to Selby's production
system. It remains, to date, BC's most modern capacity and is
described as the most modern deep mine in Europe. While the process
of technical change which was undertaken from the end of the 1970s
was designed to have wide applicability, the technical trajectory was to
have fullest expression at Selby. The first aim of this chapter,
therefore, is to outline the nature of the production system around
which Selby was developed. I argue that 'the Selby concept' was a
conscious emulation of the 'continuous flow' production model to which
the industry had been aspiring over several decades.
'The Selby concept' was for a new level of capital intensity and
production integration, making maximum use of advanced, automated
technologies. Moreover, throughout its development the suggestion was
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made that this new production system would require a new type of
labour force. In addition to the use of advanced technologies, from the
outset, there were regular (if somewhat vague) suggestions by the NCB
that there would be a new relationship between management and
workforce. Indeed, the early literature on Selby had a 'post-Fordist'
flavour to it. On the other hand, the work of the Bradford Group
(examined in Chapter Four) predicted that the type of technology
around which Selby was being designed was based on extending
management control over the miners' traditional workplace autonomy and
on eroding skills. This chapter is concerned centrally with examining
the nature of work at Selby.
The early planners of Selby, it appears, were filled with optimism about
the potential of the complex and the technology upon which it would be
based. Although much publicity was given to successive production
records at the complex, by the late 1980s, it was possible to note a
defensive tone in the pronouncements of BC concerning Selby.
Fieldwork in the complex carried out in 1989/90 revealed that
management's disappointment with Selby's performance was an open
secret. Indeed, after the completion of this case study, a spasm of
publicity was generated around this issue. This chapter helps to
illuminate the technical and human causes of Selby's underperformance.
The chapter begins by examining the origins of the Selby complex in
the provisions of the PFC and then outlines of the distinctive 'Selby
concept' and how it aspired to the conditions of a regularised, flow
production. Following this the chapter shows how the implementation of
the Selby concept has proved more difficult than was imagined by NCB
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planners for technical, and for social reasons. From a technical
viewpoint, the geological structure of the Selby coalfield proved more
complex than had been imagined, and this limited the effectiveness of
the factory-type concept. From a social viewpoint, the attempt to
recast the relationship between labour and capital was frustrated by the
traditional perception of bargaining issues held by the union combined
with the onset of the 1984/5 dispute.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the NCB made
tentative attempts to alter its relationship to new mining workforce in
the early days of the complex. However, it appears the attempt to
recast the relationship between management and labour at Selby
remained limited and vague and foundered on the events surrounding
the 1984/5 miners' strike. Following the strike management followed a
contradictory industrial relations strategy of arbitrary assertion of
authority and attempts to elicit the cooperation of the workforce in the
struggle for improved productivity. This pattern reflected, in large
measure, the ascendancy of the hardline faction within the management,
which meant that the relationship between capital and labour was one
which would tend to be based on its subordination, rather than active
participation. In practice, however, the former tended to dominate
rather than eradicate the latter. The chapter suggests that even
attempts to develop a production facility around advanced forms of
automation were influenced by the wider patterns of class conflict
characteristic of British industry in the 198 Os.
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2. THE ORIGINS OF THE SELBY COMPLEX
The origins of the Selby complex lay in provisions contained within the
Plan for Coal, 1974 (PFC). The PFC itself had been stimulated by
emerging instability in the energy market which resulted in the oil price
rises of late 1973. Simultaneously, there was in NCB circles a growing
concern at the prevailing low levels of investment. The PFC predicted
a relatively modest increase in the market for coal by the mid 1980s to
between l2Omt and l5Omt by 1985, with a mid-point guide of 135mt. To
meet this market, capacity was to be modernised. The modernisation of
capacity was to consist of the loss of 3-4 million tons of capacity per
annum, through exhaustion, and the creation of up to 42mt of new
capacity by 1985. This new capacity was to consist of 9mt resulting
from access to reserves at existing collieries which would otherwise
close, l3mt from major schemes at existing collieries, and 2Omt from new
collieries, of which lOmt was to come from the development of a new
coalfield at Selby in North Yorkshire.
Chapter Four described how the collapse of demand for energy after
1979 threw the PFC into crisis and how the NCB began a policy of
rigorous interpretation of •the clauses on closure which caused
increasing tension between the NCB and the NUM in the 1980s and
which underlay the 1984/85 miners' strike. However, while the politics
of the coal industry was dominated throughout the 1980s by the closure
issue, equally important was the process of modernisation which
continued during this period.
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Although the development of new mines included the opening of new
drifts at Royston and Kinsley in South Yorkshire and Betws in South
Wales, the centrepiece of the new mine programme was the Selby
prospect. The existence of a large coal deposit between York and
Selby had been established in the 1960s. However, its discovery came
during a period of dramatic contraction in the industry. The changing
energy situation at the beginning of the 1970s prompted a reassessment
of the potential of the area and led the NCB to believe that the area
contained abundant, clean coal (Ashworth, 1986: 387). At the same
time, it was recognised that the topology of the area posed some
potential mining difficulties difficulties. The Vale of York is a flat, low
lying area with a complex natural drainage system disturbance of which
had to be avoided. It was planned to mine from the Barnsley seam, the
richest of five seams, which together contain 2,000mt of coal. The
Barnsley seam itself contains GOOmt of which it is planned to extract
only half to avoid subsidence. For instance, large pillars of coal are to
be left under parts of Selby town (including the Abbey) and the village
of Cawood (near the confluence of the rivers Wharfe and Ouse) to
prevent subsidence leading to flooding (Mining Magazine, June 1983;
Ashworth, 1986). The output of the complex supplies nearby power
stations. First estimates put the production potential of the area at 5
mtpa. Subsequently, a figure of l3mtpa was included in the first
version of the PFC but this was revised down to lOmtpa in summer
1974, representing the fastest rate of exploitation that was thought to
be manageable (Ashworth, 1986: 387).
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A public enquiry into the NCB's proposals was held in spring 1975 and
planning permission granted in April 1976. Selby was the largest single
capital project ever undertaken by the British coal industry and was
planned as the largest deep mining complex in the world. It was
expected to employ 3,000-4,000 workers and to produce 10.2mt of coal
when full production was reached which was scheduled for 1987-8.
Originally it was anticipated that revenue production would begin at
Wistow in 1981-2, but regular production did not get underway until
July 1983. It was anticipated that increased production at Selby would
compensate for the rundown of the West Yorkshire coalfield and that
labour would be recruited from there to operate Selby. In February
1978 the cost of Selby was estimated at £552m (at August 1977 prices).
With the effects of inflation and design modifications the cost had risen
to a little over £lbn, including interest, by March 1982 (at current
prices) (Ashworth, 1986). By October 1986 the final cost had escalated
to an estimated £1.36bn.
For a variety of reasons a five mine complex (with each mine producing
2mtpa) with coal clearance through parallel drifts was proposed - the
so-called 'Selby concept' (see section 3 below). The Selby project was
inaugurated in October 1976 at Wistow, with shaft sinking beginning
there in August 1977. Drift drivages began at Gascoigne Wood in
March 1978. Between 1978 and 1980 shaft sinking began at the other
mines in the complex. Wistow mine began production in June 1983 but
shortly afterwards it was interrupted by an inflow of water.
Production was only recommenced in June 1985 following the adoption of
a radically revised mining practice (see section 4 below). In January
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1988 Riccall, Stillingfeet and Whitemoor began production, with the
remaining mine North Selby due to begin production in 1991.
3 'THE SELBY CONCEPT'
It was planned from the outset to develop the Selby complex by means
of 'a highly integrated, large-scale mining complex using the latest
technology' (Ashworth, 1986: 387). Five collieries - Wistow, Riccall,
Stillingfleet, Whitemoor and North Selby - were to be sunk and linked
underground. The output from these collieries would be conveyed via
two drifts to the surface at Gascoigne Wood, near Monk Fryston where,
fortuitously, there was a large area of unused railway sidings which
could be equipped for rapid loading (see Figure 6.1). Berkovitz quotes
a contemporary NCB document which stated that 'maximum use [was] to
be made of automation and remote control techniques, including the use
of computers programmed to react to changes in coal flow' (1977: 207)1.
Borehole data indicated a relative absence of faulting leading to a belief
that the coal was unusually clean with an ash content well below the
'From the outset Selby was conceived in terms of the latest levels
of automation. Wilfrid Miron in his plan, largely in response to labour
control considerations, had asked: 'Is it possible to set out the Selby
mine(s) on ROLF or its up-to-date like?' (see Chapter Four). Williaxn
Forrest, Selby's first chief planner, argued: 'In order to keep manpower
to a minimum, many operations would be designed for automatic or
centralized control. These systems are much more likely to be successful
if they are designed to be manless from the outset. With the techniques
available now it does not seem unreasonable that one man per shift,
assisted by patrol men, could supervize all coal handling from the face
to the coal preparation plant' (Forrest, 1974: 223; also Rees, 1976a&b).
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18-20 per cent acceptable to modern power stations. It was believed,
therefore, that run of mine coal could be transported directly from the
drift outlets to the power stations without the need for washing
facilities. This factor was important because it allowed the NCB to
allay local fears about the creation of spoil heaps. Rapid loading at the
drift head would allow a constant stream of 'merry-go-round' trains to
transport the output to Eggborough, Drax and Ferrybridge power
stations which are visible on the horizon from Gascoigne Wood.
A further factor which influenced the development of the Selby concept
was the NCB's belief that a mine complex based on drift access would
best allow the application of advanced technology2 . According to a
British Coal document:
Drift access to suitable coal reserves had become increasingly
popular in Britain during the sixties and early seventies,
coinciding with the development of high-capacity conveyor
belt systems. The continuous flow of coal-carrying conveyors
is more efficient than the stop-go method involved in winding
coal up a shaft. Total conveying also lends itself more readily
to remote monitoring and control from the surface. At Selby,
the well-proven British Coal-designed methods of controlling
the transportation of coal by conveyors, will be brought to
new levels of sophistication and efficiency, making maximum
use of the micro-chip and computer.
Drift access was especially appropriate at Selby because of the natural
incline in the seam and because at the western edge of the proposed
mining area engineers believed they had found good quality coal nearer
the surface (Pollard, 1976; also Rees, 1976a&b). 	 The production
2Had Selby been developed on the basis of five shaft mines the
labour requirements would have been much higher (over 10,000 men) and
the application of advanced microelectronics more limited. The 'Selby
Concept', therefore, was a particularly attractive one.
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process was to be integrated to a greater degree by rapidloading.
Peak output is delivered from the drift tunnels at rates of 2,500tph.
Once at the surface, the coal is carried into a covered stockyard and
retaining area. The covered stockyard - the largest single span
structure in Europe - can hold 43,000t, equivalent to one day's output
of the complex and is designed to match the output of the mines with
the availability of trains. A series of boom stackers and barrel
reclaimers feeds the coal into bunkers adjacent to and over the railway
sidings. In theory, permanently coupled British Rail liner trains are
loaded with 1, 000t of coal in eleven minutes. At peak output loaded
trains are scheduled to leave Gascoigne Wood for the power stations
every half hour, day and night, five days a week.
It was advocated from the earliest that regulation of this integrated
mine complex be achieved by the widespread application of computer
technology (Forrest, 1974; Rees, 1976a&b). Each of the shaft mines
has its own MINOS installation operated from a surface control room.
All five mine systems are linked to the master control at Gas coigne Wood
which is 'able to interrogate the systems at any of the mines and, when
necessary, carry out remote operation of certain functions throughout
the whole coalfield' (Mining Magazine, June 1983).
From an early stage it was decided to mine Selby using exclusively
retreat methods and heavy duty equipment. The first operational face
was Als at Wistow which was opened out in 1983. Als at 138m in
length, was relatively short, reflecting subsidence considerations. The
face equipment comprised an AS 500 DERDS; 80 Dowty 4 x 450t
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hydraulic roof supports; AFC, stageloader and other equipment and had
an estimated value of £3.5m (at current prices). The estimated face
output was 2,000t/day. At this stage it was planned to operate the
complex on the basis of 20 such faces (Mining Magazine, June 1983).
By 1987, however, revised specifications for face equipment were
issued. Coal faces at Selby were to operate with higher powered
shearers (of the order of 500hp), using 4 x 450/650t chocks giving rise
to an estimated average daily output per face of 5,000t (British Coal,
1988). Faces at Riccall now operate with 700t chocks (Stott, 1988).
The estimated value of face equipment had also risen. Stott (1988)
reports the cost of equipping Cis and D2s at Riccall as £9m.
Consequent upon this growth in face output potentials, it was decided
to concentrate production on 10 faces (see Table 6.1). An indicator of
the relative capital intensity of the complex is given in Table 6.2.
In addition faces are equipped as standard with a high degree of
microelectronic technology. All shield supports are fitted with
transducers which allow remote operation of the chocks in batches.
Push buttons replace the conventional hydraulic valves for the various
chock operations. All shearers are equipped with auto-steering and
with self-diagnostic condition monitoring equipment. Finally, the whole
face is subject to the wider electronic monitoring associated with MINOS
and C IS-VAX real time analysis systems.
Coal from the faces is cleared through the main parallel conveying
entries to Gascoigne Wood. These are called the 'spine tunnels' and lie
below the Barnsley seam roadways (see Figure 6.1). Originally the
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spine roads were to be driven a distance of 15km and to be connected
separately to each of the producing mines. However, a roof fall in the
south spine buried the huge Robbins circular tunnelling machine,
delaying progress while it was recovered. A new system of coal
clearance was designed which was based on connecting North Selby and
Stillingfleet and Whitemoor and Riccall (illustrated in Figure 6.1). This
had the effect of reducing the length of the spine to 12km and, to some
degree, complicating the coal clearance process. According to British
Coal, the spine tunnel conveyors 'are pushing bulk conveying
technology in coal mines to new limits'. These high capacity conveyors
are designed to operate a minimum 20 hours per day with an average
load of 2,500tph. Both are single flight conveyors and as such have no
transfer points, thus allowing considerable savings in labour3.
The Selby Concept represented the fullest expression of the trajectory
of technical change established in the 1970s. While this process of
3The conveyors are designed to accept the whole output from the
producing mines, but the delivery rate to the spine conveyors from the
producing mines will obviously fluctuate. To cope with these production
fluctuations and still maintain the necessary consistent flow of coal to
the surface, a series of buffers was planned. The conveyors themselves
are driven by two 5050kw DC motors located at the surface - itself a
departure from prevailing mining practice where conveyors are driven by
a series of smaller underground motors. The discharge rate from each
bunker must be carefully controlled to prevent overload on the drives or
spillage on the spine conveyors, since the coal will be loaded onto the
conveyor at different points along its length. The dipping gradient of
the spines means that the loading points are located at varying depths
below the surface. Therefore, the energy needed to raise coal from a
particular location depends on where the coal is discharged on the
spine. A computer system was installed at Gascoigne Wood to manage the
coal flow system and to calculate the amount of energy required to raise
the coal (Whitworth, 1989; Tuke, 1989).
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technical change was designed to have wide application, the significance
of Selby was that the whole mine complex was designed around the new
technologies and around the principles of flow production. At the
outset of the fieldwork on which this chapter is based, wide publicity
had been given to both the 'Selby Concept' and the recordbreaking
production performances at the complex 4 . However, the complex was
beset by geological/technical and labour relations problems from the
outset, and BC's disappointment with the performance of the mine was
an open secret in Yorkshire.
4. PRODUCTION PERFORMANCE AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
Selby has been witness both to production records and to unanticipated
setbacks. An examination of much of the engineering and other
literature on the development of Selby in the late 1980s reveals a more
defensive tone (eg Siddall, 1989) which is in contrast to that of the
earlier periods (see section three). The geological and technical
problems were exacerbated by labour relations problems which are the
subject of the next section. The root of the problems facing the
complex appeared to reflect an apparent over-confidence about the
geological structure of the coalfield during the period of its earliest
development. The fact that the geological structure of the coalfield is a
The wide publicity given to certain record breaking performances
was reflected in the view that Selby was in danger of overproducing and
this would cause pit closures elsewhere. This view was advanced by Prior
and Mccloskey (1988) and Whitworth (1989). For a similar interpretation
see 'Selby pits too successful?', Selby Times, 25.4.88).
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good deal more complicated than had hitherto been believed limited the
effectiveness of 'the Selby concept' .
Geological limits to the 'Selby concept'
Predictions about the geology of Selby were based on over 70 boreholes
and 15 0km of surface seismic studies conducted there mainly during the
1970s. These boreholes identified a dipping seam of 2-3m in depth and
suggested a relative absence of faulting. It was on this evidence that
claims for a low ash content were made. Once mining began at Selby a
clearer picture of the geological structure began to emerge. This
revealed that the major tectonic structure accorded with predictions but
many unexpected problems arose which were caused by minor tectonic
and sedimentary structures too small to be identified from boreholes or
surface seismic surveys. All the Selby mines have been affected to
some extent by these zones of minor faulting, but major problems have
included: the abandonment of several faces at Wistow; major stoppages
of the Robbins tunneller in the south spine tunnel; excessive
5Williams et al had the foresight to recognise that the Selby
Concept was a risky one: 'The geological risks are obvious when a
super-pit like Selby will try to win 10 million tonnes of coal per annum
from one set of coal measures. Quite apart from the problem of having
all the enterprise's (productive) eggs in one (geological basket), there
are other risks. Super-pits tie the enterprise to one local customer.
All Selby's coal, for example, goes on merry-go-round trains to local
power stations. Super-pits also use an unproven capital-intensive
technology which is vulnerable to disruption. This is certainly the case
at Selby where, when the pit is fully operational, continuous conveyors
30 kilometres long will be required to take the coal from the furthest
of the five collieries to the railhead' (1986: 185). This important
insight is developed in the following sections.
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deformation in main drivages at Whitemoor; and, a major roof fall in a
transport road at North Selby. In addition, sandstone intrusions have
caused local partial washouts of the seam, notably at Riccall (Tuke,
1989; Siddall, 1989).
The first major geological problems to be encountered at Selby included
the problems of water inrushes at Wistow and roadway deformation in
the main spine tunnels, both of which had serious implications for the
development of the complex. At Wistow the first two longwall faces Als
and A2s were lost due to flooding. The workings in the north-west
district of the mine approach the overlying water-bearing strata and
longwalls of only 140m were planned here. However, even these proved
too ambitious and had to be abandoned. In their place a system of
single-entry' faces was developed, initially 45m in length, designed to
reduce pressure on the face. Later these faces were transformed into
so-called 'microfaces' - only 15m long. These faces have been
presented as an engineering success by British Coal and have saved
Wistow north-west side from complete abandonment. Performances from
single-entries reached 25, 000t per week and more than 2. 3mt had been
extracted from A' block using this method by 1989. However, the
costs of developing such faces are high and the 'microfaces' are
reported to have a life of only five weeks or so (Siddall, 1989). The
NUM and others expressed reservations about single-entry faces
because they lack adequate ventilation and a second means of egress.
Indeed miners at the complex reported intense heat in some
single-entries and some described their personal anxieties at working up
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to 40m inbye without means of escape. Nevertheless they have become
part of normal working practice at the complex.
Problems also affected the drivage of the main south spine tunnel. The
completion of this tunnel was critical to the future of the complex
because production could not begin from all of the mines until
connections had been made into the tunnel and onto the coal clearance
system. The drivage of the tunnel was halted in 1983 following a roof
fall which buried the Robbins tunnelling machine. A similar problem
occurred in 1987 when the tunnel was at the 12.164km mark and this
was when the decision was taken not to continue the drivage to the
15km mark but instead to connect North Selby to the main clearance
system via Stillingfleet. The spine tunnels continue to suffer from
intense geological pressures which have led to serious deformations of
the roadway profile. Large numbers of men have had to be engaged in
virtually continuous backripping operations while strenuous efforts were
made to overcome these geological problems (eg. Tuke, 1989). Coal
clearance problems were compounded by problems with the South spine
conveyor drive which had to be replaced (Siddall, 1989) and problems
occurred with the computer control system at Gascoigne Wood (Buck,
1989). In the latter case, failures in the microelectronics led to
substantial machine downtimes, although these problems were seemingly
overcome following the redesign of equipment (see Figure 6.2).
These major geological difficulties were reproduced many times on a
smaller scale. Deformation of gates on retreat faces caused problems.
Despite its evident advantages, retreat mining has an Achilles heel in
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the potential problems associated with the operation of the T junction at
the main gate end where permanent supports set in the gate have to be
removed to allow the goaf to collapse. Where geological pressures are
great, gates experience severe crushing. Mining engineers at Selby
discovered that if roadways are driven parallel to the line of maximum
stress which is inherent in the coalfield, roadways are much more likely
to maintain their original profile. Where possible this is done,
irrespective of traditional concerns such as direction of cleat (Moore,
1990), but places further limits on production performance.
The direction of drivage and faulting patterns play a significant part in
in the speed of drivage as well as their ultimate stability. In total
retreat mining, as in Selby, production is critically linked to drivage
rates in order to ensure minimum disruption between the operation of
coalfaces and continuous utilisation of assets. Management stated
regularly that inadequate drivage rates represents one the main
production problems at Selby. In the period 1988-90 20 per cent of
drivages were abandoned at Selby. This resulted in situations where
only two faces have been in production in the complex (instead of 7-8).
The problem of having capacity on-line following face exhaustion is
exacerbated at Selby when face performances are high. Selby is
required to develop roadways at up to 3.5 times the rate at which roads
are being exhausted by retreat mining. Despite the application of the
most advanced roadheaders and continuous miners available, Selby
consistently struggled to achieve necessary rates of advance (in excess
of lOOm per week).
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Selby management committed themselves publicly to increasing the
amount of drivage from 50,000m to 80,000m in 1990/91. This was to be
achieved by the purchase of additional heavy duty face equipment to
eliminate installation time lags and the more extensive use of roofbolting
(Riccall Review, May, 1990). The use of total roofbolting, it is
believed, will reduce the time absorbed in setting conventional steel
supports. Total bolting also gives rise to considerable cost savings. A
rapid improvement in performance here is seen as necessary to bring
isolated record breaking performances closer to the norm.
Management found encouragement in the fact that the main drivage at
North Selby reached 1, 600m without encountering major faulting,
allowing the development of seven major faces either side of the drivage
(International Coal Report, 23.3.90). However, such optimism needs to
be tempered by the knowledge that at North Selby faces are to be
operated with three gates to overcome ventilation problems (Siddall,
1989; Tuke, 1989). The development problems suggested by this are
huge and given the depth of workings at North Selby geological
pressures are likely to be great.
The quality problem
Another major problem facing Selby concerned the quality of the
product being mined. Selby was developed on the basis of a highly
optimistic assessment of the cleanliness of the coal (see section 2 above)
which was derived from surface boreholes. Excluding the area to the
south where the seam splits into the Warren House and the Low
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Barnsley, the seam was believed to have no significant dirt bands and
to have an ash content of 4-7 per cent. This view of the nature of
reserves was held until very recently (eg. Siddall, 1988). The results
of surface seismic exploration then formed the basis for planning the
mine layout so that a product with an ash content of less than 18 per
cent could be produced for the CEGB without the need for surface coal
preparation facilities. However, output from the first four mines
during the first six months of 1988 resulted in a run of mine with an
average ash content of 23.4 per cent, sometimes peaking at over 30 per
cent. This reflects the geological disturbance and zones of minor
faulting mentioned above.
High dirt content originated, firstly, from development operations.
This included the extension of the north spine and the backrips in the
south spine described above and permanent infrastructural work which
produces a run of mine with an ash content of over 50 per cent. A
second source of ash is the coal getting operations themselves,
including in-seam drivages, and through cutting the roof and floor and
dinting operations.
The dirt problem has been tackled at the surface through the building
of a rail unloading facility in order to bring in coal to sweeten the
Selby product. At one stage this included an estimated 50,000t per
month from North East collieries 6 . In addition, a gamma ray ash
6Miners at Wearmouth joked that they had become honorary members of
the Selby complex.
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monitor has been installed above the main conveyor at Gascoigne Wood.
This enables the dirty material to be identified and stocked separately
for further treatment. The dirty run of mine is usually contained in
oversize material and screens have been installed to separate this.
Finally, four barrel washers have been installed in the covered
stockyard which can handle 20,000t per week. This situation has
completely transformed the surface operation from the original
conception of a despatch point for untreated run of mine. One problem
faced by B C has been that of disposing of large quantities of dirt from
Gascoigne Wood. This has tended to be transported by lorry to
disused mine shafts in other parts of Yorkshire - often in the face of
opposition from local communities.
The dirt problem is also being tackled underground through the
application of auto-steering. Autosteering is used to stop the shearer
cutting into the floor and roof of the face. BC estimate that, at Selby,
ten centimetres of dirt cut on the face increases the ash content by six
per cent. With autosteering, a microprocessor incorporated into the
shearer uses natural gamma rays from strata overlaying the coal to
calculate the optimum position of the cutting drums, raising them or
lowering them as required. All shearers at Selby are fitted with
autosteering. Autosteering appears to have been introduced with
variable success due to technical problems. While used relatively
successfully on single-ended shearers, autosteering has been applied
less successfully on double-ended shearers. This is said to reflect
poor reliability and lack of robustness in the microelectronic
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componentry. The issue of autosteering, in particular the impact on
workers' skills, is addressed more fully in section 6.
Capital utilisation
Originally each mine at Selby was planned to have four faces in
operation (with one spare) with each working two machine shifts per
day. The improvement in performance levels associated with heavy
duty technology, led BC to plan Selby in terms of one million tonne per
year faces. As a result the mines are planned now to operate with two
faces each working three machine shifts expected to produce two million
tonnes per year each. The reduction in face shifts from eight a week
to six a week has contributed towards a reduction in the manpower
required for the complex. The original plan was for 4,000 men; but
BC's final requirement is about 3,500w.
However, a number of problems have been associated with the strategy
of concentrating production on fewer faces. BC planned to operate a
two face production system at each mine in the Selby complex.
Equipment was purchased for two faces with the intention of
transferring this between faces. BC believed that rates of extraction
would be such that projected output levels would be attained from this
arrangement. Under the arrangement one face is planned to work at
full production (operated over three or four shifts) with the second
7This excludes the regular use of contractors at the complex on a
very large scale. This issue is addressed in section 7.
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face either salvaging, installing or building up to full production, so
that there would no gap in production. However, the inadequate
development rates and geological problems at the face described above
have exposed the vulnerability of this system. On occasions after 1987
when four of the fives mine were on stream there were occasionally no
faces operating at some mines. Selby management, therefore, recently
announced their intention to purchase additional face equipment to
prevent potential time lags between faces completing operation and new
capacity starting production. Mines will operate two faces with another
as spare capacity. The exception is Whitemoor where geological
problems mean that only one face will operate with another on standby
(International Coal Report, 23.3.90). However, in early 1990 only two
faces were operating in the complex with large amounts of expensive
face equipment standing idle. Despite the different level of technology,
then, the same production problems arise from 'over-concentrated'
production which were identified in the North East8.
Despite these problems, however, some faces have returned impressive
productivity achievements. In 1988 Stillingfleet achieved an output from
one face of 47,179t.in one week, with a face OMS of 309.07t. In June
1988 it recorded a colliery overall OMS of 36.33t. In March 1989 the
colliery established an output record of 72,471t. Riccall has achieved a
weekly face output of 36,575t and a face OMS of 76.32t. Wistow has
8When Selby Group management arranged for me to visit a face in
July 1990, they were unable to confirm which pit I should visit until
the day before because all the pits had serious production problems.
316
achieved a single entry face output of 26,928t in one week and in 1989
became the first European colliery to produce over 100,000t in a week.
However, despite the wide publicity given to these 'bull' performances,
and despite the extravagant claims made by some commentators for
likely future performance levels at Selby, average performances in the
period to 1990 were considerably lower. Stillinguleet's annual overall
OMS was 12.8t in 1988/9 and Riccall's was 10.89t. The overall OMS for
the complex over the same period was 8.14t9.
The difficulties in sustaining recordbreaking performances are great.
Machine running time data from the fieldwork period illustrates the scale
of the problem. For instance, in 1989 it was reported that in the North
Yorkshire Area (which then included Selby) conveyors were standing
idle for an average of one fifth of machine available time, with delay
analysis revealing that in some weeks cutting time has been reduced by
a quarter as breakdown bottle-necks stopped coal being cleared from
the face. In May 1989 the Area lost the equivalent of 33 machine shifts
through belt delays and in June a further 42 shifts, costing an
estimated £2. 3m in lost revenue. Stoppages in the main spine tunnel
belts at Selby accounted for a substantial part of this lost time
(Colliery Guardian, October 1989). Figure 6.3 gives data for ROM
9Each of the pit production records, moreover, has been surrounded
by allegations of 'cheating' from miners at other collieries in the
complex It was alleged that coal stored in bunkers from the previous
week was counted as coal produced during the record week at one mine.
Also miners claimed that record production levels have been achieved at
the expense of maintenance shifts which would be impossible to repeat on
a regular basis.
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production time losses for the following four months and illustrates that
these problems continued. Moreover, despite the saturation of
automated techniques and heavy duty face equipment at Selby, face
stoppages are still a significant problem. Table 6.3 shows running
times for main gate conveyors at selected Selby mines in 1989/90,
illustrating that, on average, about one fifth of production time is lost
time. It has been estimated that a reduction by half in the average
number and duration of maingate stoppages would, on average, improve
machine available time by 69 minutes per face per shift, leading to an
increase in production of 700t per shift (Moore, 1990). Data from BC's
national face databank for the 13 week period up to June 1990 reveals
that machine running time as a proportion of machine available time was
a mere 21 per cent, compared with a target rate of 40 per cent
(source: DB75, British Coal data, privately supplied). The reduction
of machine stoppages has become a major management problem at Selby,
which management are able to tackle via the introduction of more
sophisticated 'real time' monitoring systems.
The limitations of new technology impinge on questions of skill which
are addressed in section 5. Management also intend that important
innovations in work practices will play a part in increasing machine
utilisation. Sections 6 and 7 examine the development of work practices
and industrial relations at Selby in the light of these issues.
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5. NEW TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS AT SELBY
The most advanced technological systems developed by BC are standard
at Selby. Early research on advanced technology mining predicted that
the high levels of automation would have significant implications for the
organisation and content of labour. The early critical literature implied
that the high levels of productivity associated with the new technology
would be predicated on the widespread deskilling of the workforce
(Burns et al, 1985; Winterton, 1985). However, evidence from Selby,
although offering some support for the notion that new technologies are
deskilling the workforce, also suggests different motivations behind
management's introduction of new automated technologies and its
attempts to recast its relationship with its workforce. The post-Fordist
thesis, however, would suggest that the level of automation at Selby
would lead to the demand for more skilled labour in order to optimise
its operation. Two important examples of automation at Selby, both of
which are claimed to lead to higher levels of performance are automatic
steering of shearers and automated health monitoring of plant and,
significantly, the automation of maintenance skills. These technologies
and their impact on the organisation of work are examined in some
detail below.
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Autosteering
Conventionally, shearer drivers steer their machines relative to dirt
bands within the seam. At Selby the nature of the seams means that
this feature is absent or inconsistent. Therefore, steering is very
difficult as it is impossible to predict where the coal/dirt interface is.
Consequently BC have introduced a number of nucleonic and natural
gamma forms of steering at Selby which utilise the differential gamma
ray absorption properties of coal and shale to determine the thickness
of the immediate coal roof. With ranging drum shearers of the type
used at Selby, the information generated thus was used by the shearer
driver to help him guide the cutting disc along the correct cutting
horizon. The systems used at Selby automate this residual manual
function. This has been achieved by the use of a machine mounted
micro-computer which acts upon inputs from a number of transducers.
The autosteering systems, notably MIDAS, have a 'personality' unit
through which site specific constants can be configured:
The micro-computer is the machine man's 'brain', the
transducer his 'eyes' and the personality unit his long term
'memory'. . . At the heart of the MIDAS software is the active
decision maker: the steering algorithm. This simulates the
thought processes of a trained machine man (Laws, 1989:
329).
Systems such as MIDAS provide automatic vertical steering, maintenance
information and management information. The latter is 'very
advantageous to the control and accountability of the workforce' (Laws,
1989: 391) and is available in some detail:
The management information available through MIDAS is
unbiased, accurate, up to the minute and available in user
friendly printouts. Details of the available information include
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machine positions against time stoppages; machine running
time per shift; and face profiles and coal thickness for each
shear (Laws 1989: 330-2).
All faces at Selby are equipped with autosteering and its use at Riccall
is reported to have increased face outputs by 50 per cent (Colliery
Guardian, September 1989: 269).
The deskilling tendencies within such a system seem manifest.
However, it is clear that autosteering has not worked in the manner
anticipated by management and begs wider questions about the
performance of technical systems at Selby and the relationship of labour
to this technology. At either end of the face, manual operations have to
take place and the machine driver has to handle the controls. In
theory after leaving the face ends automatic control should be resumed
immediately. At Selby management have been engaged in a struggle to
cajole machine drivers not to operate the machines manually after
leaving the face ends. Further technical limits arise when geological
problems occur which are outside of the machine's capability such as
roof falls, or dirt intrusions which can damage the automatic steering
components and necessitate manual operation. Also, it appears that
machine drivers find it difficult to judge when the shearer should be
operated manually or automatically, a function which of course remains a
human one. Few machine drivers seemed aware of the principles
underlying autosteering and some reported poor or non-existent
training10.
°In addition to discussions with machine drivers, these comments
(Footnote Continued)
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Part of the machine operators reluctance to use autosteering derives
from a lack of faith in the technical capabilities of the device rather
than fears about deskilling. In particular, face men were concerned
that management's experiments with new technology had led to face
stoppages which had cost them lost bonus payments. Problems with the
microelectronics caused numerous failures when autosteering was first
introduced. On the other hand when autosteering works machine
operators report their job as being 'to follow the machine' rather than
to drive it, prompting one electrician (jokingly) to describe face men as
'the highest paid butt men in the pit'.
In general two principles underlie the introduction of autosteering at
Selby, in addition to reducing management's reliance on skilled machine
drivers. Firstly, it represents an attempt to build-in a quality control
function to coalgetting rather than to leave it until the ROM reaches the
surface. Secondly, autosteering is concerned with establishing an even
flow of coal from the face, through optimising the speed of the machine
as it traverses the face. To this extent, the real significance of
autosteering appears to lie in integrating the production rate at the
face more closely with the capacities of the backbye infrastructure.
Although, in principle autosteering deskills workers, in practice it does
so only marginally because room for human intervention still remains.
(Footnote Continued)
are based on observations of H203s at Stillingfleet made on an
underground visit in July 1990. Management at that time were struggling
to introduce MIDAS principally as a result of quality concerns.
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Most complaints from workers surrounded inadequate training rather
than potential deskilling.
The automation of maintenance skills
The widespread incorporation of transducers for monitoring the health
of machines and diagnosing faults can be seen in a similar light to
autosteering. Transducers are incorporated into virtually all plant such
as belts, fans, pumps as well as transfer points. All transfer points
are monitored at outstations which give on-line information on bearing
temperatures, vibration levels, alignments and so on. The outstations
themselves are connected to the surface control.	 Control room
operators can then contact an electrician and allocate him to an
outstation if it is registering a signal fault. The outstation will indicate
the location and nature of the fault on a VDU. The effect of all this is
to aid the rapid deployment of craftsmen and the quicker rectification of
faults. The level of monitoring is far in excess of that prevailing in
North East pits where transducer-based monitoring has not proceeded
beyond stop/start functions. The same tendencies toward the erosion
of electrical skills associated with panel changes were identified by
craftsmen. However, at Selby the automation of maintenance skills had
progressed to a much farther degree, notably through the development
and use of expert systems.
At Selby, BC use the SHEARER system for 'automating skilled diagnosis
and decision support in a complex, time pressured production
environment with safety-related considerations' CDT I, 1990: 6). This
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system was originally developed in order to quicken response to machine
failure on AM5000 shearers (which are in use at Stillingfleet, Wistow
and Riccall) and to reduce the skill requirements of maintenance staff.
On an average face, use of the system is estimated to have saved BC
almost £1. 5m per annum in output losses. It represents a step forward
from transducer-based monitoring which requires expensive fitting,
retrofitting and maintenance. SHEARER can be easily interfaced with
the real-time computer monitoring system CIS-VAX which is used at all
the Selby pits (see DTI, 1990, for a full description). The impact on
skills appears clear cut:
SHEARER operates as a stand-alone system, and has no
inputs direct from the coal cutting machine. When a fault
occurs, testing and repair procedures are carried out by a
member of the maintenance staff working on the machine at
the coal-face. SHEARER runs on a computer at the surface,
and the maintenance staff working underground are linked by
voice telephone to the surface computer operator, who relays
the information from the screen as the diagnosis proceeds.
The operator can be anyone who can use a computer keyboard
(DTI, 1990: 18)11.
An advantage of the system from management's point of view is that it
allows the automation of both fitters' and electricians' skills. Combined
with the use of transducers where appropriate and the widespread use
of RCM the net effect of such systems is to speed up and make more
efficient the fault finding process. An electrician at Riccall observed:
Moreover: 'As well as following a diagnostic process, SHEARER
gives a wide range of advice needed to return the failed machine to
service. This includes diagnostic 'tips', identification of parts using
location diagrams, provision of parts numbers, and remedial
instructions. Advice may be directed to either a full repair or a
temporary one. SHEARER's output is in the form of text, plus full screen
diagrams to show the location of parts or to clarify some other point'
(DTI, 1990: 18).
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It's made diagnosis of a fault easier. It does show you what
is wrong. You've still got to rectify it, but actual fault
finding is easier. With this level of technology its got to be.
I'm lost with a lot of stuff that we use now. But I can follow
a read out and change a part. To start fault finding yourself
- it takes some time.. . With production the way it is that
takes too long. They want that fault indicating. . . It's about
preventing faults and if there is a fault getting it done
quicker, that's what it is about. . . Its a different type of
skill. . . Ultimate now, if you're lost, you get on the phone and
get somebody on who knows something about it. . . They'll be
in the office and they'll say: right, take this step, take that
step. They're all wrote out and it's all monitored.
Like autosteering, the progressive automation maintenance skills is
eroding traditional competences, but beyond this its real significance
appears to relate to the wider effort of minimising possible downtimes.
Moreover, while SHEARER certainly deskills the craftworker, its
development, at least in part, was a response to the haemorrhage of
skilled craftsmen from the industry after the 1984/5 strike and the need
to automate specialised knowledge before it was lost (DTI, 1990).
Few craftsmen appear unduly concerned with deskilling - a fact that is
made more remarkable when it is considered that most of those
interviewed for this study were union activists and, presumably, were
more inclined toward this interpretation. Craftsmen tend rather to
complain about inadequate levels of training. Although the early
management literature emphasised the need for massive retraining of
miners from closing pits before they moved to Selby (eg Rees, 1976a),
this simply did not occur. A craftsman, asked to compare work at
Selby with work at his previous pit, offered what seemed to be the
general assessment of the nature of maintenance work at the complex:
The skills gone out of it. Men know they're being deskilled.
The craftsmen are garage mechanics now, more or less told
what to do. They're spare part replacers now, more or
less. . . They do less repairing, it's new for old. . .They're not
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hi-tech people. They're people from a 105 year old pit,
who've gone to a very new pit and are more or less just told
what to do. They're not whizz kids. The comment you hear
is: a monkey could do this12.
As well as deskilling, however, it was also possible to identify limited
forms of enhanced semi-skilled maintenance work at Selby. In collieries
in the central coalfield it has been the practice to employ non-time
served chock maintenance staff (so-called 'chock doctors') whose sole
function has been the maintenance of the hydraulic systems which
propel the face roof supports. At Selby all such chocks are now
operated electronically using a push button system, rather than through
hydraulic lever systems. With union assent the chock doctors have
been retrained in the basic electronic skills necessary for the
maintenance of this plant. As such this might be offered as an example
of upskilling although the level of such skills remains comparatively
low. The apparent aim of this development is to save on waiting time
in the event of an electronic failure. The former semi-skilled fitter can
now begin changing panels before the arrival of an electrician.
Whether the expanded responsibilities of the chock doctors foreshadow
the emergence of a genuine electromechanic remains to be seen. At
present, there is no evidence that BC is prepared to invest the large
amounts of time and money necessary to bring this about13.
2BC have introduced the much publicised 'Skiliscope' initiative.
The Skiliscope training modules and exercises tend to emphasiBe speed in
fault finding rather than the development of new skills as such.
Skiliscope was regarded cynically by miners and craftworkers because of
its emphasis on unpaid home learning through the use of tapes and so on.
3Despite much sound and fury regarding the creation of
(Footnote Continued)
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Toward quality circles?
The craftsmen's skill is more a question of how rapidly he can rectify a
fault, often through a process of elimination, rather than his ability to
trace and diagnose a fault. These latter functions are now being
incorporated into the machinery itself. The attempt to shift the
concerns of the workforce in the direction of intensive plant utilisation
is perhaps exemplified by the introduction of 'Analytical Trouble
Shooting' (ATS) at Selby. ATS is a problem solving technique
developed by a US company called Kepner-Tregoe and is explicitly
designed to engage the workforce in the struggle for 'system
optimisation' and is presented as representative of management's desire
for cooperative industrial relations (see Gardner, 1989: 469-71).
ATS is seen by management as complementing other forms of IT-based
delay analysis. At Selby all management staff, machine operators and
craftsmen have been trained in these techniques, as well as certain
other groups such as belt patrolmen. BC have stated their intention to
train workers in these techniques, with the hope that a more 'proactive'
workforce will be created. According to one member of management:
Analytical trouble-shooting pushes problem analysis and
solving right down to where it belongs - the lads on the
face. Its a technique that is built around and relies on the
shopfloor workers. He has first-hand information and is the
best placed of anybody to see what is happening. . . From our
experience so far, ATS generates a high degree of
commitment from the workforce because we are asking them to
use their heads. It's also confirmed what we already knew;
(Footnote Continued)
electro-mechanics (eg. Wheeler, 1986; also Chapter Four) there was no
evidence of the emergence of such a category at Selby.
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that there's a rich seam of untapped potential when it comes
to pitmatics - the men who are doing the job (internal
document).
Interdisciplinary management groups hold Kepner-Tregoe meetings at
each of the mines. At some mines in the complex, notably Riccall, the
ATS techniques are incorporated into team briefings for workers about
to undertake major salvages. Here management hold team discussions
away from the pit at the nearby Mines Rescue Station prior to salvages
and installations. More generally, however, management appear to hope
that the workforce will now become constantly on their guard against
systems working at less than potential and take immediate action to
ensure rectification. The system was first introduced at Whitemoor mine
where it was planned to train 65 per cent of the workforce in these
techniques by the end of 199014.
There is no doubt that ATS is sold to the workforce as part of a
quasi-cooperative approach to production organisation. Some workers
who were among the first to be trained in these techniques, described
how they received 'pep-talks' from the colliery manager before going on
the course, who told them that they were not about to be
'brainwashed'. Some workers were undoubtedly enthused by ATS,
while others remained cynical. In addition most interviewees reported
4Management have given exauiples of successes using ATS. However,
such successes appear to reflect less the value of the techniques
themselves than a generally creative attitude on the part of workers.
The introduction of ATS appears to correspond closely to Kern and
Schumann's notion of the worker in the new automated plant as a 'scout',
sensitive to the constant possibility of breakdown.
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that following an initial surge in interest, the enthusiasm of management
has waned. Moreover, it appears that management struggled to
introduce ATS in the charged atmosphere of the late 1980s. In
particular, management refused to negotiate its introduction with union
branches or to accede to union demands that a branch official attend
each ATS briefing.
There is no equivalent of ATS in the North East (none of my informants
- management or workers - had even heard of it) and its introduction
at Selby is suggestive of recognition by management that such a
capital-intensive installation required a new type of relationship with
the workforce. ATS is a clear attempt to introduce a more cooperative
type of labour relations, and appears to owe something to such a vision
of the future held (somewhat vaguely) by the mine's early planners.
In practice the industrial relations strategies of management have been
more contradictory than is suggested by the development of a quality
circle approach. For instance ATS was introduced during a period
when management had provoked major confrontations with the
workforce. Section six examines the attempt to recruit and mould a
workforce suitable to the production environment at Selby and how
these management strategies foundered. This process can be attributed
partly to the growing unrest in the Yorkshire coalfield prior to 1984/5.
Section seven examines post-strike events at Selby and places
developments such ATS in a broader context, thus illustrating their
contradictory application.
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6. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND WORK PRACTICES AT SELBY
Creating a workforce for Selby
It was argued above that the technical systems which the National Coal
Board had been developing in the 1970s and early 1980s had their
fullest expression at Selby. Given that the NCB had been developing
proposals for the alteration of work practices, it would seem safe to
assume that these would be similarly well developed at Selby. In the
light of these requirements it appears that in the early period of the
development of the complex (1980-1984) there was a real attempt by the
NCB to recast the relationships which had traditionally existed between
management and workers in the coal industry. The early literature on
Selby used a language which, if somewhat vague and overblown, was
akin to that which characterises some of the 'post-Fordist' debate:
By comparison with traditional mines, the Selby pits will be
modest employers of labour - perhaps 200 or so men per shift
at each. . . Selby is to be a high technology development whose
employees will be technicians not labourers. Automatic
monitoring, electronic alarm systems, closed circuit televisions
and a network of two-way telephones. . . will make it possible
to control operations from a small number of strategic points
(Pollard, 1976: 105).
In addition, it seems clear that, given the anticipated expansion in the
size of the industry embodied in the PFC, Selby, in large part, was
expected to be operated by 'green' labour, recruited locally 15 . This
gave added impetus to the conception of Selby as a 'modern' mine, free
5At the public enquiry the NCB attempted to present the mine as
both a source of employment for local people and as representing no
threat to existing employers (eg. Bugler, 1976).
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of many of the traditional problems associated with coal production. In
the event, the contraction of the coal industry meant that the labour
force at the mine was to comprise miners from declining parts of the
Yorkshire coalfield. From the outset, therefore, the operation of this
new mine was to be complicated by the fact that its workforce was to
arrive with traditions of custom and practice and a strong bargaining
awareness from other Yorkshire pits (see Thomas, 1983).
On the other hand, the uneven nature of the decline of the coalfield
meant that while among existing collieries within Yorkshire there was
much modern, low cost capacity, this tended to be concentrated in the
south of the region. This area had, and continues to have, a record
of industrial militancy. By contrast, the coaLfield around West
Yorkshire which was in decline had, according to the NCB's official
historian, 'a very long tradition of very good labour relations'
(Ashworth, 1986: 380n). The NCB began recruiting a workforce for
the Selby coalfield from West Yorkshire.
This process is exemplified by the case of Riccall. When Riccall was
being developed in late 1983, the management there began a series of
meetings with workers at Newmarket colliery, near Wakefield, which was
about to close because of exhausted reserves. Newmarket conformed
closely to the stereotype of West Yorkshire pits. The aim of the
meetings was to attempt to persuade Newmarket men to transfer to
Riccall. This process extended to guided tours of the complex for the
men and their families and the provision of special services to help them
overcome the upheaval of change. Such a degree of attention on the
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part of management was hitherto unknown to the men and was
considered indicative of the new climate of industrial relations which
was to prevail at the colliery (see Stott, 1989, for one account)16.
Miners at West Yorkshire pits which were about to close were faced with
the option of commuting to Selby or moving home to the area. In the
event, in excess of 50 per cent of the current workforce lives within
the vicinity of the complex. The NCB and the local planning authority
were faced with a number of difficulties in integrating up to 4,000
miners into the Selby district, but throughout the whole period the
Board appeared to be conscious of how production relations could be
broadened at Selby into the wider community. Those who elected to
move were offered an effective mortgage subsidy to encourage them to
purchase a house, which amounted to £15,000 over seven years, and
which was added onto the wage slip. By using the subsidy system
many miners were able to trade-up in the housing market.
Simultaneously, according to a management source, the NCB took 'a
political decision' to prevent the formation of 'a strong mining
community'. The building of large estates for the mining workforce was
In fact there is fairly clear evidence that in the early period,
at least, management discriminated in favour of potential recruits from
pits with quiescent labour traditions. According to Winterton and
Winterton: 'the NCB has allowed moderate collieries (including
Glasshoughton and Savile) to close before exhaustion so that their
workforce can transfer to Selby' (1989: 7). Whereas miners from the
closing Featherstone pits which had a more militant reputation (such as
Ackton Hall) tended to be dispersed to a larger number of existing pits
such as Allerton Bywater and Prince of Wales (ibid).
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eschewed in favour dispersing the workforce throughout the many small
farming villages in the area.
Regardless of whether men actually moved home, a powerful incentive to
becoming a Selby miner was the high level bonus payments obtained by
the workforce in the period prior to and shortly after the miners' strike
of 1984/85. At this time men could regularly earn around £250 per
week in addition to their basic pay. The impression given was that
Selby was to be operated on the basis of a high wage/high productivity
bargain. (Subsequently bonus payments fell dramatically and tended to
fluctuate significantly from week to week. This caused many industrial
disputes, see section seven).
These attempts by management to build a new relationship with its
workers, however, were frustrated by intractable industrial relations
problems, which reflected local and national factors (eg. Thomas, 1983).
Locally, disputes tended to reflect the workforce's determination to
ensure a consistently high level of bonus payments. This might seem
paradoxical given earlier remarks about the efforts of the NCB to select
a workforce from moderate areas of the declining coalfield. This
paradox reflects (partly at least) the assumption of positions of power
within the NUM of a group of well organised, militant miners who were
able to set an industrial and political climate in the complex which was
at odds with that hoped for by the NCB. Selby miners also took part
in the nationally organised overtime ban which culminated in the 1984/85
struggle against the NCB's pit closure programme. More generally, it
seems the NCB's hopes for a new relationship with its workforce were
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bound to be frustrated given the heightening political and industrial
tension in the Yorkshire coalfield and beyond during this period.
Selby miners could not remain immune from this atmosphere, not the
least because many still had relatives working in other pits in other
parts of Yorkshire. Nevertheless, the type of production relations
which were becoming established in the pre-strike period were to have
a material effect on the outcome of the strike in Yorkshire.
The strike and its aftermath at Selby
The 1984/85 strike represented a turning point for the Selby complex as
well as for the industry nationally. While in Yorkshire as a whole there
was strong support for the strike, at Selby support proved to be
relatively weak. When the strike ended in March 1985, at pits in the
heart of the Yorkshire coalfield less than 5 per cent of the workforce
had broken the strike, whereas in Selby the corresponding figure was
over 50 per cent (Winterton and Winterton 1989: chapter 6). This
situation could be attributed to a sectionally based perception of the
issues held by miners at Selby, ie. the knowledge that the complex was
immune from the closure pressures which faced pits elsewhere.
However, it is also clear that the collapse of the strike at Selby
reflected the type of production relations which had been established
there. In particular, it seems that the absence of a discernible mining
community to offer solidarity and the crushing burden of mortgage debt
experienced by those who had bought relatively high value homes in the
Selby district were crucial explanatory factors. Winterton and
Winterton, for instance, report that a group of Wistow miners agreed to
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return to work when their mortgage arrears reached £3,000 (1989: 136).
In general, they suggest financial difficulties were a particularly
prevalent reason for strikebreaking at Selby.
The defeat of the strike had important consequences for the
development of production relations at Selby after 1985. The national
ascendancy of management hardliners (see Chapter Four) was matched
locally. In the immediate aftermath of the strike, significant changes
were made to the management bureaucracy. Albert Tuke was appointed
director of the North Yorkshire area of the NCB. Tuke had been
associated with that faction of the management which was opposed to a
negotiated settlement of the strike and had organised systematic
strikebreaking in the Doncaster area. Managerial responsibility for the
Selby complex was given to Robert Siddall, another member of the
hardline faction, and who during the strike had responded to tales of
miners' hardship by telling them to 'eat grass'. In this context the
aspirations of the pre-strike period for a new industrial relations
bargain looked unlikely to be continued. Indeed miners at Selby walked
out following Siddall's first visit to the complex. The climate of
industrial relations changed dramatically, with management using the
defeat of the strike as an opportunity to 'put the boot in', according to
a management source. Workers who transferred to Selby in the period
after the strike were not treated to the same 'hard sell' in order to
persuade them to move. A Riccall miner describes the gradual change
in management attitude:
Before strike them lads that went - ex-Newmarket men - they
took them round on a bus for the day and showed them the
area. After strike, to us, they said: there's a job going at
Selby - do you want it? We had to go sign on and start on
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the Monday. We did had some time to think about it,
like.. .Now there's lads come up from Betteshanger. I were
talking to one - Paul - and there they shut pit on the
Wednesday and they were given two and half days to make
their mind up to come - what is it? - 300 miles from Deal.
Two and half days to make their bloody mind up. I feel sorry
for them lads. . . Its just gone from bad to worse.
One of the first acts of management following the resumption of work
was to consolidate their victory by playing on divisions between
workers. At Riccall, for instance, management set about breaking up
work groups which included die hard supporters of the strike. This
even extended to reallocating lockers at the pit baths so that 'scabs'
and 'solid lads' were mixed in together. Strike supporters were set
alongside strikebreakers in work teams underground. At all the pits
traditional trade union privileges (such as union shifts) were altered.
Work practices at Selby in the post-strike period have been an amalgam
of the regressive erosion of privileges and the exercise of new-found
managerial authority characteristic of other parts of the British
coalfield, alongside, at the same time, attempts to introduce innovative
developments - such as ATS and the extensive and impressive use of
direct communication with the workforce via regular newspapers and
magazines - which owe something to the ideals of cooperatively based
industrial relations which appear to have been in the minds of the
original planners.
Following a period of retreat and regrouping at the end of the national
strike industrial relations at Selby where characterised by a series of
'ragouts'. Between January 1986 and March 1987 there were 51
unofficial disputes at the complex which management estimated had led
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to losses of £13m (Yorkshire Evening Post, 3.8.87). According to local
union officials these disputes reflected a determination to resist the new
management offensive which manifested itself in the form of an attack on
trade union privileges, new working practices, higher levels of
supervision and reduced levels of bonus payment. The industrial
relations problems of the complex were held up as an example of
residual militancy despite the crushing of the miners' strike (eg.
Sunday Times, 11.10.87).
The period from 1986 was characterised both by hardening management
attitudes and surprising amounts of resistance on the part of the
workforce. In January 1986 Stillingfleet men walked out after
management stopped the pay of men who arrived late for work during
adverse weather conditions. The colliery manager at that time wrote to
the NUM branch Secretary Ted Scott claiming he had 'deliberately
caused men to take strike action' and warned that future action would
be regarded as 'a serious breach of the existing machinery' (quoted in
Winterton and Winterton, 1989: 223). In response to the threat an
overtime ban was instituted but was called off after Albert Tuke sought
an injunction. The scale of the disputes continued to escalate.
Whereas prior to the 1984/5 strike the incidence of disputes reflected
attempts, in the words of a branch official 'to set standards down for
the life of the colliery' and as such reflected the strength of the
workforce, the strikes after 1984/5 were essentially defensive attempts
to resist managements attempts to alter working practices. Section 7
charts the changes in work practices following the strike.
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7. RESTRUCTURING WORK PRACTICES AT SELBY
Attempts to alter working practices reflected the wider management
offensive of the post-strike period and the ascendancy of management
hardliners described previously. However, the character of change at
Selby was also influenced by the specific nature of the production
problems. Equally, the strength of the workforce's resistance initially
at least reflected its knowledge of the centrality of the Selby mine to
BC's operations and the strength which this accorded to them.
Incentives: the emergence of the Selby Agreement
The main cause of the disputes after 1985 lay in the operation of the
bonus system. Prior to the national strike, Selby operated the
Yorkshire Area agreement, the local variant of the 1977/8 Area
Incentive Agreement. This agreement applied to drivages and to the
only face in operation at that time, Als at Wistow. Many disputes
occurred under the terms of this agreement, including stoppages on Als
(see Thomas, 1983). In the period since the strike BC have introduced
a number of alternatives to the Yorkshire Area agreement, the most
widely publicised being the 'Doncaster Option' discussed in chapter 4.
The pioneering aspect of the Doncaster Option from BC's viewpoint was
that it introduced payments based on tonnes produced rather than
yards advanced.
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The Doncaster Option has provided a model for management to introduce
locally based variations 17 . At Selby management in the post-strike
period have moved, somewhat gradually, in the direction of the
Doncaster Option. A new incentive agreement was introduced at the
end of 1987, coinciding with the appointment of Albert Tuke as Area
Director. This agreement was nominally a tonnage based one: bonus
was to be paid according to a tonnage scale, but this was expressed in
strips at standard web depth or metres at standard web depth. Slight
variations of this scheme were introduced at all the mines as they came
into production. In contrast to the existing bonus arrangements face
workers were not to be compensated for delays unless they lasted for
longer than 50 per cent of MAT. Under the revised system introduced
at Riccall, the face rate at standard (determined by method study) was
raised from £7 (as under the Yorkshire agreement) to £14, in order to
compensate for the loss of payments for delays. To obtain the pit
bonus, the rate at standard was calculated on the basis of 87 per cent
of the face rate at standard, so that if both faces achieved standard
(fl4 per shift) the pit bonus would be £12.18. Non-face workers would
then receive their allotted percentage of this figure. For those outbye,
' 7The Doncaster Option was introduced because BC recognised that
local union branches had wrung significant concessions on pay from
management under the Yorkshire agreement, to the extent that by 1981, in
terms of the national coalfields league table, Doncaster pits earned the
second highest average incentive pay for the seventh highest area
performance. In 1984 BC's senior management called on Area directors to
suggest alterations to the existing incentive arrangements. In response
to this three (then) area directors - Albert Tuke, John Northard and Ken
Moses - suggested a 'task achieved bonus' for installation work, and a
'tonnage achieved bonus' for others, based on saleable ouput. These
suggestions formed the basis of the Doncaster Option (see NUN, 1986).
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full shift delays on either face were compensated at 75 per cent of the
shift average18.
One aim of the new scheme was clearly to increase incentives at the
face, although, in practice, it served also to exacerbate the existing
dissatisfaction which translated into disputes. In particular, while
facemen could make good bonuses, stoppages reduced the pit average.
This meant that those working elsewhere below ground often took home
very small bonus payments. The system resolved very little for BC,
and generated a number of disputes. A new scheme was proposed in
the summer of 1989 which was introduced at Riccall and after some
resistance extended to other mines in the complex with Stillingfleet the
last to sign up. The new system is explicitly tonnage based.
Although formally the result of negotiations between unions and
management, the scheme was regarded by some branch officials as worse
than the system it replaced. Under this scheme - the Selby Mines
Incentive Bonus Agreement - the tonnage stipulated is revenue tonnage
with an ash content of 18 per cent or less. Bonus payments begin
when 16000t are produced for which £8 per shift is paid, with
increments of 50p per 1,000t following. In the event of the standard
8The new scheme provoked a number of stoppages. All 3,000 Selby
miners struck for a week in early 1987 over bonus payments and 'jackboot
management' in action estimated to have cost BC £1.5m. Management had
stopped a week's bonus after one day walkout in protest at the visit of
Robert Siddall (Yorkshire Evening Post, 16.2.87). In January 1988 800
men struck at Wistow after claiming that management had failed to take
into account production problems and conveyor stoppages in the bonus
calculation for the previous week (Yorkshire Evening Post, 28.1.88).
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not being met, the £8 acts as a fall back rate under the following
circumstances: full cooperation is obtained from the workforce and there
are no disputes; developments perform to standard; and a local dispute
procedure is agreed and abided by. Faceworkers receive a supplement
for each percentage point above 90 per cent of the agreed standard
performance. Other measurable work is renumerated under separate
contracts. A 100 per cent payment of £10 per shift is paid, with a fall
back rate of £6.50. However, no allowance is made for delays or
redeployments under this system, except full shift delays. Finally, all
bonus earners can earn a lump sum based on pit performance. The
payment is £125 payable at the end of any financial quarter achieving
an average 50,000t per week during the thirteen weeks of the quarter.
If the annual tonnage averages 45,000 a week or more (based on 50
weeks) a lump sum will be paid at the end of the financial year
according to a scale. Theoretically, it is possible to earn £1,250 if an
average 60,000t is produced per week. However, this bonus is only
paid for 100 per cent attendance and is forfeited if any industrial action
occurs during the period in question19.
9This system did not resolve the motivation issue at Selby along
the lines suggested by Richardson and Wood's (1988) study in South
Yorkshire. Levels of morale among non-face and development workers
remained low. At Gascoigne Wood, for instance, bonus is calculated
according to the complex average. Branch off icals pointed out that while
all pits at the complex will at some stage make good money when
production is high, the fact there are always pits which are doing badly
brings the complex average down. Workers at Gascoigne Wood it seems,
will always find it difficult to earn high bonuses. The motivation of
face teams has been questioned when they are on the failback rate. One
mine manager revealed his frustration: 'These [high] earnings will only
be achieved by a determination to earn, to go forward from fall back to
earning money and not by anybody taking the view that he will not work
(Footnote Continued)
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The Selby Agreement, therefore, has two main features; firstly, miners
wages were more closely linked to the performance of the pit and,
secondly, through its stipulations concerning the ash content of ROM
output and industrial action, and its lack of payments for delays, it
integrates more closely the payment system with the broader imperative
of ensuring continuous production. In short, the costs of production
shortfalls are placed more squarely on the shoulders of the workforce.
On the face of it, the new agreement represents a step backwards for
the workforce, and prompts the question of why the union branches
agreed to its introduction. In fact, acceptance of the scheme took much
longer at some pits - notably Stillingfleet - than others. The
introduction of the scheme was effected first at Riccall mine. Some
union officials claim that Riccall represents the 'weak link' in the union
structure at Selby and accuse the branch there of having a cosy
relationship with management and it does seem that management have
used Riccall as a stalking horse for a variety of innovations in work
practices at Selby such as the use of ad hoc contracts20.
(Footnote Continued)
enthusiastically if he is on faliback. Taking that stance is only likely
to prolong the period of time we are on fallback'.
201n fact the politics of industrial relations at Riccall are
complex. The management's ability to secure the agreement of the branch
for the Selby Agreement reflects an accommodative relationship between
management and union. This appears to reflect, in large part, the
influence of one man - Steve Widdrington - a respected former union
official at Riccall who following the defeat of the miners' strike
joined the management. Widdrington has been instrumental in attempting
to create a new climate of non-conflictual industrial relations there.
Widdrington is a controversial figure who had previously been prominent
in the Left in the Yorkshire NUN. At his previous pit, Park Hill, he
(Footnote Continued)
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Management at Riccall were assisted by the traditions of moderation
established in the earliest days of the mine by the branch officials, of
whom many were Newmarket men. On the basis of this relationship the
workforce at Riccall were apparently persuaded to accept the new bonus
arrangement. The fact that following the introduction of the Selby
Agreement at Riccall in September 1989, workers there made large
bonuses appears to have persuaded the workforce at other mines to
accept it. While there was dissatisfaction with the new agreement,
reflected most obviously in the resistance of Stillingfleet branch, the
gradual acceptance of the Selby Agreement in 1989/90 appeared to
signal the beginning of a quieter period of labour relations at Selby.
This new found quiescence reflected the outcome of struggles over
coaling in overtime at Selby.
The push for flexibility
Management have attempted to introduce forms of flexible work practices
which appear to complement those made necessary by the introduction of
new technology. In the period following the strike management at the
complex attempted to introduce craftsmen as machine operators (similar
to Kern and Schumann's 'production mechanic'). A particular effort
(Footnote Continued)
was branch secretary alongside Ken Capetick a prominent figure in
national Left, who later became a branch official of the militant
Stillingfleet NUN. Widdrington had been a prominent organiser of strike
activities during 1984/5 including the celebrated blockade of the Selby
toll bridge. Winterton and Winterton (1989: 237) suggest that his
defection to management was a blow to the 'credibility' of the Left at
Selby. Whether or not this is true, his role in events at Riccall and in
the complex as a whole is important.
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was made at Riccall where management expressed a desire to have
fitters operating machines, in order that they could utilise their
knowledge of machine tolerances during production. The NUM branch
opposed this policy and even 'sent to Coventry' two craftsmen prepared
to cooperate with management. The opposition of the union was enough
to scupper the plan at that stage.
A high degree of temporal flexibility is obtained at Selby through the
use of overtime. The rapid growth in the use of overtime by
management as a key production factor has been charted as a general
feature of the post-strike period. Selby is no exception to this rule.
Overtime earnings now comprise a high proportion of the miner's
earnings at Selby and assume even greater significance when bonus
payments are low. Overtime earnings can be used also as an important
means of disciplining labour. A faceworker observed:
A lot of lads at our pit are living from week to week. A hell
of a lot of lads are living on strap [debt]. I mean its a social
thing, but they'll see things, maybe a new car and they'll go
out and get some strap and buy it. I mean its never easier to
get strap than it is now. A lot of them don't work out their
money to their basic wage. That is the biggest problem. A lot
of them think: if I work Saturday/Sunday this week, I'll make
so much. And they [the management] know this. They know
who they can go to. There's one head overman and his
biggest quote is: I'll remember that when t'weekend comes
round. Meaning you'll not get any overtime. And that's what
goes off.
Despite the widespread use of overtime at Selby, coaling in overtime
appears to be far less common at Selby than in the North East.
Although facemen report that 'if things are going well', they are often
asked to stay to cover dead periods between shifts, very little coal
production has taken place at weekend, except in the case of in-seam
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drivages. This clearly reflects an attempt to overcome the technical
problems, notably the relative slowness of drivages, described earlier.
It seems slightly ironic that B C called for continuous coaling in order to
operate highly capital intensive mines economically, yet at Selby there
are technical obstacles to achieving this. In contrast where levels of
investment are comparatively low, such as in the North East, continuous
coaling has been systematised to a much higher degree.
Contractors
The widespread use of contractors was institutionalised at Selby from
the outset and this was justified on grounds of cost. Contractors were
responsible for the main development work at the complex including the
drivage of the spine roads and the opening up of each pit prior to
British Coal workers taking over coal getting activities. During the
period of fieldwork, contractors were involved in opening out North
Selby mine and driving the connecting road to the spine tunnels.
Contractors continued to be used on a large scale for any works
connected with the spine tunnels such as the backrips described
earlier.
Given these considerations it was striking to discover that contract
workers, by everybody's estimation, were earning significantly more
than their British Coal counterparts. According to contract workers,
such firms appeared unconcerned by the size of their wage bill:
I wouldn't work if I was undercutting NCB lads, but we were
earning more.. .We were going in there for some jobs and they
were saying: get in there. And we'd say: what's the bonus?
They'd say £20 a shift. And we'd look, like. And they'd say:
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gan on we'll give you £25 per shift. You didn't have to prove
owt. Obviously you had to get yards out or they'd sharp
show you where your jacket was. But they weren't coming in
and measuring you up or owt. You could be on £20 per shift
on a promise, not if you get there, like - its yours. Nothing
was on the measure21.
The production process in the development areas operated by the
contractors was labour intensive. Outside of the spine roads most
tunnelling was achieved through shotfiring. A great deal of the
development process was carried out on the basis of 'spade work' and
what North East miners term 'handballing': large groups of men were
used to move heavy items of plant by dragging them with chains,
whereas elsewhere in Selby FSV's would be used. The contractors
tended to operate without demarcations and there was disquiet among
contract workers about unsafe working practices in these areas. High
rates of effort were maintained by the threat of instant dismissal and
by what a contract miner termed the 'macho ethic' of work groups.
The sophisticated monitoring technology used in the main coal-producing
parts of the complex operated by BC itself were wholly absent and the
work rate was maintained by the presence of the contract foreman22.
2 This informant was a former Durham miner who commuted daily with
two colleagues from the North East to Whitemoor and then North Selby
while employed by Cementation during the development of the mines. North
East miners provided a large part of the contract workforce during the
later development stages of the mine.
22The development rate achieved by contractors remained
substantially below that of BC itself. In the week ending 19.5.90 BC
achieved a rate of advance of 3m per shift, while contractors achieved
1.33m per shift (Source: figures supplied by BC).
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As the mines were opened the presence of contract firms was reduced.
However major use of contractors continued to be made at Gascoigne
Wood. Large numbers of contractors were employed on the backrips in
the spine tunnels mentioned earlier and in the maintenance of belts and
other outbye equipment. A large number of maintenance tasks were
contracted out. For instance, locomotive maintenance is carried out by
Hunslet, the loco manufacturer. According to NUM officials at
Gascoigne Wood some 600 of the 700 strong workforce there are contract
workers. Here also contract workers were earning more than the BC
employees. The use of contract workers, though, held a number of
advantages for BC. In theory at least it allows flexibility through the
exact matching of the workforce to production requirements. In
addition, the use of contractors seems to assist labour control. The
rippers in the spine tunnels at Gascoigne Wood are potentially among
the most powerful group of workers in the complex given their strategic
role. However, there are enormous difficulties in acting on this power,
because the companies for which they work are, in the words of one
contract worker, 'hire and fire merchants'.
Work at Selby
Work rates at Selby are highly intensive. This work rate is
engendered by the effects of the bonus systems described earlier, and
by a sense, apparently shared by all workers, that all aspects of their
performance are being monitored. A Wistow face electrician described
how these pressures extend into the management hierarchy:
To be fair to the overman on the face, they know Big
Brother's watching them. They can't say: 'they're timbering
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above the chocks' when they're not. . .they've got to tell them
what things are stood for.23
To the extent that monitoring technology is embodied in all plant, the
pace of work is dictated to an increasing degree by the machinery
itself. The high level of automation at Selby might suggest that effort
levels might be reduced but remote monitoring and the bonus system
ensure this is not the case. Effort rates are of a new, rather different
order, as these comments from a Riccall branch official:
You're on your go twice as much. Whether you're working
physically harder is a different thing. . .Its more continuous,
rather than more vigorous, like.
The essence of Selby is that work and technology appear to be
integrated to a qualitatively greater degree. However, the notion that
automation will follow its onward march seems highly suspect on the
available evidence. As far as coal production is concerned the notion
of the worker's role as one of iterative interventions designed merely to
optimise machine performance seems as elusive as full automation itself.
8. CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this chapter, it was suggested that, in some
degree, Selby could be conceived of as a post-Fordist mine. Born of
the technical modernisation strategy of the late 1970s and the early
23The same man reported his resentment at his work patterns and
work rate being determined from a remote point: 'I don't need somebody
telling me its broke down - I know its broke down. I don't need somebody
up my arse saying find the fault - I'm trying to find the fault. Its my
job to find it.'
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1980s, it aspired explicitly to the regulated flow production of the
automated factory. The hopes embodied in this vision led some
commentators to make great claims for the productive capacity of Selby.
Prior and McCloskey (1988) argued that the existing mine infrastructure
and surface facilities at Selby could handle more than the planned
annual output of lOmt. Similarly, they estimate that installed face
equipment at each mine is capable of producing close to maximum
potential. Operated on the basis on six day working, they estimate
that the Selby mine could produce up to 2Omtpa.
However, the evidence offered in the main body of this chapter would
require such statements to be treated with extreme caution. The
Selby Concept was based on a over-confidence about existing levels of
technical prowess, combined with optimistic assessments of the geological
structure of the coalfield. It seems clear that an initial belief that the
geology of the coal deposits in the Vale of York was relatively
unproblematic, led the then NCB to plans its development on the basis
of maximum use of automated techniques. This option was pursued in
the more or less explicit hope that the 'factoryization' of coal
production, which has been the aim of the industry since powerloading
was conceived, could be achieved there. However, production has been
less than trouble-free and has been complicated by the unexpected
quality problem.
The quality problem itself renders Prior and McCloskey's predictions for
2Omtpa output suspect. In 1989/90 Selby despatched 5.6mt to Drax
power station and planned to send 6.6mt in 1990/91. Newly installed
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barrel washers have the capability to handle 20,000t of coal per week,
sufficient to wash 4mt of run of mine - only half 8mt required to
despatch 6. 6mt of coal at 18 per cent ash. BC management maintain
that average dirt content of run of mine will fall as major development
work is completed. They argue that as revenue production develops
the amount of 'clean' coal cut from faces (with a 14.5 per cent ash
content) will increase in proportion to dirtier drivage coal and less
washing will be required (International Coal Report, 23.3.90). Even
this may prove to be optimistic, however, when it is borne in mind that
BC is already using batch disposal of development dirt (Siddall, 1989)
suggesting that the problem of dirt produced at the face and in in-seam
drivages will still be significant. The problem of ensuring adequate
development rates also suggests that caution should be exercised when
predicting future performance levels, notwithstanding the proposed rise
in development rates to the projected 80,000m in 1990/91.
Plans to increase output will in any event prove pointless unless BC
can contain costs. In the financial year to 1989/90 the four currently
producing Selby mines lost a combined £123.4m on a bottom line cost
basis. Costs of production remained stubbornly high at Selby. In the
34 weeks to November 12 1989 bottom line costs of production (operating
cost plus interest payments) in North Yorkshire Area (which at that
time included Selby) were £2.29/gj, the second highest in the country.
This reflects the high level of investment at Selby (for an indicator of
which see Table 6.3) resulting in high capital charges. More worrying
from BC's viewpoint is the fact that operating costs remained above
those of every other coalfield except South Wales and Scotland. In the
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North Yorkshire in the 34 weeks to November 1989 operating costs were
£1 .81/gj, compared, for example, to the North East area's operating
cost of £1.47 (and bottom line cost of £1.51). BC announced a change
in their accounting procedures to a 'cash cost' system from July 1990,
which placed greater emphasis on cash flow rather than costs of coal
produced. On this basis the fortunes of Selby mines are transformed,
so that Riccall and Wistow are producing at 9Op/gj, Stillingfleet at £1/gj
and Whitemoor £1.20/gj. BC estimated that, on this basis, in the
financial year 1991/92, the complex would move into profit (International
Coal Report, 23.3.90). Whether this remains an accounting sleight of
hand unconnected to real progress in production performance remains to
be seen.
Where real changes have occurred is in the sphere of industrial
relations. The pre-strike period represented an attempt to create an
accommodative industrial relations at Selby, which was in part a
development of the traditions of corporatism which had characterised the
coal industry since nationalisation. The early period of Selby's
development was accompanied by vague notions that a new type of
labour force was required to operate the complex. However, progress
in this direction was limited and ill-thought out. Moreover such
attempts as were made were frustrated by, above all, the events of
1984/5. Following the miners' struggle against the NCB's colliery
closure programme the possibilities of an accommodative relationship
between unions and management at Selby were reduced. This reflected
the ascendancy within management - at both national level and at Selby
itself - of hardliners (represented locally through Tuke and Siddall)
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who were dedicated to altering the balance of power in the industry
firmly in favour of management. Attempts, therefore, to introduce
cooperative work practices, such as ATS, could have only limited
success. Despite the hopes of some members of management at Selby
for a new 'post-Fordist' labour bargain, the dominant faction
reproduced the Thatcherite rhetoric of 'asserting management's right to
manage'.
Despite the collapse of the strike at Selby, the workforce proved
militant following the resumption of work. However, management were
able to inflict a serious defeat on the union, when it sacked Ted Scott,
a leading figure in the NUM in July 1987. Scott was sacked for
instructing miners at Wistow not to carry out weekend coaling - a key
management objective. The incident occurred at the same time as the
dispute over BC's new disciplinary code at Frickley in South Yorkshire.
At the height of the Frickley dispute, Albert Tuke wrote to all North
Yorkshire miners warning they would be liable to disciplinary action if
they struck over Scott's dismissal. The issue of Scott's sacking became
submerged in the wider debate about what action should be taken
against the disciplinary code and no action was taken in Scott's
defence. The significance of the dispute was largely that it was borne
of a union attempt to place limits on management's drive for flexibility.
Management took up the cudgels with enthusiasm and according to one
member of management, Scott was sacked as an example to the
workforce and the union. The union's failure to defend Scott appears
to have represented a watershed in the post-strike fortunes of the
union and workforce at Selby with a decline in the level of militancy,
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although disputes have not been completely eradicated. The Selby
industrial chaplain, the Rev. Gwynne Richardson, suggested this
reflected a 'spirit of resignation' on the part of the workforce (quoted
in Colliery Guardian, September 1988). In any event it is in the
context of this defeat that the Selby Agreement was negotiated. It was
certainly possible to detect an air of demoralisation among those workers
to whom I spoke in late 1989 and early 1990.
Although in the post-strike period management appear to have set out
to achieve a more quiescent workforce, given the production problems
which management face at Selby this situation may prove
counterproductive. It is doubtful whether a production facility of the
complexity of Selby can achieve optimum performance on this basis.
In the summer of 1991 a flurry of publicity surrounded Selby most of
which tended to confirm the findings of this chapter. British Coal were
forced to respond to allegations that Selby had proved to be a
'geological nightmare', that it was unlikely to repay the costs of
development, that Selby coal was being blended with North East output
to make it acceptable to power station customers and that because of
these factors the coalfield would close within 20 years (Private Eye,
16.8.91). British Coal admitted the coalfield 'has proved to have faults
that are perhaps greater than any other coalfield in Britain' (Northern
Echo, 16.8.91). Throughout 1990/91 management at Selby struggled
with production costs which averaged £1.80/g-j. BC stated their belief
that costs would fall to £1 .45/gj in 1991/2 with output planned to rise
from 5. lmt to 6. 8mt - somewhat short of 20mtpa suggested by Prior and
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McCloskey. Some hopeful signs for management lay in the fact that
profits for the first quarter of 1991 were £17m compared with a full
year forecast of about £20m. At the same time union officials at the
complex reported an improvement in the industrial relations climate with
less aggressive management and improved pay (Financial Times,
19.8.91). Whether these developments provide the basis for the stable
development of Selby over the long period remains an open question.
A comparative assessment of the pattern of restructuring in Selby and
the North East is presented in Chapter Seven. In addition Chapter
Seven analyses the features of the labour process at Selby in relation
to the debates about the impact of microelectronics on the nature of
work in large scale industry.
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80. COt	 81. OOt*
4x450/650	 4x450/72 0
£5xn	 £9m
ThBLE 6.1
SUB! NflQE
cparative Face tta for the Selby Qirplex
1983
Number of Faces per machine: 5
Average bp. per machine: 	 400
Estimated output:
	 2,000t
Estimated face productivity
(CS):	 43.65t
Powered roof supports:	 4x450
Estimated value of face: 	 £3.7m
1987	 1990
3	 3
400/500
5,000t
* Actual figure.
Source: Prior an McCloskey (1988); BC data privately supplied.
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TABlE 6.2
SBY XE
Investnnt per n i books, North Yorkshire area ar Selby (f)
Heavy Dity	 Total Area
Selby* Elsewhere Total	 Selby* Elsewhere Total
1981/2	 -	 191	 189
1982/3	 -	 412	 399
1983/4	 4,996	 172	 425
1984/5	 4,382	 263	 527
1985/6	 -	 117	 106
1986/7	 1,548	 373	 557
1987/8	 5,834	 529	 1,510
346,161
178,539
91,192
29,317
39,312
41,170
50,620
4,886
6,132
5,144
1,327
2,981
3,247
2,307
9,497
11,317
9,658
3,160
6,429
9,175
11,234
*gj on men on books at Selby only.
Source: Haynes (1989: 369).
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TABLE 6.3
ST1 HE
Prodirtion I1ays far Selby Mire (se1&±1 data)
Mine	 Weekly production	 Lost tiii	 Lost time
(t)	 (Minutes)	 (%)
Rica1l	 60,955	 1,789	 17.0
Stillingfleet	 72,471	 2,400	 22.8
Wistcz (H37)
	 45,463	 798	 15.2
Stllingfleet	 47,179	 952	 18.1
(H202)
Source: Moore (1990: 373)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
1. INTRODUCTION
This concluding chapter begins with an assessment of the significance
of the case study material and compares and contrasts the divergent
patterns of restructuring in each case. The subsequent sections take
up the themes outlined in Chapters Two and Three in the light of the
empirical and conceptual arguments about the contemporary
transformation of work which were presented in the earlier part of the
thesis. Three broad conclusions are emphasised. Firstly, the value of
analysing the present restructuring in terms of a transition from
Fordism to post-Fordism is questioned, especially in relation to the
supposed emergence of a new type of skilled work. Instead, the limited
forms of the new competencies are emphasised and the potentials for
intensification are stressed. Secondly, the notion that present
restructuring is strongly biased towards the emergence of a
'post-conflictual' labour process is examined, both in the light of the
evidence from coal, and at a broader conceptual level. It is suggested,
instead, that inherited patterns of conflict and accommodation are
crucial in determining trajectories of change. One conclusion arising
from these discussions is that history and geography (and the
interrelations between them) place important constraints on the direction
of restructuring. A final look is taken at restructuring in Britain with
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the aim of answering the question of whether Thatcherism was and is
the only solution to the problems of British industry in general and the
coal industry in particular. The possibilities of an alternative are
sketched.
2. THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE STUDIES
Contemporary workplace change in coalmining acted upon and, in many
ways, deepened an older trajectory of change. The process of
mechanisation in coalmining began in the inter-war period and
intensified in the post-war period. Mechanisation eventually proceeded
around the technology of powerloading (sometimes referred to as
'semi-continuous mining'). Although mechanisation did give rise to an
increase in productivity this was not sustained. The attention of
managers and engineers began to focus on discontinuities in the
production process. The coal-getting process was subject to technical
limits reflected in production delays. Simultaneously, managers were
vexed by problems of alleged labour indiscipline. In part,
management's labour concerns arose from the exercise of workplace job
controls and, more generally, traditions of solidaristic workplace
bargaining which reflected an ancient pattern of labour relations.
In the 1970s, a programme of technical change was initiated which had
two complimentary features. On the one hand, the general principles of
concentrating production on ever more mechanised longwall faces were
deepened through the development and introduction of heavy duty
mining equipment. On the other hand, microelectronic monitoring and
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control technologies were developed and progressively introduced. The
use of microelectronics was an attempt to overcome the proneness of the
production process to interruption and to ensure a high rate of
utilisation of new heavy duty faces. Given management's perception of
the productivity problem as a problem of labour indiscipline,
opportunities were taken in the development of the technology to build
in an enhanced degree of managerial control over the production
process.
The programme of technical change and productive expansion was
concentrated in the central coalfield from the 1960s - a process which
was intensified with development of heavy duty technology. It was in
these coalfields that geological conditions, with coal lying in thick and
unfolded seams, were thought to be best suited to the new forms of
mechanised production. The heavy duty mechanisation process,
therefore, did not have a major impact on the North East. Automation
of some plant occurred but was of a limited kind and did not reflect the
leading edge of change embodied in the ATM strategy (systems such as
CIS-VAX were absent). A more limited pattern of technical change did
underpin a gradual concentration of production on fewer faces, but the
types of technology which might have helped the North East were not at
the centre of the technical change strategy.
The paradox is that on the basis of this strategy the North East moved
into profit. Productivity rose rapidly after the miners' strike but on
the basis of an intensification of labour - an outcome engendered
largely by a real and justified fear of pit closures on the part of the
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workforce - rather than a programme of technical change around the
principles of heavy duty mining. Productivity levels, however,
remained low by national levels, reflecting the low level of investment in
the coalfield. In turn, however, low levels of investment meant a low
level of capital repayment charges and this laid the basis for short-term
profitability, but did not lay the basis for long-term economic viability.
Moreover, increased concentration of production on fewer faces sowed
the seeds of future disaster by exacerbating the effects of production
stoppages.
In many ways, Selby provides a striking contrast to the North East.
Selby was designed to incorporate the new production principles of
heavy duty mining equipment and advanced technology mining, which
promised a highly integrated and automated production system. 'The
Selby Concept' was conceived on a grand scale around optimistic
assumptions about the geology of the coaLfield and this was the origin
of its later problem. Geological problems meant that the production
process was subject to unexpected disruption. The impact of the
delays was exacerbated by the capital-intensive and highly automated
character of the production process: concentration of production on few
faces - in Selby's case reflecting management's unshakable faith in the
abilities of new technology - meant stoppages had an immediate and
large effect on output. Output losses and high capital charges meant
the financial performance of the complex was poor despite high levels of
productivity.
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Selby was developed around the pursuit of large scale production
designed to give economies of scale. The ATM strategy was designed
mainly to ensure high utilisation levels of this expensive plant. For
various reasons, there was a strong tendency to attempt to incorporate
skills into machinery and there is considerable evidence that where
possible increased managerial control over the workforce made possible
by microprocessor technology was designed into equipment. In some
important cases, though, notably autosteering, the automation of human
skills was only partially achieved. However, where space remained for
the deployment of traditional skills, management and engineers tended
to see the opportunity for further automation. Current research
focuses on 'robotisation' of face activities:
The 'robot' shearer will be programmed to cut a horizon, set
by the machine attendant and lodged in a shearer gate
computer. Once programmed the machine will perform each
successive shear to the pre-set pattern and will only be
changed thereafter should the machine attendant determine
the need for correction to the programme. . . The ultimate aim
is to work the coalface with one monitor-man in attendance at
the face and a gateroad operative as his sentry, together
with shift supervisor and maintenance (Brabbins, 1990: 301).
Although suggestions had been made in the earliest days of the
planning of Selby that new types of labour would be required for the
mine, in practice this seems to have been limited to the selection of a
workforce with a moderate bargaining tradition, and even this waned
after the strike. Management's attitude toward workforce and unions
hardened after the strike. Given this underlying feature of
management's attitude to its workf'orce, it is hardly surprising that the
technical problems of the complex were added to by persistent labour
problems, even after the defeat of the 1984/5 strike. Subsequent
efforts to create a culture of cooperation in the battle for productivity
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and quality were stymied because of the climate of conflict in industrial
relations.
3. FORDISM, POST-FORDISM OR A FALSE DICHOTOMY?
The evidence from British coalmining does little to bolster the claims of
those who identify the emergence of a new 'industrial paradigm' based
on the widespread use of microelectronics in industrial processes and,
instead, cautions against theorisations which emphasise sharp
discontinuities in industrial practice. The post-Fordist thesis has
tended to emphasise the emergence of a new industrial paradigm based
on decentralised forms of production organisation and control. This
industrial paradigm is underpinned by the potentialities of
microelectronic technologies and the claim that these technologies reach
their full economic potential when the autonomy of workers or groups of
workers is guaranteed. As Elger (1990) has noted, however, such
'transformational' accounts and 'positive' accounts are buttressed more
by the polemical and overdrawn contrasts they make than by a
recognition of the complexity and equivocation of actual restructuring.
The conceptual discussion and the empirical evidence in this thesis
suggests a different interpretation of the changes occurring in monopoly
capitalism. The main direction in innovations in production control is
toward further integration, arising from the time saving imperative
expressed in Taylorism and Fordism. The main trend in technical
change in large scale industry represents the pursuit of the
optimisation of production time and the better management of the
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production flow. The widespread use of information technology in
production is aimed mainly at this end of improving the productive flow
and reducing idle and unproductive time, thus increasing machine
utifisation rates. However, this process is not underpinned by the use
of microelectronics alone. Japanese manufacturers of mass produced
standardised goods began the pursuit of this end before
microelectronics were available on a large scale. Moreover, most
commentators agree that Japanese industrial success owes more to the
organisation of labour processes than to a particular technological
system. The varied and uneven character of the pursuit of this end is
captured by the idea that managements engage in the constant search
for time and control economies, but that this has many forms and
diverse outcomes.
The dominant pattern of change in skills and work practices tends to
reflect management's interest in the integration of the production
process, rather than the recreation of craft skills to meet differentiated
demand. Growing capital intensity and integration of the production
process increases managerial concern with machine utilisation and, at
times, has led to limited, heavily circumscribed extensions of workplace
autonomy to liberate creative aspects of workers abilities, in an effort
to promote a concern among workers with optimising production
processes.
These tendencies are highlighted in the case of coal. The
mechanisation of longwall mining was an attempt to emulate a kind of
Fordism. Although, the labour process in coalmining was built on the
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legacy of a craft past, mechanisation gradually eroded the craft
elements of the labour process, in effect establishing the real
subordination of labour. In coal, though the use of scientific
management was gradually extended, its actual application was mediated
by pre-existing patterns of worker autonomy and job controls, which
tended to be reformulated to meet the demands of mechanisation.
Technical change in coal occurred on a large scale in the late 1970s and
1980s, but in ways which extended the principles of flow production
and in ways which minimised human skills. Deepening capital intensity
and the discontinuous nature of mining generated managemenVs
heightened concern with the wide application of microelectronics.
The recent technical change around the use of microelectronics is slowly
altering the character of work in coalmining is ways which workers
clearly understand. The nature of change is most clearly discernible in
the case of maintenance work at Selby. A complex process of change
revolves around the automation of key aspects of skilled work and the
extension of limited competencies to previously semi-skilled workers.
The prognostication for maintenance skills in mines organised around
HDME/ATM principles appears to be for the emergence of new type of
semi-skilled work. The human content of the maintenance process is
less and less concerned with fault finding and diagnosis, which is
subject to automation, and more emphasis is placed on rapid changes of
faulty equipment, reflecting the general emphasis on ensuring the
continuity of production. Selby itself might therefore be seen as a
neo-Fordist (le. only a limited departure from Fordist principles),
rather than post-Fordist workplace. This pattern of change lays the
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basis for an intensification of the labour process, along the lines
suggested in Chapter Two, section six.
Intensification of some mining labour processes may be a function of
new automated technologies, but, more generally reflected the altered
balance of power between management and labour following the defeat of
the miners' strike. This is evidenced by the fact that surveillance
technologies existed in some pits prior to the strike without resulting in
a productivity breakthrough. In the post-strike period such
technologies, however, were used to facilitate a general tightening of
work practices in the face of weakened unions. This raises a further
conceptual point. Computerisation does not, as the IfS suggests, itself
lead to the 'final subsumption of labour' (see Chapter Two). The
subordination of labour is not guaranteed by superior forms of
electronic information generation, but remains open and subject to
contest and is a function of the prevailing balance of class forces.
4. CLASS CONFLICT AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
The evidence of this study suggests that industrial change remains a
socially bargained and often contested process. In the case of coal the
progress of restructuring owed far more to historically received
patterns of interest determination and conflict and accommodation than
any inherent properties of the technology. It is this factor which helps
to accounts for a large measure of the unevenness which is embedded in
the process of restructuring and which belies attempts to identify a new
universal, 'post-Fordist' pattern of rationalisation.
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Periods characterised by qualitative developments in the pattern of
industrial restructuring, it seems, have tended to be characterised
simultaneously by profound pessimism and unbridled optimism about
about the potentialities of new technologies and forms of production
neither of which, in my view, are justified. Around the time of the
emergence of new forms of production based around the principles of
scientific management and assembly lines - 'Fordism' - such a
polarisation of view occurred. Clarke (1990) has shown how many
contemporary critics of capitalist exploitation welcomed the arrival of
Fordist forms of production as evidence of a ripening of the forces of
production and a deepening socialisation of the relations of production.
Gramsci and Lenin, for instance, believed that the immanent tendencies
within the capitalist organisation of industry were essentially
progressive. For revolutionaries of the period the task of politics was
to create a social superstructure which reflected this development of the
economic substructure. Nevertheless, for the communists of the
inter-war period the process of social and economic change remained one
which was characterised by conflicts arising from the different material
interests of social groups involved in production.
In one crucial respect, then, the terrain of the present debates is
significantly different to. those which accompanied the emergence of
Fordism. For the post-Fordist thesis, exemplified in the
pronouncements of Marxism Today, the notion that the restructuring
process is fundamentally conflict-ridden is abjured. Conflict only really
matters at the margins of change, because restructuring occurs
according to 'inescapable lines of tendency' (Hall, 1985). These lines
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of tendency are defined, largely, by the properties of new technology
which, in their very nature, propel new skill requirements. In this
study, however, it has been seen that restructuring remains contested
because new technologies are introduced by firms primarily to help in
their struggle for competitive advantage, not in order to humanise the
workplace.	 Clarke's conclusion, therefore, is validated:
Post-Fordist technologies can no more liberate the working
class than could the technology of Fordism because the
working class is not exploited and oppressed by technology
but by capitalism (Clarke, 1990: 150).
This point is further illustrated by the examination of the biases
inscribed into the national patterns of restructuring in the UK, Japan
and Germany. In the UK case restructuring has occurred in the
context of a weakening of organised labour during the 1980s, a process
exemplified by restructuring in the coal industry. In Japan, the
competitively successful forms of industrial organisation are based on
the structural weakness of Japanese company unionism, a weakness
which reflects defeats suffered by radical trade unions in the period
after 1945, which means there are few brakes on management's
rationalisation efforts.
In the German case an opposite set of tendencies appear to be at work.
While industrial modernisation, reflected in investment in advanced
process technologies, has resulted in the emergence a high wage/high
productivity virtuous circle in key areas of manufacturing, this does
not reflect the benign features of the technology but the pattern of
class conflict and accommodation which is embodied in the German
system of industrial relations.	 The legal framework of German
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industrial relations makes it difficult for firms there to lay off workers.
Moreover, the co-determination of industrial relations through the works
council system forces German employers to include the views of unions
in planned rationalisation and modernisation. The productivity
performance of the German economy and the extensively negotiated
pattern of technical change largely reflect management's recognition of
these constraints in their activities. German firms, therefore, are more
likely to plan labour requirements over a long period. Also, German
firms have responded to the constraints on their operations by moving
into high value-added production. This becomes a virtuous circle as
the firms gain lucrative and stable markets and this forms the basis for
longer term planning of industrial change (Lane, 1987; Streeck, 1985)1.
5. LIMITS OF THATCHERISM AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Men make their own history but they do not make it just as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all
past generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living (Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852)
I showed in Chapter Three how the debate about the supposed
emergence of post-Fordism in Britain is bound up inextricably with the
analysis of the impact of Thatcherism on British industrial performance.
It was argned, though, that Thatcherism was not concerned with laying
This is not to argue that German workers and their unions do not
face threats (see Chapter Two). In Chapter Two, for instance, I noted
that the conflict over the reduction in working time was crucially
related to the issue of technical change. My aim, rather, is to suggest
that the legacy of historical patterns conflict and compromise in German
industrial politics have provided unions with a basis for dealing with
these challenges which British workers seem to lack.
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the foundations of post-Fordist production but with a more limited
reduction in the workplace power of trade unions, in which the rhetoric
of flexibility figured prominently.
The argument that Thatcherism orchestrated and presided over a
productivity miracle, therefore, rests on the idea that job controls
represented a break on managerial prerogative which blighted the
productivity performance of British industry - a view which was widely
held in relation to nationalised sectors like coal. While there is plenty
of evidence to suggest that Britain emerged over the post-war period as
a low-investment/low productivity economy, there is little evidence that
job controls themselves were the determining factor in this state of
affairs. Nevertheless, this interpretation of the industrial problem has
predominated and has been given added edge by the free market
rhetoric of the Thatcher governments and their ideological supporters.
Thatcherism can be seen as the apotheosis of this view of the 'British
problem'.
In Britain during the 1980s there have been important changes in forms
of work organisation, wage bargaining and payment systems. However,
there is little evidence of any determinate link between these changes
and the introduction of new technologies. Instead these changes tended
to reflect the growing strength of management and the weakened
position of labour in the prevailing recessionary conditions. In Britain
the push for 'flexibility' in labour relations and workplace organisation
has been concerned essentially with an intensification of labour on the
basis of a shift in the balance of class forces in favour of capital.
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The role of the state was important in this process. The state, and
more especially the Thatcher governments, has been central promoting a
particular view of the industrial problem as a problem of labour
indiscipline and excessive trade union power. The state, moreover,
through its promotion of a particular solution ('flexibility') to the
productivity problems of British manufacturing, has sought to provide a
'demonstration effect' for private manufacturing. The state was able to
become involved in determining the direction of restructuring in key
parts of industrial production by virtue of its ownership of important
industries.
The case of coal adds powerful supporting evidence for this argument.
The state sanctioned significant investments in new production
processes in the late-1970s to mitigate the previous run-down of the
industry. The pattern of technical change established in the 1970s,
exemplified by the Selby Concept, was characteristic of the investment
choices made by other nationalised industries in the 1970s in
capital-intensive, rigidly automated process technologies (cf. also the
discussion of BL in chapter three) which can be contrasted, for
instance, with the Japanese approach of low-cost modifications of
existing processes. Moreover, this technological choice occurred just as
the benefits of more flexible technologies were becoming apparent. The
strategies of nationalised industries did not emphasise the 'fine tuning'
of existing process technology which, at low cost, could have increased
productive efficiency in general and machine utilisation in particular.
Williams et al, (1986) argue that instead of choosing this latter approach
British Coal chose to make rhetorical public statements about modern
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manufacturing and bought in processes and plant which could not
increase efficiency because they represented risky investment in
inflexible production and placed their faith in computer monitoring to
ensure high plant utilisation rates. The evidence presented in
Chapters Five and Six certainly lends support to this argument. In the
Selby case the large investment in a highly automated mine complex has
been plagued by technical problems2.
For Williams et al, the technical choices adopted by British Coal (and
other nationalised companies) reflected an acceptance of orthodox
assumptions about the economics of western mass production and the
pursuit of economies of scale. This pursuit of scale economies was
scuppered by the collapse in demand for coal. This argument warrants
broad support on the evidence presented in this thesis, but there is
more to it than this. In part, at least, the development of the
technical choices of British Coal was an embodiment also of an obsession
with labour control issues. Thus, while the overall motive behind the
development of microelectronic-based monitoring systems was a general
concern to minimise machine downtimes, where the opportunity
presented itself, BC sought to marginalise the contribution of skilled
labour to productive efficiency. As far back as 1973 Wilfrid Miron
2The more piecemeal modernisation efforts in the North East brought
the area into profit for the first time since nationalisation, although
there is no evidence that this reflected a technological breakthrough
and, more importantly did not lay the basis for sustained competitive
success. Profitability reflected an absence of investment and in this
way the North East coalfield might be seen as a metaphor for industrial
restructuring in Britain during the 1980s.
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stressed the opportunities which BC's investment programme presented
for reducing the role and significance of human labour (especially NUM
members) in the production process. Despite the evidence which
suggests this strategy is flawed in efficiency terms, mining engineers
persist with an approach based on the automation of everything.
Was this anti-labour bias inevitably inscribed into the pattern of
restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s? Leys (1991) in a vigorous
defence of the 'new times' thesis, has argued that Thatcherism was the
only viable political solution to the crisis of the British economy by 1979
and that the subordination of labour was a necessary, though perhaps
not sufficient, condition for economic growth. However, the very
features of industrial organisation which are said to have inhibited
British industrial development (ie, union 'interference' in production)
might have provided the basis for an alternative model of restructuring.
In Chapter Three, I emphasised the positive aspects of job controls and
and stressed their historical basis in ideas of craft: the commitment to
standards of craftsmanship and the promotion of self-discipline among
small groups. In many ways there are similarities between this form of
work organisation and the types of flexible group working beloved of
the new orthodoxy: both in a sense are forms of responsible autonomy.
However, Edwards and Terry (1988) have pointed to some crucial
differences. The British model of responsible autonomy was not a
managerially inspired device: loyalty was to the craft and its standards,
not to the firms as such. The whole climate was different:
craftworkers take pride in their independence, whereas workers given
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autonomy by firms are often enmeshed in a structure in which business
needs are paramount and have little or no discretion in the deployment
of their efforts. Paradoxically, management inspired autonomy can be
an attempt to more fully subordinate workers to management - a process
illustrated graphically by the Japanese example discussed in Chapter
Two. For British firms though, with a short-term outlook and 'hire
and fire' mentality, the independent forms of control exercised by their
workers and their shop stewards were a hindrance to 'management's
right to manage'.
Edwards and Terry, surveying the post-war development of industrial
relations, suggest that reform of managements' limited perception of the
industrial problem (and its practical manifestations in short termism)
might have provided the means for developing the potentials of
responsible autonomy that existed within the British tradition of job
controls and craft practices. They argue, though, that the unions
themselves would have needed to change. In particular, in exchange
for job security unions would have had to offer flexibility across union
demarcation lines. There was, in any event, a widespread recognition
that many forms of demarcation were illogical and outmoded but it was a
distrust of management which prevented them from being given up.
While recognising that managements have made significant changes in
work organisation during the 1980s and shop stewards are less
autonomous and assertive than they were hitherto, the evidence that
the underlying character of British industrial relations has altered is
hard to find. Workplace trade unionism, while weakened, has not been
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wholly eradicated and the surge of industrial action in the late 1980s
illustrated that where grievances existed and profitability was improved,
workers would begin to reassert their interests. The pressing need to
alter the zero-sum nature of British industrial relations remains. As
Edwards and Terry note:
• initiating new forms of commitment is an expensive task, as
resources have to be devoted to communication and training
programmes, and also raises the problem of creating
resentment and distrust. Although disinclined to do so,
British managements might well gain by considering the
sources of shopfloor order and pride in workmanship to be
found in long established traditions (1988: 233).
6. WHAT FUTURE FOR COAL?
What possibility is there for this scenario to be adopted in the case of
coal. The evidence from both Selby and the North East is not
encouraging. In the North East, following the defeat of the strike,
management launched a concerted offensive against job controls,
although they presented no evidence that these were a hindrance on
productivity improvement. The operation of job controls in the North
East reflected more a concern with developed notions of fairness in the
distribution of earnings, working conditions and career progression.
Such job controls, however, did underpin traditions of solidaristic
workplace activity and, for management, they came to be seen as
something to eradicate, rather than something to build on.
Automation of skills seems central to the technical system at Selby.
Trist and Bamforth in their study of the emergence of mechanised
longwall mining suggested that, despite the erosion of the traditional
hewing skills, a particular 'mining skill' still existed:
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But the specifically mining skill of contending with
underground conditions and of maintaining a high level of
performance when difficulties arise, is developed only as a
result of several years of experience at the coalface. A work
system basically appropriate to the underground situation
requires to have built into the organisation situation the
findings of this experience (1951: 23)
The development of systems such as SHEARER and MIDAS are explicit
attempts to incorporate this knowledge into machinery, although the
case of Selby suggests the technical difficulties of achieving this. At
Selby there were attempts also to incorporate workers' knowledge of
production process into the competitive effort. However, this attempt
to engage workers into a more positive attitude toward production was
not bargained, but imposed on management's terms. Moreover, this
approach was introduced alongside the continued arbitrary exercise of
management power and tended to be marginal to management strategy.
There was no attempt by management to forge a genuine accommodation
with the unions or workforce of the type which the post-Fordist thesis
would deem necessary to operate such a capital-intensive production
unit. Quite the opposite occurred: the subordination of labour was
seen as a precondition of the successful operation of the mine. This
attitude underpinned the labour relations difficulties of the post-strike
period.
The examples of both the North East and Selby illustrate that the
production process in coal remains subject to the kinds of interruption
identified by Trist and Bamforth. Yet the development of a form of
work organisation which might elicit creative and positive responses
from the workforce in the face of such interruptions has eluded
management. 'Cooperation' has been sought wholly on management's
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terms and has been impelled by the threat of job loss due to BC's
deteriorating market position. These forms of 'cooperation' are coerced.
A further constraint on the pattern of contemporary restructuring and
which militates against the development of the alternative model
advocated by Edwards and Terry, is the deteriorating market position
of British Coal. Many mines are characterised by demoralisation among
workforce and management and the onset of a 'redundancy culture',
borne of the very real threat of closure hanging over a large part of
BC's production. The are two components to the changing market
position of British Coal, although both arise from the recent
privatisation of the electricity supply industry and the concern of the
privatised utilities to increase their imports of coal. These are
described below, although amidst the gloom there are some rays of
hope.
The newly privatised electricity utilities, National Power and Powergen,
are committed to the expansion of imports principally on grounds of
costs. According to a report prepared for the Coalfield Communities
Campaign only about half of BC's pits can compare on price terms with
foreign competition. The report suggests a worst case scenario of
imports of 43mtpa which would mean a loss of 47,000 jobs and £1.5b
increase in UK imports. The most immediate threat is to the traditional
markets of the North East coalfield, the Thameside power stations (see
Chapter Five). A further threat comes from the generators' decision to
purchase low-sulphur coal - in order to meet new EC emission
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guidelines - despite the fact that Britain is a world leader in clean coal
technology.
If there are powerful economic and ecological arguments for retaining a
domestic coal industry, there are also a few rays of hope for BC.
Those that do exist include: potential action by the European
Commission over imports and subsidies; the future activities of a
non-Conservative government which, in part, will be determined by the
actions of the Commission and; the possible expansion of small scale
power generation by local authorities in coal producing areas.
A possible EC ruling against dumping of non-Community coal in Europe
and the Commission's reported desire to create an intra-Community
energy market in order to guarantee security of supply might allow an
incoming non-Conservative government some room for manoeuvre to
protect remaining mining jobs. The argument that subsidies are
necessary to protect the remaining mining capacity - and that this end
is desirable - is widely held and was recently advanced by the
Conservative-dominated House of Commons Energy Committee. In a
recent report they argued that the short term interests of the new
generating companies should not be allowed to threaten the future of
UK reserves and and long-term interest of electricity consumers
(Financial Times, 18.7.91).
Even in the event of these developments transpiring the North East's
southern markets remain vulnerable (see Chapter Five). Here again,
though, there is some hope centred on the creation of a Tyneside
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Energy Park at Howdon. This plan is for an environmentally dedicated
business park, the centre-piece of which would be a combined heat and
power station and district heating network. Initially, a gas-fired power
station was proposed for the site, but recognition of likely prices rises
and an appreciation of the potential of clean coal technology led the
development consortium (the leading player in which is North Tyneside
Council) to opt for a coal-fired power station. Research by the NUM
suggested that given the site location was 3 miles from Westoe colliery
in South Shields, a coal water mixture could be pumped along a pipeline
to the proposed CHP station. The regionally indigenous source of fuel
and the projected life of the colliery (35 years) would ensure security
of supply and low transport and handling costs. Anticipated fuel
preparation costs would be low, as run-of-mine shearer smalls could be
mixed with washery froth flotation fines, much of which currently is
dumped in the North Sea. The proposed business park is intended to
be a example of good practice in energy efficiency and general
environmental management.
Electricity from the plant would be distributed through the grid to
regional users, while twastet heat would be used to provide process
heat for industrial users on the site and district heating for nearby
communities, many of which are characterised by high levels of social
deprivation. Bed wastes and ash would be used by a materials
construction plant on the same site. The proposal amounts to an
energy-led economic regeneration project fuelled by an indigenous
resource which would assist the North East to become energy
self-sufficient. Instead of supplying southern power stations, jobs
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would be secured by the creation of a regional energy market. The
NUM argues that, unwittingly, the government's regulatory framework
for electricity privatisation has opened up a space and created an
incentive for local authorities to become electricity generators and in
the process recapture parts of energy production for the public sector.
The idea is for a local authority led energy utility which might include
the NUM branch on its management body and investment from the
rvlineworkers Pension Fund. In short, it is a practical expression of the
type of strategy advocated by Edwards and Terry.
The example of the proposed municipal power station (and its possible
successor) is a small one, but it illustrates arguments of wider
significance. It shows that an alternative model of industrial
development could exist in Britain and illustrates the severe limits of
the present strategy based on the unilateral assertion of management
control. An alternative model would recognise and build on the positive
contribution which workers can make by virtue of their knowledge and
experience. In the particular case outlined above it is the NUM itself
which has actively sought out the potential market and developed the
outlines of the production system necessary to meet its needs - in
effect doing the job of BC's marketing department. In this case the
autonomous activities of • the union, far from acting as break on the
prerogatives of management, may actually prove to be the saviour of
the pit. In the process it might also have revealed how a different
type of post-Fordism might emerge, in which the positive contribution
of workers to meet pressing needs in their communities, is genuinely
acknowledged.
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APPENDIX ONE
METHOD
1. INTRODUCTION
In a letter to his friend Sir Richard Rees, some forty years
ago, George Orwell mused on this curious British obsession
with lack of bias or objectivity as an asset in politics or
journalism. He wrote that pretty well anyone who writes
anything about current affairs is almost certain to be biased
in one direction or another. The way to deal with this was
not, he said, to try to cut out opinions or bias, but to admit
them. Those who were frank about where they stood on the
whole wrote more honestly and informatively than those who
pretended to be objective when in truth they were not
objective at all. The real credibility test, it seems to me, is
not in the political bias of a story, but in the accuracy and
sweep of the information it conveys.
(Paul Foot, Words as Weapons, p91).
The aim of this appendix is to outline the process by which the
research reported in this thesis was conducted and to describe some of
the problems encountered. The discussion commences by outlining the
constraints which are placed on a study such as this by the current
form of doctoral training and the system of funding of doctoral work.
Such constraints have a strong bearing on the nature and quality of
contemporary doctoral work yet are rarely discussed openly in
methodological appendices. I attempt to show that the character of this
thesis and the research on which it is based were affected significantly
by the existence of these constraints. I argue that there were
particular problems involved in conducting research into work-related
issues in the coal industry in the late 1980s. This meant that the
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classic studies conducted in the industry in the 1950s and 1960s
provided few clues as to how to proceed in the conduct of fieldwork.
Some problems of conducting research in the coal industry in the
post-strike period are outlined and the means by which I attempted to
overcome these. The appendix explains the choice of the North East
and Selby as case-studies. Finally, I outline the actual conduct of the
case-studies. It is not my intention in this appendix to contribute to
great issues of method, but rather to offer an account of the conduct
of the research.
2. LIMITS TO DOCTORAL RESEARCH
The doctoral research on which this thesis is based was funded for
three years through a studentship from Economic and Social Research
Council's (ESRC) Programme on Information and Communications
Technology (PICT). I received funding for three years, six months of
which was a taught course reflecting the ESRC's new found concern
with formal research training, through Centre for Urban and Regional
Development Studies' Doctoral Programme on the Social and Economic
Impact of Information and Communications Technologies.
Under the present funding system, PhD students are given three years
grant, but four years in which to complete their thesis before the host
department is penalised under the ESRC's rules on completion rates.
Although the ESRC appears to work on the assumption that doctoral
research will take four years to complete, it offers no suggestions as to
how the inevitable funding gap implied by this system, be filled. In
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addition, the growing importance attached to research training tends to
mean that the three year period for research is significantly reduced.
The fourth year tends to become an integral part of the doctoral study
period, yet for many students all or part of this period is experienced
as one of acute financial difficulties .
The level of research funding is a further problem. The level of
postgraduate grant is little incentive to undertake doctoral work,
especially for students are not the stereotypical 21 year old with few
financial commitments. Perhaps the low level of grant is designed to
act as stimulus to early completion, although in practice it serves to
exacerbate overall financial difficulties of doing doctoral work. In
addition to the inadequate level of grant another real constraint on the
research was the financial resources provided by the ESRC for
fieldwork (and conference attendance) purposes, which amounted to
£300 per annum. In practice, like most PhD students I know, I have in
effect subsidised the ESRC by not re-claiming the full cost of fieldwork
expenses.
The funding system also gives rise to important time constraints.
Firstly, there is an effective limit of four years on ESRC funded PhDs
a pressure felt keenly by departments and transmitted to their
students. While in the past there was, in effect, no time limit on the
The Winfield Report on the future of the social science PhD argued
in 1987 that, where doctoral progranimes have been approved, the ESRC
should provide four years of funding for students (Winfield, 1987: 129).
Such a system has yet to instituted.
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completion of PhDs, now this is not the case, and this has had an
bearing on the nature of this study. For instance I intended to
conduct a greater number of case studies. I abandoned this idea due
to time considerations (and for financial reasons). The research design
of this study was crucially influenced by a desire to be as near to
completion as possible by the end of the third year of funding.
These time constraints and financial factors placed limits on the
research. Within these constraints some fairly clear calculations had to
be made about what could be achieved. There are a series of
inconsistencies in funding which cloud the expectations surrounding
contemporary doctoral work.' Although this is the context for much
doctoral work in the social sciences it is rare to see it discussed openly
in methodological sections of theses. My reason for raising these
concerns here is that current PhD funding places constraints on what
can be achieved and that these need to be recognised, not least by the
ESRC.
3. CHOICE OF CASE STUDIES
In particular the time-based and financial constraints outlined above
placed limits on choice of case-studies. My aim was to contrast change
in capital intensive mines with more labour intensive ones. Given this
broad concern I originally proposed to compare mines in several
coalfields but was forced to abandon this approach for the reasons just
outlined. In the end I elected to compare the North East and Selby.
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The North East was an obvious choice as a case study of an
under-capitalised coalfield. First, it was on my doorstep. This meant
it was convenient and, importantly, was cheap to research (see section
2). In addition, the North East is my home region and I knew
something about its history which, to a large degree, is the history of
coalmining. It was easy for me to establish contacts in the industry,
which speeded up the process of acdimatisation.
I elected to contrast the North East with Selby. Selby represented the
culmination of the trajectory of technical change established in the 1970s
and seemed an appropriate selection given the contrast I was seeking to
draw. Practical considerations cemented the choice of Selby. Firstly,
it is the next nearest coalfield to the North East. This meant that it
was possible to get to Selby and back in a day comfortably, allowing
the possibility of saving fieldwork expenses. In addition Jonathan
Winterton of Bradford University, who had carried out research and
written widely on the Yorkshire coalfield, was interested in
developments in Selby and proposed some joint interviews with miners.
Winterton had extensive contacts among union branches in Yorkshire
and the proposal of joint interviews was attractive in that it saved the
time consuming process of establishing my own contacts. Some of the
interview material on which Chapter Six is partly based is derived from
these interviews2.
21 had intended to compare the automation in coalmining at Selby,
with technical change at other capital intensive, but older mines, I
abandoned this idea. The process of establishing contacts at Selby was
(Footnote Continued)
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4. RESEARCH IN COAL: THE CLASSIC STUDIES
In approaching the question of how to conduct these case studies I
consulted the classic studies of work in the coal industry. However, I
quickly concluded that none of the approaches adopted in the famous
studies of the coal industry conducted during the early period of
nationalisation seemed feasible in the context of the 1980s and within
the constraints under which my research was conducted.
The first of these studies (eg. Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Trist et al,
1963) examined the impact of technical change on work in the coal
industry in the 1950s for the Tavistock Institute. The study was
conducted over 10 years largely at one, anonymous pit in north west
Durham (later identified as Chopwell) with follow up studies in the
1960s. In part, these studies were conducted for the NCB and, in the
heyday of nationalisation, involved the research team observing miners'
work. Although of much interest because of its findings, the scale of
this research, the time frame in which it was conducted and the
extensive personnel resources on which it was based meant that it
provided few ideas of how to conduct research in more constrained
circumstances. In addition, the type of cooperation from management
and labour upon which its was founded, were unlikely to be reproduced
(Footnote Continued)
slow and I had no reason to believe it would not be the same or worse
elsewhere. In fact I did intend to contrast Selby with mines in
Nottingham where the TJDN was the majority union. Although this contrast
would have helped to highlight the uneven pace of change, the problems
of organising this case study would have been great.
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in the late 1980s (see below). This type of study was out of the
question in the 1980s (cf. Campbell's [1985] attempt to 'update' the
work of Trist et al).
The classical 'anthropological' study of 'Ashton' (later identified as
Featherstone) conducted by Dennis et al (1955) in the 1950s involved
one of the researchers actually being employed as a miner for a period
and living in the community he was studying. This study remains in
many ways unrivalled and generated a rich knowledge of one pit and its
community. The study, however, was conducted over several years
and in a period when it was possible for a social scientist to be
employed at a pit as a data! hand and to be a regular participant at
union meetings. Again, there was little chance of replicating this
research strategy.
Kreiger's (1983) study of changing wages systems in the coal industry,
conducted in the mid-1970s, offered a more likely template for the
conduct of my case studies. Krieger examined the impact of the
introduction of the NPLA through a comparison of five named pits in
Durham and Nottinghamshire. In this study, the author appeared to
spend one day in each colliery conducting interviews with key actors in
management and Lodge or, branch officials, in an attempt to grasp their
particular 'anthropologies'. In addition, Krieger was allowed unlimited
access to the relevant files at pit level and nationally. Although this
approach was the one I was most likely to emulate, by no means would
it be possible to adopt this approach unproblematically in the late
1980s. In particular, the level of joint cooperation from management
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and labour was unlikely to be forthcoming in the charged post-strike
atmosphere.
The nature of studies just outlined owed much to the political climate of
the period in which they were conducted. In the heyday of the
nationalisation period it appears there was an atmosphere which
appeared to be conducive to these studies. On the one hand, the
adoption of a 'productionist' and increasingly 'scientific' outlook by
management, it appears, made them open to the investigations of social
scientists. On the other hand, unions also appear to have accepted
willingly the presence of researchers underground. However, certainly
by the late 1960s, this situation was beginning to change. When
researchers from the Tavistock Institute carried out a study in the
Yorkshire coalfield in 1969/70 they found that the climate of industrial
relations and the mechanised mining process itself precluded the
possibility of extensive underground observation of the type they had
used in Durham in the 1950s (Murray and Spink, 1979). Similarly,
when Edwards and Heery (1989) studied the introduction of incentives
in the late 1970s, although they secured extensive cooperation from
management, they found themselves excluded from pits in Yorkshire.
Given the limits on the study it was pointless attempting to emulate the
large scale studies of the 1950s and 1960s because I lacked the
resources (eg. armies of research assistants) and because circumstances
had changed (the period of relative union-management consensus
characteristic of much of the post-war period had disintegrated).
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Similarly, for technical and political reasons the type of research
pioneered in the post-war period would be inappropriate
5. RESEARCH IN COAL IN THE 1980s
In their study of restructuring at Cadbury's, Smith et a! (1990)
describe how they secured total cooperation of management. As a
consequence they were able to construct a real history of organisational
change rather than invent a 'semi-fictional 'choc co •' whose disguised
identity would immediately limit the interpretation and quality of the
research findings' (xv). They argue that management cooperation in
the research enterprise improves the quality of research as social
scientists do not have to guard against every comment or internalise
self-censorship in order to secure access necessary to produce critical
empirical analysis of real experience of organisational change and
transition. The alternative, they argue, is to obtain data which cannot
be used:
Such data, and therefore the research which relies on them,
can make no useful contribution to knowledge, and social
scientists are fooling themselves by agreeing to such
stringent controls on their action in exchange for access
(Smith et a!, 1990: xv).
This may or may not be true, but raises the question of how to proceed
with research in organisations without the sanction of management in
the context of the 1980s. Informal contacts with coal industry experts
and with managers made it clear that I could expect only limited forms
of cooperation from management, who would have little time and would
be suspicious about any research in the field of labour relations. On
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the other hand, management positions, at a general level, were set out
clearly in the engineering literature in the late 1980s.
Doctoral studies of the coal industry conducted during the 1980s
highlighted the difficulties even further. Campbell's (1985) study, in
inspiration at least, is concerned with the introduction of information
technology in the coal industry and its impact on industrial relations.
Campbell reports that he began his study with the intention of
'updating' the 10 year Tavistock Institute study (Trist et al, 1963)
described in section 4, in the light of the introduction of systems such
as MINOS. However, the industrial relations aspects of the study
proved too controversial to secure the cooperation of the NCB which
would have been necessary to implement the underground observation of
face work, especially following the publication of the Bradford Group's
original study (Burns et a!, 1985) and the onset of the miners' strike.
Campbell instead turned his attention to the impact of monitoring
technologies on the work of deputies, hoping to test the thesis that
microelectronics was eliminating supervisory work (see Campbell, 1985:
chapter 4). This idea was also rejected by management because
NACODS might fear it was an exercise in method study. Eventually,
Campbell reports that he settled for a study of the changing relations
between management departments in the light of technical change. This
final study is a long way from the originally proposed one, and serves
to highlight some of the political difficulties of conducting research in
the coal industry3.
31n fact Campbell's study reveals the difficulty in securing
(Footnote Continued)
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An alternative approach was that of Renouf (1990). Renouf's main
concern is with the role of union branches in the crisis of the coal
industry in the 1980s through a study of conflicts at Murton colliery in
County Durham. Renouf's study is an almost anthropological one based
on long term contact with past and present key actors in the union
branches. This approach was supplemented by a few approaches to
management. Using this approach Renouf was able to construct an
impressively detailed account of change at Murton. Renouf's decision to
approach his research question through the experience of the union
side reflected also his political sympathies, but was born mainly of a
recognition that in the context of the post-strike period it was
necessary to choose a 'principal route' into the industry (a recognition
shared, in a way, by Campbell).
In this light, I elected to pursue a strategy whereby my 'principle
route' into the coal industry would be through the union side. This
was necessary given my interest in questions of work and class
conflict. My 'picture' of the nature of change and prevailing balance of
forces between management and labour at particular collieries is
therefore influenced by this choice. I assumed that I would have only
limited opportunities to speak to pit-level management and for this
reason my approaches to management would be sparing.
(Footnote Continued)
management cooperation for a study of coal with industrial relations
implications. Campbell, by his own account, seemed more concerned with
securing management cooperation than with substantive questions.
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6. THE CONDUCT OF THE CASE STUDIES
My initial understanding of events in the North East and Selby was
drawn therefore from contacts with union officials. Later I approached
management with specific sets of questions which arose both from the
review of the engineering, historical and other literature and the
preliminary discussions with union officials at pit level. This allowed
me to minimise my demands on management time, which increased the
chances of cooperation and reduced the chances of this aspect of the
research being scuppered by my discussions with the unions being
exposed.
The statistical data which form part of the case studies had various
origins. Discussions with management produced only limited forms of
data. In the case of the North East my major source of statistical data
proved to be the NUM and NACODS who made available Area level
production data which the union obtained from Area consultative
committees.	 Part of this included detailed technical data for
1981/2-1987/8. These form the basis of some of the figures in Chapter
Five. Unfortunately, this data series was discontinued after this date.
The provision of this data was completely fortuitous and reflected an
act of goodwill on the part of NUM area officials. It stands, perhaps,
as a testament to the role of luck in academic research.
Paradoxically, obtaining statistical data on the performance of Selby
proved less difficult. It might be assumed that with such a new
production facility it might prove difficult to obtain detailed
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quantification of its performance. This was not the case. This is
explained by at least two facts. Firstly, the performance of the Selby
complex has been covered regularly in the press and in the engineering
literature. In the course of these articles much interesting data has
been produced some of which is discussed in Chapter Six. In addition,
management plans and aspirations are spelled out in detail in the
publications used by management in their extensive direct
communications effort. For instance, one of these publications,
'Gascoigne Wood News and Views', provides regular information on the
running times of the main coal clearance systems, data reproduced in
Chapter Six. Also, management's hopes for autosteering, ATS, and so
on were covered in detail in these internal publications.4
The source of more qualitative evidence on the pattern of change came
from discussions with key actors at Area and pit level. In the North
East case, two in-depth studies of change at Westoe and Wearmouth pits
were conducted. The discussions at pit level were conducted with
branch officials (the equivalent of shop stewards) and management.
This means that the data has an 'activist' bias. However, within this
bias a range of opinions were offered. In each case, in addition to
discussions with DMA and DCMA branch officials, discussions took place
with NACODS officials and, in the case of Wearmouth, discussions were
41n addition, I received some data privately which while extremely
useful and which informed the background discussions in Chapter Six,
unfortunately I was unable to use because they were supplied on a
confidential basis. For instance, I received data on a private basis
from CIS-VAX monitoring from a member of management which although
confirming some of my hypotheses I was unable to use directly.
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held with officials of the UDM, who offered a distinctive perspective on
the nature of change at the pit. The discussions with a range of key
actors at the two case-study pits were supplemented by less systematic
discussion with key actors at other pits, in order to situate Westoe and
Wearmouth in the context of the North East, and in order to allow me to
make generalisations about the coalfield as a whole.
In the case of Wearmouth and Westoe, valuable data was obtained from
presentations given by the respective colliery managers to the North of
England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers at Newcastle,
which I attended. This forum proved a valuable means to gauge
management opinion in the coalfield more generally. Data from papers
presented at the Institute are included in Chapter Four. I also paid an
underground visit to Westoe colliery which lasted for one morning.
Although this was wholly inadequate as an experience on which to base
anything but the most superficial generalisations about technology and
mining systems, the discussions held with junior management and face
supervisors in their work situations that day proved highly
illuminating. (Attempts to secure an underground visit at Wearmouth
proved unsuccessful). The main advantage of the visit was to allow me
to make a general comparison between a North East pit and the Selby
complex.
At Selby I made separate underground visits to both Riccall and
Stillingfleet. The first at the beginning of the research and the second
near the end. Although such visits provide only a snapshot picture,
they did serve to contrast the large scale and the newness of Selby
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with the more antiquated feel of the North East. At Selby contacts
with management were more limited than in the North East - there was
no local equivalent of the Institute of Mining Engineers - and were
limited to one-off discussions. However, Selby Group management did
provide specially some useful data which is included in Chapter Six,
along with data derived from engineering and other sources. In the
Selby case the more limited contact with management was more than
compensated for by the extensive coverage of the mine's development in
the engineering literature and through a review of internal
communication literature.
Contact with the Selby unions was facilitated initially through Jonathan
Winterton of Bradford University. In addition, discussions were held
with miners from the complex who attended the Leeds University day
release course. Subsequently discussions were conducted with branch
officials on a series of day visits to Selby. The absence of separate
unions for miners and craftworkers in Yorkshire, meant that particular
care was taken to include the views of all grades. In the case of the
North East and Selby much information was gleaned in highly informal
situations (usually pubs). While such information was invaluable and
helped to inform the background to reports of the case studies in
Chapters Five and Six, the extended quotes in the text come only from
taped interviews with key actors (some thirty individuals in all) -
unless otherwise stated.
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